



**This electronic thesis or dissertation has been
downloaded from Explore Bristol Research,
<http://research-information.bristol.ac.uk>**

Author:

Zavos, John

Title:

**Sangathan : the pursuit of a Hindu ideal in Colonial India; the idea of organisation in
the emergence of Hindu nationalism 1870-1930.**

General rights

Access to the thesis is subject to the Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International Public License. A copy of this may be found at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode> This license sets out your rights and the restrictions that apply to your access to the thesis so it is important you read this before proceeding.

Take down policy

Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to having it been deposited in Explore Bristol Research. However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you consider to be unlawful e.g. breaches of copyright (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please contact collections-metadata@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:

- Your contact details
- Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
- An outline nature of the complaint

Your claim will be investigated and, where appropriate, the item in question will be removed from public view as soon as possible.

***Sangathan:* The Pursuit of a Hindu Ideal in
Colonial India**

**The Idea of Organisation in the Emergence of Hindu
Nationalism 1870 - 1930**

John Zavos

A thesis submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements of
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts

Department of Theology and Religious Studies
September 1997

Abstract

Sangathan, or organisation, has emerged as a central idea in Hindu nationalist ideology. This thesis examines the development of this idea, culminating in its concrete expression in the nineteen twenties as the *sangathan* movement. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Hinduism was the subject of a constant dialogue between individuals and groups seeking to define and codify - or organise - the religion in the context of colonial control. I argue that this dialogue forms the context for the movement of the twenties, and further that it constitutes the means through which the ideology of Hindu nationalism itself was initially produced.

Organisation is examined on two inter-related levels: first, on the level of political mobilisation - the way in which Hinduism became organised as a political force; and secondly, on the level of religious ideology - the way in which organisation came to be articulated as an ideal to which Hindus could legitimately aspire. On both levels, the protagonists were forced to confront the question of what constitutes Hinduism: what were its defining characteristics, and where were its boundaries located. Because of this over-arching question, the two levels developed together, producing a series of approaches to the organisation of Hinduism, propagated by various groups claiming to represent the interests of Hindus in the arena of colonial politics. The thesis examines the following groups as progressive examples of the various approaches: the Arya Samaj; the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal; the cow protection movement of the early eighteen nineties; the *shuddhi* movement; the Hindu Sabha movement; the Hindu Mahasabha and the *sangathan* movement; and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.

A significant feature of this research is its focus on middle class ideological development. Through a Gramscian interpretation of the state, it recognises the importance of the middle class as strategically placed in the domain of hegemonic politics, close to the focal points of power. On this basis, middle class ideologies are examined as critical to the development of political discourse in India. In particular, the study focuses on the competing ideologies of Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism as elaborated by this class, and demonstrates a fresh interpretation of the relationship between these ideologies.

Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to all those who have given me advice and encouragement in the course of this project. In its early phase, I received valuable help in ordering my thoughts and drawing out ideas from Partha Mitter, Bruce Graham, Sudipta Kaviraj, Rohit Barot and Thomas Hansen. I would like to thank all these for their time and interest. Later, I benefited particularly from the thoughtful comments of Christophe Jaffrelot on the direction and content of my work. These comments supplemented the inspiration I gained from Christophe's own work on Hindu nationalism and other matters, particularly his important book, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India* (Viking Penguin India, Delhi, 1996). Christophe also gave me some valuable leads for my study trips to India, for which I am again most grateful.

Whilst in India, I benefited once more from the vibrant intellectual atmosphere of the Centre for Historical Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. I am indebted particularly to Mridula and Aditya Mukherjee, and to Bipan Chandra, for all their help and kindness, as well as their trenchant comments on my work. I would also like to thank Achin Vanaik for sharing his thoughts with me on the nature of communalism and religious nationalism.

My approach to these and other issues was examined in fearful detail during long discussions with Eddie and Niva Rodrigues in Bombay. I am amazed at their persistent ability to get to the heart of the matter, as well as their capacity to remain intellectually lively even in the smallest hours of the morning, and after one of Niva's spectacular feasts. All thanks is due to them for making my time in Bombay so enjoyable, and so critical in terms of the overall direction of the thesis. Thanks is also due to Jitendra Nath, who helped me in so many ways whilst I was in Delhi, and whose indomitable sense of hospitality I will always cherish.

I am most grateful to Mohan Kadu for his help in translations from Marathi, and his ability to "go with the flow" whilst at Hedgewar Bhavan in Nagpur. I also thank Ramkrishna Pralhad Deo and Shrikant Joshi of the RSS for their assistance and kindness whilst I was in Nagpur, as well as all the *swayamsevaks* who agreed to talk to me about their early years in the Sangh. Many thanks also to Gita Saberwal, Deputy Director of the Archaeology, Archives and Museums Department in Bhopal: a sane voice in a mad world.

In Bristol I have been guided by Professor Ursula King. I thank her for all her work on this project - particularly her persistent ability to inject much needed rigour - and for the many kindnesses she has shown me along the way. I have also been ably advised at Bristol by Dr. Vernon Hewitt in the Department of Politics. His valuable comments have often given me the confidence to proceed, and his consistent willingness to go through my work has been nothing short of heroic.

I am most grateful to the Humanities Research Board of the British Academy for funding the bulk of my research period, as well as a study trip to India. In addition, I must thank the University of Bristol for funding the first year of my research, and the Spalding Trust for funding a much needed second trip to gather data in India.

Lastly I must thank my family for supporting me, making me laugh, understanding the need for time and all the other complexities and needs of the eternal student. More than anything else, they have never failed to put the whole project in a real perspective. Thanks then to Niki, Callum and (latterly) Isla, but especially to Christina. Because we have lived it together, I dedicate this work to you.

Author's Declaration

I certify that this thesis is my own work. I also confirm that the views expressed within the dissertation are my own and not those of the University.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John Zurek", followed by a period. The signature is fluid and cursive.

Contents

1.	Introduction	1
1.1	Objectives and Limitations	3
1.2	Methodology and Sources	7
1.3	Plan of Presentation	11
2.	Key Concepts and Significant Literature in the Study of Hindu Nationalism	14
2.1	Ideology, Class Interest and Cultural Identity	14
2.2	Hegemony and the Colonial State	18
2.3	Nationalism and Communalism	27
2.4	The Hindu Religion in Colonial India	34
2.5	Organisation and <i>Sangathan</i>	41
2.6	Summary of Discussion	44
3.	The State and the Hindu Religion in the Nineteenth Century	46
3.1	The Organisation of the State and the Disorganisation of Society	48
3.1.1	Hegemonic Cornerstones as Images of Organisation	48
3.1.2	Disorganisation and the Duality of Hinduism	53
3.2	The Pressure to Organise	57
3.2.1	1858: Developing the Colonial Discourse of Organisation	57
3.2.2	Pressures on the Structure of Hinduism in the Public Space	61
3.3	Establishing Patterns of Organisation: Hindu Movements in the Late Nineteenth Century	69
3.3.1	Reformism: The Transformative Structure of the Arya Samaj	70
3.3.2	Orthodoxy: Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal	77
3.3.3	Defining Approaches to the Organisation of Hinduism	81
3.4	Summary of Discussion	84
4.	Indian Nationalism and Representations of Hinduism towards the End of the Nineteenth Century	87
4.1	The Development of Nationalist Organisation	87
4.1.1	Early Indian Nationalism and the State	88
4.1.2	Beginnings of Mass Mobilisation as Nationalist Strategy: B.G. Tilak and the Search for Contact in the 1890s	90

4.2	Undermining Hindu Organisation in the Public Space	93
4.2.1	The Census and the Taxonomy of Hinduism	93
4.2.2	A Challenge to Middle Class Pretensions	97
4.3	Practising the Organisation of Hinduism	102
4.3.1	Cow Protection as Horizontal Organisation	102
4.3.2	<i>Shuddhi</i> as Vertical Organisation	109
4.4	Summary of Discussion	114
5.	Imagining the Constituency of Hindus in the Early Twentieth Century	117
5.1	The Dynamism of Indian Nationalism	118
5.1.1	Tilak and Nationalist Strategies of Confrontation	118
5.1.2	The Battlefield of Representation: Extremists, Moderates and Constitutional Reform	122
5.2	Caste and the Census: the Development of Hindu Consciousness in the Public Space	126
5.2.1	The Gait Circular	126
5.2.2	The Dying Race Theory	128
5.3	The Hindu Sabha Movement: Organisation as Paramount Objective	131
5.3.1	Beginnings of the Movement: the Hindu Sahaik Sabhas	132
5.3.2	"Self Abnegation": Defining the Structure of Hindu Politics	134
5.3.3	The 1909 Hindu Conference: Establishing the Paramount Objective	137
5.4	Summary of Discussion	142
6.	Contextualising Hindu Nationalism: The Development of Political Discourse in the Post-War Years	146
6.1	Towards a New Discourse of Organisation	149
6.1.1	<i>Satyagraha</i> as a Framework for Nationalist Strategy	150
6.1.2	Mediating <i>Satyagraha</i> : Nationalist Organisation and the Volunteer Concept	154
6.1.3	Institutionalising Nationalist Strategy as Political Expression	159
6.2	Situating "Others": Hindu Identity and Communal Consciousness in the Early Twenties	164
6.2.1	"Stigmatising and Emulating Threatening Others"	166
6.2.2	Representing The Moplah Rebellion	169
6.2.3	Music Before Mosques as Hindu Self-Assertion	172
6.2.4	Hindu Organisation and Low Caste Mobilisation	176
6.3	Summary of Discussion	182

7.	Organisation and the Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Twenties	184
7.1	The Organisation of Hindu Nationalism I: the Hindu Mahasabha	185
7.1.1	Swami Shraddhanand and the Articulation of <i>Sangathan</i>	187
7.1.2	<i>Shuddhi</i> , <i>Sangathan</i> and the Triumph of Horizontal Organisation	191
6.3.3	V.D. Savarkar and the Articulation of <i>Hindutva</i>	197
7.2	The Organisation of Hindu Nationalism II: the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh	204
7.2.1	Early History of the RSS: the Pattern of Expansion	204
7.2.2	Organisational Models	210
7.2.3	<i>Sangathan</i> in RSS Ideology: Conceptualising Hinduism and Hindu Society	216
7.3	Reviewing Approaches to the Organisation of Hinduism	221
7.3	Summary of Discussion	223
8.	Conclusion	225
8.1	Reviewing Objectives	226
8.2	Implications	231
	Glossary of Indian Terms	239
	Bibliography	242

Chapter One

Introduction

During the colonial period in India, certain ideas emerged as central to the construction of modern Hindu identities. In the nineteenth century particularly, middle class intellectuals interested in social and political issues developed a set of ideas which have emerged as extremely influential and resonant factors in the formation of these identities. I am thinking particularly of notions such as the "Golden Age" of Vedic Hinduism, the Aryan race as the fundamental force that generated Hindu culture, the slow disintegration and eventual stagnation of that culture during the medieval period, and the related notions of forced conversion to Islam and destruction of Hindu temples as the defining events of that particular period. These ideas contributed a great deal to analyses of the predicament of India both as a subjugated land and as a force in the development of the modern world; as a result they were also influential in informing perceptions of what it meant to be a Hindu in this context. In this thesis I will examine the emergence during the nineteenth and early twentieth century of one influential idea in the construction of modern Hindu identities. This is the idea of *sangathan*, or organisation.

Sangathan has been a particularly significant idea in the development of Hindu nationalist thought. It is also perceived as an important ideological link between Hindu nationalism and the entrenchment of communalism in Indian political discourse. The 1920s are recognised as the defining period for this entrenchment, and *sangathan* was a dominant theme for Hindu organisations and the Hindu press at this time. Every act of violence was followed by a call for Hindus to become organised, to display the 'organic' unity which was projected as characterising the Muslim community. In particular, the idea was expressed as a movement: a concerted attempt, orchestrated by the Hindu Mahasabha, to consolidate Hinduism, to increase its effectiveness as a distinct social and political force, by invoking *sangathan* as an ideal.

In contemporary Hindu nationalist ideology, *sangathan* is still a central notion. It is often expressed as the objective of Hindu nationalism; the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in particular projects itself as a model organisation for the realised Hindu *rashtra*, or nation. It has also been identified as a strategy of political mobilisation which has

long been implemented by Hindu nationalist organisations in electoral politics.¹ This strategy has placed emphasis on the development and maintenance of a network of activists "capable of working locally in depth in order to inculcate Hindu nationalist ideals in the minds of the largest number of people".²

Sangathan, then, appears as an enduring and deep-seated idea in Hindu nationalism. This thesis analyses the development of the idea, culminating in its concrete expression in the 1920s. It examines how, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Hinduism was subjected to a constant examination by individuals and groups seeking to define and codify the religion as a prerequisite for its ascendance (if not its survival) in the modern world. This process of examination forms the context for the movement of the twenties, and in many ways constitutes the means through which Hindu nationalism itself was produced. It will be illustrated that the image of a threatening and unified Islam, so dominant during this decade of communal violence, was the latest of a long line of images and pressures that stimulated Hindus to examine the "shape" of their religion, the way in which it presented itself within the rapidly changing context of colonialism. The *sangathan* of the title, therefore, is not confined to a narrow focus on the movement of the twenties; it rather encompasses the whole idea of an organised Hinduism - how it emerged as a central issue for Hindu elites within the colonial *milieu*, and what debates informed its development as a seminal idea in the emergence of Hindu nationalism.

I have arrived at this particular focus after much deliberation as to how to approach the problem of militant Hinduism as a feature of modern Indian political history. As a student of the national movement in India, I have previously concentrated on the development of nationalist ideologies in the period prior to Gandhi's assumption of the leadership of Congress.³ Inevitably, the study of ideology in Indian nationalism meant acknowledging the presence of so-called communal ideologies in Indian politics and society. Situating these ideologies over the same period, however, has proved to be a veritable minefield in terms of the integration of apparently conflicting positions; it was a period, as Sudipta Kaviraj has put it, in which society was "humming with political narratives".⁴ The focus on *sangathan* is designed to counter the complexity of this scenario by tracing the development of one key theme. It is perhaps not surprising that

¹ See C. Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India* (Viking Penguin India, New Delhi 1996), esp. Chapter 3.

² Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p.135.

³ J. Zavos, "Ideology and Hegemonic Struggle in the Early National Movement: Some Case Studies" (Unpublished M.Phil Dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 1987)

⁴ S. Kaviraj, "The Imaginary Institution of India" (in *Subaltern Studies VII*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992, pp. 1-39), p. 3.

this theme was important not only in terms of Hindu nationalism, but also of a variety of these "humming" political narratives. In this sense, then, the focus on organisation has provided a means of understanding how ideologies related to one another in this critical period of colonial history.

1.1 Objectives and Limitations

A recent study of the Hindu Right in contemporary India has commented:

Within the whole corpus of explanations for communalism, there has been little work on it as an ideological formation - that is, not just a set of ideas, but the elaboration of organisational structures that embody and spread these in effective ways.⁵

This thesis aims to address this problem by examining the processes through which the ideology of Hindu nationalism was formulated, and in particular by examining its relationship to the concept of organisation: in terms of both ideas and material structures.

Over recent years, the historical analysis of communalism as a feature of Indian politics has benefited from research which has placed it in an expanded framework of interpretation. There has been a shift away from the examination of communal antagonism as an autonomous, self-perpetuating force, and towards the examination of wider social and political pressures and their relationship with forms of identity in India.⁶ One significant result of this has been to liberate the analysis of forms of communalism from the problematic notion that they constitute a reactionary deviation from the development of the Indian nation towards modernity. This notion derives from a particular perception of the status of religion in Indian society, as a signifier of its "naturalness", removed from the hard realities of economic and political progress.⁷

It has been common to hear communalism explained, along with forms of "fundamentalism" in India and other parts of the post-colonial world, as the unfortunate entry of religion - a private concern - into the public world of politics.⁸ This process is

⁵ T. Basu, P. Datta, S. Sarkar, T. Sarkar, S. Sen (hereafter Basu et al), *Khaki Shorts and Saffron Flags: A Critique of the Hindu Right* (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1993), p.5.

⁶ This point is made and illustrated by R. O'Hanlon, "Historical Approaches to Communalism: Perspectives from Western India" (in P. Robb [ed.], *Society and Ideology* (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 247-266), pp. 248-9.

⁷ For an elaboration of this theme, see R. Inden, *Imagining India* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990), esp. Chapter 3, "Hinduism: The Mind of India", pp. 85-130.

⁸ See, for example, S. Das, "Communal Violence in Twentieth Century Bengal: An Analytical Framework" (in K.N. Panikkar [ed.], *Communalism in India*, Manohar, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 34-50), pp. 34-5; A. Nandy, "Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of

seen as a feature of the colonial and post-colonial predicament. It is only in this context that the otherwise tolerant, syncretistic system which is Hinduism deteriorates into an aggressively exclusivist form of identity politics. It is clear now, however, that far from causing a convergence of religion and politics, the initial impact of colonialism was to create a division between these two from about the 1820s onwards. Where pre-colonial rulers had participated in religious ceremonies and incorporated the dynamics of religious identity into state politics as a matter of course, the objective of the colonial state was to present itself as a neutral arbiter, withdrawing from this active role and attempting to draw a line between politics as the concern of the state, and religion as the concern of a depoliticised population. This withdrawal had a whole host of implications, some of which have been considered recently by scholars.⁹ One of these implications was, of course, the creation of a new, "non-religious" political arena in Indian society, in which the parameters of political expression were controlled by the state. This "non-religious" political arena was part of what I will term the public space of colonial India - the space in which the state launched its attempt to gain hegemony over the indigenous population. What will be examined in this thesis is the paradoxical articulation of religion within this arena.

In particular, the thesis traces the development of a particular sense of Hindu identity in this context. I will argue that the state projected a specific image of organisation as a cultural language - a discourse of organisation - in its attempt to exert hegemony. Organisation was expressed here as a discourse of modernity. Ideas about Hinduism which emerged in the public space were subject to the parameters of this discourse. Organisation came to be perceived as an ideal to which the religion should aspire if it was to have meaning within this discourse, and, by association, within the modern world. The key hypothesis of this study is that the ideology of Hindu nationalism was developed on the basis of the pursuit of this ideal.

Of course, ideas about Hinduism were not the only ideas to emerge and be expressed in this space. In particular, it was also a productive and influential arena for the development of Indian nationalism. Considerable space will be given over to the development of these ideas, as a means of clarifying the relationship between two

⁹ Religious Tolerance" (in V. Das [ed.], *Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 69-93), p. 70. See especially S. Freitag, *Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1990); K. Prior, "The British Administration of Hinduism" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Cambridge, 1990); and Prior, "Making History: The State's Intervention in Urban Religious Disputes in the North Western Provinces in the Early Nineteenth Century" (in *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 27, 1993, pp. 179-204).

dominant ideologies of modern Indian politics: the ideologies of Hindu and Indian nationalism.

The objectives of the thesis, then, may be expressed sequentially as follows:

- (i) to examine the historical development of the idea of organisation as a feature of Hindu identity in the late nineteenth/early twentieth century
- (ii) to examine the articulation of this sense of Hindu identity in political organisations and movements over the same period.
- (iii) to provide a critical analysis of the link between the Hindu reform movements and Hindu nationalism.
- (iv) to establish organisation, or *sangathan*, as a defining concept in the ideology of Hindu nationalism.
- (v) to explain the relationship between the ideologies of Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism by examining their historical development in the context of colonialism.

These objectives are framed within certain limitations. Most importantly, this is a thesis about ideologies and identities formed primarily within a middle class context. It is a history of ideas and movements formulated by elites, but not, as I will explain in some depth in Chapter 2, an elitist history. Through a Gramscian interpretation of the state, the thesis emphasises the importance of the middle class as strategically placed in the domain of hegemonic politics, close to the focal points of power. On this basis, middle class ideologies are examined as critical to the development of political discourse in India. This middle class focus, however, does not preclude the importance of other forms of ideology emerging over a similar period of Indian history; it is adopted in the context of recent developments in the historiography of modern India, and it necessarily acknowledges the significance of subaltern movements, and the dynamic flow of ideologies between social blocs.¹⁰

A further limitation emanates from this middle class focus. The study does not concentrate intensely on any one region or city of India. It has a loose focus on Nagpur, the administrative centre of the Central Provinces from 1861, but it does not attempt to provide a micro-study of developments in this city.¹¹ As well as again going

¹⁰ The most significant recent attempts to construct histories of the development of non-elite ideologies that fed into communal conflict are G. Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1990), and Freitag, *Collective Action and Community*.

¹¹ Unlike a recent work which also attempts to examine the development of political ideologies of the elite: D. Haynes, *Rhetoric and Ritual in Colonial India: The Shaping of a Public Culture in Surat City, 1852 - 1928* (Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1991).

somewhat against the grain of recent historiographical trends, this limits the ability of the study to provide a comprehensive environment within which to view locally bound historical developments. Nagpur is of course significant as the city in which one of the principal organisational forms of Hindu nationalism - the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) - was first established. This is particularly interesting, because Nagpur had neither a significant Muslim minority, a history of strong regional identities, nor the presence of an influential elite-based socio-religious reform movement to encourage the development of Hindu nationalist ideas. This suggests the independent entrenchment of middle class ideologies, and it is because of this point that I have determined that the focus on this city should remain loose. Middle class ideologies always had the potential to be cross regional, precisely because of their middle class-ness. Their ramifications were felt across the public space of colonial India, continually intervening in the development of larger, macro-identities. Movements centred on Punjab or Bengal, for example, had a significance across the country. As we shall see, they continually prompted a response from individuals and groups in unrelated areas. The way in which these responses were articulated tells us a great deal about how ideologies and macro-identities were formulated.

Finally, this study is limited chronologically. It concentrates on the period 1870 to 1930. Prior to this, certain organisational forms emerged which were significant articulations of Hinduism in an organised form. In particular, the Brahmo Samaj (formed in 1828) and the Dharma Sabha (formed in 1831) were significant, and they will be referred to briefly in Chapter 3. After 1930, furthermore, *sangathan* continued to be a highly significant feature of Hindu nationalist ideology, and as indicated earlier it remains central to the Hindu nationalist world view. Again, this will be referred to briefly in Chapter 7. The period chosen for this study, however, emphasises the vital processes through which the idea of *sangathan* became entrenched in this key position in relation to Hindu nationalist identity. A good deal of work has examined the development of Hindu nationalism from the nineteen twenties onwards. In particular, Christophe Jaffrelot's important study *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, which examines its development right up until the nineteen nineties, takes 1925, the year in which the RSS was established, as its starting point. What I am interested in is the ideological developments which allowed for the emergence of Hindu nationalism in this form. On what basis did it emerge, even by the nineteen thirties, as a form of identity with enough resonance among middle class Hindus to challenge the idea of individual citizenship, which the Indian National Movement propagated as the basis of national identity? In this sense the purpose of this study is to focus on the complex

ideological developments which make up the "pre-history"¹² of Hindu nationalist identity.

1.2 Methodology and Sources

This study is presented as a history of ideologies. It aims to examine the development of certain ideologies in their historical context. The method of analysis is therefore specifically textual. Written sources are approached as texts, in the sense that:

A text is not a line of words releasing a "theological" meaning (the "message" of the Author-God), but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.¹³

The text, then, forms a "multi-dimensional space" filled with certain patterns of discourse, certain networks of ideology. The navigation of this space and its implicit networks is the principal form of analysis in this study. This approach is taken on the basis of a definition of ideology which gives it a central position in the formation of identities and the production of consciousness.¹⁴ And as Gramsci has stated:

Man is above all else mind, consciousness - that is, he is a product of history, not nature.¹⁵

The historical significance of consciousness, as it is expressed here, is informed by ideology. It is in this sense that I understand Barthes' "variety of writings, none of them original" as the content of a text. Hence it will be towards the development, the history, of certain ideologies, and to the pressures and motivations which affect them, that this study will look - not to individuals as such, their personal or psychological origins.

Although it is grounded in historical method, the framework for this analysis is interdisciplinary. It is undoubtedly a sign of the academic times that secondary material relevant to this thesis spans a good number of disciplines within the social sciences and humanities. In particular, history has become increasingly integrated into social science work. This point is well illustrated by the recent publication of Jaffrelot's *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India* - a comprehensive history written by a political scientist. This of course is no bad thing. On the one hand the contribution of historians and historical analysis to the crucial theoretical debates of social science is essential; the

¹² The phrase refers consciously to Christopher Bayly's significant article "The Pre-history of 'Communalism'? Religious Conflict in India 1700-1800" (in *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 19 No. 2, 1985, pp. 177-203).

¹³ R. Barthes, *Image, Music, Text* (Fontana, London, 1977), p.146.

¹⁴ On ideology and its significance, see Section 2.1.

¹⁵ Gramsci writing in *Il Grido*, 1916; quoted in C. Boggs, *Gramsci's Marxism* (Pluto, London, 1976), p.59.

efficacy of social science theories, after all, are dependent upon their historical legitimation, their assimilation into historical perspectives or world views. On the other hand, history benefits from a closer relationship with social science theory. The processing of societal models provided by the social sciences constructs new frameworks for the interpretation of historical data, investing such data - critically - with new meaning.

In addition, disciplines within the humanities have contributed much to debates over the development and significance of Hindu nationalism in the context of Indian culture and politics.¹⁶ The richness of this work is indicative of the move towards the wider examination of social and political pressures and their impact on forms of identity noted earlier. This thesis situates ideological history within this expanded framework of interpretation. In particular, it draws on academic perspectives within the fields of religious studies and political science to inform historical interpretations of issues which are, after all, concerned with the relationship between religion, culture and politics. This approach will, it is hoped, produce an integrated perspective on the development of Hindu nationalist ideology.

As stated above, the study is focused loosely on Nagpur City, the administrative capital of Central Provinces since its formation in 1861. During the previous eight years, Nagpur was administered as a separate unit by a commission of officers. Before this, it had been ruled by the Bhonsla dynasty, initially as a semi-autonomous wing of the Mahratta empire. The British had maintained a Residency at Nagpur since 1798, and their influence increased markedly after the Battles of Sitabaldi and Nagpur in 1817. They assumed control of the strategic hill of Sitabaldi in the city, and the Resident "superintended and administered every department of the State through officers appointed by himself".¹⁷ As with other areas of the Deccan, British influence in Nagpur was geared increasingly towards the commercialisation of agriculture, in particular the transfer of land to cotton production for the Lancashire market.¹⁸ Nagpur City was to become a centre of this cotton trade. Richard Temple, the first Chief

¹⁶ See, for example, P. Lutgendorf, *The Life of a Text: Performing the Ramcaritmanas of Tulsidas* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991); S. Chandra, *The Oppressive Present: Literature and Social Consciousness in Colonial India*, (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992); P. Mitter, *Art and Nationalism in Colonial India: Occidental Orientations* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994); J.J. Lipner, "On 'Hindutva' and a 'Hindu-Catholic,' with a Moral for our Times" (in *Hindu-Christian Studies Bulletin*, Vol. 5, 1992, pp. 1-8).

¹⁷ *Gazetteer of the Central Provinces* Pt. IV: Munda & Nagpore (Chief Commissioner's Office Press, Nagpur, 1867), p. 252.

¹⁸ See *Gazetteer of the Central Provinces* (1867), p. 268: "Large tracts of land hitherto growing edible grain have been brought under cotton cultivation"; on the commercialisation of Deccan agriculture, see S. Guha, *The Agrarian Economy of the Bombay Deccan 1818-1941* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1985).

Commissioner of Central Provinces described the city in 1862 as "probably one of the most ill-kept and unsightly cities in India".¹⁹ It nevertheless grew rapidly, particularly after the establishment of the rail link from Bombay in 1867. By 1908, Nagpur had developed into the "leading industrial and commercial town of the centre of India".²⁰ The 1872 census recorded the population of the city as 84,441. By 1921 this had risen to 145,193, despite serious plague epidemics around the turn of the century.²¹

As the administrative centre of Central Provinces and Berar, the city also developed a strong middle class. A quarter of the province's graduates lived in Nagpur. This class, and indeed the higher echelons of the education system, was dominated by Maharashtrian Brahmans, a caste with a long intellectual tradition and a history of administrative employment under the Bhonslas.²² Consequently the emerging political leadership in the eighteen nineties and early nineteen hundreds was also drawn from this caste. The politically conscious working class in Nagpur consisted of the untouchable Mahar caste, well represented in the cotton industry, and low caste Hindu and Muslim weavers.²³ The 1921 Census recorded the Muslim population as 11.7%, the Hindu as 81.3%.²⁴ Most Muslims in the city were engaged in industry or trade,²⁵ and there was no marked tension between Hindus and Muslims before the nineteen twenties.²⁶

Source material for this study has been collected both in the U.K. and India. A great deal of evidence has been gathered from newspapers, and provincial government weekly reviews of the regional press. The published writing of various individuals has also been studied in some depth: for example, that of Swami Shraddhanand and V.D. Savarkar, and also a section of the copious writings of M.K. Gandhi. In addition, private papers have assisted in explaining ideological positions; I have used the diary of

-
- 19 "First Report on the Administration of the Central Provinces upto August 1862", paragraph 51; See Temple Papers, MSS Eur F86/61 (India Office Library, London - hereafter IOL).
 - 20 *Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District*, A Volume (R.V. Russell [ed.], Times Press, Bombay, 1908), p. 318.
 - 21 The population fell from 127,731 in 1901 to 101,415 in 1911. See *Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District*, B Volume: Statistical Tables 1891-1927 (Government Press, Nagpur, 1928), pp. 8-9.
 - 22 See D. Baker, *Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province: The Central Provinces and Berar 1919-1939* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1979), p. 20.
 - 23 Baker, *Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province*, p. 17.
 - 24 The Muslim proportion of the population had decreased slightly since 1901, when it was 13.5%. See *Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District*, B Volume, pp. 8-9.
 - 25 See *Census of India 1921* Vol. XI, Central Provinces and Berar, Pt. 2: Tables (Superintendent Government Printing, Calcutta, 1912), pp. 337-346. Out of a population of 16,988, the number of Muslims in industry was 4843 (mostly in cotton ginning and weaving) and in trade was 3464 (especially general shopkeeping).
 - 26 See *Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District*, A Volume (1908) pp. 312-3. The only riots noted in the city were related to the introduction of plague measures in the 1890s.

B.S. Moonje, and the letters of K.B. Hedgewar in this regard. I have also referred to the private papers of V.D. Savarkar, B.G. Tilak and Sir Richard Temple. As some of this work is written in Marathi, I have been assisted in my research by a translator, with whom I have sifted through and identified relevant material. Most of the material I have referred to, however, is in English; this again emphasises the cross-regional character of middle class ideologies, English being the main language of cross-regional communication for colonial elites. I have also been fortunate enough to be able to interview certain people involved in the developing Hindu nationalist movement in Nagpur in the nineteen twenties. These interviews did not follow a set pattern dictated by a pre-arranged sequence of questions. Rather, they were discussions guided by the parameters of my research topic, which I explained to interviewees prior to conducting the interview. The principal objective of interviews was presented as the construction of a picture of the status of Hindu nationalist ideology in the city at this time, and its relationship with Indian nationalist politics. Five interviews were conducted during research trips to India in 1995-6. I have also examined government records in Nagpur, Bhopal, Delhi and London, mostly as a means of gaining background information on relevant organisations and movements.

This research has been supplemented by a review of a wide range of secondary sources. As I have already indicated, literature on nationalism and communalism in India is particularly rich and sophisticated. This will be illustrated in the review of theoretical considerations in Chapter 2.

Note on the Presentation of Indian Words

In this thesis I have avoided the use of diacritical marks. Transliteration of words from Indian languages is indicated simply through italicisation. The plural -s is also italicised, as in *pandits*, *vyavasthas* and so on. This follows a tradition pursued somewhat silently by writers more interested in clarity of presentation than in accuracy of pronunciation.²⁷ In reproducing Indian words in Roman script I have tried to be consistently phonetic. However, as there are more sounds in, for example, Hindi than there are letters in the Roman script, this system is obviously limited. Pronunciation may in most cases be checked by reference to R.L. Turner's *Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1966). Proper names, either of people, organisations or social groups (including the names of castes) have not

²⁷ See, for example, R. Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and Mass Politics in Maharashtra* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975); S. Sarkar, *Modern India 1885-1947* (Macmillan India, Delhi, 1983); G. Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism*; and Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India* - all of whom use this system but none of whom comment on transliteration.

been italicised. Thus, for example, organisations which in the late nineteenth century began to promote the idea of *sanatana dharma* as Hindu orthodoxy are known as Sanatana Dharma Sabhas. There are inevitable anomalies in any system of transliteration. I have tried to keep resulting misunderstandings to a minimum by relying on consistency of use, supplemented by a select glossary of Indian words (see pp. 239-241).

1.3 Plan of Presentation

My thesis is presented in six major chapters (Chapters 2 - 7), each of which is concluded by a summary. As well as this introductory chapter, there is in addition a concluding chapter (Chapter 8), where the main findings of my research are extrapolated and some suggestions of further research are indicated. The chapters are broadly chronological. Some chapters do, however, examine the same period from different perspectives. This derives in part from the idea of constructing a dual narrative, tracing the development of the idea of organisation in both a Hindu and an Indian nationalist context.

Chapter 2 has developed out of the need to define key concepts at the heart of debates over Hindu nationalism. Although I initially planned to make definitions a feature of the introduction, the complexity of some of the terms involved in this study - notably ideology, hegemony, nationalism, communalism, Hinduism and, of course, *sangathan* - persuaded me that an extensive examination would be worthwhile. As well as establishing definitions, this chapter reviews significant literature related to the study and builds a theoretical framework for the interpretation of historical data.

Chapter 3 looks at the context of colonialism in the nineteenth century, and the emergence of organisations that sought to represent Hinduism within this context. It begins with an examination of the way in which organisation as a feature of British power was expressed as a cultural force in Indian society. It then looks at the elaboration, after 1858, of the "discourse of organisation" through which Indians were encouraged to articulate concerns to the Government. In the context of Hinduism, these concerns were increasingly focused on the structure of the religion, and how various groups were or were not perceived as a part of it. The final section looks at ideas formulated in response to these concerns, expressed explicitly in terms of organisation.

Chapter 4 introduces the idea of a dual focus on the development of ideas of organisation in Hindu and Indian nationalist contexts. This dual focus is a logical implication of the definition of Hindu and elite-led Indian nationalism (established in Chapter 2) as middle class ideologies following similar patterns of development, strongly influenced by the colonial discourse of organisation. This is illustrated in relation to Indian nationalism through an examination of the framework of "moderatism", and its almost immediate challenge by emerging "extremism". The language of this challenge, it will be shown, was representation - proposing new ways of representing the people in the nationalist struggle. The chapter then examines the ramifications of this nationalist debate in terms of the organisation of Hinduism. In particular, it examines the articulation of conflicting ideas of organisation in movements towards the end of the nineteenth century, and the implications of these movements in terms of the projection of a definitive constituency of Hindus.

Chapter 5 extends this analysis by examining developments in the first decade of the twentieth century. It argues that this was a particularly critical phase in the formulation of Hindu nationalism, precisely because of the upheavals apparent in the Indian nationalist movement at this time, and the ways in which the state sought to marginalise the development of an effective nationalist counter-hegemony. Again, the form of political representation, and of constituencies to be represented, was at the heart of this process. In this context the first concerted, systematic attempt to present unified Hinduism as politically significant was mooted. This attempt was a product of its time, in that it was dominated by notions of representation, and the nature of the constituency of Hindus. The chapter will examine how these ideas were expressed, and how they set the parameters for the projection of organised Hinduism as a nation.

Chapter 6 examines political and ideological developments after the First World War and in the early nineteen twenties. In this complex arena, it concentrates on two particular issues of relevance to the development of Hindu nationalism: the emergence of a new discourse of organisation in Indian politics, as a result of the extension of the strategy of counter-hegemony by the Congress under Gandhi's leadership; and the entrenchment of Hindu identity as a feature of middle class politics, largely in response to the communalisation of politics on a wider plane during this period. These developments provide the context for the development of Hindu nationalism in the nineteen twenties.

Chapter 7 concentrates on the development of Hindu nationalism in terms of its ideology and its organisational presence in Indian politics during the nineteen twenties. It analyses the concept of *sangathan* as employed by various proponents of Hindu

nationalism, and the extent of its integration with ideas of the organisation of Hinduism identified in earlier chapters. It then looks at the elaboration of Hindu nationalism in institutional terms, focusing on the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. I will argue that these two organisations constitute very different approaches to the ideal of *sangathan*, and that this difference is indicative of the eclectic ideological positions and formations which consistently informed the articulation of Hinduism in colonial politics.

Chapter 8 concludes my analysis by reviewing the initial objectives of my research and examining the implications of the arguments put forward in this thesis for the further study of ideology, Hindu nationalism and related topics. Principally, this thesis is offered as a contribution to continuing debates on the nature of religious nationalism and its significance in the modern history of India.

Chapter Two

Key Concepts and Significant Literature in the Study of Hindu Nationalism

In this chapter I will examine the key concepts that underpin this history of the idea of organisation in modern political Hinduism. My objective is to construct a framework of interpretation, by mapping out and analysing these concepts in the context of developments in the study of Indian history and communalism. As well as setting the parameters for the rest of the thesis, this will allow me to establish definitions of important terms, and to review literature that is relevant to the study. Recent developments, particularly in the area of modern Indian historiography, have made this a complex field of analysis.

In the course of this chapter I will examine concepts within the following broad thematic areas: colonialism and the state; nationalism and communalism; and religion and Hinduism. In the first instance, however, I will concentrate on ideology, as I have conceived this project primarily as an ideological history, examining the emergence of a particularly dynamic ideology in modern India.

2.1 Ideology, Class Interest and Cultural Identity

The work of the Italian marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) on ideology and the state has been central to the whole project of cultural studies from the nineteen seventies onwards, and since the early eighties his ideas have had a profound impact on modern Indian historiography. In this section I will examine the nature of this impact.

It is difficult to employ Gramsci's work as a comprehensive framework of analysis. Because of the circumstances in which it was written, the consistency and rigour that is normally associated with the marxist approach simply does not exist in Gramsci's work.¹ But as Stuart Hall has usefully pointed out, Gramsci's work has had a "fertilising impact" on the theorisation of superstructural issues within the marxist

¹ This point has been emphasised by Perry Anderson in his critique "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci" (in *New Left Review*, No. 100, 1976-77, pp. 5-80), p. 28. Anderson has shown, for example, that Gramsci referred to at least three different forms of the critical relationship between state, hegemony and civil society in his work.

tradition, and it is in this sense that I would want to refer to his work here.² In particular, his work on ideology has had a liberating influence on marxist thought. Gramsci is located as a theorist of "neutral" ideology, a conception that emerged within marxism from Lenin onwards.³ This immediately distinguishes his work from that of Marx, where ideology is perceived as a "negative" instrument of bourgeois capitalist control, designed to produce a false consciousness in oppressed classes. For Gramsci, ideology is rather a facet of social reality; it is a means of expressing "a conception of the world", a conception that is implicit "in all manifestations of individual and collective life", and generally serves to "cement and unify" any social bloc.⁴ Ideology, in this sense, is as much a part of proletarian reality as it is of bourgeois reality. Indeed it has an objective (though historically defined) existence, and is related much more strongly to actual or real consciousness.

Gramsci elicits several important ramifications from this reinterpretation, and it is here that he begins to depart from Lenin's own "neutralisation" of ideology. Whereas Lenin's ideologies were rigidly associated with class positions, Gramsci began to develop the idea that ideologies, having a material structure, were not necessarily related to particular classes. They frequently cut across class boundaries, forming discursive frameworks with their own historically configured resonance. This sensitivity towards class relations and the historical process is a useful insight for the interpretation of ideological development in colonial India, where the dynamism of middle class development encompassing a variety of ideologies needs to be rationalised.

Initially, this is an insight which is problematic, in that it suggests a radical dislocation of base and superstructure which is incompatible with a marxist critique. The materialism with which Gramsci invested ideology, however, meant that he always presented it as a concept associated with historical moments in the political process, a process necessarily defined by the antagonism of social formations (classes or class alliances). Stuart Hall has pursued this interpretation:

Ideologies do not become effective as a material force because they emanate from the needs of fully-formed social classes. But the reverse is also true... . No ideological conception can ever become materially

² See Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity" (in D. Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen [eds.], *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 411-440), p. 417.

³ See J. Lorrain, *The Concept of Ideology* (BI Publications, New Delhi, 1979) p. 76-83.

⁴ See Gramsci (edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971), p. 328.

effective unless and until it *can* be articulated to the field of political and social forces and to the struggles between different forces at stake.⁵

Ideology can only be made sense of, be meaningful, for social theorists, if it is situated in its historical terrain - a terrain defined by class relations. This in itself is an impeccably marxist approach, and in effect it reclaims Gramsci for that tradition. At the same time it separates him from later elucidations of autonomous ideology, notably in the work of Louis Althusser.

Two further points need to be emphasised on the basis of Gramsci's approach to ideology. First, this historically defined dynamism means that classes can easily be crosscut by a series of conflicting ideologies, reflecting the conflict of perceived interests at any given moment. As a result the unity of a class is something which needs to be produced or constructed through the conscious articulation of class-based ideologies. Secondly, and following on from this, different classes may combine through what Hall has called a process of "tendential alignment".⁶ Different classes may be attracted to the same ideology, even though their perception of what that ideology means may differ. This kind of alignment is again dependent upon historical conditions.

I have highlighted these points because I believe that they are particularly pertinent in an analysis of the class at the centre of this thesis - the colonially-constructed Hindu middle class. This class developed rapidly during the nineteenth century and established itself as the class of "natural leadership" as India moved towards independence in the twentieth century. By employing the "fertilising impact" of these Gramscian ideas, it is hoped that adequate theories of the development of this class can be established. Of course, this class has been theorised many times before within Indian historiography, but I believe that Hindu nationalism still poses a major problem for an understanding of how this class developed.⁷ Already in this overview of Gramscian theory, some conceptual space is evident for an understanding of how the

5 Hall, "The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees" (in Morley and Chen, *Stuart Hall Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, pp. 25-46), p. 42.

6 *ibid.*

7 For examples of a variety of approaches towards the middle class, see B. McCully, *English Education and the Origins of Indian Nationalism* (P. Smith, New York, 1966); C. Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964); A. Seal, *Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the later Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968); A.R. Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism* (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1976), esp. chapter XI, pp. 174-220. Sumit Sarkar provides a general critique of these approaches in his *Modern India*; see esp. chapter III, pp. 43-100. Douglas Haynes has developed a significant new "ethnohistorical" approach to middle class politics in his *Rhetoric and Ritual in Colonial India*, but the ideology of Hindu nationalism is not examined in detail; see esp. the chapter on communalism, pp. 261-284.

middle class managed to produce such radically different ideologies - Hindu nationalism and Indian nationalism - over the same period of time. One of the principal objectives of this thesis will be to explain how this development occurred.

In addition, the articulation of Gramscian theories serves to emphasise the complexity of the process through which ideologies are produced on a material level. Emphasising this complexity is necessary because of the tendency in some recent work to perceive the emergence of Hindu nationalism as a relatively straightforward 'reflection' of the interests of a particular group. Most significant is Christophe Jaffrelot's view that Hindu nationalism "reflects the Brahminical view of the (nineteenth century) high caste reformers who shaped its ideology".⁸ Jaffrelot looks to draw a direct line particularly from the reformism of the Arya Samaj to Hindu nationalists of the twenties and later.⁹ This formulation draws on conceptions of ideology developed by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. Geertz perceives ideology as a conscious "construction of schematic images of social order" - symbols or metaphors - as a means of rationalising change in a modernising society.¹⁰ Despite his insistence that "the function of ideology is to make an autonomous politics possible", however, Geertz is curiously reticent in defining its relationship to class - a point acknowledged by Jaffrelot¹¹ - and also to colonialism, despite the fact that much of his work draws on the ethnology of post-colonial South East Asia. This reticence engenders a limited perception of ideology. It emerges as a facet of culture, a reinterpretation appropriated as a means of establishing and defending that culture in the face of rapid change (for Geertz, this rapidity appears to be the most significant aspect of change in colonial and post-colonial society). Although this may be an attractive model for the interpretation of Hindu nationalism, it does not encompass the complexities of the problem. No model can do so, I would say, if it does not adequately address such crucial issues as class and colonialism as factors in this historical development.

Referring back to Gramsci and the extension of his work (particularly in relation to culture) by Stuart Hall, ideology can be resituated in a far more strategic relation to culture itself. In this conception, ideology means the "mental frameworks -

the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation - which different classes and social groups

⁸ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 13.

⁹ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 11.

¹⁰ Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture* (Fontana, London, 1993), p. 218-9.

¹¹ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p.12 : "neither Geertz nor Fallers places sufficient emphasis on the social background of the reinterpreters who shape ideologies".

deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works.¹²

The fundamental position that ideology assumes here in relation to people's perception of the world means that far from being an aspect of culture, ideology is a means through which culture is defined. What is perceived as culture is dependent upon the dominance of particular ideologies. To understand the emergence of Hindu nationalism and its powerful cultural symbolism, therefore, it is necessary to analyse the blend and clash of ideologies, and their relationship with particular social forces on the historical terrain of colonial India.

2.2 Hegemony and the Colonial State

In Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*, the state is defined as

the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consensus of those over whom it rules.¹³

It is in this area of 'active consensus' that the concept of hegemony is located. In polemical response to the economism of the Second International, and on the basis of the historical experience of the proletariat in Italy and other western capitalist formations, Gramsci formulated the concept of hegemony as a mechanism of discursive dominance over the whole complex of social relations in a given societal formation. Consent appears in this context as "a psychological state involving some kind of acceptance - not necessarily explicit - of the socio-political order or of certain vital aspects of that order".¹⁴ In the western advanced capitalist context, this acceptance is conceived of as being based on the recognition (implicit or explicit) of national interests:

The development and expansion of the particular (ruling or hegemonic) group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the 'national' energies.¹⁵

It is by establishing this consent, by articulating to "its discourse the overwhelming majority of ideological elements" within society, and hence becoming "the class expressing the national interest"¹⁶, that a particular class or social bloc becomes hegemonic. The struggle for domination in society, then, is underwritten by a struggle to gain hegemonic control over other strategic social blocs.

12 Hall, "The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees", p. 26.

13 Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, p. 244.

14 J. Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought* (Clarendon, Oxford, 1981), p. 37.

15 C. Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci" (in Mouffe [ed.], *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, Routledge, London, 1979, pp. 168-204), p. 181.

16 Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci", p. 195.

The difference between domination and hegemony was emphasised by Gramsci in his later writings. A class may dominate by virtue of its control of repressive state apparatuses, whilst relinquishing its hegemonic control to a leading group in society.¹⁷ Hegemony here is itself an area of struggle, an area where the dynamic ideologies of different social blocs fight for popular consent.

The state is nevertheless the most powerful player in this area of struggle, because of the extent of its material structure. Hegemony is attained through the 'expansion of the state' in terms of the increased sophistication of civil society.¹⁸ In this context civil society may be perceived as

the private 'network' of the state through which it organises the whole of social reproduction, permeating all forms of organisations and mass-consciousness and provoking a 'diffusion of hegemony' at all levels of society"¹⁹

The structure of the state, then, is radically expanded. It is a structure which touches "all levels of society"; its power must be seen as having an implicit effect on consciousness, or, more specifically, as moulding the discursive possibilities of the latter.²⁰ Civil society becomes a means of reproducing ideological domination.

This conception of the state and its relation to society has emerged as influential in modern Indian historiography over recent years. It is part of a wider project to utilise Gramscian ideas as a basis for understanding the processes of Indian history.²¹ This project is problematic in terms of the relevance or applicability of Gramscian ideas to a context of colonial underdevelopment, because Gramsci worked on features of advanced capitalist development in the West, and especially the development of fascism in Italy. This has led, for example, to the development of the notion of "semi-hegemony",²² which places obvious emphasis on the limitation of hegemony in the

¹⁷ Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity", p. 425.

¹⁸ C. Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State* (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1980), p. 92.

¹⁹ Mouffe, "Gramsci Today" (in Mouffe [ed.], *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, Routledge, London, 1979, pp. 1-18), p. 5.

²⁰ As Mouffe notes, it is this Gramscian conception of power that informs the work of Foucault, Derrida, Said, on the structure of power and knowledge in capitalist and colonialist society; see "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci", p. 201.

²¹ See Bipan Chandra, "The Long-Term Dynamics of the Indian National Congress - Presidential Address" (*Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 1985); Partha Chatterjee's two books, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (Zed Books, London, 1986) and *The Nation and its Fragments*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993); Bhagwan Josh and Shashi Joshi, *Struggle for Hegemony in India* Vols. I - III (Sage, New Delhi, 1992-4); Shula Marks and Dagmar Engels (eds.), *Contesting Colonial Hegemony in Africa and India* (British Academic Press, London, 1994); and the *Subaltern Studies* Volumes 1 - VIII (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982-1994). For a cogent critique of the use of Gramscian concepts in this context, see Aijaz Ahmed, "Fascism and National Culture: Reading Gramsci in the Days of Hindutva" (*Social Scientist*, Vol. 21, Nos. 3-4, 1993, pp. 32-68).

²² See Bipan Chandra, "The Long-Term Dynamics of the Indian National Congress", and Josh & Joshi, *Struggle for Hegemony in India* Vols. I - III.

colonial context. Force remained the “ultimate sanction” of British rule in India, and at times of crisis hegemonic rule could be withdrawn to reveal “the mailed fist beneath the glove”.²³ The problem with this notion of semi-hegemony is that it says very little about the actual nature of hegemony in the context of colonialism. The idea of the state revealing a repressive side is not peculiar to colonialism, nor is the notion of limited ideological power. Referring again to Hall, it may be seen that Gramscian hegemony is perceived precisely as an area of struggle within society, and the state is continually shifting its stance to respond to specific, historically-produced situations. In this expanded notion of hegemony, “there is no pure case of coercion/consent - only different combinations of the two dimensions”.²⁴ Unless there is something specific in the nature of colonial coercion, then, it appears that semi-hegemony is an unnecessary theorisation of the process.

This problem of the relationship between hegemony and coercion is cited by Sudipta Kaviraj as part of the reason for his reluctance to use the term in an Indian context.²⁵ The polarisation of these terms in modern historiography, he says, renders hegemony as “an ahistorical taxonomic device” - i.e. any political state of affairs which is not coercive must therefore be hegemonic, and vice versa. Rightly, he explains that the Gramscian concept is far more subtle, and constitutes a “deeply historically indexed” model for state/society relations. Because of this historical indexing, Kaviraj is reluctant to transplant hegemony from its context of high capitalism; “it must be resistant”, he says, “to an easy shift to an explanation of imperial hegemony, except in some limited and specific ways.”²⁶

Leaving aside for a minute Hall’s argument for the ‘fertilising impact’ of Gramsci’s work, it is useful to examine some of the arguments cited by Kaviraj for this resistance. First, he notes the lack of any “single order common sense” in “traditional Hindu society”, which prevents the development of a homogenised culture, the pattern of development in capitalist hegemony. Whether, this *is* the pattern of development in capitalist hegemony, however, is not sufficiently argued. Stuart Hall has noted that common sense forms a kind of battleground, “on which more coherent ideologies and philosophies must contend for mastery”.²⁷ This implies a fragmented, shifting notion of common sense in capitalism. Furthermore, it has been argued by P.K. Dutta that Gramsci perceived a series of “common senses”, representing the world view of

23 Bipan Chandra, “The Long-Term Dynamics of the Indian National Congress”, p. 9.

24 Hall, “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity”, p. 426.

25 See Sudipta Kaviraj, “On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony” (in Marks and Engels, *Contesting Colonial Hegemony*, pp. 19-54), pp. 51-4.

26 Kaviraj, “On the Construction of Colonial Power”, p. 52.

27 Hall, “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity”, p. 431.

competing social blocs in society.²⁸ The idea of a "single order common sense" in capitalist hegemony, then, is by no means a given.

Kaviraj's second limitation is particularly interesting. Because of the alien nature of the regime, colonial rule was unable to penetrate fully the complex tissue of Indian culture; its primary means of control, therefore, was through the "forcible integration of the segmentary productive regimes of rural India into an integrated economy".²⁹ This is not to say that the colonial state did not have a hegemonic arrangement - indeed, Kaviraj appears to suggest that such an arrangement was inevitable, because ultimately the ruling class was a part of the bourgeois political order in Europe. But it was limited in its effect to the new middle class, who "related themselves to imperial authority in a way reminiscent of the typical hegemonic construction". Unfortunately, Kaviraj suggests, the middle class failed the state in that it was unable to transmit hegemony, through a 'trickle down' process, to the myriad forms of subaltern class discourse.

Two points should be made on the basis of Kaviraj's argument here. First, despite his position in relation to hegemony in India, Kaviraj notes that the state *had* to have a hegemonic arrangement, because ultimately it was configured by a political formation (i.e. British capitalist democracy) with hegemony at its heart. Here stands a case for the theoretical accommodation of hegemony on its own.³⁰ Despite making the point, however, Kaviraj is reluctant to use the term due to what he perceives as the failure of state hegemony to succeed in India. In a sense this is beside the point. If the state is configured in this way, it must be considered as a feature of the socio-political terrain. This is particularly so, of course, in the context of Indian nationalism and its position vis-a vis the state, but it is also true of other forms of socio-political discourse. The ramifications of the state's hegemonic arrangement were felt deep within indigenous society.

This leads us to the second point to be drawn from Kaviraj's argument. Hegemony may be (reluctantly) admitted in an Indian context, he says, but only in as much as it affected the middle class. This form of hegemony is reminiscent of what Femia

²⁸ P.K. Dutta, "'Dying Hindus' - Production of Hindu Communal Common Sense in Early 20th Century Bengal" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 28, No. 25, 19 June 1993, pp. 1305-1319), p. 1305.

²⁹ Kaviraj, "On the Construction of Colonial Power", p. 53.

³⁰ This is a more convincing argument than the idea that hegemony was an "objective necessity", because of the sheer size of the subordinate population in relation to the ruling class (see Bipan Chandra, "The Long-Term Dynamics of the Indian National Congress", p. 10); Kaviraj himself indicates this: "early nationalist writers often wondered how a large society like 'India' could be colonised and held by such a small group of British people. ...The simple answer to the puzzle...was that of course there was no pre-existing India which was conquered by British rule." See "On the Construction of Colonial Power", p. 32.

identifies as 'minimal hegemony' in Gramsci's work. Gramsci had developed the concept in the context of the *Risorgimento*, where "the hegemony of the moderates extended only to other sections of their own bourgeois class...(and) never managed to reach down to the masses and construct a truly national community."³¹ Here, hegemony is extended only to the economic, political, and intellectual elite, whilst maintaining a principally coercive control over the mass of the population. Whereas Gramsci recognises the state strategy of the *Risorgimento* as class alliance, however, Kaviraj is suggesting not so much an alliance as a structural limitation, born out of the alien nature of the state - its inability to penetrate indigenous culture. Again, this is perceived as a 'failure' of the state's hegemonic project - a failure brokered, however, by the indigenous middle class. As in so much recent historiography, this perception is too ready to dismiss the significance and power of the middle class in colonial society. Recent emphasis on subaltern movements has re-focused historiographical lenses on moments of history outside the straightforward narrative of the middle class, male-dominated national movement - on to the "real" history of India under colonial rule, the history of popular movements and popular discourse. Welcome though this re-focus is, it has tended to obscure the vitality of the colonial middle class, and its fascinating position in the complex of colonial power. The limitation of hegemonic influence that Kaviraj suggests is, I would say, questionable, but even if this limitation is accepted, it must still be admitted that hegemony is a significant factor in the structure of colonial rule, precisely because of the critical position of this middle class.

But what, after all, was so critical about this position? As has already been suggested, the point of departure for the construction of hegemony in the colonial context was the hegemony of the metropolis. The British state, itself developing increasingly sophisticated hegemonic structures during the nineteenth century, gradually transposed a mechanism of hegemony in areas of colonial control. As noted earlier, the increasing influence of hegemony is fostered by the "expansion of the state". The most decisive role in this process of expansion is played by the bureaucracy, an "essential form of internal organisation of the dominant social bloc, enabling a leading class to root organically in the masses the state machine that it wields".³² The state's development of bureaucratic control, so characteristic of British Indian government, hence assumes a critical position:

As a real link between state and civil society, the bureaucracy appears as the mediating element in a new society/state relation... . As a factor of social and political unification, it functions as an instrument of

³¹ Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought*, p. 47.

³² L. Paggi, quoted in Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State*, p. 102.

hegemony in the state apparatus and as bureaucratic unification of the power bloc.³³

What is most interesting here is the identification of the bureaucracy as a mediating force in the formation of a 'new society/state relation'. The complex administrative structure of the state renders it increasingly abstract, divorced from individuals or personalities. In India this objectification of the state was facilitated by the development of other hegemonic cornerstones: features such as the law, the education system and the development of infrastructure and with it the systematisation of trade.³⁴ These factors contributed to the promotion of what Carl Boggs has called a "rational-legal culture" that attempted to "permeate all spheres of society...rendering the general population loyal, fragmented and depoliticised".³⁵ It is in the heart of this "rational-legal culture" constructed by the state that the middle class - English-educated and profession-oriented - emerged to fulfil the possibilities of the new terrain. I am not, however, suggesting here that the middle class was the *only* class affected by this culture. The influence of the "rational-legal culture" was necessarily more penetrating than that. But nevertheless it can be asserted that the middle class secured for themselves the most strategic positions in the new terrain. They became, as it were, functionaries in the expansion of the state, and as such held a position of unique power.

Nowhere is this power more evident than in their occupation, or even control, of what I shall call the "public space" of colonial society. A variety of historians and political scientists have referred to some form of public terrain as pivotal in Indian socio-political life during the colonial period. Sandria Freitag has built a strong case for the emergence of a "public arena" in India after the withdrawal of the East India Company from its role as patron of religion and collective ritual. This space, from which the state had consciously retreated as part of its developing strategy of religious neutrality during the nineteenth century, became an alternative, indigenous arena for the construction of communal identities.³⁶ Partha Chatterjee has recently drawn a distinction between the discourse of nationalism in the public and the private domain: the former being a domain which was governed by the colonial projection of rationalised modernity, where nationalist efforts served only to "institute and ramify the characteristically modern forms of disciplinary power".³⁷ Sudipta Kaviraj also refers to the public

³³ Buci-Glucksmann, *ibid.*

³⁴ Bhagwan Josh cites the law as the fundamental cornerstone of hegemonic rule: "This principle (the rule of law) became the first plank on which the ideological apparatus and the colonial state itself was to be evolved." *Struggle for Hegemony in India*, Vol. II p. 27.

³⁵ Boggs, *Gramsci's Marxism*, p. 45.

³⁶ Freitag, *Collective Action and Community*.

³⁷ See Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, p. 74-5; this distinction is part of a wider separation of 'material' and 'spiritual' nationalism in this book - a separation which will be examined presently.

sphere as a concept "central to the enterprise of modernity". Kaviraj's public realm "stretches from judicial processes on one side to the consumption of the novel on the other", and although he has not elaborated it, it is clear that it is an idea of central significance in the history of ideas of colonial India.³⁸

The scope of Kaviraj's theme here indicates the kind of public space I would like to develop, and hold as central to the objectives of this thesis, in that I see the images of organisation to which Hindu nationalists were drawn as images fashioned largely in this space. The public space to which I will be referring was an element of the "rational-legal" culture of the state, part of its hegemonic arrangement.³⁹ As a feature of the expanding, objectified state, then, the public space was necessarily "non-religious" - a neutral zone, as it were - although this did not prevent the articulation of religious issues within it. Indeed, it will be demonstrated that the self-conscious neutrality of this zone encouraged the articulation of religious issues in a particular manner.

The function of the public space was to give the indigenous population the opportunity to address the state - directly or indirectly - in a systematic fashion. This may be through a variety of channels: the press - the most important feature of the public space; the law courts; petitions and memorials; literature and art; the actions and policies of legally-constituted organisations (political, social, religious etc.); and, progressively, through representation and electoral politics.⁴⁰ What distinguishes this space from Freitag's is that it was a space over which the state attempted to wield self-conscious authority - widening or narrowing the space, changing its shape in various areas, as it saw fit, and according to what it perceived as the responsibility of those who used it.⁴¹

³⁸ Kaviraj, "On the Construction of Colonial Power", p. 34, n. 30.

³⁹ This close relationship between the public space and the state's hegemonic arrangement is a possible departure from Kaviraj's theme, as it appears to conflict with his perception of the limited influence of this arrangement.

⁴⁰ Josh notes that constitutional development in India was characterised by 'deferred instalment payment' - successive instalments of representative power being released in 1861, 1892, 1909, 1919, 1935, and finally 1947. See *Struggle for Hegemony in India* Vol. II p. 44.

⁴¹ Interestingly, a similar idea is brought out by Kaviraj as a feature of the work of the Bengali social theorist of the late nineteenth century, Bhudev Mukhopadhyay. Kaviraj notes that Bhudev saw Western political life as "based on conflict between opposing social forces in a common public realm," whereas "traditional India did not have such a common public realm in the strict sense; it contained groups living in their own public arenas, avoiding contact with others, rather than settling conflicts by appeal to a common sovereign." Resistance to colonial incursions into indigenous social and economic life, Bhudev suggested, should be effected through "withdraw(al) from the public realm of the colonial state. Because whatever is rendered public in this sense, immediately becomes amenable to colonial control." See Kaviraj, "The Reversal of Orientalism: Bhudev Mukhopadhyay and the Project of Indigenist Social Theory" (in Dalmia and von Stietencron, *Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity*, Sage, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 253-279), pp. 274, 276.

This is most ably illustrated by the history of press regulation in India - the way in which repression was periodically used as a means of controlling the thrust of press comment.⁴² It is also evident in the manner in which petitions and memorials were rigidly formularised, subjected to rigorous vetting and arbitrary re-routing, according to the interpretation of colonial officials.⁴³

This space is also distinguishable from Chatterjee's public domain, in that it encompasses far more than the articulation of opposition to government. It is a space in which discourses contend not only with the state, but also with each other, and also, needless to say, in support of the state. In this sense, it operates as a state-regulated framework for one form of indigenous debate. At the same time, however, it is a potentially subversive space, because of its very position as an aspect of hegemonic control. As Rosalind O'Hanlon has pointed out in her extensive critique of Subaltern Studies, "colonial discourse" came into being not as a result of straightforward domination, but rather of struggle between the state, its native informants and those with influence over the latter. "This struggle", she says,

was the site not only of contested understandings, but also of deliberate misrepresentation and manipulation, in which the seemingly omnipotent classifications of the Orientalist were vulnerable to purposeful misconstruction and appropriation to uses which he never intended, precisely because they had incorporated into them the readings and the political concerns of his native informants.⁴⁴

This view gives us an indication of the subtlety of Gramscian hegemony. O'Hanlon describes it as a site of power governed by struggle or contestation. The colonial context heightens this element of struggle, precisely because of the alienness of the ruling elite. Knowledge and its transference from native to master was an area replete with tension, in which the superior socio-cultural knowledge of the native was

⁴² For examples of this process during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see G.R. Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: a Study of Controversy, Conflict and Communal Movements in Northern India 1923-1928* (Brill, Leiden, 1975), Section II.2, "Government Control of Publications", pp. 19-31.

⁴³ A good example of the way in which Memorials and Petitions were adjusted in this manner is provided by the Government of India's review of Memorials in the late 1880s. This review was designed to cut down the number of Memorials and Petitions requiring the consideration of the Central Government, the Secretary of State or the British Parliament; by 1889 Local Government had the power to withhold petitions on a number of accounts, including "when a petition contains language which, in the opinion of the Local Government, is disloyal, disrespectful or improper." See "Memorials to Her Majesty's Secretary of State and Government of India", Central Provinces Secretariat Records, General Department Compilation No. 218 of 1889.

⁴⁴ R. O'Hanlon, "Recovering the Subject: Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia" (in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 22, 1988, pp. 189-224), p.217. A similar point is brought out by Christopher Bayly in his *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India 1780-1870* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996); hegemony, he says, was "never absolute", and the creation of colonial knowledge must be seen as a "dialogic process" (p. 370).

particularly powerful. The public space constituted the most consistent domain for the articulation of this struggle: a space where the framework of colonial civil society was confronted by the knowledge of the indigenous middle class. The tension thus created is illustrated by the state's attempts to codify religion and caste (to envelop and neutralise indigenous knowledge) through the census.⁴⁵ As we shall see in Chapter 4, setting the boundaries of Hinduism was a consistent problem for colonial officials in this exercise, particularly in terms of situating low castes and tribal groups in relation to the religion. A major element of this problem was the propensity of enumerators to make their own judgements on the issue. The Report on the 1881 Census, for example, complained that

Many of the more bigoted high caste Hindoos employed as census enumerators or supervisors objected to record such low persons as of the Hindoo religion. This was illustrated by numerous instances brought to my notice of such persons having been recorded as of the Dher, Mang or Chandal religion by mere repetition of their caste in the column for religion. Possibly some in their humility and ignorance may not even have claimed to be of the Hindoo religion. More probably they were not even asked.⁴⁶

Here, then, the acquisition of colonial knowledge was disrupted by the intervention of a self-confidently independent understanding ("bigoted" or otherwise) of the field. The census enumerators - mostly school teachers and other local professionals, archetypal members of the colonial middle class⁴⁷ - used their position as prime movers in the public space to translate and transform, unpick and subvert the mechanics of colonial discourse. In this sense, then, the space must be located as an area of ideological struggle, in which, again, the middle class holds a privileged position. It is to the development of the ideologies of nationalism and communalism within this space which I will now turn.

⁴⁵ For elaborations of this theme of the census as a paradigm of colonialist knowledge as power, see B. Cohn, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987), esp. chapter 10, "The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia", pp. 224-254; also B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, London, 1991), chapter 10, "Census, Map, Museum", pp. 163-186.

⁴⁶ *Report on the Census of British India taken on 17 February 1881*, Vol. I (HMSO, London 1883), p. 17. This source will be referred to hereafter as *Census of India 1881*, Vol. I, India.

⁴⁷ It should be noted that the position of census enumerator was a voluntary one; it was therefore limited to those literate Indians with enough leisure to devote time to this activity, and also those with a sense of the value of the census as a feature of administrative order.

2.3 Nationalism and Communalism

Many historians of modern India prior to the 1980s made a fundamental linkage between nationalism, modernisation and the middle class.⁴⁸ The pattern of nationalist development held the key to the pattern of modernisation in the country, and this whole project was overseen by the politically-conscious middle class, mediating the complexities of modernisation for the rest of the country. This kind of linkage is also evident in much of the theoretical work that has been done on the concept of nationalism. It has been summarised in A.D. Smith's *Theories of Nationalism*. More recently, Ernest Gellner's work, *Nations and Nationalism*, and Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* have confirmed the power of the linkage, where the old world of religious sensibility is undermined, supplanted by the modern *Weltanschauung* of nationalism, fuelled by the development of the capitalist economy in Europe.⁴⁹ For Anderson, the middle class connection is exemplified by the centrality of his concept of "print capitalism", and the consequent liberation of the literate classes from the limitations of religious truth languages.⁵⁰

From the early '80s, however, an important movement in Indian historiography has disrupted the predominance of this linkage. The defining principle of the Subaltern Studies series has been to deconstruct the idea that the history of Indian nationalism consisted of the "spiritual biography of the Indian elite",⁵¹ that the mass of the population had little or no agency in the struggle for liberation. In its place, Subaltern Studies has concentrated on constructing a history of nationalism that is disparate, fragmented, powerfully subversive - the history of working class, peasant, low caste and women's resistance not only to the state, but to a variety of oppressions within the framework of colonial society.⁵² Because of its polemical position in relation to "elite-based" forms of historiography, one important point about the trajectory of Subaltern Studies is often overlooked: it does not deny the validity or significance of middle class/elite history, nor does it posit an empirical separation of elite and subaltern

48 This is evident, for example, in the analysis of the Marxist A.R. Desai; see his *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, pp. 432-442.

49 Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (Duckworth, London, 1971); Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1983); Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

50 On religious truth languages and their limitations, see *Imagined Communities* pp. 12-19 and pp. 22-23; on the "revolutionary vernacularising thrust" of print capitalism, see pp. 37-46

51 Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India" (in Guha [ed.], *Subaltern Studies I*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982, pp. 1-8), p. 2.

52 See *Subaltern Studies I - VIII* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982 - 1994); for elaborations of the fragmentary view of modern Indian history, see Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, and Pandey, "In Defence of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today" (*Economic and Political Weekly*, Annual Number, March 1991, pp. 559-572). On the history of women in the colonial period, see K. Sangari and S. Vaid (eds.), *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History* (Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1989).

politics. As Ranajit Guha states, "there was a great deal of overlap" between these two domains; an overlap which occasionally manifested itself in anti-imperialist struggle, "with some splendid results", but also implied a more continuous flow of ideological formations.⁵³ As has already been made clear, this thesis aims to focus on the development of ideologies associated with the middle class; a Gramscian interpretation of the state must recognise the importance of this class, strategically placed in the domain of hegemonic politics, close to the focal points of power. It is necessary to state, however, that this emphasis does not imply a contradiction of the significance of subaltern movements. On the contrary, it is hoped that the analysis will contribute to historical perspectives on such movements.⁵⁴

One feature which Subaltern Studies has held in common with what it calls "elitist historiography" is the centrality of the notion of the "nation-in-making" in modern Indian history. Guha makes it clear in his opening statement that the "failure of the nation to come to its own" constitutes the "central problematic" for historians of modern India.⁵⁵ The development of the country towards nationhood, then, must form the framework for the interpretation of history. Communalism in this perspective is seen as specifically anti-national, a set of ideologies ranged precisely against the emerging hegemony of the nation as one. This is certainly also true of nationalist and marxist historiography, if not of the colonialist school. As Peter van der Veer has recently shown, however, this is a problematic polarisation, in that it places religious nationalism in the position of a traditional, reactionary force, holding back the modernity of Indian nationalism.⁵⁶ A good deal of work has argued that this opposition of modernity and tradition is a distorted model, and that traditional social and political formations are an integral part of the project of modernity.⁵⁷ Van der Veer

53 Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India", p.6; see also G. Pandey, *Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India*, p.19.

54 Part of Rosalind O'Hanlon's critique of Subaltern Studies is based on what she sees as a failure to adequately accommodate hegemony as a theory of colonial power; see "Recovering the Subject: Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia", p.215.

55 Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India", p.7.

56 Van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994) p.22-3; this point is similarly made by Pandey in "In Defence of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today", p.559.

57 See, for example, L. & S. Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1967); E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983); P. Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*; T. Raychaudhuri, *Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in Nineteenth Century Bengal* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1988); S. Kaviraj, "The Reversal of Orientalism", p. 278: Kaviraj points to Bhudev Mukhopadhyay's awareness of "the historicity of traditions, despite their own pretence of immutability". "Traditions survive," he continues, "despite their own delusions, by coming to terms with the unprecedented and surprising in their history." On the relationship between tradition and modernity particularly in the context of constructions of history in colonial India, see Kaviraj, *The Unhappy Consciousness: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the Formation*

has gone further, by arguing that communalism and nationalism are simply radical and moderate tendencies within the same ideology of nationalism. "The moderates," he says, "accept cultural pluralism and equality among different religious communities within the nation, while the radicals see the nation as the community of co-religionists." It is all part of the same conception of nationalism, which for van der Veer is based on pre-colonial notions of religious community.

Although this questioning of the polarity of communalism and nationalism, tradition and modernity, is helpful, the second part of van der Veer's argument appears to be dangerously close to the colonialist notion that Indian nationalism was in fact inherently communal, because of the primordial antagonism of various religious cultures. This is certainly not an intentional proximity, as he is at pains to point out, but nevertheless his employment of the model of a linear scale of nationalism limits his options. On this basis, for example, he rejects the validity of secular nationalism, in that it fails adequately to accommodate religion as an aspect of Indian national identity. This is an argument developed from the work of T.N. Madan and other sociologists opposed to the viability of secularism in Indian society.⁵⁸ But it is the linear model that demands it, as secularism cannot be accommodated in the 'moderate to radical' scale, with its implication of the common denominator of religious identity.

The problem in identifying communalism as what van der Veer calls "only a form of nationalism", in which "a common religion ...is imagined as the basis of group identity", is that it fails to acknowledge the flexible nature of this term. Whilst he does refer to Gyanendra Pandey's identification of communalism as "an orientalist term", produced as a form of colonialist knowledge, van der Veer does not pursue Pandey's argument, which recognises the fact that communalism is not specific to religiously-configured communities. It is rather a term that is applied to any form of community that displays an antagonistic stance towards another community, within a colonial or post-colonial context - religious, yes, but also linguistic and caste based communities.⁵⁹ This hostility, it must be noted, is always directed primarily towards communities based on the same kind of signifier as their own. The other of the communalist is a kind of conceptual echo: a linguistic communalist will direct his hostility towards another linguistic group; a religious communalist towards another religion, and so on. Communalism, then, is a fairly stark and simple structure. It is

of Nationalist Discourse in India (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1995), esp. chapter 4, "Imaginary History", pp. 107-157.

⁵⁸ See T.N. Madan, "Secularism in its Place" (in *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1987, pp. 747-759); also A. Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance".

⁵⁹ See Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism*, p. 6-7.

defined first and foremost by what is other than itself, and that other is principally some form of conceptual echo of itself. Because of this simplicity, communalism does not necessarily generate its own ideology; it is more likely, in fact, to appropriate existing ideologies to extend its form, deepen its impact.

In this thesis I will work on the premise that Hindu communalism - the most significant form of communalism in India - draws heavily on ideas which may be termed Hindu nationalist. Hindu communalism, then, is not the same as Hindu nationalism - it is rather that the latter provides the ideological tools for the development and extension of the former. Let me make the distinction clear:

1. Hindu nationalism is defined as a set of ideologies that seek to imagine or construct a community (i.e. a nation) on the basis of a common culture - a culture configured by a particular notion of Hinduism.
2. Hindu communalism is an ideological *structure* that aligns the interests of this community - social, cultural, political, economic - precisely against the interests of other religious communities, particularly, of course, the Indian Muslims.

It is important to make this distinction firstly in order to avoid the kind of conceptual straight jacket supplied both by a straightforward polarisation of nationalism and communalism, and by van der Veer's linear model. Secondly, it allows for the exploration of an ideological development in the nineteenth and early twentieth century - that of Hindu nationalism - which is less teleologically burdened. It is widely accepted that the nineteen twenties constitute the period in which communalism was crystallised as a systematic factor in the discourse of Indian politics.⁶⁰ What I am saying is that this crystallisation does *not* constitute the culmination of a process of ideological development. It rather must be perceived as a process driven by the interplay of several historical factors, some of them ideological, but also others that were structural, "event-led", and even external to indigenous politics. The ideology of Hindu nationalism was of course a major factor in the process, as shall be illustrated - but its development *as an* ideology needs to be divorced from the process, as it had, and still has, its own existence independent of the framework of communalism.

Having established a distinction between Hindu communalism and Hindu nationalism, I will now consider the issue of the difference between the latter and Indian nationalism. The nature and extent of this difference is again a matter of some debate. As has already been noted, Gyanendra Pandey cites the 1920s as the point at which nationalism begins to be perceived as the opposite of communalism. Before, this, he

⁶⁰ See, for example, Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism*, p. 233.

says, there was no Indian nationalism as it is now perceived: "a nationalism that stood above (or outside) the different religious communities, and took as its unit the individual Indian citizen".⁶¹ Before the radical interjection of communalism forced this articulation into being, he says, the objectives of community and nation were *generally* convergent.⁶²

Partha Chatterjee has also argued for a relatively late distinction between the two ideological streams.⁶³ He has written of the significance of the creation of a national culture prior to the formulation of political nationalism. This national culture is fashioned in the "spiritual" domain, which is opposed to the "material" domain of economy, state-craft, science and technology - the domain of western superiority. Chatterjee situates this formulation of national culture in the "second phase" of reformism in the nineteenth century, when Indians stopped looking to the state to effect change in traditional institutions and customs, and began to insist on change through indigenous channels. When political nationalism emerged after the 1880s, it refocused nationalist attention on the state, without altering the contrapuntal development of "spiritual" nationalism as an indigenous project. This dislocated development created the space for the emergence of a truncated national culture - i.e. the culture of Hindu nationalism.

Christophe Jaffrelot, on the other hand, appears clear in his recognition of Hindu nationalism as a distinct ideology emerging around the turn of the century in North and North West India.⁶⁴ The development of this ideology constitutes the first stage of what he calls the "birthing" process of Hindu nationalism. The second stage saw the emergence of Hindu nationalism as a form of political mobilisation that drew on identity symbols provided by that ideology. This would appear to be a similar model to that outlined above, but Jaffrelot further theorises his model, by placing it within the framework of ethnic nationalism.⁶⁵ Ethnicity distinguishes Hindu nationalism from the universalism of Indian nationalist ideology, with its projection of "all individuals, all communities living within British India" as the nation.

⁶¹ Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism*, p. 235.

⁶² It follows from this that Pandey does not make an ideological distinction between Hindu nationalism and Hindu communalism; in fact he has also asserted that Hindu nationalism is a product of the twenties: see "Which of us are Hindus?" (in G. Pandey [ed.], *Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today*, Viking Penguin India, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 238-273), p. 242.

⁶³ Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, p. 6-13.

⁶⁴ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, pp. 11-19; see also his "Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 20, Nos. 12-13, 20-27 March 1993, pp. 517-524); and "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab: from the Arya Samaj to the Hindu Sabha 1875-1910" (*Indo-British Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1993, p. 3-39)

⁶⁵ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 13.

The framework of ethnicity obliges Jaffrelot to situate Hindu nationalism in relation to its attendant tensions: most notably, the tension between primordialist and instrumentalist approaches to the development of ethnic movements.⁶⁶ As a form of identity, Jaffrelot states that Hindu nationalism was not primordialist, drawing on an established sense of ethnicity; yet at the same time, it was not instrumentalist, a cynical construction of the elite, because it does reinterpret themes drawn from the established tradition of Hinduism. Jaffrelot rather suggests the ideological construction of Hindu nationalism as a cultural strategy to defend brahmanical hegemony, largely through the activities of socio-religious reform organisations like the Arya Samaj.⁶⁷ As it moves into its second stage of political mobilisation, however, it is more straightforwardly interpreted as an instrumentalist movement driven by what he calls "ideologically minded Hindu elites".

To my mind, this projection of Hindu nationalism as ethnic nationalism is problematic, and an unnecessary theorisation. First, it leaves little room for the development of the culture of *Indian* nationalism - the latter is presented as a rather flat political nationalism that can have no influence over the development of an exclusivist, combative Hindu sense of ethnicity. This belies the increasing sophistication of Indian nationalism towards the end of the nineteenth century, and leads Jaffrelot to describe the extremist strategy of the Congress nationalists Tilak and Aurobindo as a product of their "Hindu leanings", rather than of their search for more effective strategies in the development of the struggle against colonialism.⁶⁸ Interpreting extremism in this way is reminiscent of van der Veer's moderate to radical scale of nationalism. Secondly, his emphasis on Hindu nationalism as a strategy designed to defend Brahmanic hegemony is particularly problematic in the context of the Arya Samaj, as in its early years around the turn of the century this organisation faced fierce resistance from precisely those groups - the established hierarchies of Hinduism - whose interests it is presented as protecting.

But most significantly, although Jaffrelot presents Hindu nationalism as a distinct ideology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, he nevertheless states that it was not "codified" until the early nineteen twenties. By this he means that it was not until this period that the ideology was consciously articulated, largely through the written work of V.D. Savarkar.⁶⁹ This codification constitutes the "second stage" of

⁶⁶ On these approaches, see J. Hutchison and A.D. Smith [eds.], *Ethnicity* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), esp. part II, "Theories of Ethnicity", pp. 32-105.

⁶⁷ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 13: "Hindu nationalism...largely reflects the Brahminical view of the high caste reformers who shaped its ideology."

⁶⁸ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 17-18.

⁶⁹ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 25.

the birth of Hindu nationalism, and although it is perceived as different, in that it represents a straightforward instrumentalist project of the elite, it is not perceived as a conceptual difference. Communalism emerges simply as a more extreme form of Hindu nationalism, and the construct of ethnic nationalism is shown to be implemented differently, only because of the different demands of those "ideologically minded Hindu elites". Instrumentalism therefore emerges as so central to the development of Jaffrelot's construct of Hindu nationalism as communalism, that the elaboration of an earlier form of the ideology seems irrelevant. In this sense the whole category of *ethnic nationalism*, with its accompanying baggage of instrumentalism and primordialism, appears unhelpful as a way of theorising Hindu nationalism, obscuring rather than clarifying the development of the ideology.

The idea that Hindu nationalism has a distinct history as an ideology (in the sense mapped out in section 2.1) which is separate from that of Indian nationalism is nevertheless one which this study will pursue. I will employ this idea, in conjunction with the idea of communalism as a framework, rather than an autonomous ideology in itself, in order to analyse the development of Hindu and Indian nationalism as middle class ideologies in the pre-twenties period. This model emphasises autonomy, without the historical necessity of implacable opposition. Indeed, the evidence of the nineteenth and early twentieth century suggests that the two ideologies followed quite similar patterns of development, and that very often elements of each were expressed by the same individual. Cases can be cited from the writings and speeches of such figures as Lajpat Rai, V.D. Savarkar, M.M. Malaviya, Swami Shraddhanand, where the two ideologies are seen to blend and clash.⁷⁰ This, I would say, reflects their contemporaneous development on the discursive terrain of middle class consciousness, and may be said to support the Subaltern Studies perception of the development of nationalist ideologies as fragmentary, characterised by fissure and contradiction. How then, is this distinct or autonomous history of Hindu nationalism to be identified? It is the contention of this study that whereas Indian nationalism developed out of an identification of the economic impact of colonialism,⁷¹ Hindu nationalism developed out of the singular impact of colonialism on the Hindu religion. It is to this problem which I will now turn.

⁷⁰ Swami Shraddhanand's enthusiasm for the Rowlatt Satyagraha is a case in point. Heavily involved in the struggle in Delhi at this time, he states that: "For full twenty days it appeared that Ramraj had set in. ...goondas had ceased to exist; every Hindu woman was treated like his own mother, sister or daughter by every Musalman and vice versa"; quoted in J.T.F. Jordens, *Swami Shraddhananda: His Life and Causes* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1981), p. 111.

⁷¹ The definitive statement of this identification is still Bipan Chandra's *Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India* (Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966).

2.4 The Hindu Religion in Colonial India

The introduction to Jaffrelot's important study of the Hindu nationalist movement remarks on the rise of this ideology as a "challenging phenomenon" for social scientists, because of the incompatibility of Hinduism's "essential characteristics" with the kind of "closed and monolithic radicalism" that is normally associated with religious militancy.⁷² By this, he means the aspect of fundamentalism that characterises such movements undertaken in the name of Christianity, Judaism or Islam. In contrast to these faiths, he says, Hinduism does not appear to have the capacity to homogenise large groups of people, because it is all along characterised by social, cultural, doctrinal differentiation. Hinduism is perceived as an inclusivist tradition, and its tendency has been to accommodate, rather than resist, the presence of other traditions.

Jaffrelot sees the development of Hindu nationalism as occurring in opposition to this continuing inclusivism. As has already been noted, he perceives it as emerging out of a strategy of certain high caste Hindus engaged in reformist activities in the late nineteenth century. His interpretation, then, pits a paradigmatic traditional inclusivism precisely against the exclusivism of a self consciously modern, westernising influence. To support this view, Jaffrelot refers to A.D. Smith's typology of nationalisms, situating Hindu nationalism as an ethnic nationalism evolving in response to European modernity.⁷³ Smith's ethnic nationalism posits a doubly socialised intelligentsia - subject to both modern and traditional influences - resorting to the selective usage of tradition in order to "ensure the survival of the group's cultural identity".⁷⁴ There is a complexity in this notion of modernity and tradition which is not sufficiently accommodated in this model. I have already referred to work which draws out this complexity, challenging the historical immutability of tradition, and increasingly suggesting it as a concept that is part of the project of modernity. Jaffrelot indicates his awareness of this work in the text, but his implementation of the Smith model leads to an insufficiently historicised interpretation of some aspects of tradition. For example, his citation of the "Golden Age" theory as a construction of elites reforming their traditions does not take account of the specific history of this theory in the Indian context. As will be illustrated in Chapter 3, the "Golden Age" was a colonial construct - an image of the Indian past, of Hindu tradition, formulated by Orientalist scholars, and utilised by the colonial state as a rationalisation of western domination.

⁷² See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 1.

⁷³ See Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, chapter 10, pp. 230-254.

⁷⁴ Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*, p. 217; see also p. 243: the "reformist" response of the intelligentsia was to "look back...from the outside to discover what is of essential value in the ancient tradition."

Judging by his analysis of Dayananda, this observation is not one with which Jaffrelot would disagree, but it nevertheless indicates an area which his book does not explore: the area of what might be called structural transformation. In this area, the parameters of the elite's selective usage of the Hindu tradition - in this case, their articulation of the Golden Age - was subject to the rapid development of what was *perceived* as tradition during this period, by key social groups. My point is that rather than a certain section of the elite picking and choosing from the "cultural supermarket" of Hindu tradition in order to satisfy their own needs, throughout the nineteenth century Hinduism was developing in such a way, within such a framework, that it became a *necessary* feature of elite discourse. In particular, it assumed a key position in precisely that area identified earlier as strategically central for the development of nationalist ideologies - the colonial public space.

I will illustrate this point by reference to the impact of the colonial legal system on Hinduism.⁷⁵ In 1772 Warren Hastings produced a plan for the effective administration of Bengal which was designed to establish the Company's rule as a recognisable authority in this foreign land. Hastings' plan, which he explained in a letter to the Court of Directors, was to

adapt our Regulations to the Manners and Understandings of the People, and the Exigencies of the Country, adhering as closely as we are able to their ancient uses and Institutions.⁷⁶

The plan, then, was to govern according to the "ancient" practices of the Indians themselves, and in particular to adhere to a legal system which would be recognised as such. This was consonant with the policy of non-intervention adopted by the company in relation to indigenous affairs. It also made particular sense for a commercial company to adhere to recognisable laws related to property, for here was an area where

⁷⁵ I use the term "Hinduism" here for clarity's sake, despite clearly anachronistic connotations. Defining Hinduism is still a matter of debate for contemporary academics; in the late eighteenth century it was a barely articulated concept. As Romila Thapar has commented, "Hinduism of the pre-modern period was...not a uniform monolithic religion, but a juxtaposition of flexible religious sects." See her "Syndicated Moksha?" (in *Seminar* No. 313, 1985, pp. 14-22), p. 22. For further accounts of the development of the term "Hinduism" into a meaningful signifier of a particular religious tradition, and also on the etymology of "Hindu" in general, see W.C. Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (SPCK, London, 1978), pp. 63-71; R.E. Frykenberg, "Constructions of Hinduism at the Nexus of History and Religion" (in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* Vol. 23, No. 3, 1993, pp. 523-550); H. von Stietencron, "Religious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the Modern Concept of Hinduism" (in V. Dalmia and H. von Stietencron [eds.], *Representing Hinduism: the Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity* (Sage, New Delhi, 1995). On defining Hinduism in the context of contemporary Religious Studies, see B.K. Smith, "Exorcising the Transcendent: Strategies for Defining Hinduism and Religion" (in *History of Religions*, Vol. 27, 1987, pp. 32-55).

⁷⁶ Quoted in B. Cohn, "The Command of Language and the Language of Command" (in Guha [ed.], *Subaltern Studies IV*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1985, pp. 276-329), p. 289.

disruption would directly affect the Company's ability to operate. A certain epistemological assumption underpinned Hastings' plan, which is indicated by this use of the phrase "ancient uses and institutions". This referred to a notion that the legal system of the indigenous population had "continued unchanged, from remotest antiquity".⁷⁷ This was particularly so in relation to civil law (i.e. including law related to the issue of property), which under Mughal rule had remained the domain of "traditional community-based institutions".⁷⁸ As Derrett points out, this way of conceiving of law implicitly paralleled *shastric* law with ecclesiastical law in England, which covered marriage and divorce, property, religious worship, excommunication and so on.⁷⁹

The problem for Hastings and other administrators in Bengal was that the repositories of this law were not specified texts (or scripture), but "professors of the *shastra*", or *pandits*. Much of a *pandit*'s learning was based on memorised textual material, acquired through the oral tradition of Brahmanic learning. The material used ranged from "technical *shastric* material, from epics and legends, and from other treatises of relatively late date (such as *puranas*, spurious *smritis*, *agamas* and *tantras*) which...played then a valid part in expounding Hinduism as it was lived, learnt and understood."⁸⁰ It was, however, not so much the texts themselves, but rather the fact that the *pandit* possessed learning based on these texts, which gave him the authority to pronounce on legal matters. In addition, the extent to which *pandits* were relied upon varied considerably from area to area.⁸¹ Local custom articulated through *panchayats* was often a far more authoritative basis for the practice of law than the rulings of *pandits*, although there was certainly a relationship between the two.⁸²

Initially, British courts dealing with civil claims involving Hindus⁸³ relied solely on the *vyavasthas* (written or formal 'opinions') of recognised *pandits*. Without proper recourse to the texts upon which the judgements of *pandits* were based, and not being

77 Quoted in Cohn, "The Command of Language and the Language of Command", p. 290.

78 M. Kishwar, "Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 29, No. 33, 13 August 1994, pp. 2145-2161), p. 2145

79 J.D.M. Derrett, *Religion, Law and the State in India* (Faber, London, 1968), p. 232-4.

80 *ibid.* On the oral tradition and the shifting status of written texts in Hinduism, see C. Mackenzie-Brown, "Purana as Scripture: From Sound to Image of the Holy Word in the Hindu Tradition" (in *History of Religions* Vol. 26, No. 1, 1986-7, pp. 68-86).

81 Derrett, *Religion, Law and the State in India*, p. 230.

82 See Rudolph and Rudolph, *Modernity of Tradition*, p. 270-1.

83 i.e. as opposed to Muslims - as the *shastric* code was perceived as a religious code, it had to be matched by an equivalent code for Muslims, the *Sharia*. As the Rudolphs have pointed out, this was again problematic, particularly in Bengal, "where most Muslims...were Hindu converts who often continued to use local Hindu law rather than Koranic and traditional law after their conversion," Rudolph and Rudolph, *Modernity of Tradition*, p. 270.

able to recognise the authority of legal precedent (*stare decisis*),⁸⁴ British judges had no choice but to accept *vyavasthas* as the basis for judgements in appropriate cases. There is a central issue of power here. The *vyavastha* system localised power in the decisions of the *pandits*, as opposed to the judgements of Company officials. This was by no means acceptable, and very quickly after the implementation of Hastings' plan the Company began to take steps to circumvent or undermine the localised power of the *pandits*.

This implicit power of the *pandits* in the Company's courts was reflected in the unease with which they were viewed by officials. On the one hand they were respected as learned professors of the *shastra*, yet on the other they were distrusted and felt to be moulding *vyavasthas* to suit their own interests. This distrust reflected the widely-held belief that an original and ancient body of *shastric* law did exist in textual form, and that the *pandits* were deliberately obscuring it in order to maintain their position of power.⁸⁵ The original body of laws was made doubly obscure by the "corruption" it had suffered over the centuries as a result of interpretations and commentaries. Much of the project of Sanskrit Studies which developed around the turn of the century was directed towards the reconstruction of this original code. The Government Sanskrit College, established at Benaras in 1791, emphasised above all the study of the *Dharma Shastras*, which dealt specifically with sacred law.⁸⁶

William Jones, who was appointed as a judge in the Calcutta Supreme Court in 1783, became the first British official to develop a proper command of Sanskrit, and was largely responsible for the establishment of the first institution for the study of Indology, the Asiatic Society of Bengal, in 1784.⁸⁷ He was motivated by a desire to introduce consistency into the legal system, and to preserve the "true" laws of the indigenous population.⁸⁸ As such, his major work was to produce a Code or Digest of Hindu law which would adequately represent the legal aspects of *Dharma Shastra*. Throughout, Jones was concerned with revealing a "pure" form of Hindu law, which

84 Derrett, *Religion, Law and the State in India*, p. 235 - this lack of recognition was based on a similar system in British ecclesiastical courts.

85 Hinduism as a faith deliberately obscured by Brahmans was a common assumption in the 18th century. See, for example, Alexander Dow, "A Dissertation Concerning the Hindoos", in P.J. Marshall (ed.), *The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970), pp. 107 - 139; Dow speaks of the "impenetrable veil of mystery with which the Brahmans industriously cover their religious tenets and philosophy", and notes that they are "at so much pains to conceal (their faith) from foreigners" (pp. 107-8).

86 Nita Kumar, "Sanskrit Pandits and the Modernisation of Sanskrit Education in the 19th-20th Centuries" (Unpublished Seminar Paper, SOAS, London, 1993), p. 13.

87 See Inden, *Imagining India*, p. 44.

88 Derrett, *Religion, Law and the State in India*, p. 244.

would allow European judges to make judgements which they could be certain were correct.

The structure of Jones' thought is revealing. He was intent on "discovering" or "reconstituting" a system of law which was *the* true form of that system within the parameters of Hinduism. Without this, the indigenous population would not be able to receive proper justice. The true form of the system could only reside in a text, and not an individual or collective memory, because the latter necessitated interpretation, and interpretation implicitly suggested the corruption of the original. Text, then, was central, and since the *shastric* texts were essentially religious texts, this emphasis on texts meant an emphasis on scripture. Again, as interpretation implied corruption, the greatest authority, the truest form of the text, must be the oldest. Antiquity embodied in scripture was equated with the "real" tradition of the Hindus.

In this way, the system of law which emerged during the nineteenth century developed a character of immutability based on its association with tradition. Significantly, the value of this notion of tradition was measured by reference to texts perceived as scripture, preferably "ancient" scripture. To invoke the rule of law, then, was to call up a specific discourse of tradition. There are several ways in which this discourse of tradition began to penetrate the idea of Hindu religiosity. The most obvious is the critical position of scripture, and of the need to verify actions and events by reference to this scripture. This is illustrated most pertinently by the debate over *sati* during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, particularly between 1818, when Rammohun Roy published his first work on the subject, and 1829 when it was outlawed by Bentinck's government.

Recent research by Lata Mani has presented this debate in a light which relates directly to the foregoing analysis of the development of Hindu law.⁸⁹ Mani has analysed the discursive parameters within which the debate over the abolition of *sati* was articulated; this analysis indicates just how pervasive the colonial discourse of tradition had become

⁸⁹ See Mani's two articles: "The Production of an Official Discourse on *Sati* in Early 19th Century Bengal" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 21, No. 17, 26 April 1986, pp. 32-40); and "Contentious Traditions: the Debate on *Sati* in Colonial India" (in K. Sangari and S. Vaid [eds.], *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*, Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 88-126). Sheldon Pollock has produced an interesting critique of Mani's work in his "Deep Orientalism? Notes on Sanskrit and Power beyond the Raj" (in P. van der Veer and C. Breckenridge [eds.], *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1993, pp. 76-133). Pollock's critique is based on his wider argument that "post-orientalist" analysis has hitherto ignored or even obscured the dynamics of power evident in precolonial social relations. Specifically in relation to Mani's analysis, he argues against textual tradition as a colonial construct, pointing to "perhaps a millennium of debate in India over what constitutes 'traditional' textuality and how local practices interact with that textuality." (p. 100).

within a relatively short period of time. Initially, the most striking element of her work is the illustration of how colonial officials and indigenous reformers committed to the abolition of *sati* argued not on the basis that it was "cruel" or "barbaric" or "against the practice of civil society", but rather that it was not sanctioned by authoritative scripture. As Mani states, quoting from the 1821 *Parliamentary Papers on Hindoo Widows*, "the civilising mission of colonisation was thus seen to lie in ...giving back to the natives the truths of their own 'little read and less understood shaster'."⁹⁰

Official attempts to establish the scriptural efficacy of *sati* involved extensive use of the *vyavastha* system noted earlier in the formative structure of the legal system. Mani's own citations of *sati*-related *vyavasthas* illustrate that they referred to custom as well as scriptural sources, and also that they were expressed explicitly as *interpretations*, rather than expressions of absolute truth.⁹¹ These aspects were marginalised as evidence, and in the case of *vyavasthas* based on custom were often required to be revised. Throughout the period of debate and formal consideration by the state, then, scriptural authority was reinforced as the most legitimate form of authority, the repository of truth.

This attitude is consonant with the discourse of tradition illustrated as underpinning the construction of the legal system. The mission of the state was perceived as reviving the moribund culture of India, to reformulate it as a civilised yet still exotic country, as appeared to be depicted in its scriptures. What is interesting is that Mani illustrates the pro-*sati* lobby as accepting these parameters, and arguing with the same intensity on the basis of scriptural authority. The final pro-*sati* petition of 1830 was accompanied by "a paper of authorities" described as "a translation of a decision of the legal points declaring the practice of suttee lawful and expedient".⁹² Scriptural references were described as "legal points", and the approval of scripture rendered the practice of *sati* "lawful". The issue to which this petition was directed is, of course, whether or not *sati* should be outlawed, but even so, the implementation of legal vocabulary to describe what the pro-*sati* lobby perceived as an explicitly religious practice is striking. Law intervenes in Hinduism to the extent that it signifies what is and what is not part of the religion. The mechanism through which this decision process occurs is scripture, which becomes both a repository of religious faith and a legally-binding authority. Because of its association with the law, scripture begins to outstrip other signifiers of

⁹⁰ Mani, "Contentious Traditions", p. 95.

⁹¹ See Mani, "The Production of an Official Discourse on *Sati* in Early 19th Century Bengal", p. 37.

⁹² Quoted in Mani, "Contentious Traditions", p. 115.

religious faith, becoming the ultimate authority, the objective representation of religiosity.

The significance of the *sati* debate in our context is partly that it is conducted precisely in the developing public space of colonial India. This is true not only in terms of its airing in the law courts and in petitions to the government, but also in terms of the press, where it was widely discussed, and views were frequently expressed as indications of "public opinion".⁹³ Within this space, the parameters of what constitutes Hinduism are by the 1820s being widely scrutinised and discussed, and a certain perception of these parameters is already dominant. It is important to note, furthermore, that this perception is not confined to those described as reformers - it is also prevalent among those described as orthodox. This needs to be emphasised, because of the tendency to perceive the objectification of Hinduism as a scripture-based faith at this time as a reformist concern. My argument is that this process occurred within the public space, as a result of the structural transformation of Hinduism under the impact of colonial rule. It was therefore a process that affected a far wider spectrum of indigenous opinion: not only reformist, but also those who were consciously anti-reformist; and beyond this, those who actively engaged the public space through one process or another. Because of this key position of the public space, it can also be concluded that the middle class were at the heart of this developing perception of Hinduism.

Interestingly, this point is supported by one of the most significant developments that occurred in the context of the *sati* debate; it also leads us into the final area of clarification in this chapter. This is the emergence of divergent organisations in Calcutta claiming to represent the "true" Hindu tradition. The Brahmo Samaj, of course, developed into a major reforming organisation, driven by a succession of brilliant minds. In the context of the *sati* debate, however, the establishment of the Dharma Sabha as an organisation to protect the interests of "orthodoxy" was an equally significant event. Both these organisations drew on new perceptions of what constituted Hinduism; both were drawn from the Calcutta middle class. In addition, both were modern political formations, conforming to the conventions of what constituted an organisation within the context of the colonial state. It is to this area of organisation, and to the Hindu nationalist concept of *sangathan*, which I will now turn.

⁹³ For some examples of this kind of debate, see S.D. Collet, *The Life and Letters of Raja Rammohun Roy* (Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, Calcutta, 1962 - 1st ed. 1900), p. 261; Collet notes among other comments that of the Asiatic Journal of June 1830, which stated that "the Government had satisfied itself that the majority of the native community was decidedly opposed to the practice."

2.5 Organisation and *Sangathan*

Organisation is central to this thesis on two inter-related levels: first, on the level of political mobilisation - the way in which Hindus became organised as a political force; and secondly, on the level of religious ideology - the way in which organisation came to be articulated as an ideal to which Hindus could legitimately aspire. It is significant, then, on both a political and a religious level. On both levels, the protagonists were forced to confront the question of what constitutes Hinduism: what were its defining characteristics, and where were its boundaries located. Because of this over-arching question, I would suggest, the two levels developed together, mutually informing debate and development in the area of organisation. It is not until the 1920s, however, that this process produced the conscious articulation of *sangathan*, as both a religious and a political movement.

The *sangathan* movement of the mid-1920s was intimately linked to the ascendance of the Hindu Mahasabha as a political force and the Malkana *shuddhi* campaign to reconvert a certain group of nominal Muslims in western United Provinces with clear links into existing Rajput castes. In this context, the *sangathan* movement was articulated as a means of consolidating Hindu society, of unifying Hinduism, in response to the perceived unity of Indian Muslims.⁹⁴ *Sangathan* was generally popularised by the Hindu Mahasabha at this time, and in particular it was spelt out as a programme of development by the Arya Samajist Swami Shraddhanand.⁹⁵ In history and political science literature, accounts of the movement generally trace its roots to the emergence of the Sabha movement in the Punjab in the first decade of the twentieth century.⁹⁶ Although it will be illustrated that this Sabha movement was influential in the development of *sangathan*, my thesis will look to integrate this as part of a more long-term development of the idea in both religious and political terms.

Sangathan is derived from the Sanskrit prefix *sam*, "together", and the verbal root *ghaṭ*, "to form or mould".⁹⁷ This is evident in the more strict Sanskritic use of *saṅghaṭan*,

94 As Mushirul Hasan has pointed out, the 'organic' unity of Indian Islam was very much a fabricated image - Indian Muslims were at this time subject to numerous divisions; see his *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-1930* (Manohar, New Delhi, 1991), p. 12-13.

95 Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan - Saviour of the Dying Race* (Delhi, Arjun Press, 1926); this was followed a little later by Bhai Parmanand's *Hindu Sangathan* (Central Hindu Yuvak Sabha, Lahore, 1936).

96 See Indra Prakash, *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement* (Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Mahasabha, Delhi, 1938); J.T.F. Jordens, *Swami Shraddhananda*, p. 135; Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 159; Jaffrelot, "Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building".

97 See R.L. Turner, *Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages*, pp. 237 and 746. The conjunction is evident, for example, in *samghaṭayati*, "joins together", and *samghāṭa*,

"organisation, formation, constitution, composition."⁹⁸ In its more general Hindi form - *sāṅgaṭhan*- which will be adhered to in this thesis, it is translated as "(the act or process of) organisation (or an organised body or system or society)."⁹⁹ A review of religious studies literature reveals that it is not recognised as a significant feature of Hinduism.¹⁰⁰ This lack of treatment suggests that, if indeed the idea of organisation that *sangathan* denotes can be established as a central feature of Hindu nationalist ideology, it was not derived from traditional forms of religiosity, and further that the structure of Hindu nationalism was not based on recognisable institutions in Hinduism.¹⁰¹ Where the notion of organisation or unification in modern Hinduism is discussed in religious studies literature, it is often linked strongly to the reform movements, especially the Arya Samaj, and through these, to the influence of Christianity.¹⁰² Again, although these were undoubtedly important influences, it will be illustrated in this thesis that organisation was a wider concern, forced into the arena of public debate by a variety of images and pressures associated with the context of colonialism. I will argue that organisation had a direct impact on the presentation of both religion and politics in this context.

It is in this sense that I will be developing the idea of a "discourse of organisation" as a feature of colonial India. As has been illustrated, the hegemonic arrangement of the colonial state served to produce a kind of rational-legal culture. In Chapter 3 I will

"fitting and joining of timber". I am grateful to Dr. Rupert Gethin for drawing my attention to this point.

98 See M. Chaturvedi and B.N. Tiwari, *A Practical Hindi-English Dictionary* (National Publishing House, Delhi, 1970), p. 641. This form is employed by V.D. Savarkar and Indra Prakash in the latter's *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement*. Also, this was explained to me in an interview as the correct Sanskrit pronunciation by the RSS *swayamsevak* and Sanskrit scholar Dr. S.B. Warnekar; interview conducted 22 April 1996.

99 Chaturvedi and Tiwari, *A Practical Hindi-English Dictionary*, p. 640.

100 Organisation as a feature of Indian religious tradition is associated more with the Buddhist and Jain notions of *sangha*, "any number of people living together for a certain purpose, a society, association, company, community", especially in terms of a monastic order or sect. See Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit - English Dictionary* (Clarendon, Oxford, 1899) p.1129. Neither Monier-Williams nor the following works mention the idea of *sangathan*, referring only to *sangha* as an organisational concept in Buddhist and Jain contexts: J.L. Brockington, *The Sacred Thread: Hinduism in its Continuity and Diversity* (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1981); K. Klostermaier, *A Survey of Hinduism* (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989); J.J. Lipner, *Hindus: Their Beliefs and Practices* (Routledge, London, 1994); K.M. Sen, *Hinduism* (Penguin, London, 1961); R.C. Zaehner, *Hinduism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1966).

101 This point, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7, counters the argument of some non-religious studies literature that the RSS was modelled on Hindu notions of the "sect" and asceticism; see, for example, Jaffrelot, *Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, pp. 35-45, and "Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building", pp. 521-522.

102 A recent example is provided by Heinrich Von Stietencron, "Religious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the Modern Concept of Hinduism", p. 79; see also D. Gold, "Organised Hinduisms: From Vedic Truth to Hindu Nation" (in M. Marty and R. Appleby [eds.], *Fundamentalisms Observed*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, pp. 531-593), p. 533.

examine some of the ways in which this rational-legal culture was expressed. It will be illustrated that the state persistently projected organisation as the key facet of this culture - it was a means of articulating power, in that the projected organisation of the state was contrasted to the disorganisation of society. In fact this projection has already been alluded to in relation to the Orientalist approach to Hinduism: an attempt to establish some order, some organisation, by reconstituting the scriptural truths of the religion's "little read and less understood shaster", and in so doing to undermine the inconsistent, disorganised authority of priestly interpretation.

This projection of organisation had critical implications for modes of articulation in what has been defined as the public space of colonial India - an element of the rational-legal culture, and the space in which the indigenous population had the opportunity to address the state, and each other in relation to the state, in a systematic fashion. Organisation constituted a central feature of this space, not only in the sense that Societies, Sabhas, Samajes increasingly provided an appropriate platform for addressing the state on issues of indigenous rights, but also in the sense that organisation within this context implied representation. A Sabha that petitioned the government on the "legality" of beef sales in a particular market, for example, did so on the basis that its view was representative of a constituency. The Nagpur Gorakshini Sabha, which petitioned the Government of India in July 1894 on the issue of cow protection, did so on behalf of "the inhabitants of Nagpur and the adjoining districts."¹⁰³ The Sabha - a self-appointed collection of lawyers, bankers, landowners and the like - could not seriously claim to stand for such a wide constituency, but the accuracy of representative claims was not necessarily the point. The idea of representation was necessary in order to legitimise the claims of the Sabha, to give them meaning, within the public space. It is in this sense that I am referring to organisation as a discourse: a means through which issues, claims - the putative expression of the people's "rights" - are given meaning within the public space of colonial India.

The idea of a discourse of organisation is presented as configured by the hegemonic arrangement of the colonial state. As such it is not a static concept: it developed historically, and increasingly became the site of struggle as the power and sophistication of Indian nationalism was extended around the turn of the century. It may be defined consistently, however, as the accepted or recognisable way of "being public" within the parameters of the public space. For overtly political organisations like the Congress, of course, this also meant the way of "being political" in the public space. Increasingly, this political implication was also to become central to the

¹⁰³ Home Department Public, July 1894, "A" Proceedings (hereafter abbreviated as A Progs), no. 302 (National Archives of India - hereafter abbreviated as NAI)

alignment of religious organisations in this context. The reason for this was the articulation of religion as a "right", as expressed in the example given above from Nagpur. In Chapter 3 this idea of religion as a "right" will be examined in more detail, as the discourse of organisation became more elaborate in the second half of the nineteenth century.

2.6 Summary of Discussion

In this chapter a series of key points have been discussed. These may be summarised as follows:

1. Ideology is defined as a "framework" for the perception of the world; it therefore has a fundamental role in identity formation.
2. The relationship between class and ideology is not deterministic, and ideology has an objective, material existence. In its materialism, however, ideology is historically configured, and is therefore given meaning only by its association with particular classes or social blocs.
3. Ideologies may be projected by elements within classes - i.e. class unity is by no means a given - and equally, ideological alliances between classes are possible, as are "tendential alignments", through which different classes align themselves to the same ideology, without necessarily having the same interpretation of that ideology.
4. Hegemony is the means by which the state produces consent within society. This active consent is achieved by means of the expansion of the state, in terms of the increased sophistication of civil society. Hegemony is nevertheless an area of struggle between the ruling class and other social blocs in society; the fact that the state has produced the cornerstones of hegemony through its own expansion simply means that it occupies the most strategic terrain in this struggle.
5. Despite the fact that Gramsci developed the idea of hegemony in a western capitalist context, it is a valid model in the interpretation of Indian colonial society. In the first instance, this premise is supported by the fact that the ruling class of colonial society was drawn from the bourgeois political order in Europe - an increasingly hegemonic order.
6. The English-educated, profession-oriented middle class held a position of power within the hegemonic arrangement of the colonial state, precisely because of its proximity to, or even integration with, those elements of civil society that began to develop across the existing web of Indian society.
7. Central to the state's hegemonic arrangement was the development of a public space. A space where the indigenous population could address the state, as well as each other on matters related to the state. Although this space was ultimately controlled

by the state, it was also the site of independent indigenous comment - an opportunity to develop subversive ideologies in direct relation to the discourse of colonialism.

8. Elite-led Indian and Hindu nationalism developed as ideologies within this context. Although intimately related, they must be differentiated, in as much as their objectives are distinct, and, more importantly, the pressures that brought them into being were separate.

9. Hindu nationalism must also be distinguished from Hindu communalism. Whereas the former constitutes an ideology, the latter constitutes a simple "framework" within which this ideology operates from the twenties onwards.

10. Hindu nationalism developed as an ideology out of the singular impact of colonialism on the Hindu religion. This impact produced "structural transformation" of Hinduism in terms of its relationship to society. In particular, authority within Hinduism - the essence of the faith - was relocated in scripture, with antiquity forming the index of this authority.

11. This transformation of Hinduism was felt particularly among the middle class, because it was effected principally through the legal framework of colonial rule, and so reverberated most strongly in the public space.

12. Because of the nature of this transformation, it is not correct to place emphasis on reformism as the sole source of innovation in terms of religious ideology in the nineteenth century. Instead, emphasis should be placed on the development of ideologies within the public space, mediated by the middle class. These ideologies were both reformist and non-reformist.

13. Organisation is important in this context, because of the operation of the discourse of organisation in the public space. First, if issues of religion were to be addressed to the state, they needed to be "packaged" within organisations that the state would recognise. Secondly, organisation as expressed in this context began to be perceived as synonymous with the "revitalisation" of the Hindu religion (i.e. the revitalisation of the "true" tradition as embodied in the text).

14. It is this perception which developed into the idea of *sangathan*, and it is on the basis of this idea that the ideology of Hindu nationalism is constructed. How the idea developed, then, constitutes the principal concern of this thesis.

These points are established as a framework for this thesis. As such, they will be subject to review in the course of the study. In the next chapter I will examine the development of the underlying discourse of organisation in colonial India, the initial pressures on the Hindu religion to conform to this discourse, and the ramifications on the religion as articulated by the middle class.

The State and the Hindu Religion in the Nineteenth Century

The development of the colonial state in India was a gradual process, characterised by trial and error.¹ The East India Company had a clear enough objective - profit - but its approach was tempered by a hypersensitivity towards local social and commercial relations. Initially, this was due to the concern that the disruption of these relations may affect the ability of the Company to extract profit. As one scholar has commented, "for the British it was clear that an orderly marketplace was an issue of primary importance".² From the 1780s onwards, however, the power of the Company was gradually curtailed by the British state, with the Crown taking increasing responsibility for aspects of government. As this responsibility grew, the activities of the Company became more and more subject to scrutinisation by liberal forces within the British establishment; forces which were determined to enforce the already extant view that the role of the British in India was primarily to improve the lot of the indigenous, "heathen" population.³ The ensuing struggle between liberal and conservative forces within the establishment - symbolised by the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings - has been presented in a recent account as a struggle to assert the predominance of certain ideologies of British identity in the context of rapid capitalist development and European expansion.⁴

The conditions of possibility for this debate, however, were provided by the growing realisation of the strength of British power in India. By the turn of the century, this fact was felt keenly by officials within India. H. Straching, for example, Judge and Magistrate in Midnapore, writes in 1802 that "the power of the Bengal Government appears to me, of all governments, the most unquestionably despotic over its subjects. The submission of the natives is perfect and unqualified; so complete as to preclude the necessity of concern or intimidation of any kind."⁵ The underlying feeling, therefore,

¹ This is particularly well illustrated by Prior in "Making History"; and by Bernard Cohn in "The Command of Language and the Language of Command".

² Fusfield, "Communal Conflict in Delhi: 1803-1930" (in *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1982, pp. 181-200), p. 187.

³ See T. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994; series title: The New Cambridge History of India ; 3.4), p. 17.

⁴ Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, pp. 15-19; especially the Whig-inspired ideology of private property as the foundation of progressive civil society.

⁵ "Answers to Interrogatories of the Governor General to the Judges of Circuit and Zillah Judges, in Bengal; respecting the effects of the New System of Revenue, and of Judicial Administration; Papers on Police, Missionaries, Hindu Religion and Infanticide", *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers* 1812-13, Vol IX.1, p. 31; the "Interrogatories" consist of a series of 39 enormously varied questions, ranging from detailed inquiries into the working of

is one of "unquestionable despotism", leading to an increasingly confident attitude towards Indian society and the possibility of intervention within it.⁶ The implementation of liberal ideologies could only come as a result of the manifestation of this power within India.

What, then, was the impact of this manifestation of power on colonial society? The conception of Hinduism as a religion was an area in which the power of the emerging state was undoubtedly influential.⁷ During the nineteenth century, movements towards the articulation of Hinduism as a single religious tradition, to be compared with other "World Religions", are clearly evident.⁸ Certain elements of "Western culture" - notably Christianity and rationalism - are often presented as agents in the development of these movements, although the processes through which this kind of cultural interaction occurred are still a matter of debate.⁹ My objective in this chapter is, in a sense, to divert attention from this direct correlation between explicit cultural forces and

the law courts and police to general calls for opinions on the moral character of the population, the likelihood of insurrection, local attitudes towards the concept of private property and the state of economic, civic and social improvement in the various districts. Straching's reply is amongst the lengthiest, running to detailed pages of information and opinion. He makes a further interesting contribution to the above debate when he states that: "Our government...appears to me very strong, and secure from serious internal commotion, although the natives can hardly be said to be attached to it, for none of them understand it. No government ever stood more independent of public opinion" (p. 27).

6 This attitude is illustrated well by official comment during the debate over the criminalisation of *sati*. British power, it was felt, was now a settled fact, and change could therefore be effected without fear of opposition. See, for example, the comment of R.N.C Hamilton, Acting Magistrate of Benaras, in August 1826:

"At no period, since the introduction of European supremacy, has the British power been so exalted and permanently fixed as at the present; wars have ceased; the factious and turbulent spirit of cabal and discontent has been aroused, excited and crushed; the whole country, in every direction, is in the enjoyment of the most perfect tranquility and soundest peace; the recollection of the only stay, on which discord and revolt could rest a hope, remains only as a warning and proof of the utter uselessness of opposition, and the nothingness of the best concerted schemes when brought in contact with British power; such a season, then, may surely be deemed peculiarly apt for the introduction of a law, having for its object the termination and extinction of the most revolting and most lamentable sacrifice, and thereby casting away a reproach, which cannot but be attached to its longer sufferance..."

"Correspondence Relative to Burning of Hindoo Widows on the Funeral Piles of their Husbands", *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, 1830, Vol. XXVIII.783, pp. 901-2.

7 On the development of the term Hinduism as a signifier of a single religious tradition, see also Chapter 2, note 75.

8 It is important to emphasise plurality here; there was no single movement towards the expression of Hinduism as a given entity. This is a point which has recently been drawn out by Vasudha Dalmia: "there were, in fact, many points of departure for the variant representations of Hinduism, as it was being articulated in the second half of the nineteenth century, each of which claimed equal validity." See Dalmia, "The Only Real Religion of the Hindus: Vaisnava Self-representation in the Late Nineteenth Century" (in Dalmia and Von Stietencron, *Representing Hinduism*, pp. 176-210), p. 176.

9 Jaffrelot's "stigmatise and emulate" model is one such process; on this model, see Section 6.2.1 of this thesis. For an overview of issues involved in debates over cultural interaction, see U. King, "Some Reflections on Sociological Approaches to the Study of Modern Hinduism" (in *Numen: International Review of the History of Religions*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1989, pp. 72-97).

new departures in the signification of Hinduism. I will concentrate instead on the manifestation of colonial power as a significant cultural force in itself. In particular, ideas about organisation, and the way in which the colonial state was organised in relation to society, operated as a central theme of this cultural force. The theme of organisation developed in the second half of the nineteenth century into an important discourse in the articulation of colonial power. It is in this context that organisation was to emerge as a critical element in the representation of Hinduism as a single religious tradition.

3.1 The Organisation of the State and the Disorganisation of Society

In the first instance, I will look at the way in which the colonial state deployed organisation as a cultural force. I will argue that specific images of organisation and disorganisation brokered British power in cultural terms. These images were particularly focused on the elements of the state which effectively delivered the British challenge in this arena of culture: namely, the "cornerstones" of the hegemonic arrangement, the key elements in the production of the rational-legal culture.

3.1.1 Hegemonic Cornerstones as Images of Organisation

In Chapter 2 it was noted that the development of hegemonic power was based upon the "expansion of the state" - the development of features of civil society identified as hegemonic cornerstones. Bureaucracy was cited as playing the most decisive role in this process of expansion, but other cornerstones were also identified: the legal system, the education system, and aspects of infrastructural development. All these were aspects of the state which were expansive, expressing the progressive power of the state. This expression occurred in a particular cultural language. My contention in this section is that this was the language of organisation, and I will support the contention by examining these cornerstones as cultural expressions of organisation.

(a) Law

As we have seen,¹⁰ the establishment of a definitive body of "Hindu" and "Muslim" law was accepted as a necessary task of colonial rule, and men such as N.B. Halhed and William Jones set about "discovering" the ancient texts that contained this law. Not only were the texts identified, they were also ordered in terms of significance according to antiquity. In this way, the state attempted to establish a legal system recognisable to

¹⁰ See Section 2.4.

itself, its European officers and the British establishment as rational and just. As Bernard Cohn has noted, this process meant "ignor(ing) local indigenous adjudication procedures and model(ling) the process of adjudication in the courts on that of the British law courts of the period".¹¹ The sacred significance of this systematised law was signposted as early as 1793 by Cornwallis, when he declared that the Government itself, despite its "unquestionable despotism", would be subject to the rule of law.¹² Presenting law in this manner facilitated the construction of the "framework of a new state consciously projected as based purely on rules, procedures and principles."¹³ The framework, in other words, for the projection of impersonal or neutral organisation as a defining characteristic of British power.

This image of the law was reinforced by the introduction of codes of civil and criminal procedure in the 1860s. These codes standardised the approach - or subjection - of any individual to the law. The steady construction of this framework was perceived as having a profound impact on the indigenous population. As James Fitzjames Stephen, legal member of the Viceroy's Council from 1869 to 1872, articulated it:

The establishment of a system of law which regulates the most important parts of the daily life of the people constitutes in itself a moral conquest more striking, more durable, and far more solid, than the physical conquest which rendered it possible. It exercises an influence over the minds of the people in many ways comparable to that of a new religion.¹⁴

The first sentence here indicates the way in which "regulation" - or, in our terms, organisation - was perceived specifically as an aspect of domination. The second sentence locates it implicitly as an ideological force. The impact of this force is exemplified by the nature of unrest during the colonial period. Josh has noted the way in which peasant unrest was consistently articulated within the framework of legal rights.¹⁵ In this thesis it will be noted consistently in relation to religious disputes and communal unrest. It constitutes a rational, organised force in society, to which any class or social bloc could relate.

(b) Aspects of Infrastructural Development: Communication and Movement

One of the most striking features of colonial development during the second half of the nineteenth century was the growth of the rail network across British India. This growth was fuelled by a massive investment of British capital, "the largest single unit

¹¹ Bernard Cohn, *An Anthropologist Among the Historians*, p. 568.

¹² Cited in Bhagwan Josh, *The Struggle for Hegemony in India Vol. II*, p. 27.

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ Quoted in Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, p. 39.

¹⁵ See Josh, *The Struggle for Hegemony in India Vol. II*, pp. 35-6.

of international investment in the nineteenth century".¹⁶ The ramifications of this development are obviously far-reaching and complex, both in terms of the colonial economy and the political and social unification of the subcontinent.¹⁷ In the present context, I want to emphasise the way in which the network shifted perceptions of travel and its role in the organisation of society. This is well illustrated by contrasting two policies of the colonial government.

The first concerns what the government termed 'wandering tribes' - bands of *sannyasis*, vagrants and itinerant traders who moved about the country, following pilgrimage or trading routes. As one scholar has suggested, this kind of movement represented "an alternative structure of social and political organisation" to the arrangement of the colonial state, which was inherently threatening.¹⁸ Increasingly, the "dangerousness" of a particular community was justified on the basis that "they do not lead a settled life" or "they always move from place to place for the ostensible purpose of their trade".¹⁹ In 1871, the government introduced the Criminal Tribes Act as a means of eradicating this practice. Under this legislation, the government "indiscriminately identified entire groups as offenders, making few distinctions between the different kinds of peripatetics, such as pastoral nomads, bards, minstrels, mendicants and traders, and between castes and tribes."²⁰ Groups identified as criminal under the terms of this act were subject to a regime of pass carrying, restricted movement and in some cases enforced settlement; any unauthorised movement led to imprisonment.²¹

This severe restriction of "disorderly" movement can be contrasted to the development of rail travel as a viable prospect for most Indians. Travel governed by clock-time,

¹⁶ Bipan Chandra, *Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism*, p. 176.

¹⁷ On the economic impact, see Chandra, *Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism*, pp. 178-90; on social and political significance, see A.R. Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, pp. 131-34.

¹⁸ S. Freitag, "Collective Crime and Authority in North India" (in A. Yang [ed.], *Crime and Criminality in British India*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1985, pp. 140-164), p. 157.

¹⁹ Statements of Madras Government officials quoted in M. Radhakrishnan, "Surveillance and Settlements under the Criminal Tribes Act in Madras" (in *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. 29 No. 2, 1992, pp. 171-198), p. 176.

²⁰ See Yang, "Dangerous Castes and Tribes: the Criminal Tribes Act and the Magahiya Doms of Northeast India" (in Yang [ed.], *Crime and Criminality in British India*, pp. 108-127), p. 116. The Bengal government classified "sunnyassees" under the Act as "religious mendicants who wander about the country (and who) live by begging, cheating and pilfering."

²¹ On the implementation of the Criminal Tribes Act and its implications, see also S. Freitag, "Crime and Criminality in the Social Order of Colonial North India" (in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1991, pp. 227-261; M. Radhakrishnan, "The Criminal Tribes Act in Madras Presidency: Implications for Itinerant Trading Communities" (in *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1989, pp. 270-295); and Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, p. 123-4.

according to regular schedules, became an increasingly integral feature of everyday life. In particular, rail travel became a significant factor in the regulation of large movements of people. This is reflected in shifts in the nature of pilgrimage during the late nineteenth century. Festivals at major pilgrimage sites such as Allahabad, Benaras and Ayodhya grew in size due to increased accessibility, and became major feats of administrative organisation.²² Similarly in the early twentieth century, as Indian nationalism developed into a mass movement, the government concentrated on rail travel as a means of regulating movement, accommodating unrest. During the Flag *Satyagraha* in Nagpur in 1923, for example, the provincial government attempted to diffuse the situation by preventing potential *satyagrahis* from other areas reaching Nagpur; they did this by vetting passengers at stations on the outskirts of the city.²³ In this way, stations became focal points for the monitoring and regulation of large movements of people. Symbols, as it were, of a cultural intervention governed by the notion of organisation.

(c) Education

Education is again a familiar area for an examination of the colonial impact in India. Such examination, however, tends to focus on the Anglicist/Orientalist debate in the 1820s and early 30s, and the subsequent adoption of English as the medium of instruction for Higher Education after 1835. The structure of the British approach to education, however, is also significant. This is evident in the educational initiatives of the Company prior to the Resolution of 1835. Bernard Cohn, for example, has highlighted the format of colleges set up in Calcutta and Benaras in the late eighteenth century:

The British conceived of education as taking place in 'institutions', meaning a building with physically divided spaces marking off one 'class' of students from another, as well as teachers from students. There were to be fixed positions of professors, teachers and assistants, who taught regular classes in subjects. The students' progress had to be regularly examined to measure their acquisition of fixed bodies of knowledge. The end of the process was marked by prizes and certification which attested to the students' command of a specifiable body of knowledge.²⁴

Despite the fact that both the Calcutta Madrasa and the Sanskrit College in Benaras were projects designed to promote education based on indigenous knowledge, they were *organised* within a specific cultural framework. Without this, they would not have had meaning within the colonial project. As Cohn continues, these colleges had to

²² See Katherine Prior, "The British Administration of Hinduism", pp. 80-86.

²³ See *Taruna Maharashtra*, 14 July 1923, in Report on Indian Papers Published in the Central Provinces and Berar, 1923 (NAI).

²⁴ Cohn, "The Command of Language and the Language of Command", p.319.

be governed by a "British metalogic of regularity, uniformity and...fiscal responsibility."

The influence of organisation is again evident at a later stage in the development of the colonial education system. The 'trickle-down' strategy that the government adopted as part of the Anglicist vision of 1835 was recognised as failing by 1854. As a result, a new total system of education, from primary to university, was established in accordance with the Education Despatch of Sir Charles Wood. This Despatch envisaged a system built in collaboration with private organisations, financed by a system of grants-in-aid. The system developed into a huge educational bureaucracy, monitoring the effectiveness of institutions, paying out grants and considering applications for fresh aid.²⁵ This system encouraged the growth of institutions in response to the requirements of provincial bureaucracies, in that the process of applying for and maintaining grants-in-aid was governed by rules, which did much to mould the shape of educational development. In Madras Presidency, for example, a "teacher certificate" system regulated grants on the basis of teachers' qualifications. In Bombay, a "payment by results" system paid out grants on the basis of students' success in examinations. Through this "helter-skelter of instructions and multiplicity of official interpretations" the grants-in-aid system expanded to encompass some 79% of educational institutions in British India by 1900.²⁶

(d) Bureaucracy

The education system developed, then, as a facet of a burgeoning bureaucracy. Many of its products - English-educated, middle class young men - would look to this bureaucracy as a means of employment. Partly because of this significance for the middle class, and partly because of its key position in the expansion of the state, bureaucracy constitutes the most enduring image of colonial organisation. Thomas Metcalf has illustrated how the bureaucracy became a kind of tool for the organisation of colonial society, through the acquisition and processing of information. Even by 1820, he states, "the Raj was already based far more on direct observation and measurement in the Indian countryside than on the citation of Sanskrit texts."²⁷ The bureaucracy in effect defined the division of British India into presidencies, provinces, divisions and districts. It controlled the development of municipalities, infrastructure, natural resource exploitation and trade through a myriad of departments that were continually formed, amalgamated, split and reformed.

²⁵ See J. Brown, *Modern India: the Origins of an Asian Democracy* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), p. 123.

²⁶ See A. Misra, *Grants in Aid of Education in India* (Macmillan, Delhi, 1973), p. 8-27.

²⁷ Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, p. 26.

Although not accountable to the people, the bureaucracy was nevertheless accountable to itself, and so generated enormous quantities of records detailing its own workings. It is in this area of record keeping that the indigenous middle class was utilised as a facet of colonial organisation. The position of clerk became the most recognisable source of employment for middle class Indians completing their education. With executive power remaining largely in the hands of British civil servants, the lot of departmental clerks was an endless process of organising and reproducing information in triplicate or quadruplicate.

The oppressive nature of this culture of organisation has been brought out recently by Sumit Sarkar in a study of the effect of European clock-time in colonial India.²⁸ Interestingly, Sarkar points to three specific sites where the introduction of clock-time had a resounding impact: railways, schools and government offices. Whereas in the first two contexts, time discipline was accepted relatively uncritically, he says, in government offices it was often perceived as a means of oppressing the lower bureaucracy, through such factors as severe punishment for lateness and the extension of the working day. This led in Calcutta in 1905, for example, to a white collar industrial dispute. What it reveals in our context is again the fascinating position of the middle class in relation to colonial discourse. The very proximity of this class to the cornerstones of colonial hegemony enables them to disrupt elements of the discourse that inform this hegemony. Yet at the same time, their predicament is illustrated by the pervasive nature of colonial discourse - Sarkar's citation of the uncontroversial nature of time discipline in the rail and education systems indicates the way in which images of organisation had become entrenched in the expanded colonial state. In addition, middle class attempts to confront time discipline as oppression in relation to bureaucratic employment left them vulnerable to further layers of colonial discourse structured around the idea of organisation. These layers, to which I will now turn, were the Orientalist projections of Indian society as fundamentally disorganised.

3.1.2 Disorganisation and the Duality of Hinduism

Images of European organisation and order were made meaningful for coloniser and colonised by placing them in the context of indigenous disorder. Images of disorder were projected through a number of lenses - as Metcalf describes it, an "array of polarities"²⁹ - which both reinforced and legitimised the ascendance of British

²⁸ S. Sarkar, *Colonial Times: Clocks and Kaliyuga in Nineteenth Century Bengal* (Seminar delivered at SOAS, London, 20 June 1996).

²⁹ Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, p. 6.

"rational" rule. Effeminacy, indolence, deceitfulness, the closed nature of the village economy: all these images were projected as elemental features of a drifting, changeless society.³⁰

Most important in the present context is the colonial projection of Hinduism. It has been noted in Chapter 2 how the colonial legal system was constructed through a search for the "true" or "revealed" texts of Hinduism. This was the central thrust of the Orientalist approach to Hinduism, and it implied a duality, a setting apart of this "essence" from the morass of popular Hindu practice. In the academic fields of anthropology and comparative religion, this idea that a culture can be understood as two interlinked but essentially separate traditions has been extremely influential.³¹ Variations of this model have persistently informed methods of understanding religions and cultures, and it clearly underpins the work of Jones and other Orientalists.

We can begin to understand its significance by looking briefly at the history of the model itself. Benedict Anderson locates its emergence as an effect of European expansion. The realisation of the rich variety of forms of human knowledge and experience that expansion precipitated meant that world religions were forced to confront each other, and so define themselves in relation to each other. As Anderson demonstrates through the writing of Marco Polo, the faith of the Christians began to be conceived of not as true, so much as truest.³² In a sense, then, expansion created the field of comparative religion, and the field demanded some index through which comparisons could be made. Isolating textual traditions was a means of providing this index. It provided a field of reference for the comparison of the great religious faiths. Max Muller states the position clearly in 1874:

Although each individual believer is responsible for his religion, no religion can be made responsible for each individual believer. Even if we adopt the theory of development in religion, and grant to every thinking man his right of private interpretation, there remains, and there must always remain, to the historian of religion, an appeal to the statutes of the original code with which each religion stands and falls, and by which alone it can justly be judged.³³

30 For work on the production of these images, see Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*; Ronald Inden, *Imagining India*; Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial masculinity: the 'manly Englishman' and the 'effeminate Bengali' in the late nineteenth century* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1995).

31 This influence is immediately evident, for example, in the anthropological model of Great and Little Traditions, as first defined by Robert Redfield in *Peasant Society and Culture* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956). Redfield's idea was that "in a civilisation there is a great tradition of the reflective few and there is a little tradition of the unreflective many" (p. 70).

32 See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 16-17.

33 Max Muller, *Chips from a German Workshop Vol. IV* (Longman, London, 1880) p. 316-7.

Muller recognises the dynamism of religious practice, but nevertheless maintains that the "true form" of the religion, the one to be studied most persistently by historians of religion, was that encased within "the statutes of the original code". The text becomes the embodiment of the religion, the basis upon which it is perceived as "A World Religion" or "A Great Religious Tradition". The structure which elevates the text to this position is of course generated by the structure of Christianity, and particularly Protestant Christianity, with its central emphasis on the New Testament.

In their efforts to understand Hinduism, the Orientalists constructed an essential tradition based on its most ancient texts. The Aryan society that apparently produced these texts was consequently projected as representing a so-called Golden Age in the history of India. Kopf points out that this Golden Age construct reflected the preoccupation of early Orientalists like Jones with classical civilisation in Europe - the Golden Age of Greece and Rome.³⁴ The work of Jones is replete with allusions to the latter, and by linking Sanskrit to European languages he began to construct a common history for Indian and European civilisation. The most critical point in the present context, however, is not the linking of Indian to European civilisation (although this was indeed to become an enduring and influential image in nineteenth century Hinduism) but rather the *de-linking* of the former from the actual practices of contemporary Hinduism. The glorification of Aryan civilisation as the depository of a true or normative form of Hinduism necessitated the projection of its contemporary legacy as a degenerate, debased form, permeated with superstition and idolatry, and indicative of the degeneration of indigenous society.

Two distinct levels of Hinduism, then, are constructed, which configure much of the thinking on Hinduism during the nineteenth century. Monier Williams, for example, refers to contemporary Hinduism in 1891 as "Brahminism run to seed and spread out into a confused tangle of divine personalities and incarnations. The one system is the rank and luxuriant outcome of the other." Again, Alfred Lyall comments in 1884 that popular Hinduism was "a whole vegetation of cognate beliefs sprouting up in every stage of growth beneath the shadow of the great orthodox traditions and allegories of Brahminism."³⁵ As a development of this model, Ronald Inden has identified three levels in what he calls the "rationalising of the Hindu jungle". Level one is Brahminism, the religion of the intellectual priesthood. Level two is devotional theism,

³⁴ D. Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969) pp. 38-9.

³⁵ Both quoted in Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj*, p. 136. The idea of Hinduism as a jungle, so evident in these examples, is perceived by Ronald Inden as one of two enduring metaphors used in Indology to denote the religion; the other being the sponge; see *Imagining India*, pp. 86-87.

the religion of the emotional laity. Level three is animism, the folk tradition of a "changeless religion of survival".³⁶

The subtext of degeneration in the Orientalist conception of Hinduism was, ironically, strengthened by the archetypal exponent of its supposed antithesis, James Mill. Mill's work can be perceived as the inspiration of a generation of Anglicists who battled with and eventually defeated Orientalism in the critical field of educational policy during the 1830s. His seminal work *A History of British India* appeared in 1818,³⁷ and was destined to become a standard text for Indian Civil Servants. Rooted firmly in utilitarian notions of evolutionary political and societal progress, Mill's history effectively rubbished the idea of Aryan civilisation as a golden era, stating that its ritualistic, ceremonial achievements were configured by a primitive despotism which was antithetical to progress. The most enduring feature of Mill's history, however, was his division of Indian history into three distinct eras: the Hindu, Muslim and British eras. There is an obvious shift in the method of categorisation here. Mill does not call the third era the Christian era - this would not make sense, because for Mill British rule was essentially secular and based on the rule of neutral, equalising law. Previous periods of Indian history, however, are characterised by the religious affiliation of the dynasties - although even this is not strictly adhered to: no "Buddhist era", for example, is signified. Many historians have illustrated the fallacy of this categorisation,³⁸ but it was undoubtedly influential in nineteenth century India as a structure for the interpretation of Indian history. The intellectual elite who had co-operated with the Orientalists now had a framework for understanding the degeneration of Hinduism necessarily implied by the existence of the Golden Age. The "Muslim period" came to be perceived as the "dark ages" of Hinduism, in which religious and social persecution precipitated the decline into oppressive casteism, idolatry, superstition - all the signifiers of this contemporary degeneracy.

The images of colonial organisation discussed in the first half of this section represented a kind of bulwark of modernity, the antithesis of images such as degenerate Hinduism. The contrasting of these images - the organisation of the state and the disorganisation of society - was enormously influential in the development of middle class ideologies during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. This is evident, for example, in the accepted frameworks of nationalist

³⁶ See Inden, *Imagining India*, p. 89.

³⁷ Mill, *A History of British India* (reprinted University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975).

³⁸ See Romila Thapar, Harbans Mukhia & Bipan Chandra., *Communalism and the writing of Indian history* (People's Publishing House, Delhi, 1969).

historiography over this period.³⁹ Before considering how this influence was manifested in terms of middle class perceptions of Hinduism, it is necessary to examine some further factors which impacted on the predicament of this class, creating pressure on the idea of Hinduism in relation to colonial modernity.

3.2 The Pressure to Organise

Pressure exerted on Hinduism in this context was manifested, unsurprisingly, as a pressure to organise. There were two sources of this pressure during the second half of the nineteenth century which were particularly explicit. One was the increasing incursion of aggressive new religious influences - principally Hindu and Christian - on the established structure of the religion. The other was the increased significance of the colonial discourse of organisation. The organisation of the state and the disorganisation of society provided the groundwork for the production of this discourse. As the expansion of the state progressed in the first half of the nineteenth century, methods of "being public", of articulating issues and concerns in the public space, were increasingly subject to its parameters. The most significant events in the development of the discourse, however, occurred in the aftermath of the 1857 Rebellion. This revolt against the order and organisation of the Empire was followed by an elaboration of the hegemonic arrangement which raised the profile of the colonial discourse of organisation.

3.2.1 1858: Developing the Colonial Discourse of Organisation

In 1858 the Government of India Act formally transferred ultimate authority in India from the East India Company to the Crown. Henceforth the Court of Directors was replaced by a Secretary of State for India (i.e. a minister within the British Cabinet), assisted by a Council of India comprised mostly of recently returned officials from the subcontinent. Despite the unparliamentary nature of the Council, the Act projected the idea that the Queen's Parliament in Britain formed the ultimate authority in India. At the apex of imperial power, a representative body held sway, a body that operated through the language and institutions of democracy. The fact that this body was representative

³⁹ See B. Chandra, "Historians of Modern India and Communalism", in *Communalism and the writing of Indian history*; and Thapar, *Interpreting Early India* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992), esp. chapter 1, "Ideology and the Interpretation of Early Indian History", pp. 1-22; for wider examinations of the growth of middle class ideologies in the context of colonial control, see B. Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse* (Sage, New Delhi, 1989), chapter 2: "Hindu Responses to British Rule", pp. 34-70; and K.N Panikkar, "Presidential Address" (in *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 38th, 1975, pp. 365-399).

of the British and not the Indian people was not the point; what was created was an impression of representation, justice and benevolence in the wake of the Rebellion.

This impression was precisely reflected in the Queen's Proclamation of 1 November 1858. As she explained in a letter to Lord Derby, the first Secretary of State for India, Victoria wanted the document to "breathe feelings of generosity, benevolence and religious feeling, pointing out the privileges which the Indians will receive in being placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown."⁴⁰ In consonance with the assumption that the Rebellion was largely the result of an excessive display of religious passion, the Proclamation dwelt upon the communication of these "feelings" in relation to religion, emphasising the state's neutrality towards indigenous religion whilst also affirming the monarch's own faith in Christianity:

Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure.⁴¹

Here, religious observance is articulated as a "right", enjoying the "equal and impartial protection of the law". It is situated within a framework of theoretical "Subjecthood" governed by the rule of law. The Queen's Government in India was established by law, and the indigenous population assumed a kind of quasi-legal status in relation to the metropolis through their recognition as the Queen's subjects. "The Company's Government is at an end," stated a contemporary newspaper, "the name has followed the substance, and now the inhabitants of this country can in truth declare they are the subjects to Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen."⁴² These subjects practised their own religion as a legal right.

Two principal points can be drawn from the Proclamation. First, it established the idioms of constitutional liberalism as the appropriate language of politics in colonial India. At a public meeting in Calcutta in November 1858, the Proclamation was described as based on "the justest, the broadest principles... . Humanity, Mercy,

⁴⁰ Queen Victoria to Lord Derby, 15/8/58, in C.H. Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947: Select Documents* (Oxford University Press, London, 1962; Vol. IV of *Select Documents on the History of India and Pakistan* - general editor, C.H. Philips), p. 10.

⁴¹ Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan*, p. 11.

⁴² *Bombay Telegraph and Courier* 9 November 1858.

Justice breathe through every line."⁴³ The Calcutta-based *Hindoo Patriot* commented that "the Sovereign Will has ordained that Her auspicious reign will be marked by the promotion of all works of public utility, by the introduction of general reforms and by the...amelioration of Her subjects irrespective of colour or creed of which no distinction is professed to be observed."⁴⁴ A vital element of the colonial discourse of organisation was consolidated here. The Proclamation provided a reference point for the articulation of "representative" politics in India as a feature of the colonial state. As we shall see, it was persistently invoked in this way. For early nationalists in particular, the Proclamation came to be perceived as a statement of civil rights. As the Bengali Surendranath Banerjea stated in 1892, it was the "Magna Carta of our rights and privileges".⁴⁵ Although it was little more than a statement of intent, the Proclamation provided the justification for the assertion of these rights and privileges. This assertion, then, was symbolic - it had nothing constitutional to refer to; only the equally symbolic "Humanity, Mercy, Justice" of the Queen's statement.

Secondly, the Proclamation established religion as central to this symbolic projection of rights and privileges. The reason for the prominence of religion can be explained through British preoccupations in the wake of the 1857 Rebellion, and through the underlying assumption that religion, degenerate though it may be, was the motor force of Indian civilisation and social relations.⁴⁶ What is most significant is that it brings religion into the realm of colonial politics in a quite explicit manner, a manner articulated through the idioms of constitutional liberalism as explained above.

An interesting example of this is provided by Partha Chatterjee's lengthy citation from the memoirs of the Bengali nationalist, Bepinchandra Pal.⁴⁷ Recalling his student days in Calcutta shortly before his death in 1932, Pal describes the operation of student boarding houses in the 1870s as "small republics... managed on strictly democratic lines". Disputes were settled by a "Court" of the whole "House", with offenders being

43 Speech by Rangopaul Ghose, reported in *Bombay Telegraph and Courier*, 25 November 1858.

44 *Hindoo Patriot*, 11 November 1858; see B. Ghose, *Selections from English Periodicals of Nineteenth Century Bengal*, Vol. V (Papyrus, Calcutta, 1980), p. 91.

45 Speech at 1892 Congress; see S. Banerjee, *Speeches* Vol 4 (Calcutta, n.d.), p. 67.

46 The belief that outraged religious feelings constituted the principal motivation for the Rebellion was by no means reflected in indigenous press comment at the time, which tended to look towards British arrogance and the exclusivity of the administration as the principal cause; see, for example, articles in the *Hindoo Patriot* on 18 November and 9 December 1858, and 6 January 1859, quoted in Ghose, *Selections from English Periodicals*, pp. 97-110. Indeed, it should be emphasised that the Proclamation was not generally perceived as a panacea in the Indian press in 1858. In the context of continued unrest associated with the 1857 Rebellion, it received comparatively little attention in terms of editorials. As the earlier citation from Banerjea indicates, however, its significance was established for later reference.

47 Bepinchandra Pal, *Memoirs of My Life and Times* (1932), quoted in Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, pp. 11-13.

threatened with expulsion. Most interesting is Pal's description of debate over the food conventions of the house mess:

The composition of our mess called for some sort of a compromise between the so-called orthodox and the Brahmo and other heterodox members of our republic. So a rule was passed by the unanimous vote of the whole "House", that no member should bring food to the house...which outraged the feelings of Hindu orthodoxy. It was however clearly understood that the members of the mess, as a body and even individually, would not interfere with what anyone took outside the house.

As Chatterjee explains it, the blending here of idioms of "European civic and political life" with what may be termed the traditional issues of commensality and food sensibility reflect the "imbrication of two discourses" - the discourses of elite and subaltern politics. Although Chatterjee's objective - the mutual implication of elite and subaltern domains - is very much in line with the aims of this thesis, it is nevertheless difficult in this instance to detect subalternity in the citation from Pal. The implication is that the "orthodox" sensibility over food pollution is to be perceived as subaltern, whilst the idioms of European civic and political life, the framework of the mini republic, are to be perceived as elite. Returning to the themes of Chapter 2, it is easy to see here a reverberation of the tradition/modernity model as the wellspring of the social dynamic. Pal's fellow students are presented as articulating both elite (modern) and subaltern (traditional) ideologies - the inherent tension between the two constitutes the force through which decisions are made, society is moved on, but there is nevertheless an implication of dissatisfaction, of the traditional intervention "holding back" the forces of modernity. Considering the aims of the Subaltern Studies group, this is perhaps an unhelpful perception of the subaltern intervention.

By emphasising the position of religion in relation to politics as indicated by the Proclamation, the implications of the passage emerge as somewhat different. The students in Pal's mess are very much a part of the elite of late nineteenth century Calcutta. Their construction of a mini republic reflects their belief in the language and institutions of representation; the same language and institutions projected symbolically by the Proclamation (upto a point, of course - it is doubtful whether Victoria would have been impressed by the idea of a mini republic operating in Calcutta, at the heart of colonial power!). This discourse is brought to bear on all aspects of life within the mini republic, including those related to food. Those described by Pal as "orthodox" are as much a part of this project as any one else; indeed, judging by the result of the vote, they were in a position of strength. The point is that the whole community respected the idioms of representational politics as a valid framework for the organisation of their collective life, and the issue of commensality and food sensibility was an integral part of this life - as integral and as "modern" as the payment of the rent and the punishment

of offenders against the democratic rules of the "House". The domain of religious observance and cultural norms - a domain described by Chatterjee as "utterly incongruous with that of civil society" - is in this elite context a domain influenced by facets of colonial hegemony, a point which is resoundingly confirmed by the prominence given to religion by the Proclamation. Representation and the rights of individuals - the idioms that informed the colonial discourse of organisation - have a legitimate presence in this domain.

After 1858, then, the discourse of organisation emerged as a more elaborate feature of the state's hegemonic arrangement. The Proclamation presented the idea of rights and the representation of these rights as a feature of Imperial citizenship, or more accurately Subjecthood, sanctioned by the rule of law. The transfer of power to the Crown and the institution of a Secretary of State for India answerable to Parliament appeared to confirm the proximity of representative institutions to the processes of government in India. These features emphasised the notion of "symbolic representation" as a means of articulating indigenous concerns. The "right" of religious freedom confirmed by the Proclamation created the space for the articulation of religion in this manner. It is in this sense that the developing discourse of organisation increasingly acts as a pressure on Hinduism to become organised in the public space. As issues of religion became more prominent in this space during the second half of the nineteenth century, Hindus were increasingly required to articulate their concerns within this framework. It became the established, recognisable format for meaningful expression within this space.

3.2.2 Pressures on the Structure of Hinduism in the Public Space

Certain factors encouraged Hindus to assert their religious rights far more forcefully in the public space. Often, this assertion revolved around the position of women in Hindu society. The debate over *sati*, examined in Chapter 2, is one example of this. It was followed by a succession of legal challenges and Government interventions on issues such as widow remarriage, the age of consent and conjugal rights.⁴⁸ My focus, however, is on issues which questioned the structure of Hinduism in the developing public space, and particularly the predicament of low castes and untouchables in relation to this structure. It is these issues which forced Hindus to examine the "shape" of their religion quite explicitly in terms of organisation and disorganisation.

⁴⁸ For examples see C.H. Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964), esp. chapter VII, "Origins and Enactment of the Age of Consent Bill", pp. 147-175; S. Chandra, *The Oppressive Present: Literature and Social consciousness in Colonial India*, pp. 71-115; S. Chandra, "Whose Laws? - Notes on a Nineteenth Century Hindu Case of Conjugal Rights" (in V. Dalmia and H. von Stietencron [eds.], *Representing Hinduism*, pp. 154-175).

(a) Missionary Activity

The pattern of conversion from Hinduism to Christianity during the later decades of the nineteenth century constitutes the most overt pressure on this level. Whereas the early years of missionary activity had concentrated upon the conversion of high caste individuals, from the 1860s onwards missions in various parts of India began to convert low caste groups. Indeed, these groups were often converted as a caste bloc, following the decision of caste elders to take the step.⁴⁹ This trend has been termed "mass movement".⁵⁰ Census figures confirm rapid increases in the Christian population between 1871 and 1901, and most reports record the predominance of low caste converts as a feature of this increase.⁵¹ It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the motivations behind low caste conversion during this period. Some research has pointed to a proliferation of localised reasons,⁵² whilst others have emphasised common factors such as the perceived egalitarian approach of Christianity, and a general desire amongst low castes for self respect.⁵³ The significance of mass movements in the present context is that they presented a picture of Hinduism as a religion being eroded from its base upwards. In addition, low caste conversion begged the question of who were the converted - were low castes and untouchables Hindus, or 'animists', as many tribal groups, for example, were described in census reports?

Two interrelated narratives, therefore, are indicated by the success of mass movements towards Christianity. First, the vulnerability of Hinduism, due to the oppression of low caste groups. Secondly, the question of the shape of Hinduism, how it defined its boundaries and maintained its own identity. The prominence of missionary successes in census returns (see Section 4.2.1 on this) ensured that these issues were tangible in the public space - a source of increasing debate in the press. They were also, of course, issues which very much concerned the Hindu reform movements.

⁴⁹ See D.B. Forrester, *Caste and Christianity: Attitudes and Policies on Caste of Anglo-Saxon Protestant Missions in India* (Curzon Press, London, 1979), p. 69.

⁵⁰ See J.W. Pickett, *Christian Mass Movements in India. A Study with Recommendations* (Abingdon Press, Lucknow, 1933), p. 21: "Who first called them 'mass movements' we have not discovered. The term did not gain wide currency until the early years of this century. We have searched more than a hundred volumes of reports from missions in which these movements developed during the latter half of the nineteenth century without finding a single use of the term before 1892."

⁵¹ See *Census of India 1901*, Vol. I, India, Pt. 1: Report (Government Printing Office, Calcutta, 1903), pp.387-92. The Bengal Report, for example, is quoted as noting that "the classes most receptive of Christianity are those who are outside the Hindu system or whom Hinduism regards as degraded."

⁵² See G. Oddie, "Christian Conversion in the Telugu Country 1860-1900: A Case of One Protestant Movement in the Godavery-Krishna Delta" (in *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol.12, 1975, pp.61-79).

⁵³ See Forrester, *Caste and Christianity*, chapter IV, "Caste and the Mass Movements", pp. 69-96.

(b) Reformism

In later sections, nineteenth century reformism will be examined as part of the movement to transform Hinduism through organisation. Here, however, it will be examined not as an agent, but as an "external" pressure on the structure of Hinduism. Understanding how this pressure was exerted entails the identification of the defining characteristics of reformism in this context.

The historiography of Hindu reformism locates it as a feature of colonial society from the early nineteenth century. A classic account will begin with the work of Rammohun Roy and perhaps Henry Derozio, move through the Brahmo Samaj in its various forms, the Prarthana Samaj as its Western Indian counterpart, the Arya Samaj and the Ramakrishna Mission, before slipping into the more eclectic movements of the twentieth century.⁵⁴ The historiographical models that determine this narrative are instructive. Eighteenth century Hinduism is presented as a degenerate form, along much the same lines as those projected by Orientalists. The reformers are then cast as modernisers, inculcating a more humane or ethical religiosity, characterised by the insistence on a personal relationship between the individual and God. Often, reformism is located as a kind of Indian version of the Protestant reformation in Europe.⁵⁵

The hegemonic text of this trend is J.N. Farquhar's *Modern Religious Movements In India*.⁵⁶ Although encompassing a far broader spectrum of movements during the

⁵⁴ See, for example, A.R. Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, chapter XVII, pp. 281-307; B. Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, K.N. Panikkar, S. Mahajan (hereafter Chandra et al), *India's Struggle for Independence* (Penguin, Delhi, 1989), chapter 6, pp. 82-90; G. Richards, *A Sourcebook of Modern Hinduism* (Curzon Press, London, 1985) - Richards' book is presented as a collection of "modern Hindu writers who may be considered to be inheritors of the religious and social traditions of India and who have made an important contribution to the renaissance of Hinduism and the reformation of Indian society" (p. ix). The writers covered are Rammohun Roy, Debendranath Tagore, Keshub Chandra Sen, Dayananda, Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, M.G. Ranade, G.K. Gokhale, Rabindranath Tagore, M.K Gandhi, Aurobindo Ghose, S. Radhakrishnan and Vinoba Bhave. See also K. Klostermaier, *A Survey of Hinduism*, pp.388-392, although it should be noted that Klostermaier sounds a cautionary note at the beginning of his discussion of reform movements, placing them in the context of a far wider "traditional" Hinduism which remained both current and vital.

⁵⁵ See for example Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, p.282, and K. W. Jones, *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth Century Punjab* (Manohar, Delhi, 1976), p. 36-7. Jones describes Dayananda's tour of Punjab in 1877-8 as being opposed by the "beleaguered forces of orthodoxy." "Dayanand would have his say," Jones continues, "and orthodoxy its answer, in this the most basic of all struggles." Susan Bayly has recently commented on this kind of approach to nineteenth century Hindu reformism: "So-called Hindu 'revivalism' has...been viewed teleologically as a 'modernising' Protestant-style 'reformation' launched against a Catholic-style 'Hindu' establishment." S. Bayly, "Hindu 'modernisers' and the 'public' arena: indigenous critiques of caste in colonial India" (Unpublished Seminar Paper, SOAS, London, 1993), p. 39.

⁵⁶ Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India* (Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1967; first published Macmillan, 1915); Jones calls this book "the single authoritative source on

nineteenth century, Farquhar articulates the notion of western-inspired ethical reform, held back by a "reactionary" orthodoxy. The resurgence of this reactionary force, he concludes, indicates a "continuous and steadily increasing inner decay" in Hinduism, which he equates with "the revival of the ancient religions of the Roman Empire in the early Christian centuries".⁵⁷ Farquhar identifies colonial influence as the source of progressive elements in the nineteenth century movements ("the stimulating influences are almost exclusively Western..."⁵⁸); he also focuses on middle class movements, particularly the Brahmo Samaj, as agents of progress. As such his approach may be said to be elitist in the sense identified by the Subaltern Studies group. Progressive reform is defined by its proximity to European conceptions of modern society: the eradication of caste, the emancipation of women, the condemnation of idolatry, individual communion with God; all efforts to promote such causes as these were to be identified as reformist, as long as they were articulated within a "modernist" or middle class framework. The problem for this kind of historiography emerges when the same causes were promoted outside of such frameworks, using non-western idioms. As research into pre-colonial India is extended, it is becoming increasingly clear that such causes were espoused by numerous Hindu movements, particularly those within the *bhakti* tradition.⁵⁹ What then constitutes reformism in the nineteenth century is rendered problematic.

Some attempt to relocate the particular attributes of reformism in the colonial era has been made by Kenneth Jones, in his *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India*, a sweeping review of movements in the nineteenth century. Jones begins his survey with the exemplified statement that there was nothing new in the idea of socio-religious reform in British India. India had, indeed, been the site of a remarkable array of reformist movements over a period of some three millennia. He then goes on to assert the singular character of nineteenth century reform, by making a conceptual distinction between "transitional" and "acculturative" movements. Transitional movements "had their origins in the pre-colonial world and arose from indigenous forms of socio-religious dissent", and displayed a "lack of concern with adjusting

socio-religious movements since its publication" - see *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989; series title: New Cambridge History of India, 3.1), p.228; an interesting critique of Farquhar's work and its influence can be found in Lutgendorf, *The Life of a Text*, pp. 360-362.

57 Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, p. 431, 445.

58 Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, p. 43.

59 For example, on the development of the idea of individual communion with God, often identified as the most fundamental contribution of the west or Christianity to Hindu reformism, see C. Mackenzie-Brown, "Purana as Scripture: From Sound to Image of the Holy Word in the Hindu Tradition" (in *History of Religions*, Vol.26, No. 1, 1986-7, pp. 68 - 86). See also Lipner, *Hindus: their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, pp. 136-143; and Lutgendorf, *The Life of a Text*.

concepts and programmes to the colonial world". Acculturative movements were driven largely by "English-educated South Asians influenced by the specific culture of England", and sought an accommodation of "the personal position of...members within the colonial world".⁶⁰ The key distinguishing concept here is what Jones calls the "colonial milieu": a space where "indigenous civilisations of South Asia came into active contact with British culture". Movements that emerged within this milieu were acculturative; those outside it were transitional. Jones perceives that there is no substantive difference between the two forms - acculturative movements rested as much on "the indigenous heritage of social and religious protest" as did transitional, and were "in no way...totally new or without roots in the general high cultures of South Asia and the specific sub-cultures of a given region". The difference, then, is defined through the "point of origin" of a given movement - i.e. whether it stems from inside or outside of the colonial milieu.⁶¹

The conceptual framework enables Jones to accommodate a whole host of movements which have been marginalised in the historiography of religious reform. This is in itself an important contribution to understandings of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless there appears to be little significance in the framework if the central idea of a colonial milieu is not sufficiently theorised. Distinguishing movements on the basis of their origins being inside or outside this milieu reduces the framework to the status of a taxonomic device, which becomes increasingly irrelevant in the complex ideological environment of the twentieth century. Consequently, in his discussion of later movements, and also in his discussion of communalism and religious nationalism, Jones is unable to utilise the conceptual framework he has mapped out for the interpretation of the nineteenth century.⁶² The precise significance of reformism as an aspect of historical development is therefore obscured.⁶³

How, then, can one elaborate the distinctive character of nineteenth century reformism? A more fruitful approach is to examine the structural implications of some of these

⁶⁰ Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India*, p. 3.

⁶¹ Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India*, pp. 3-4.

⁶² See Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India*, pp. 184-209 and 218-221.

⁶³ One result of this is the loss of an opportunity to elaborate the idea of subalternity in the context of religious reform. This would be most interesting, in the light of the above identification of the historiography of reformism as elitist. It is also interesting to note that Jones has to locate nearly all movements generated by low castes as transitional, because of the obvious limitations of the colonial milieu. The only exception is the Swami Narayana movement in Kerala, which is classed as acculturative due to the involvement of some western educated Izhavas, although this involvement was not extant until the twentieth century. See *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India*, pp. 179-182. The very modern low caste movement of the late nineteenth century in western India, however, which was led by Jotirao Phule and institutionalised in the Satyashodak Samaj, is not taken into account by Jones. See Section 4.2.2 on this movement.

movements for Hinduism. This approach may be developed from the starting point of recognising the particular quality of orthodoxy in Hinduism; for if we are to define reformism, it is necessary in the first instance to identify what exactly is to be reformed. The idea of orthodoxy is itself a contentious and complex issue in modern Hinduism. Much of this complexity arises from relatively recent historical developments, which may be said to have been generated by the intervention of the text as a means of defining religious identity - the idea that the "true" or "real" form of the religion could be located as a kind of doctrinal core.⁶⁴ Some modern sociological and anthropological approaches to Hinduism, however, have attempted to cut across this dominance of the text.⁶⁵ In some cases this has led to a reconfiguration of orthodoxy, defining it through the construction of regionally-specific frameworks. Two institutional structures - caste and *Sampradaya* - form this framework. Together, these structures define a code of practice and a range of doctrinal truth that has a direct influence over *svadharma*, or individual, personal *dharma*. Klaus Klostermaier argues strongly for the recognition of doctrinal orthodoxy controlled locally by caste *panchayats* and *Sampradayas*:

Although there has never been one central authority in Hinduism strong enough to decide the issue categorically, the numerous heads of the various Hindu churches have nevertheless established very rigorous canons from within which their understanding of orthodoxy is defined. ...The caste *panchayats* and the leaders of *sampradays* have always exercised control over their members, carefully watching them and enforcing their views of orthodoxy.⁶⁶

Anncharlotte Eschmann is less convinced by the existence of doctrinal orthodoxy, but she also asserts that "there are institutions defining and supervising orthodoxy but...they are of consequence only within a certain place or region and are usually linked with a certain caste."⁶⁷ In both cases, orthodoxy is configured by regional "establishments", formed through the interaction - to a greater or lesser degree - of dominant caste and *Sampradaya* institutions.

⁶⁴ See Inden, *Imagining India*, pp. 105-8 for an account of the projection of Shankaracharya's Advaita Vedanta as the core of Hinduism; for a wider discussion of this idea, see T. Fitzgerald, "Hinduism and the World Religions Fallacy" (in *Religion*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1990, pp. 101-118).

⁶⁵ See Fitzgerald, "Hinduism and the World Religions Fallacy"; R. King, *Religious Studies and the Sacred Text: Limitations of the World Religions Approach* (Unpublished Seminar Paper, Bristol, 1994); U. King, "Sociological Approaches to the Study of Modern Hinduism" (in *Social Action* Vol.32, 1982, pp. 427-448); C.J. Fuller, *The Camphor Flame: Popular Hinduism and Society in India* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992), especially chapter one, pp. 3-28; and J.J. Lipner, *Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*.

⁶⁶ Klostermaier, *A Survey of Hinduism*, p. 59.

⁶⁷ A. Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change: the Role of Sects in Hinduism" (Unpublished Seminar Paper, Kandy, 1973), p. 4.

Interestingly, however, an implicit fluidity is also recognised as a feature of these institutions. Eschmann has developed this idea by illustrating how *Sampradayas* developed as repositories of a whole range of views in relation to Hindu religiosity:

... for instance the school founded by Sankaracarya, generally considered to be one of the most venerable and orthodox manifestations of Hinduism, is called *Sampradaya* as well as dissenting and protesting communities like, for instance, Virasaivism. The latter 'radical *Sampradays*', as one might call them, introduced not only doctrinal changes, but are or at least were advocates of considerable social changes. They challenge orthodoxy, by for instance not admitting image worship or by not recognising and even deliberately trespassing caste barriers.⁶⁸

Despite such aspects as non-recognition of caste, denying image worship and so on, the radical *Sampradayas* are nevertheless part of the institutional structure of Hinduism. They exist *alongside* caste, and generate doctrinal, ritual and even social change from the coterminous position of the *ashram* or *matha*, mostly through a gradual adjustment of religious practice. There is, however, no structural opposition between caste and *Sampradaya* (i.e. in the manner of Church vs. sect in Christianity), and the *Sampradaya*, even in its radical manifestation, will not necessarily have a transformative effect on the system as a whole. For example, the core of Virashaiva teaching is its refusal to recognise the concept of ritual pollution. Nevertheless, Virashaivas operate within the caste system, and even recognise caste distinctions among themselves.⁶⁹ Virashaivas, or Lingayats as they are more commonly known, have been encompassed by the system their teachings have sought to repudiate, and now operate as a separate caste or set of sub-castes in their own right. The radical *Sampradaya* of the twelfth century has become institutionalised as part of the structure of Hinduism.

Eschmann states as an "astonishing fact" that the 19th century reform movements did not build on the work of radical *Sampradayas*. "Not only was the fundamental openness of the Hindu tradition not at all considered," she notes, "even tenets coinciding with the aims of modern thought were at first not taken up."⁷⁰ Here then, the distinction between Jones' transitional and acculturative movements is beginning to acquire depth. Eschmann cites as an example of her point the Satya Mahima Dharma movement, a movement identified by Jones as transitional.⁷¹ This movement was widespread in Orissa, and also reached into Andhra Pradesh, Bengal and Assam

⁶⁸ Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 3.

⁶⁹ See C. Parvatham, *Politics & religion : a study of historical interaction between socio-political relationships in a Mysore village* (Sterling, New Delhi, 1971), pp.xviii-xix: "the non-observance of caste distinctions based on ritual status is retained only in theory by veerasaivas".

⁷⁰ Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 6.

⁷¹ See Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements*, p. 131-5.

during the second half of the nineteenth century. The movement was avowedly monotheistic, critical of idol worship and of Brahmanic practice, as also of the institution of caste as a whole.⁷² Much of the teachings of Mahima Gosain, the founder of the movement, was drawn from the medieval Vaishnavite school of Pancasakha, which was also an Orissan, anti-Brahman tradition.⁷³ Here, then, is a movement which expressed similar principles to an acculturative movement like the Arya Samaj, operating, expanding, during much the same period. Yet there was no connection between them, and no recognition of a common goal. Even after the dramatic incident in 1881, when Mahima Dharm devotees attempted to burn the main idol in the Jagannath temple in Puri, there appears to have been little response from the Arya Samaj.⁷⁴

The distinction between Mahima Dharma and the Arya Samaj is primarily structural. The former emanated from a *Sampradaya*; its self image located it within what Eschmann calls "the living Hindu tradition". The latter, on the other hand, cannot be situated within this structure; it was "not only...against tradition, but, so to speak, completely without tradition".⁷⁵ Structurally, it attempted to provide an alternative framework for the expression of religious truth; alternative, that is, in the sense of *appropriating the functions* (i.e. as opposed to simply criticising or rejecting the functions) of the existing framework provided by caste and *Sampradaya* institutions.

Presently I examine precisely how this alternative framework was constructed. What it illustrates here is that the growing prominence of reformism in the nineteenth century constituted a particular pressure on the tradition of Hinduism, concentrating on the structure of that tradition as exemplified by the caste-*Sampradaya* nexus. In a similar fashion to Christian mass movements, therefore, reformism focused attention and debate on the shape of Hinduism, on how it was organised in relation to other religions and to society. At the same time, the development of representation as a feature of the discourse of organisation encouraged the articulation of this debate in the public space within specific parameters. I will now examine the nature of the movements and debates that emerged.

72 ibid.

73 See Eschmann, Kulke & Tripathi (eds.), *The cult of Jagannath and the regional tradition of Orissa* (Manohar, Delhi, 1978), p. 389-90.

74 I have been unable to locate any comment on this incident, which occurred on 9 March 1881, in the Punjabi press.

75 See Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 7.

3.3 Establishing Patterns of Organisation: Hindu Movements in the Nineteenth Century

The earliest examples of Hinduism articulated in modern organisational frameworks were formulated in the first half of the nineteenth century in Calcutta, the seat of the colonial government and the hub of the expanding state. The Brahmo Samaj, formed by Rammohun Roy in 1828 as the Brahmo Sabha, is commonly cited as the first reforming organisation in India. Until 1830, it was little more than an informal weekly gathering of Bengali Brahmans in a private Calcutta residence.⁷⁶ The organisation was consolidated through the construction of a permanent Brahmo building, which was run by a board of trustees appointed to "conduct the affairs of the Samaj". In addition, a trust deed was drawn up which gave legal definition to the organisation.⁷⁷ By the end of 1830, however, Rammohun had left for England and the organisation, lacking his guiding energy, "faded almost to extinction".⁷⁸

More significant at this stage was the formation of the Calcutta Dharma Sabha in 1831. It was formed by those elements of the Calcutta intelligentsia who had petitioned Parliament early in 1830 opposing Bentinck's *sati* decree, and as such it is commonly cited as the first orthodox institution of the colonial era.⁷⁹ Its main weapon in its stated objective of defending Hindu tradition was to formulate petitions and memorials addressed to authority. As such, it developed an appropriate form for this kind of political expression: it included "a president, a board of directors, a secretary, and a treasurer, and the members regularly organised committees for special purposes"; in addition, the Sabha "conducted its meetings according to strict rules of parliamentary procedure".⁸⁰ When the Brahmo Samaj was revived in the early 1840s by Debendranath Tagore, it followed a similar pattern of development, establishing the Brahmo covenant as a formal basis for membership, and merging the structure of the Samaj with that of the Tattvabodhini Sabha, Debendranath's "highly effective organisation" geared towards resisting the encroachment of missionary influence in Bengal.⁸¹ Both organisations drew their membership from the same social bloc: the Calcutta *bhadralok*, a land-owning, high caste bloc, with vested interests in British rule, and after 1835, almost invariably English educated.

⁷⁶ A house was rented for the purpose; see Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements*, p. 34.

⁷⁷ See F.L. Damen, *Crisis and Religious Renewal in the Brahmo Samaj 1860-1884* (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, 1983) p. 25.

⁷⁸ Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements*, p. 33.

⁷⁹ Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements*, p. 32; for an account of the emergence of the Dharma Sabha, see D. Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance*, p. 270-2.

⁸⁰ Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance*, p. 271.

⁸¹ See D. Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979), p. 162.

Here, then, is an example of the influence of the state's legal-representative culture on the presentation of Hinduism in the public domain, where the primacy of organisation is evident. Hindus operating within the realm of colonial civil society articulated their concerns through the formation of bodies which had a coherent meaning within this context. These bodies were modern in the sense that they were governed by constitutions and aims and objectives, they had secretaries, executive boards and membership lists, and they employed techniques such as subscription campaigns, public meetings and petitions to authority. Within this framework, the Brahmo Samaj "represented" a reforming, modernising constituency, and the Dharma Sabha "represented" a traditional, orthodox constituency. The constituencies were projected in order to legitimise or give meaning to these organisations within the public space, despite the lack of any tangible evidence that such constituencies existed.

Both the Dharma Sabha and the Brahmo Samaj were limited by the comparatively isolated social status of their adherents. Nevertheless their form and their position in relation to the colonial public domain illustrates the pattern of organisation which was to develop in the later nineteenth century, in the context of some of the images and pressures on Hinduism noted above. Even at this early stage, the pattern is marked by a template of polarisation, which sees the presentation of reformism and orthodoxy as opposing constituencies in a projected "community of Hindus".⁸² This examination of the development of Hindu movements will concentrate on the elaboration of these oppositional positions: how they articulated themselves in relation to each other and to the wider world of Hinduism.

3.3.1 Reformism: The Transformative Structure of the Arya Samaj

Dayananda completed the first edition of his major work *Satyarth Prakash*, or "Light of Truth", in 1875. This work articulated the basic principles of the Arya Samaj creed: the belief in a single, unitary God, the identification of the Vedas as the embodiment of complete truth, and the logical inference that the age of Vedic religion constituted the Golden Age not only of Hinduism, but of all religion. Dayananda hence perceived his

⁸² The ideological proximity of the Brahmo Samaj and the Dharma Sabha which this template of polarisation tended to obscure was nevertheless evident in the late 1840s, when the two organisations collaborated to establish the Hindu Charitable Association as a counter to missionary educational advances. In this Association, the President of the executive board was Radhakanta Deb (the leading figure of Dharma Sabha "orthodoxy"), while the Secretary was Debendranath. Here, in a sense, was an early indication of the tendency to symbolise the "community of Hindus" by establishing a spectrum of representatives in one organisation. See Chapter 5 on this tendency in the Hindu Sabha movement.

work as the re-introduction of Vedic practices in Hinduism, and the opening up of this practice to the whole populace. As Lajpat Rai comments in 1914:

It may be difficult for us to visualise that in the second half of the 19th century the Vedas were a sealed book in India, and no one could even read them, much less quote them in open debate attended by all communities, Hindus and non-Hindus alike. At present the Vedas are being read, studied and commented upon by all classes and castes of Hindus. This is the greatest service rendered by Dayanand to the cause of religious and intellectual as well as social freedom in India, and this alone entitles him to be called the Saviour of Hindu India.⁸³

As a Samajist himself, one can expect Lajpat Rai to over-emphasise the achievements of the Swami. Nevertheless this passage gives an indication of the kind of impact Dayananda's teaching attempted to effect. What Lajpat Rai describes is a process of "textualisation" of the Vedas. In certain (admittedly small) sections of Indian society, Vedic texts are by the second decade of the twentieth century being "read, studied and commented upon by all classes and castes of Hindus". The Vedas are projected as the "Book" of Hinduism, in the same manner as the Koran or the Bible are projected as the "Book", the embodiment, of Islam and Christianity.

At the same time, however, Dayananda maintained his belief in Sanskrit as the language of revelation. As such any serious comment on or study of the Vedas required a thorough knowledge of Sanskrit.⁸⁴ Dayananda was dismissive of any form of learning which was not supported by this knowledge,⁸⁵ and this was indeed a natural corollary to his belief in the Vedas as the depository of absolute truth. Dayananda perceived Sanskrit as a universal language, the "mother of all tongues",⁸⁶ and as such it was the appropriate language for the expression of the truths of the Vedas.⁸⁷ In effect, Sanskrit became the objective vehicle of truth in the text, as opposed to the subjective and mystical authority of Brahmanical utterance noted in Chapter 2. Access to religious truth was shifted, in that any individual who accepted Dayananda's teaching *and* who was sufficiently educated could contemplate the universal truths of the Vedas directly.

This reformulation formed the basis of Dayananda's rejection of the contemporary caste system in favour of an idealised vision of society structured in accordance with

⁸³ Lajpat Rai, *A History of the Arya Samaj* (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1992), pp. 54-55. It should be noted, however, that Dayananda specified equal access as a necessity in the contemporary, "fallen" state of Hinduism; if society was properly structured (i.e. according to the four *Varnas*) then Shudras would be denied the right to study the Vedas. See Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati: His Life and Ideas* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1978), p. 104.

⁸⁴ See Lajpat Rai, *A History of the Arya Samaj*, pp. 55-56.

⁸⁵ See, for example, his dismissive attitude towards Guru Nanak on this basis - Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati*, p. 135.

⁸⁶ Quoted in Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati*, p. 104.

⁸⁷ It should be noted here, however, that Dayananda was also a committed supporter of the idea of Hindi as a national language in India.

the Yajur Veda's four *varnas*: Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras. Dayananda's interpretation of *varna-vyavastha* cited merit, not birth, as the determining factor in the system:

All individuals should be placed in different *Classes* according to their qualification, accomplishments and character. By adopting this system all will advance in every respect, because the higher *Classes* will be in constant fear of their children being degraded to the *Sudra Class*, if they are not properly educated. The same fear will also make the children acquire knowledge and culture. Whilst the lower *Classes* will be stimulated to exert themselves for admission into the *Classes* above them.⁸⁸

In reality, this system upheld the notion of an elite socio-religious group - the Brahmans remained the "mediators" of religious truth - but it was an elite defined not by the "closed" signifier of birth, but rather by the more accessible notion of an appropriate education. This of course had a very particular significance for the emerging colonial middle class.

As such, Christophe Jaffrelot's characterisation of the Arya Samaj as employing a strategy of "reform and defence" of hierarchical, Brahmanical Hinduism is somewhat misleading. He suggests that Dayananda, as a Brahman, was primarily concerned to maintain the existing social hierarchy - what he perceived as the "core of the Hindu tradition". Thus, "even though he considered the Brahmans to be responsible for the development of superstitions and the decline of Hindu society, the alternative social model he proposed was based largely on the traditional - mainly Brahmanical - world view...".⁸⁹ For Jaffrelot, then, Dayananda's work represents a reformulation of existing structures of oppression, and as such it appears as an appropriate antecedent to the reactionary tendencies of Hindu nationalism.

My contention is that by shifting the weight of religious authority on to the written text of the Vedas in Sanskrit, Dayananda had necessarily to subvert the position of the existing caste structure. Of course, the institution of *varna-vyavastha* would maintain the position of Brahmans as the elite of the structure, but this elite maintains its authority through its relationship with the text of religious truth, rather than through the "natural" superiority of birth. It was exactly this departure from the "traditional - mainly Brahmanical - world view" in the area of caste that was to cause so much tension between the Arya Samaj and the wider world of Hinduism during the first forty years of its existence.

⁸⁸ Dayananda Saraswati (Ed: C. Bharadwaja), *Light of Truth or An English Translation of Satyarth Prakash* (Arya Samaj, Madras, 1932).

⁸⁹ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 15.

Jaffrelot cites Dayananda's emphasis on the importance of the meritocratic *varna* system as indicative of a strategy of emulation of the western tradition, in that it represents an expression of "individualistic values".⁹⁰ Emulation - the "paradoxical imitation of the Other" - is perceived as strengthening the position of Hinduism in its confrontation with the aggressive proselytising of Christianity:

(Arya Samaj practices) contain a mimetic dimension, in so far as they imply a reform of Hinduism inspired by the values of its western opponents. However, this imitation entails a strategy of assimilating those cultural traits which give the opponent his superiority and prestige in order to resist him more effectively, while pretending to discover such traits in one's own 'original civilisation'.⁹¹

The strategy of emulation leads us here to a notion of Dayananda "pretending" to discover individualism in the Aryan *varna* model in order to appropriate what were perceived as superior western values. Whether this is a meaningful statement or not is difficult to prove. It is, moreover, indicative of the kind of problems posed by locating "cultural traits" as the principal area of emulation. The *Satyarth Prakash* certainly refers to western values such as duty, discipline and patriotism (although not, explicitly, individualism) as causes of European advancement,⁹² but are these formative or motivating factors in Dayananda's work? Do they, in any case, constitute anything new in terms of the cultural response to colonialism? Such emulation had after all been a central feature of Brahmo Samaj ideology since the 1830s.

It is rather in the structure of Dayananda's interpretation of Hinduism that the most critical mimesis can be identified. Through his "foregrounding of the Vedas",⁹³ Dayananda developed a system whereby religious texts were deemed as either *arsha* (the Vedas and any text based on a proper understanding of the Vedas - such as Manu Smriti), or *unarsha* (generally products of the post-Mahabharata period, with no connection to the Vedas).⁹⁴ In short, Dayananda attempted to establish a Hindu canon, and he frequently used this principle to refute *pandits* in debate. Daniel Gold cites this canonical principle as "directly influenced by western models" and "an idea with little precedent in Hindu thought".⁹⁵ Anncharlotte Eschmann does perceive an existing

⁹⁰ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 16.

⁹¹ *ibid.*

⁹² Dayananda Saraswati, *Light of Truth*, p. 469-70.

⁹³ The phrase is used by Uma Chakravarty as a characteristic of 19th Century reform movements; see her essay: "What ever happened to the Vedic Dasi? Orientalism, Nationalism and a Script for the Past" (in Sangari and Vaid [eds.], *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*, Kali For Women, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 27-87), p. 33.

⁹⁴ See Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements*, p.96; Daniel Gold, "Organised Hinduisms", p. 542-4; Dayananda, *Light of Truth*, p. 733.

⁹⁵ Gold, "Organised Hinduisms", p.544; in addition Gold cites rational theism and a scientific approach to religious texts as central to Dayananda's understanding of Hinduism. Although these aspects are not directly attributed to a strategy of emulation, they were nevertheless

canon in Hinduism, but it is a canon consisting of "two parts, the second of which - astonishing (*sic*) enough- is still unfinished".⁹⁶ The *Smriti* canon (including the Ramayana and Mahabharata, the Puranas etc.) is identified by Eschmann as an open, flexible canon that encourages change in Hinduism; the nature of Dayananda's canon was closed, fixed by its insistence on Vedic authority.

This establishment of a fixed canonical core reiterates the emphasis of Dayananda's work on the objective, timeless text of the Vedas in Sanskrit. As stated earlier, this shift in the weight of religious authority was inherently transformative, and as such was immediately subversive to the existing caste structure.

The transformative nature of Dayananda's creed was reflected in the structure and character of his principle legacy, the Arya Samaj. The Arya Samaj was established in Bombay in 1875, and subsequently had its most profound impact in the Punjab. Dayananda travelled to the Punjab in 1877, and the Lahore Samaj was established within two months of his arrival. The membership was dominated by trading castes - Aroras, Banias and particularly Khattris. These, however, were trading castes with a difference: it was exactly these castes that formed the basis of the rapidly emerging English educated elite in the Punjab, fulfilling the new demands of government bureaucracy, the legal system and the education system in the Province.⁹⁷ As Jordens has illustrated, the Lahore Samaj was driven by "some of the best-educated Punjabis," many of whom held positions of power within the colonial milieu.⁹⁸

The Lahore Samaj was to become the central unit in the development of the Samaj structure throughout the Punjab during the 1880s and 1890s. The Punjab was then to become the basis for extension into other provinces, particularly the United Provinces. The fundamental element of the Samaj structure was the local branch organisation. Any nine individuals (male or female) willing to accept the Ten Principles of the Arya Samaj (see below) could set up a local branch. Each member would in normal circumstances contribute 1% of their income as subscription to the branch to which they belonged. The centre of local Samaj activity was the Samaj Mandir, or meeting house, which was generally a building funded by donation. The Arya Samaj as a whole developed as a loose pyramidal structure, with the local branches forming a wide base, affiliated to

"congruent with beliefs found in western Protestantism", and therefore added to the evangelical flavour of Dayananda's work.

96 Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 5.

97 See R. Kumar, "The Rowlatt Satyagraha in Lahore", in Kumar, *Essays in the Social History of Modern India* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1983, pp. 148-212) p. 156; n.b. English education had not been instituted in the Punjab until 1856.

98 Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati*, p. 173.

Provincial Sabhas which in turn were affiliated to a central Sabha.⁹⁹ This basic structure had been articulated by Dayananda in the 28 rules of the Bombay Samaj in 1875.¹⁰⁰ In the Punjab a further element was added, in that the Samaj became committed to an expansive policy of establishing educational institutions, which further concretised the organisation's presence in the Province.

Expansion was also aided by the considerable elasticity of the Ten Principles (*Niyams*) which came to form the basis of Samaj membership after the establishment of the Lahore branch. The Bombay Samaj's 28 Rules had included guidelines on ethics, methods of worship and constitutional matters, as well as questions of creed.¹⁰¹ The Lahore Principles dealt only in a very general way with matters of creed and morality, and not at all with methods of worship, organisation, constitution etc. As Graham notes, "one could apparently be an Arya Samajist while following practically all the social customs of orthodox Hinduism."¹⁰² What this means, of course, is that Samajists would not jeopardise their caste status by agreeing to the Ten Principles. The importance of this has been illustrated by Jones, when he contrasts the status of Aryas in Punjabi society with that of Brahmo Samajists. The latter suffered a degree of social boycott as a result of the radical manifestation of their creed. In particular, Brahmos were caricatured as "anti-national" in their adoption of all things European, and almost non-Hindu in their approach to Christ and Mohammed.¹⁰³ Arya Samajists, on the other hand, remained integrated within the wider world of Hinduism, through their consistent maintenance of caste status.

At the same time, two factors were critical in maintaining the transformative character of the Samaj. First, despite the generic character of the Ten Principles articulated at Lahore, Principle Three clearly emphasised an aspect of Dayananda's teaching that has been identified as critical:

99 See Veena Dua, "The Arya Samaj and Punjab Politics" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 5, Nos. 43-44, 24 October 1970, pp. 1787-1791), pp. 1788-9.

100 Rule three of the Bombay Samaj stated: "There shall be a Principal Arya Samaj in each province, and the other Arya Samajes shall be its branches, all connected with one another."; quoted in J.R. Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism with Special Reference to Caste" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Yale, 1942), p. 162. It should be noted, however, that when expansion really took hold in the Punjab, individual samajes retained a high degree of autonomy within this structure.

101 See Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 164.

102 Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 197.

103 See Jones, *Arya Dharm*, p. 40-43; it should also be noted that the Brahmo Samaj was a Bengali-dominated organisation, at a time when Bengalis were still cast as the principal beneficiaries of employment in the Punjabi bureaucracy.

The Vedas are the books of all true Knowledge. It is the paramount duty of all Aryas to read them and to instruct others in them, to hear them read, and to recite them to others.¹⁰⁴

There has been a tendency to emphasise the first part of this statement, as the only statement in the Principles that alludes to the status of the Vedas.¹⁰⁵ What is perhaps more interesting is the second half, which affirms the study, discussion and even preaching of the Vedas as the "paramount duty of all Aryas". The critical importance of the fixed, textual canon is evident here, as is the necessity of "spreading the word" of the new canon. As noted earlier, it is exactly this assertion that challenges fundamental elements of Brahmanical Hinduism.

The second critical factor was the Samaj Mandir. The Mandir developed as the basic institutional unit of the Arya Samaj; the focal point of each branch organisation, however large or small, where all of its regular activities were held. Principal among these activities was the weekly service, which consisted of Vedic ritual, singing of hymns, prayers and a sermon. These services were open to the public. In addition, the Mandir was the venue for Samaj committee meetings, and for elections to that committee. It would also be used for specialist services, such as marriage ceremonies, and also for regular classes. Most important of these latter were classes in Hindi and Sanskrit, which each Samaj was theoretically obliged to arrange for those of its members not conversant with either of these two core languages.¹⁰⁶ In effect, the Samaj Mandir assumed the position of a church-like organisation, tending to the needs of the "congregation" of local Samajists. This parallel was consciously perceived by contemporary Samajists. For example, when Lajpat Rai commented on public access to Samaj services, he said that "anybody can come into the Church of God and occupy whatever seat he likes".¹⁰⁷ This kind of language was easily projected onto the Arya Samaj as a whole; for example, in a speech in 1908, Lala Munshi Ram (later Swami Shraddhanand) referred to the Samaj as the "Vedic Church", and called on Aryas to "cultivate the grace of faith, and bear the cross".¹⁰⁸

The conception of a church-like structure had implications in terms of the Samaj's transformative trajectory. What distinguishes the nineteenth century reform movements, as I have said, was their construction of an alternative framework, outside the traditional structure of Hinduism. The church-like structure of the Samaj constitutes the material articulation of this alternative framework. Eschmann has noted that caste in

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in Jones, *Arya Dharm*, Appendix 1, p. 321.

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati*, p.175; Jones, *Arya Dharm*, p. 37.

¹⁰⁶ See Lajpat Rai, *A History of the Arya Samaj*, p.158-9.

¹⁰⁷ Lajpat Rai, *A History of the Arya Samaj*, p. 157.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Jordens, *Swami Shraddhananda*, pp. 87-8.

Hinduism performs many similar functions to the Church in Christianity. Duties such as the selection and training of priests, the trusteeship of sacraments such as marriage, the admission of individuals by birth and the power to excommunicate them, are all either general caste responsibilities or recognised as the preserve of certain castes. These functions are also characteristic of the Church in Christianity.¹⁰⁹ By constructing an institutional space similar to that of the Church, the Arya Samaj aligned itself in direct confrontation to the institutional function of the caste system. It is here, then, on the level of the organisation of Hinduism, that the transformative potential of Dayananda's ideology was manifested.

3.3.2 Orthodoxy: Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal

Earlier, it was suggested that the pattern of organisation that emerged in Hinduism during the nineteenth century was marked by a template of polarisation, meaning the development of movements and bodies in opposition to each other. This pattern is certainly evident as the Arya Samaj expanded its network in the north west, as it was shadowed by the development of "orthodox" institutions, the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and their umbrella organisation, the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal. As has been shown, orthodoxy is a somewhat complex idea in Hinduism: it must be understood in terms of local or regional frameworks, by reference to caste and *Sampradaya* configurations. Indeed, it has also been illustrated that the transformative potential of reformism - the feature that distinguishes it as reforming - is based upon the challenge to this structural arrangement. Orthodoxy as symbolised by *sanatana dharma*, however, is a somewhat different idea, in that it seeks to project a monolithic establishment: orthodoxy in a pan-Hindu context, or, more appropriately, as a pan-Hindu constituency.

Recent work by Vasudha Dalmia has focused on the development of a self-consciously modern image of orthodoxy in Benaras during the late 1860s and 1870s. In particular she has concentrated on the work of Bharatendu Harischandra and his attempts to formulate a standardised Vaishnavite approach to the "true" form of Hindu belief and practice.¹¹⁰ Harischandra fashioned his approach through his journals, and through his involvement in two organisations, the Kashi Dharma Sabha and the Tadiya Samaj. The Kashi Dharma Sabha had been instigated in the late 1860s by the Maharaja of Benaras, and Harischandra was its executive secretary during its early years. One of its principal concerns was the dispensation of *vyavasthas*, religious ordinances. This of

¹⁰⁹ See Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", p. 5.

¹¹⁰ See Dalmia, "The Only Real Religion of the Hindus"; Dalmia, "The Modernity of Tradition: Harischandra of Banaras and the Defence of Hindu Dharma" (Unpublished Seminar Paper, SOAS, London, 1993); and Dalmia, *The Nationalisation of Hindu Tradition: Bharatendu Harischandra and Nineteenth Century Banaras* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1997).

course had long been a recognised function of individual *pandits*, guided by their own *Sampradaya*-based theology. Dalmia states that the Maharaja sought to provide this system with an organised structure through the establishment of the Dharma Sabha. She illustrates how the Sabha exercised its authority, mostly by making rulings on issues of ritual practice. These rulings were widely accepted, it would appear, due to their association with Benaras and the Maharaja, but the thrust of the organisation is nevertheless clear: to establish a body with the authority to define correct or standard procedure within the Hindu religion.

Because of its basis in the *vyavastha* tradition, the Sabha's authority encompassed ritual practice; Harischandra, however, was by the early eighteen seventies more interested in establishing a doctrinal standard in Hinduism. He attempted to consolidate the doctrinal approach of key Vaishnavite *Sampradays* through the articulation of a common base in monotheism and *bhakti*.¹¹¹ The Tadiya Samaj was the organisational form for this. It is clear that Harischandra and his associates in the Tadiya Samaj were motivated by a concern for the predicament of Hinduism as a whole within the context of colonial rule. This concern was precisely expressed in 1872 as a need to counter the heterogeneity of Hinduism, which prevented the presentation of a united front, an effective "Hindu public opinion".¹¹² The colonial public space, then, was influential in the articulation of this formulaic orthodoxy. But it also drew on the traditional authority of the *Sampradaya* structure, and the "natural" authority of Benaras as the theological centre of Hinduism.

This sophisticated attempt to reformulate tradition in a modern, nationalist context is quite different to the approach of the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas that emerged in the late eighteen seventies, and to the idea of *sanatana dharma* as a symbol of orthodoxy. In the Punjab Census Report for 1891, the Census Superintendent notes the tendency of "orthodox Hindus...to record themselves as orthodox by sect." Whilst specifying numbers returned as brahmachari (592), smartak (123) and karm kandi (838), he then goes on to comment that

a still larger number were entered as Sanathan-dharmi, but I have not thought it worthwhile to record their numbers: the term merely implies that they belong to the 'old school', and it is generally used in contradistinction to the followers of the Arya Samaj. In Lahore City I found at the commencement of the preliminary enumeration that almost everybody who was not an Arya was being recorded as a Sanathan-dharmi, which was a view of the meaning of our 'sect-column' that would have deprived it of its main interest. The term is generally used

¹¹¹ See Dalmia, "The Only Real Religion of the Hindus", pp. 188-9.

¹¹² "Public Opinion in India", an editorial published in Hariscandra's journal *Kavivacansudha*, quoted at length in Dalmia, "The Only Real Religion of the Hindus", p. 186-7.

now-a-days in contradistinction to the Aryas, and there are numerous societies and clubs which under this title do what they can to maintain the orthodox faith.¹¹³

Three points should be noted from this comment: first, "not being an Arya" is identified as the common characteristic of "sanathan-dharmis"; secondly, the non-Arya Lahori Hindus, were *being recorded* as "sanathan-dharmis", as opposed to positively stating their allegiance - this implies the conscious intervention of census enumerators, similar to that noted in Chapter 2 in the recording of Hindus in the Central Provinces; and thirdly, "numerous societies and clubs" are cited as "maintaining the orthodox faith". The Census Superintendent outlines an idea with little apparent substance, actively promoted by middle class agents, and manifested in modern organisational forms. In addition, it may be said that the spread of this new formulation mirrored that of the Arya Samaj, as it is first mentioned in the Punjab report, before spreading to the United Provinces report somewhat later.¹¹⁴ The simple image of a reactive, conservative force is nevertheless somewhat misleading. Pandit Shraddha Ram, the most prominent early "Sanatani", was a proactive and by no means conventional campaigner. As early as 1875 he had established the Hindu Dharm Prakashik Sabha, "dedicated to the defence of Hindu orthodoxy".¹¹⁵ This organisation was established in the specific context of Ludhiana, where Kanhya Lal Alakhdari's reformist Niti Prakash Sabha had been operating since 1873. Prior to this, however, he had been working in collaboration with Alakhdari in Amritsar on a campaign to purify Hindu practice. In addition, as early as 1874 he had performed several *shuddhi* ceremonies to reclaim converted Hindus.¹¹⁶

The establishment of the Ludhiana organisations is an early indication of the way in which nominally reformist and orthodox bodies developed together during this period. These organisations all recruited from the same pool of educated, profession-orientated middle castes - Khatri, Aroras and Banias.¹¹⁷ From the outset, they were concerned

¹¹³ *Census of India 1891*, Vol. XIX, Punjab and its Feudatories, Pt. 1: Report (Superintendent Government Printing, Calcutta, 1892), p. 171-2.

¹¹⁴ Its sudden popularity evidently still baffled the Punjab Census Superintendent in 1901, as he states "how the phrase has become so widespread I cannot explain"; *Census of India 1901*, Vol. XVII, Punjab and its Feudatories, and the North-West Frontier Province, Pt.1: Report (Government Central Printing, Simla, 1902), p.115. First mention in the U.P. Census Report is in 1911, when 8861 were returned as sanatana dharmis by sect, and the Superintendent noted: "The phrase is used chiefly in opposition to the Arya Samaj. ...All but 25 are found in the three western divisions where Aryaism is most prevalent... ." See *Census of India 1911*, Vol. XV, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, pt. 1 (Superintendent Government Printing, Allahabad, 1912), p. 131.

¹¹⁵ Jones, *Arya Dharm*, p. 28.

¹¹⁶ *Shuddhi* was performed by Shraddha Ram at Sialkot, Mian Mir, Jullundar, Phagwara, Phillaur, Ludhiana, Ambala and Saharanpur; see *ibid*.

¹¹⁷ N.B It would be an interesting extension of this observation to research the relative level of government employment within comparable Sanatani and Arya organisations. Whether there

not only with attacking or defending various aspects of ritual practice and social custom, but also with issues which engendered a consensus across the spectrum of organised, literate Hinduism in the public domain. Jones notes that it is often difficult to trace the development of the "competing" networks of Arya and Sanatani organisations, because of the tendency to use the same terminology and the confluence of objectives among these organisations.¹¹⁸ The classic notion of a furious debate between Aryas and Sanatanis over the issue of image worship is underwritten throughout this period by a consistent consensus on issues such as cow protection, the promotion of Sanskrit and Hindi, the need to purify practice and curb expenditure on ritual, and to a certain extent, the necessity of *shuddhi*.

How, then, did the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas distinguish themselves as orthodox? Unlike Harischandra's attempt to develop a homogenising doctrinal core, the Punjabi Sabhas generated doctrinal statements - beyond the vague invocation of *sruti-smriti* or *ved-upanishad-itihās-purāṇa* - only in response to reformist concerns. No core theology was developed, to be referred to by any well-read Sanatani in a debate with an Arya. Instead, Sanatanis relied on learned individuals like Shraddha Ram to travel from district to district, refuting the arguments of Dayananda and other reformers as they arose. This is significant, because of the emphasis it placed on practice and structure - as opposed to doctrine - as the defining elements of Hindu tradition. The main areas of Arya criticism in the 1880s were image worship and the position of Brahmans in Hindu society. Consequently, image worship and established caste hierarchies were identified as core features of the tradition signified by *sanatana dharma*, and defended by Sanatana Dharma Sabhas.

This is reflected in the most ambitious projection of orthodoxy during the late nineteenth century, the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal. This organisation first met at Hardwar in 1887, and is said to have been the work of Pandit Din Dayal Sharma.¹¹⁹ Unsurprisingly, given the prevalent mood at this time, the Government interpreted the Mahamandal as another manifestation of the cow protection movement.¹²⁰ It did, however, appear to have wider aims, projecting itself as a central umbrella organisation for the network of Sanatana Dharma Sabhas that were by this time well established in Punjab and North Western Provinces. Promoting the second meeting of the

is, for example, a greater representation of 'middle appointments' (vernacular literacy required) amongst Sanatanists, and 'higher appointments' (English required) amongst Aryas.

118 See Jones, *Arya Dharm*, p. 111, n. 56.

119 See "Proposed Deputation of the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal Society to the King's Coronation", Foreign Department, Internal, B Progs, June 1902, Nos 112-114 (NAI).

120 See *ibid.*, which states that the Mahamandal was founded "in connection with kine killing" and notes that Din Dayal "has done all in his power to prevent kine killing"; on the cow protection movement, see Section 4.3.1 of this thesis.

Mahamandal in 1889, Sharma is reported to have publicised the expansion of the Sabha network from under 100 to more than 200 since the foundation of the Mahamandal. In addition, the organisation was said to have preserved Sanskrit manuscripts by placing them in "the libraries of the Dharma Sabhas"; improving "old indigenous Sanskrit schools" and opening new ones; appointing "learned Brahmins...to lecture on orthodox Hindu religion"; and generally making efforts to "refute the new propaganda of the modern Hindu sects".¹²¹ The Mahamandal developed into a Congress-style organisation,¹²² meeting fairly consistently on an annual basis, and attended by delegates representing affiliated Sabhas. It projected several Hindu Rajas as patrons and figureheads of a revived Hinduism. By 1902, the Mahamandal claimed as its constituency "the whole of the orthodox classes of the Hindus in India"¹²³

Subjects of discussion at the 1900 session of the Mahamandal, held at Delhi, give an indication of the issues that defined this orthodoxy. The worship of images, use of "Devanagari language", obedience due to *Pandits* and Brahmins, the lack of *Shastric* authority for widow remarriage, the need for a Sanskrit College "in which the old Hindu laws and c. were to be taught".¹²⁴ The agenda, then, was dominated by issues of practice and structure; the lack of any doctrinal core is evident in this body representative of orthodoxy.

3.3.3 Defining Approaches to the Organisation of Hinduism

The above examinations illustrate that reformist and orthodox positions, despite having a great deal in common and sharing the same "broad 'discursive field' of 'Hindu' religious thought",¹²⁵ were nevertheless distinct on one level: the level of organisation or structure. By this I mean not their own organisation or structure, although this was to become a prominent issue in the development of the Hindu nationalist movement in the twentieth century. Rather, I am referring to their relationship with and attitude towards the organisation or structure of Hinduism itself: how they perceived the "shape" of the religion, and how this shape might evolve. As noted earlier, the

¹²¹ *Bharat Bandhu* (Aligarh) 28 December 1888; quoted in Selections from Vernacular Newspapers: North Western Provinces, Oudh, Central Provinces, Central India and Rajputana, 1889.

¹²² The *Mahratta* notes on 6 March 1892 that the constitution of the Mahamandal "closely resembles that of the National Congress".

¹²³ Letter from Rai Baroda K. Lahiri, Secretary, Bharat Dharma Mahamandal, Aligarh, to Chief Secretary to the United Provinces Government, 31 March 1902; Home Department, Public, A Progs, May 1902, no. 260 (NAI).

¹²⁴ Extract from CSB Abstract No.35, dated 5 December 1900, quoted in Foreign Department, Internal, B Progs, June 1902, Nos 112-114 (NAI)

¹²⁵ The observation is Susan Bayly's, in "Hindu 'modernisers' and the 'public' arena: indigenous critiques of caste in colonial India", p. 39.

pressures on Hinduism at this time were pressures which focused attention on this shape, and in particular on the issue of caste. For Aryas, the main pressure was the threat of Christianity. They explained the evident success of Christian missionaries by focusing on two central factors: first, the passive, disorganised nature of Hinduism, with its proliferation of subcastes, which made it vulnerable to aggressive missionary activity; secondly, the oppression of certain groups as a result of this proliferation and the corrupt power of the Brahmans, which rendered these groups willing to accept Christianity. Both of these factors were underpinned by a sub-text of the degeneration of Hinduism, its fall from the Vedic Golden Age. For the Sanatanis, both missionaries and reformers created the pressure, but the issues were essentially the same: the disorganised nature of Hinduism and the problem of low caste oppression. Again, this was a symptom of degeneracy in Hinduism, and the principal objective was to counter this degeneracy. The combined problems of disorganisation and oppression had to be addressed, whilst at the same time defending the existing caste structure as a fundamental aspect of Hindu tradition.

The difference in approach of Aryas and Sanatanis to these problems is crucial to an understanding of the dynamics of Hindu politics as it developed in the twentieth century. The Arya approach was based on its transformative potential. It meant working towards a *vertical* restructuring of society, reflecting Dayananda's interpretation of the Vedic notion of *varnashramadharma*, and the objective accessibility of the 'core' of Hinduism, the Vedic canon. Hinduism would be unified by means of an overhaul which would see the gradual diminution of the oppressive elements of the structure, bringing it progressively into line with the Vedic ideal - as we shall see, *shuddhi* was to become the principal means of achieving this overhaul. The Sanatani approach, on the other hand, had no doctrinal source. Indeed, its success depended on the *relegation* of doctrine to a position of secondary importance, as doctrinal difference was precisely what the idea of a pan-Hindu orthodoxy could not confront. Instead, it focused on a kind of *horizontal* binding together of the existing structure, driven by the notion that all castes have an organic role in Hindu society and therefore demand respect. Respect for low castes, untouchables and women was accompanied by a commitment to an improvement of their conditions, but not a change of their status in relation to the rest of Hindu society.

The way in which this difference of approach was articulated is exemplified by the publication of a pamphlet entitled *An Old Hindu's Hope* in Calcutta early in 1889. The increasing sophistication of the public space is illustrated by the fact that this pamphlet had an impact across British India. It was reported at length, for example, in the

Bombay-based Marathi/English weekly *Native Opinion* in May 1889.¹²⁶ The *Opinion* stated that the pamphlet laments the fissiparous tendencies of Hindu society, fuelled by caste and doctrinal antagonisms. As a remedy, it advocates unity "under the banner inscribed with the words *Iswara o Matribhum*", God and Motherland. Unity should be given a material form through the organisation of a Maha Hindu Samiti, in which "no sectarian religious discussion will be allowed. Only subjects relating to the religious rights and privileges of Hindus in general will be deemed legitimate subjects...". The pamphlet then goes on to list some such subjects: the promotion of Hindi and Devanagiri, the protection of cows, the promotion of swadeshi and the establishment of a Sanskrit University. Discussion of social questions, on the other hand, would be "totally avoided", apart from those "relating to sanitation, temperance, education, and c." The *Opinion* rounds off its lengthy reportage by calling this "a laudable undertaking" and opining that the Maha Hindu Samiti "exists on paper only". The Maha Hindu Samiti, then, is presented as a means of binding together Hindus under a common banner. What have already been identified as consensual issues would form the basis of the Samiti's work, and neither "sectarian (religious) interests" nor "social questions" would be allowed to disrupt this work. In effect, the pamphlet is an articulation of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism.

The Lahore-based *Tribune*, also reporting on the pamphlet in May 1889, presents a somewhat different approach to that of the approving *Native Opinion*.¹²⁷ The paper interpreted the proposition to avoid "sectarian religious discussion" and exclude social issues not as a means of promoting unity, but rather as rendering the Maha Samiti "altogether objectless":

We should have seen some meaning in Old Hindu's proposals if he instead of practically excluding all religious questions and formally excluding all social questions, had made them the principal questions to be dealt with by his Maha Samiti. Such questions the National Congress cannot discuss, nor can Hindus, Mahommedans and Christians discuss such questions together. Such objects could only give a Hindu National Congress a *raison d'être*; and we doubt not by discussing religious and social issues we could gradually introduce reform in the Hindu religious and social practices.

The *Tribune* does see a role for a pan-Hindu organisation, which it articulates in the style of the Indian National Congress - a political body, addressing itself to the state, founded some three years earlier. The objective of this pan-Hindu organisation, however, should be precisely to address the issues which are excluded in the objectives of the Maha Hindu Samiti. Here, then, is a divergent view of the perceived route to the

¹²⁶ *Native Opinion* 16 May 1889.

¹²⁷ *Tribune* 18 May 1889.

organisation of Hinduism. It is a view based on the vertical reorganisation of the religion, expressed as the need to confront the issue of reform.

The language in both approaches is that of representation. The *Tribune's* reference to the Congress is indicative of its acceptance that a pan-Hindu body should be structured as a modern political organisation, meaningful within the public space. Similarly, the direct reference to the 'rights and privileges' of Hindus in the pamphlet indicates how this notion of organisation was projected as a means of promoting the status of Hindus as Subjects of the Queen, in the sense articulated in the Proclamation.¹²⁸ In both cases, the putative Samiti was cast as representing the interests of Hindus as a homogeneous group, recognisable within the framework of the colonial state.¹²⁹ This common idea of representation was to become the site of struggle between the two approaches, horizontal and vertical as both sought to define the constituency of Hindus in consonance with these conflicting ideas of organisation.

3.4 Summary of Discussion

What has been examined in this chapter is the development of perceptions and manifestations of Hinduism in the context of the expanding colonial state in the nineteenth century. I began by looking at a series of images projected by the state which had a lasting impact on colonial society. These images were constructed within the framework of a discourse of organisation as a fundamental asset of the colonial power, and of European civilisation in general. Conversely, the state projected the image of Indian society as fundamentally disorganised, under threat of anarchy if British power were to be withdrawn. Hinduism as a stagnant jungle, a once great religious system gone to seed, was a constituent component of this image. As facets of the state's hegemonic arrangement, these images had their most immediate impact amongst the growing middle class population.

¹²⁸ Interestingly, *The Tribune* reacts strongly to Old Hindu's citation of rights and privileges, summoning up the spirit of the Proclamation in the process: "Why," it asks, "has anyone assailed these rights and privileges? We live under the tolerant government of England, under which the meanest man can and does practise his own religion in perfect safety. There is no forcing of beef down the Hindu's throat now, nor ham down the Mahomedans."

¹²⁹ This idea of representation was also at the heart of a debate engendered by the response of the *Hindu* daily to the pamphlet (See especially the editorial in the *Hindu* on 10 May 1889). The newspaper's criticism of the idea of a Maha Hindu Samiti being dominated by orthodoxy prompted "Old Hindu" himself to intervene. His letter to the *Hindu* commented: "if the majority of (the Samiti's) members do not belong to (the orthodox) class, it would have no representative character, as men holding heterodox opinions constitute but a fraction of the Hindu community of India." Reproduced in *Indian Mirror*, 22 May 1889.

I then examined the mounting pressures which were brought to bear on this debased image of Hinduism. First, a pressure emanating from within the colonial state, as it became more elaborate, more expansive, in the wake of the Mutiny. This was the development of the discourse of organisation, and with it the increased prominence of the idea of representation as an idiom of power in the public space. After 1858 the British Parliament, through the Secretary of State, was far more directly associated with executive power in India. In addition the Queen's Proclamation promoted the "rights" of Indians as Subjects of the British Empire. These aspects served to emphasise representation as a language of power in colonial India, and so encouraged the articulation of concerns as emanating from constituencies. Petitions to the government were therefore couched as "representing the views" of the "residents of Nagpur and the surrounding areas," for example, in order to give them more impact within a state that projected the language and institutions of representation at its centre. The fact that Indians' "rights" as set out in the Proclamation were expressed first and foremost in religious terms - the right to practice one's religion as sacrosanct - meant that this idiom of power was particularly pertinent for those with religious concerns.

Other pressures developing during the nineteenth century forced these concerns increasingly into the public space. In the context of Hinduism, these pressures were: first, shifts in the pattern of Christian missionary activity, towards the conversion of low caste groups as opposed to high caste individuals; and secondly, the growth of the reform movements which aligned themselves specifically against the established structure of the religion. Both these pressures focused concern on the issue of structure, and the predicament of low castes and untouchables in relation to this structure.

The third section of this chapter has examined how these concerns were articulated by middle class Indians in the second half of the nineteenth century. I have described the emergence of organisations concerned with Hinduism within the public space as being governed by a "template of polarisation". The opposing ideas of orthodoxy and reformism were in this sense "called into being" by each other. This is not to deny the innovative zeal of such figures as Dayananda. Rather, it suggests that movements developed a specific significance within the public space: they were articulated as reformist or orthodox on the basis of the discourse of organisation, and they were given meaning by the respective projection of modern, reforming and traditional, orthodox constituencies of Hindus. Both demanded the existence of the other in order to substantiate this position within the public space.

In fact, however, what has been illustrated is that both types of organisation were equally modern, and that both focused on the same problem of the organisation of Hinduism. The distinction between the two groups, exemplified here by the Arya Samaj and the Sanatana Dharma movement, lies in their approach to this problem. I have characterised the distinction as that between vertical and horizontal organisation: the alignment of the Arya Samaj in relation to Hinduism meant that it had the potential to effect a vertical restructuring of Hindu society, by transforming the nature of caste and its relationship to religiosity; the Sanatanis sought a horizontal "binding together" of Hindu society, which implicitly accepted the established position of caste within it. The next chapter will be structured around two movements in the 1890s which concretised the different approaches, giving them a material existence in the development towards a specifically Hindu politics.

Indian Nationalism and Representations of Hinduism towards the End of the Nineteenth Century

Having examined the formulation of ideas of the organisation of Hinduism during the late nineteenth century, I will now look at the implementation of these ideas; how they were articulated towards the end of the century as concrete movements. Two particular movements were influenced by the divergent approaches - horizontal and vertical - which have been identified in the formulation of ideas of organisation: first, the cow protection movement, which swept across much of north, west and central India during the 1880s and early 1890s; and secondly, the *shuddhi* movement, which became increasingly significant as an issue of both social reform and politics from the late 1880s onwards.

These movements must be placed in the context of the emerging ideology of elite-led Indian nationalism. Ideas of organisation and representation were also significant factors in the shaping of this ideology. As well as reflecting the continued elaboration and expansion of the colonial public space during the final three decades of the nineteenth century, the way in which Indian nationalism established itself in this environment demonstrated a growing understanding of the nature of colonial hegemony and the means of countering it. This was to have significant ramifications for the articulation of Hindu organisation in the same environment.

4.1 The Development of Nationalist Organisation

It is now well understood that the foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was neither a sudden event nor the sole work of an individual Englishman hoping to provide a "safety valve" for volatile political aspirations.¹ Recent accounts have rather presented it as a significant act in a process of elite political formation which had been fairly well established during the 1870s.² The two most significant political organisations to emerge during this decade were the Sarvajanik Sabha and the Indian

¹ For an account of how these ideas became entrenched as features of Congress history, see B. Chandra et al, *India's Struggle for Independence*, pp. 61-70.

² See, for example, Chandra et al, *India's Struggle for Independence*, pp. 71-81.

Association . It was these organisations which did much to establish the Maharashtra-Bengal axis that characterised the Congress in its early phase.³

4.1.1 Early Indian Nationalism and the State

The Sarvajanik Sabha was established in Poona in 1870 with a significant membership criterion. This was that each member was required to hold a letter of representation, signed by fifty men from Poona and surrounding districts, who appointed the member to act as their spokesman in the dealings of the Sabha. This criterion meant that the Sabha had a firm representative base, albeit within a limited social context. By 1871, the Sabha could confidently claim to represent the views of some 17,000 citizens of Poona.⁴ This representative quality was not appreciated by the Bombay government, a view reflected in an article on the Sabha in the *Englishman* : "It is well to realise that we are not yet prepared to govern India by means of popular representation, and that anything which approaches to a *bona fide* representative body will necessarily exercise a power incompatible with the existing system of administration."⁵ In consonance with this view, the Government kept a close watch on the Sabha and subjected it to mild harassment during the 1870s.⁶

In many ways the Indian Association, established in Calcutta in 1876, constitutes a more typical example of political formation at this time. Surendranath Banerjea, the prominent Calcuttan moderate and architect of the Association, describes its aim as "to represent the views of the educated middle class community and inspire them with a living interest in public affairs."⁷ At the same time, the Association had as one of its principal objectives the "unification of the Indian races and peoples upon the basis of common political interests and aspirations."⁸ The most important phase of this activity came a year after the Association's foundation, when the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, reduced the maximum age limit for entrants in the ICS examination. This effectively discriminated against Indians hoping to gain entry, due in part to the greater organisation entailed in preparing for and attending examinations in London. During the summer of 1877 Banerjea was sent as "special delegate" of the Indian Association on a lecture tour to galvanise "public" protest against the measure. As a result, says

³ See *ibid*; also S. Sarkar, *Modern India*, pp. 88-95.

⁴ See R. O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low Caste Protest in Nineteenth Century Western India* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), p. 190.

⁵ *The Englishman* 18 May 1875, quoted in O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, p. 191

⁶ Most famously by transferring M.G. Ranade, the leading light of the Sabha, from his post as a judge in Poona; see O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, p. 191.

⁷ S. Banerjea, *A Nation in Making* (Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1963), p. 37.

⁸ Banerjea, *A Nation in Making*, p. 39.

Banerjea, organisations similar to the Indian Association were formed "at Lahore, Meerut, Allahabad, Cawnpore and Lucknow. Thus a network of organisations was started, and the foundations were well and truly laid...for united and concerted action among our representative men, over an area extending from Calcutta to Lahore."⁹

This early political initiative, then, was replete with representative idioms. The Association was founded in order to represent "the educated middle class community", which in turn was assumed to represent "the political interests and aspirations" of the Indian people as a whole. When Banerjea embarked on his lecture tour he was sent as a "special delegate", and the organisations subsequently set up in cities across the northern plains were constituted by "representative men". Unlike the Sarvajanik Sabha, the Indian Association had no representative mechanism built into its membership criteria. The symbolic invocation of representation was nevertheless persistently expressed as central to the self image of the Association, in order to give it meaning within the public space in which it operated. Precisely because of this symbolic character, the representative claims of the Indian Association did not attract the same opprobrium as those of the Sarvajanik Sabha; they were not "incompatible with the existing system of administration", because they were expressed within the parameters of the discourse of organisation.

This same pattern is evident in the Congress. In its early years this organisation had little infrastructure; it was simply a gathering of prominent professional people every year, "in what became a great social occasion as well as a political assembly."¹⁰ The proceedings of the Congress, however, were nevertheless "conducted democratically, issues being decided through debate and discussion and occasionally through voting."¹¹ Representation again assumes a symbolic quality in this context.

This is not to say that Congress nor many of the individuals that energetically pursued nationalist politics during the eighteen eighties and nineties were not genuinely concerned at the plight of the country. Several historical studies have illustrated the sophisticated and trenchant nature of what is known as the "moderate" critique of colonialism, particularly in relation to economic exploitation.¹² Moderate ideology is rather distinguished from later positions through its perception of the colonial state. Moderates such as Banerjea and G.K. Gokhale were convinced by the hegemonic claim of the state, that it operated ultimately in the interests of the Indian people. There was a

⁹ Banerjea, *A Nation in Making*, p. 44.

¹⁰ Sarkar, *Modern India*, p. 89.

¹¹ B. Chandra et al, *India's Struggle for Independence*, p. 78.

¹² See Bipan Chandra, *Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India*.

conviction that the Imperial mission as articulated in Victoria's Proclamation was a legalistic principle - Banerjea's "Magna Carta" - at the heart of British rule. "If it is at once admitted," Banerjea states in 1877, "that she (Britain) has no mission here, we are driven to the conclusion that the English Empire rests not upon the principles of justice and truth, or upon the willing allegiance of a subject people, but upon pure, simple, unmitigated brute force."¹³

The mission was the basis of Banerjea's loyalty and his vision of the British Indian state as lawful, constitutional and ruling in the interests of the people. The fact that the state did not always live up to these principles of justice and truth was an exasperating feature of the colonial predicament. In an editorial in the *Bengalee* in 1898, Banerjea noted that "the peculiar character of the struggle is that we are fighting with Englishmen for the preservation of English principles in the government of the country, and the bureaucracy is apparently resolved to fall back upon oriental methods in the government of an oriental country."¹⁴ The complaint, then, is of the difference between the professed lofty projections of liberal imperialism and the material existence of colonial government. It is a virtual recognition of the structure of colonial hegemonic rule, and of the inherent contradiction at its base. At the same time, this contradiction is articulated entirely in its own terms: the characterisation of oppressive government as "oriental" - the "Other" of western lawful and constitutional government - being an integral feature of the hegemonic project.¹⁵ What is indicated here is the intimate relation between moderatism and the hegemonic arrangement of the state. One might even characterise this moderatism more accurately as "hegemonic nationalism". The symbolic representation that has been illustrated as central to moderatism is also - through the discourse of organisation - intimately connected to this hegemonic arrangement.

4.1.2 Beginnings of Mass Mobilisation as Nationalist Strategy: B.G. Tilak and the Search for Contact in the 1890s

Almost immediately, however, some elements of the Indian national movement began to diverge from this "hegemonic nationalism", challenging the parameters of the discourse of organisation in the process. The work of the Maharashtrian nationalist

¹³ Speech at Calcutta 28 April 1877; S. Banerjea, *Speeches* Vol.1, p. 67.

¹⁴ *Bengalee* 10 December 1898.

¹⁵ In the sense demonstrated in Section 3.1 - contrasting the organisation of the state with the disorganisation of society. G.K. Gokhale later rationalised this apparent contradiction in colonial government as the distinction between 'narrow' and 'noble' Imperialism; see, for example, his speech at Madras 25 July 1904, in Ambedkar and Karve [eds], *Speeches and Writings of G.K. Gokhale* Vol 2 (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966), p. 177.

B.G. Tilak during the nineties illustrates this development. Tilak's career has been studied by several historians. Nationalist historiography has viewed him as an icon of the freedom struggle - the first nationalist to genuinely reach out to the people.¹⁶ Some western historians have been rather more circumspect, viewing his work, particularly in relation to the Ganapati and Shivaji festivals, as irresponsible dabbling in religio-political mobilisation.¹⁷ This view recalls the imperialist commentator Valentine Chirol, who cites the Ganapati festival in his *Indian Unrest* as a prime example of Tilak's "reactionary" politics, an unethical and power hungry appeal to "popular superstitions".¹⁸ In more recent years some historians, pursuing the lead of the Subaltern Studies group, have decried this emphasis on Tilak's work altogether, citing its narrow focus on movements which were elite-led, with its implication that without elite agency subaltern consciousness remained mute or irrationally violent.¹⁹

Although I find this complaint eminently justifiable, it should by now be clear that I am not prepared to accept that the history of elites (as opposed to elite historiography) is rendered insignificant by Subaltern Studies. Tilak's actions during the 1890s demand attention, precisely because of their ramifications in the realm of elite-led politics. These ramifications, however, do not revolve around the notion of Tilak's supposed manipulation of subaltern consciousness - "raising the demon", as it were, of some supposedly innate Hindu or Marathi chauvinism - but rather around his exploration of new methods of political representation in the public space of colonial India. Tilak's work began to challenge the accepted discursive structure of how a public organisation should operate; a structure which accommodates all the organisational forms - both political and religious - studied so far in this thesis.

Tilak turned his attention to the Ganapati festival in Poona in 1894. The festival is an annual event popular in Maharashtra, which celebrates the elephant-headed deity Ganesh. Tilak's intervention aimed to infuse the festival with a political message, and he attempted to effect this through a positive restructuring of the way the festival was celebrated. The central feature of this restructuring was to encourage celebration on a community level (i.e. neighbourhood or caste communities), as opposed to the more established emphasis on an extended family or immediate neighbourly basis.²⁰ To use

¹⁶ See, for example, D.V. Tahmankar, *Lokamanya Tilak: Father of Indian Unrest and Maker of Modern India* (Murray, London, 1956); S.L. Karandikar, *Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak: the Hercules and Prometheus of Modern India* (Poona, 1957).

¹⁷ See R.I. Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya*, p.66, 97; S. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1962), pp. 68-70.

¹⁸ Chirol, *Indian Unrest* (MacMillan, London, 1910), p. 40.

¹⁹ See especially Sandria Freitag, *Collective Action and Community*, pp. 7-13.

²⁰ For a detailed account, see Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya*, p. 76-77.

Freitag's terminology, this was an attempt to push Ganapati further into the "public arena".²¹ Within this "popularised" context, Tilak introduced the familiar concept of *melas*, or singing parties, designed to deliver the "messages" which would provide political direction to the festival.

Once this basic restructuring had been established, it is important to note that the festival was left largely to shape itself on a local level. Although a central co-ordinating body was formed in 1896, caste or neighbourhood Ganapati committees were left to their own devices, collecting their own subscriptions and organising their own leadership and *melas*. This would suggest that the politicisation of Ganapati did indeed have a subaltern element. As a project of the nationalist elite, it is clear that it was perceived by Tilak as an alternative to the structure of politics within Congress:

This work will not be as strenuous and expensive as the work of Congress. The educated people can achieve results through these national festivals which it would be impossible for the Congress to achieve. ...Will it not be possible for political activities to enter the humblest cottages of the villages through such means?²²

Considering the urban nature of the movement, this was a somewhat ambitious claim, but it nevertheless illustrates the way in which Ganapati was perceived as a means of extending the representative quality of nationalism.

This may again be perceived in Tilak's attempts to launch a movement in the name of Shivaji, the Kshatriya hero who carved the Maratha kingdom out of the Mughal Empire in the late seventeenth century. The Shivaji movement was launched on the basis of a call to restore and renew the dilapidated memorial to Shivaji at Raigad. As Rosalind O'Hanlon has shown, towards the end of the nineteenth century Shivaji became a pliable historical tool in the presentation of a variety of ideological stances.²³ In this context, Tilak was only resorting to available materials to achieve his objective.

As well as appealing to princely states, Tilak conducted a campaign through his Marathi newspaper *Kesari* to encourage popular donation to the restoration fund. Even the smallest donations were acknowledged in the columns of *Kesari*, and this strategy proved to be enormously successful. Of the sum of rupees 15 000 collected by the end of 1895, as much as 80% was received in contributions under one rupee. The total number of contributions amounted to nearly 60 000.²⁴ The significance of these

²¹ On Freitag's public arena, see Section 2.2 of this thesis.

²² *Kesari* 8 September 1896; quoted in Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya*, p. 79.

²³ See O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, chapter 10, pp. 164-186.

²⁴ *Mahratta* 31 December 1895; quoted in Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya*, p. 107.

figures is articulated by Tilak in connection with the Paisa Fund, which was initiated in 1900 on the same principle as the Shivaji fund:

The Paisa Fund teaches all people how to utilise their money and bodily power to the national object... . When these two things are yoked to any wagon, no official class will have in its hands the power to stop the motion of that wagon.²⁵

The fund-raising principle is articulated here as a means of raising levels of consciousness; its significance lies not so much in the achievement of the objective, as in the educative and consciousness-raising functions of individual commitment. As with the Ganapati movement, the emphasis was on mobilising interest and support for elite-led nationalism in non-elite sectors of the population, and so reifying the idea of a nationalist constituency - increasing the legitimacy of elite claims to represent the people.

Ultimately, both the Ganapati and Shivaji festivals were limited as political movements by the lack of an adequate infrastructure. This was a point which Tilak himself evidently acknowledged, as much of his later work was based on the expansion and use of effective political networks.²⁶ What it illustrates here is the pattern of elite nationalist activity - moving away from the symbolic representation that characterised the hegemonic nationalism of the moderates, and towards a counter-hegemonic attempt to raise consciousness and so reify the nationalist constituency. This pattern of activity was to have a profound impact on the organisation of Hinduism as a political force, and also on the state's perception of seemingly a-political movements. Certain other factors during this period were increasing the pressure on Hinduism to organise as an ideological entity. Before examining Hindu movements themselves, therefore, I will examine two of these factors as of definitive significance: the growing impact of the census, and the increasing prominence of low caste mobilisation.

4.2 Undermining Hindu Organisation in the Public Space

4.2.1 The Census and the Taxonomy of Hinduism

The All India Census was first taken in 1871, and as the decennial series unfolded, a variety of commentators began to detect demographic patterns and trends which were to have significant political ramifications. Perhaps the most important in our context is the "dying race" theory, which was first articulated in a series of articles in the *Bengalee* in

²⁵ Quoted in V.P. Varma, *Life and Philosophy of Lokamanya Tilak* (Agra, 1978), p. 210.

²⁶ See J. Zavos, "Ideology and Hegemonic Struggle in the Early National Movement", Chapter 4, pp. 103-162.

1909, written by Colonel U.N. Mukherji.²⁷ This theory will be examined in Chapter 5. In this Section, I want to concentrate on the initial impact of the census; in particular, its implicit questioning of the whole idea of Hinduism as a viable category in the framework of colonial ethnography.²⁸

Quantifying Hinduism, defining its limits, emerged as a consistent and perplexing problem in census reports. Attempts to gain a full picture of religious affiliation for the census of 1881 were seriously hampered by confusion over what constituted inclusion in the Hindu religion. The 1881 Report states that:

There were instances where the column in the enumerator's schedule, in which religion should have been entered, was filled up, not with any designation of any known religion, but with either the name of a caste or the title of a sect.²⁹

This practice was so prevalent in Central Provinces that Drysdale, the Provincial Census Superintendent, felt it necessary to list a large number of responses, grouping them under his own title of "Hindu". The list consisted of thirty castes, four sects, eight devotional groups and five groups that the Superintendent could only categorise as "others".³⁰ The Report also records the remarks of Mr. Kitts, Census Superintendent for Berar, who first complains of the "vagueness of the term Hindoo", and then goes on to describe the sometimes farcical attempts to pin down the affiliation of certain hill tribes:

When the hill people were pressed for a reply as to what their religion was, sometimes after much parleying, they said either they were Hindoos, or that they knew nothing about religion; that they were *arani log*, ignorant people. All they knew was, they were Korkus by caste. ...Nowhere, as far as I can discover, did a single individual assert that there was such a distinct and separate thing as a Korku religion; he merely answered to the effect 'I am a Korku, but I do not know what my religion is called. I worship Mahadeo, Hunuman, Byram-Bai, Chand, Suraj and the Bhagwant, who is the author of my religion, call it what you please'.³¹

27 Mukherji constructed an argument to show that Hindus would disappear altogether from India within a given number of years. He based this argument on Census figures 1871-1901. For a thorough analysis of Mukherji's work, see P.K.Dutta, "Dying Hindus", p. 1306-7; on the dying race theory in this thesis, see Section 5.2.

28 A good deal of excellent scholarly work has been accomplished on the census in India - see, for example, B. Cohn, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays*, especially the essay "The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia", pp. 224-254; S. Kaviraj, "The Imaginary Institution of India" (in *Subaltern Studies VII*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992, pp. 1-39); N.G Barrier [ed.], *The Census in India: New Perspectives* (Manohar, New Delhi, 1981); on the census as a facet of colonial rule in general, see B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, chapter 10, pp. 163-186.

29 *Census of India 1881*, Vol. I, India, p. 17.

30 *Census of India 1881*, Vol. I, India, p. 18.

31 *Census of India 1881*, Vol. I, India, p.19.

The state and its representatives, then, faced a problem which was created specifically by the Orientalist perception of Hinduism. On the basis of this perception, Hinduism should have been a recognisable, material feature of Indian society. The census revealed that this was by no means a settled fact. The blurred boundary between Hinduism and animism illustrates this point. Kitts' exasperation at the inability of hill tribes to define their religion, or even to *care* about how it should be defined ("call it what you please"), is indicative of the uncertainty with which these two categories were applied.

The report on the 1901 census reiterated the problem. The Superintendent R.V. Russell commented on the proclaimed Hinduism of the rural population of Seoni district that "whether they are Vaishnavas, or Shaivas, or Shaktas, they know as much as the man in the moon does."³² Russell attempted to by-pass the problem by defining contemporary Hinduism as "not so much a religion as a social system", which was governed by caste. This led him to suggest that: "as to the religion of the majority of the people who are called Hindus, if they can be said to have one religion at all, it would appear to be more correct to consider it as Animism than anything else."³³ Popular religious belief, then, "resemble(d) generally the religion or the superstitions of any other comparatively primitive races", the only difference being that "they are more numerous and complex because the population is large."³⁴ This view virtually consigned contemporary Hinduism - as a religion - to the status of a historical residue, with Russell concluding that "the Hindus of the present day are more backward than their forefathers, whose beliefs are portrayed in the Vedic hymns."³⁵ The conclusion indicates the trajectory of Russell's analysis. He attempts to follow the logic of the duality of Hinduism proposed by the Orientalists, locating the normative form of the religion in Vedic antiquity. Not unnaturally, therefore, he ends up by claiming that Hinduism is practised only "at a few of the great religious centres", with the majority of the population having "regressed" to a semi-primitive animism. Even for Russell this was too radical a conclusion to articulate statistically, and he goes on to explain that in practise he instructed his enumerators to record a person as a Hindu "if (he) said he worshipped Mahadeo..., and if he revered the tribal gods, the name of the tribe was to be entered in the column of religion."³⁶

32 See *Census of India 1901*, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt. 1: Report (Secretariat Press, Nagpur, 1902), p. 78.

33 *Census of India 1901*, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt. 1, p. 90, 99.

34 *Census of India 1901*, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt. 1, p. 90.

35 *Census of India 1901*, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt. 1, p. 92.

36 *Census of India 1901*, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt. 1, p. 95.

This practical uncertainty over the boundary between Hinduism and animism was exacerbated by the actions of some high caste enumerators, whose inclination was to actively exclude low castes and tribals from a Hindu identity. This is evident in a passage already quoted from the 1881 Report (see Section 2.2) where Drysdale states that

Many of the more bigoted high caste Hindoos employed as census enumerators or supervisors objected to record such low persons as of the Hindoo religion. This was illustrated by numerous instances brought to my notice of such persons having been recorded as of the Dher, Mang or Chandal religion by mere repetition of their caste in the column for religion. Possibly some in their humility and ignorance may not even have claimed to be of the Hindoo religion. More probably they were not even asked.³⁷

As with Russell, a specific perception of what constitutes Hinduism is at work here. Drysdale configured Hinduism as a system with definable limits, which in this case clearly encompassed low caste groups such as Dheres, Mangs and Chandals. These limits of Hinduism were only obscured for the Superintendent by the characteristic "bigotry" or "ignorance" of its various adherents.

Whatever the assumptions of officials like Drysdale, however, the questioning of social and religious relations by the subject peoples is implicit in the operation of the census. Low caste groups were forced to consider the relationship between their own sense of religious reality and the imperceptible, macrocosmic notion of Hinduism. High caste elites, like the enumerators cited above, were forced to confront the question of the limits of their religious community. If Hinduism was to be perceived objectively, as a world religion or a great religious tradition, where precisely did this tradition end and the morass of "primitive" animism and superstition begin?³⁸

In the present context, two dilemmas for elite Hindus emerged which are particularly interesting. First, the census highlighted the dilemma of how to project a positive image of Hinduism in a world religious context if it was characterised by a caste system which was manifestly oppressive. This was exactly the dilemma addressed by the reform movements, and by the development of the idea of a vertical re-organisation of Hinduism which would eradicate this oppressive element. The second dilemma was far more widely experienced, and was far more specifically a political dilemma. By quantifying caste and religious communities, the census inevitably placed the emphasis on numerical size as a means of assessing political importance. As we shall see, the "communal principle" introduced in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 confirmed this

³⁷ *Census of India 1881*, Vol. I, India, p. 17

³⁸ For further examples of this, see G. Pandey, "Which of Us are Hindus?", p. 246. Pandey in fact notes that in Tamil Nadu "the term Hindu is used to this day to differentiate upper caste Hindus (the 'Hindus') from untouchables or Harijans...".

trend. Limiting the size of Hinduism by rejecting the "Hinduness" of low caste and untouchable groups, or indeed by questioning the practical validity of Hinduism as a category of religion altogether, in the manner of Russell, was hence a threat to the political influence of high caste Hindus.

This was precisely the dilemma addressed by the putative orthodoxy of the late nineteenth century, and by the development of the idea of horizontal re-organisation, making the ties between high caste and low caste, urban and rural an explicit, if not positive, feature of the Hindu tradition.

4.2.2 A Challenge to Middle Class Pretensions

Insecurity over the numerical size of the Hindu religion was exacerbated by the increasing prominence of low caste mobilisation³⁹ towards the end of the nineteenth century. Again, this was particularly a feature of western India, where low caste traditions were buttressed by the growing strength of the supra-caste Maratha identity amongst cultivating castes.⁴⁰ As with general religious reform movements, it is important to emphasise the fact that low caste movements *per se* were by no means a new phenomenon in the late nineteenth century.⁴¹ What was new, however, was the notion of low caste mobilisation through the singularly colonial avenue of social reform. Social reform meant addressing issues of customary practice - the position of widows, child marriage, female infanticide, low caste oppression, to name but a few - without necessarily invoking a religious justification. Social questions had of course been a feature of religious reform movements throughout the nineteenth century, and in practice it is difficult to distinguish the two (hence the epithet "socio-religious reform"), as any attempt to effect social reform had inevitable ramifications within Hinduism.

A conceptual distinction is nevertheless evident. An example is provided by the pamphlet examined in Chapter 3, *An Old Hindu's Hope*. Although the author stated that all issues which may disrupt the unity of the proposed Maha Hindu Samiti should be disallowed, he nevertheless felt constrained to categorise these issues: "sectarian religious questions" were articulated separately to "social" questions. This conceptual

³⁹ In this thesis I will use the term "low caste" in the context of movements, consciousness etc. in a generic sense, to signify the resistance of low castes, untouchables and *adivasis* (tribals) to high caste oppression.

⁴⁰ On the Maratha-kunbi (cultivator) identity, see O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, chapter two, pp. 15-49; see especially p. 45: "The tendency for ordinary kunbis to call themselves Marathas was most noticeable in the Pune area - the birthplace of non-Brahman ideology."

⁴¹ See, for example, the medieval Orissan anti-brahman movement associated with the Vaisnavite school of Pancasakha, cited in Section 3.2.2.

separation was very much a ramification of Orientalism, in that it was based on the identification of Hinduism as a religion tied to a series of texts, which in turn produced the series of intellectual and spiritual traditions of Brahmanical history. "Social" issues, on the other hand, were a feature of the degeneracy that affected both contemporary society and religious practice. It was these social issues which the missionaries focused on, whilst studiously avoiding direct assaults on Hindu texts. The state also relied on this separation to make incursions into contemporary practice, whilst maintaining the policy of neutrality in relation to religion.⁴²

In the present context, one central characteristic of social reform during this period is significant: motivation and leadership of indigenous initiatives was almost entirely confined to the middle class. This is illustrated by Tilak's objection to the strong links between the Social Conference and the Congress during the mid-1890s. They held their annual sessions in the same *pandal*, and many Congressmen also attended the Conference. Tilak's complaint was that the Social Conference was so strongly identified with the elite that it was positively detrimental to the nationalist objective of widening its constituency. In 1895, when the joint Congress/Conference sessions were to be held in Poona, Tilak commented: "If we could be convinced that the conference could do any good even to a microscopic minority of the masses, we should be content to leave it alone."⁴³ As a concern of the elite, however, it could not have this effect. It could not therefore be accommodated as part of Tilak's programme for the expansion of nationalism.⁴⁴

Tilak's dismissal of social reform, however, was challenged by the work of Jotirao Phule and other low caste reformers of the late nineteenth century. Phule was born in 1827; his family belonged to the Mali caste, a cultivating caste ranking as Shudra in the *varna* scheme.⁴⁵ He was educated in mission schools, and as early as 1848 he opened a school for low caste girls in Poona. Over the following decades he launched and developed a network of reform projects, largely in the area of low caste education. This work was underpinned by the steady development of an ideology of positive low caste identity, based on the projection of ancient Shudra and *adi*-Shudra (untouchable) nobility, destroyed by the brutality of high caste oppression. In his 1875 publication

42 This, for example, was the thinking behind the Age of Consent Bill, introduced in 1890 to raise the marriageable age of consent for women from ten to twelve years. Although this bill became law, it raised a storm of protest articulated through caste and religious channels. See Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya*, pp. 56-8; Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform*, pp. 147-175.

43 *Mahratta* 24 November 1895; in Report on the Native Press, Bombay, No.48 of 1895.

44 Protest against the link between Congress and the Social Conference in Poona in 1895 led to the latter being moved to a separate site in the city; see Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale*, p. 76.

45 O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, p. 105.

Slavery, Phule reinterprets the coming of Aryan civilisation as the beginning of this caste oppression. Shudras and *adi*-Shudras were presented as the Kshatriyas of a previous age, downtrodden by the Aryan invaders. In this perception of Hindu history, the Golden Age was re-located as the pre-Aryan realm of Kshatriyas under the benign rule of King Bali. The Shudras and *adi*-Shudras were presented as the true descendants of this Golden Age.⁴⁶

In effect, Phule retains the structure of orientalist discourse on Indian history - an enormously influential discourse, as we have seen, amongst middle class, high caste Hindus - but completely inverts its meaning to emphasise low castes as the original, hence "genuine", inhabitants of the subcontinent. This strategy implicitly undermines the status of ideologies seeking to organise Hinduism both horizontally and vertically, because it subverts the actual quality of the *varna* structure that underpins both approaches.⁴⁷

A further area where Phule's work challenged the established pattern of middle class discourse on Hinduism was precisely that of organisation and representation. Phule formed the Satyashodak Samaj, or "Truth Seeking Society", in 1873. The Samaj worked to promote low caste consciousness and increase awareness of Brahman oppression. It also worked to increase low caste access to education and to oppose certain customs and practices associated with low castes, such as liquor drinking and meat eating.⁴⁸ Politically, the Satyashodak Samaj set itself up in opposition to the Sarvajanic Sabha, which Phule labelled the "*bhat* (Brahman) Sabha".⁴⁹ The Samaj was nevertheless structured along the classic lines of nineteenth century reform movements. It had a management committee and regular meetings, voting procedures and a stipulated financial commitment for members. Indeed, of the 28 rules of the Samaj drawn up shortly after its inauguration, no less than 20 dealt with matters of internal organisation. Phule's Samaj, then, cast a familiar profile in the public domain.

What is interesting is that it used this profile to make ambitious statements of its representative quality, which specifically contradicted those of high caste social and political organisations. Particularly from 1882 onwards, Phule turned his attention to

⁴⁶ O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, p. 149.

⁴⁷ There is nevertheless evidence that Phule co-operated to a certain extent with the Arya Samaj. In 1875 he took part with a group of his friends in a rally in Poona given in honour of Dayananda. Their involvement appears to have been limited to the role of a "protection force" in the face of strong opposition to Dayananda from the Poona religious establishment. Ideological support for the Swami was muted even on this occasion. See D. Keer, *Mahatma Jotirao Phoolley: father of the Indian Social Revolution* (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1964), p. 139; O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, p. 223.

⁴⁸ O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, pp. 231-6.

⁴⁹ Keer, *Mahatma Jotirao Phoolley*, p. 109.

the rural districts around Poona, and members of the Samaj began to deliver lectures in villages and small district towns. The emphasis of Phule's writings also began to shift: away from the gulf between low castes and Brahmans, and towards that between the rural poor and the educated elite.⁵⁰ In effect, the Satyashodak Samaj now began to project itself as the representative of this massive constituency: the cultivators and labourers of rural Maharashtra. In so doing, it explicitly opposed the claims of the Sarvajanik Sabha to represent this constituency, and implicitly opposed the idea of an organised Hinduism - vertical or horizontal - as a means of unifying the country. As Phule states in the *Cultivators Whip-Cord*, written during 1882-3:

It will be unity so long as it serves their purpose, and then it will be me here and you over there again. It's just like the old saying: We'll eat your seed-corn, and use mine for planting - this is how the Brahmans look after themselves. But if our learned Aryans really want to build unity amongst all the people, and improve the country, then they will have to get rid of this vile religion of winners and losers.⁵¹

Significantly, then, Phule tied his questioning of the representative claims of the Sarvajanik Sabha into the very idea of an organised, Brahmanic Hinduism. How could this organisation be representative of the people, if it was simultaneously representative of this "vile religion of winners and losers"? This was the very antithesis of what the ideologues of organised Hinduism were trying to promote.

The issue of representation emerged as one of the principal complaints of the non-Brahman movement from the late 1880s onwards. The 1889 Congress at Allahabad, for example, was challenged by a non-Brahman campaign centred in Poona, based on the unrepresentative character of this so-called national body. The campaign culminated in a rally held concurrent with the Congress session. Three of the four resolutions approved by this meeting emphasised the unrepresentative nature of the Congress (the fourth called on the government to introduce compulsory education for all). As one of the resolutions stated, "this National Congress is just composed of a handful of upper class and educated people. Therefore it should not represent its decisions as those of the whole nation".⁵²

Representation, then, emerges as a central bone of contention between the non-Brahman and Brahman-dominated organisations in western India. Representation, that

⁵⁰ O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, p. 258.

⁵¹ Quoted in O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, p. 267

⁵² Resolution 3, quoted in O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, p. 285; the other resolutions read: "1. If 99 out of every 100 people in the population have never even heard of the National Congress, it cannot be called a National Congress, meaning chosen by the nation and respected by the nation. 2. The nation has not elected this National Congress, and does not regard it as such; therefore its decisions cannot be said to be approved by the country at large. 4. The Government should begin to introduce compulsory education for all."

is, of the people to the state. Both the Satyashodak Samaj and the Sarvajanik Sabha claimed to represent the views of the rural population of Maharashtra to the Bombay Government. In so doing, both assumed a form consonant with the colonial discourse of organisation - quasi-constitutional bodies largely unhampered by material structures of representation (as we have seen, even the Sabha's modest attempts to extend their representative quality drew a sharp retort from the governing classes, which perceived such structures as "incompatible with the existing administration"). Phule and his contemporaries were therefore left to fight it out in this realm of symbolic representation, where the strength of representative claims could be sanctioned only by Government recognition. Ironically, the significance of the Satyashodak Samaj in this context is that it was quite easily accommodated by a strong current of colonialist thought, which perceived Indian society as hopelessly fractured and Brahmanism as irretrievably corrupt. As such, it seriously challenged the validity of elite-based organisations even within this narrow domain of symbolic representation.

In addition, it has been noted that low caste mobilisation within this framework implicitly challenged the legitimacy of ideological developments towards the organisation of Hinduism. This challenge was enhanced by the suggestion, often encouraged by Phule's opponents in Poona, that members of the Satyashodak Samaj were no longer Hindus. O'Hanlon notes that members were reluctant to cut themselves off from Hinduism altogether, but nevertheless the rejection of many of the recognised trappings of caste Hinduism placed them on the fringes of the religion.⁵³ As this positioning was articulated very much in the public space, it helped to focus attention exactly on that issue of where the limits of Hinduism lay, in a similar manner to the census.

Two principal conclusions, then, can be drawn from this section. First, in the narrow domain of symbolic representation - a domain mapped out for the indigenous population by the state - a dynamism is evident in the claims and counter-claims of various organisations. This dynamism naturally focused attention on the structures of representation, and the reality or otherwise of the projected constituency. This was a process which echoed developments in Indian nationalism. Secondly, the ideologies of organised Hinduism, both horizontal and vertical, were actively challenged by new forces in the public space, which persistently drew attention to the fuzzy edges of Hinduism, and to the apparent lack of harmony in its central structures. In this sense, the viability of a Brahman dominated, internally coherent community of Hindus was brought into question even during this early period.

⁵³ O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology*, p. 239.

4.3 Practising the Organisation of Hinduism

In the late 1880s and 1890s two major movements did much to counter this challenge to middle class pretensions. These were the cow protection movement and the *shuddhi* movement. In both, middle class elements aimed to concretise the projected "community of Hindus", by actively practising the organisation of Hinduism. Their divergent approaches to this task reflect the distinction between horizontal and vertical organisation identified in Chapter 3.

4.3.1 Cow Protection as Horizontal Organisation

In recent years, a good deal of scholarly work has examined cow protection as a movement associated with the articulation of the Hindu community during the period 1880-1920.⁵⁴ My intention in this section is not to replicate this material by giving my own account of how the movement developed, but rather to work from it, by examining some specific issues related to the movement in the wider framework of this thesis.

As Gyanendra Pandey has pointed out, one of the principal subtexts of the literature on cow protection has been to establish it as an issue which bridged problematic gaps in the development of communalist consciousness - in particular, the gap between urban and rural Hindus, and that between elite and mass consciousness.⁵⁵ This whole area is replete with problems, as Pandey has to some extent illustrated through his account of cow protection in the Bhojpuri region. Here, he says, cow protection did not represent the construction of new political alliances, new forms of consciousness; it was, rather,

the strength of local caste and community organisation (that) mattered, and...the feeling of belonging to a wider 'Hindu' or 'Muslim' community did not mean...that 'Hindus' and 'Muslims' responded automatically and in unvarying ways to every appeal for action on behalf of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' interests.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism*, p. 162, n. 9 for a good listing of this work. Apart from Pandey's book, I have found the following particularly useful in constructing a picture of the cow protection movement during the 1890s: McLane, *Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress*; A. Yang, "Sacred Symbol and Sacred Space in Rural India: Community Mobilisation in the 'Anti-Cow Killing' Riot of 1893" (in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 576-596); S. Freitag, "Sacred symbol as Mobilising Agency: The North Indian Search for a 'Hindu' Community (in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 597-625); and P. Robb, "The Challenge of Gau Mata: British Policy and Religious Change in India, 1880-1916" (in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1986, pp. 285-319).

⁵⁵ Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism*, p. 163.

⁵⁶ Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism*, p. 198-9.

Beyond these problems of local communal dynamics, which may be seen as a feature of fragmented development associated with Subaltern Studies, it is also necessary to emphasise problems associated with the location of communalism - the ideology - in this process of bridging the gaps. There is a teleological focus on cow protection as a "cause" of communal rioting across the northern plains, which overshadows the spread of the movement over a much wider area of colonial India, employing a less specifically confrontational ideology. This focus produces a common anomaly in the literature on cow protection: the perception of the movement as emanating from the aggressive proselytising network of the Arya Samaj, whilst at the same time acknowledging its strength in areas where that organisation was weak. This anomaly is epitomised by the frequent statement that the headquarters of the movement was located in Nagpur, a city with minimal Samaj activity and little Hindu-Muslim tension during this period,⁵⁷ without exploring the relationship between this centre and the rapidly unfolding violence of the northern plains.⁵⁸

My argument in this section builds on the idea that cow protection during this period was not so much a movement as a series of movements, inspired by fragmentary ideological interests. This of course is very much the point that Pandey makes through his study of the Bhojpuri region. Where I would like to extend it is by arguing that one of these fragmentary interests was the horizontal organisation of Hinduism; an elite-based ideology that attempted to encompass cow protection as a means of reifying its vision of Hinduism as one. The Nagpur Sabha constitutes an example of this kind of mobilisation, particularly in its attempt to project itself as the headquarters of a nationwide movement. Although this kind of mobilisation is not so easily described as communalist, because of its generally non-confrontational approach, it is nevertheless a significant step in the development of Hindu nationalism, as it is defined in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

⁵⁷ By 1901 there were no more than 406 Arya Samajis in the whole of Central Provinces, a rise from 275 in 1891. Most Samajis were based in the Hindi-speaking Jubbulpore district in the north. See *Census of India 1901*, Vol. XIII, Central Provinces Pt 1, p.99. The lack of Hindu-Muslim tension in the region at this time may be gauged by the Secretary of the Nagpur Gaurakshini Sabha's comment to the local government that "it is...no small satisfaction to (the Sabha) that the Central Provinces have enjoyed an entire freedom from those religious outbreaks, which disturbed the peace of other parts of India." Letter from Gopal Hurry Bhide, Sabha Secretary, to Revenue Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces; see Central Provinces Secretariat General Home Department, B Progs, June 1894, Nos. 49-53 (Nagpur).

⁵⁸ See, for example, Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism*, p. 164: "Stimulated by the writing and activities of Swami Dayanand Sarawati, the movement found organisational form in the Gaurakshini Sabhas (Cow Protection Societies) of the early 1880s, first established in Punjab and then spreading to other parts of northern and central India. Nagpur in the Central Provinces was described as being the headquarters of the Gaurakshini movement at the end of the decade."

I will identify three areas of change in the way in which cow protection was articulated towards the end of the nineteenth century, which indicate the trajectory of this intervention of the ideology of horizontal organisation. The first concerns the location of cow protection as an issue in the public space. Katherine Prior has noted colonial involvement in cow protection disputes in the early nineteenth century as a means of establishing local custom.⁵⁹ This in itself, she suggests, led to the strengthening of the role of the cow as a symbol of Hinduness. In addition, it established the involvement of the state in a particular way, in that disputes were subjected to the "neutral" arbitration of the rule of law. The *legality* of people's actions in relation to cows - selling them, slaughtering them, eating them, conveying them (both dead and alive) in public places, and of course protecting them - came increasingly to be seen as the central issue in disputes. By the 1880s, cows per se were frequently relegated to a secondary level of importance in these legal battles. Early in 1881, for example, the newspapers of the northern plains engaged each other in a long debate over a recent incident during *Id* in Mirzapur. The major issue was not kine killing itself, but rather the perception that the magistrate of Mirzapur acted in favour of Muslims in resolving the dispute. The *Kavi Vachan Sudha*, a Hindi weekly published in Benaras, argued that "Mussalmans should not sacrifice kine in honour of the *Id* festival, as is obvious from a judgement recorded by the magistrate of Benaras on the 30th April 1840, which was confirmed by the *Sadr Nizamat* of Agra on 17 March 1841. Their religion asks them to sacrifice sheep, camels, and c...".⁶⁰

In conjunction with this emphasis on law as a defining feature, the state's projection of religious neutrality was a prominent reference point in cow protection disputes. This is well illustrated by press comment on incidents in princely states, which of course were subject to local legal frameworks. Again in 1881, for example, the Punjab press responded to an incident in Bahawalpur state, which led to riots and the destruction of Hindu temples. Many newspapers in Lahore were unable to envisage the Muslim Nawab meting out appropriate justice, and so called on the colonial government to "interfere and protect them (the Hindus of Bahawalpur) from the oppression of the Mussalman", because "a European would show no partiality to the Mussalmans or Hindus".⁶¹

Here then, we see the progressive entrenchment of cow protection as an issue in the public space. Although it had occupied this space to some extent throughout the

⁵⁹ Prior, "Making History", pp. 191-203.

⁶⁰ *Kavi Vachan Sudha* 28 February 1881. Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers, Punjab, North West Provinces, Oudh, Central Provinces and Berar, 1881, No. 125.

⁶¹ *ibid*; *Mittr Vilas* 28 March 1881; *Anjuman-i-Punjab* 28 March 1881.

nineteenth century, towards the end of the century it became increasingly bound up with law, and the neutrality of the state projected by this law; issues which were articulated persistently in the indigenous press. As such, the participation of colonial elites in cow protection was ensured; if nothing else, they provided the interface between those involved in cow protection disputes and those that they hoped to influence: the state, and the "public" as represented by the newspapers.

Secondly, the 1880s witnessed the growth of a new kind of cow protection, which indicates the active involvement of elite-based ideology. This was the introduction of programmes for the improvement of pastoral care and cattle usage in villages. As the *Mahratta* expressed it in 1889, the main problem in relation to cow protection was "education of the people as to proper husbandry techniques...(because) our animals, as they appear, are wretched looking skeletons fit for shooting."⁶² This kind of cow protection reflected the concerns of middle class organisations; in particular the concern to educate and increase awareness amongst rural populations. The Nagpur Gaurakshini Sabha was particularly renowned for promoting this kind of work. The leading lights of the Nagpur Sabha, Gopal Hari Bhide and C. Narayanswami Naidu - both lawyers - toured the countryside giving lectures on the economic benefits of cow protection, and eventually instructed a body of lecturers to extend this work.⁶³ This kind of semi-philanthropic cow protection aligns the Nagpur Sabha with other middle class organisations attempting to extend their influence in the *mofussil*. As such, John McLane's claim that the economic emphasis of the Sabha was responsible for its support base amongst the middle class ("Maratha Brahmin pleaders and other prominent persons"), which is roundly criticised by Pandey as classic elitist historiography,⁶⁴ appears to carry some weight. This support, however, was engendered not on the basis of the 'bourgeois economic interests' of the elite, as Pandey somewhat mischievously suggests is McLane's point,⁶⁵ but rather on the

⁶² *Mahratta* 7 July 1889.

⁶³ See D.F McCracken's "Note on the Agitation Against Cow Killing", Home Dept Public, December 1893, No. 210, p. 10 (NAI). The establishment of institutions to train preachers on cow protection was also one of the aims of the projected all-India movement of which the Nagpur Sabha was to be the central body; see "Proceedings of the Sixth Anniversary of the Gorakshini Sabha, Nagpur"; Central Provinces Secretariat General Home Department, B Progs, June 1894, Nos. 49-53 (Nagpur). See also J. McLane, *Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977), p. 286.

⁶⁴ See Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism*, p. 18-9.

⁶⁵ Pandey makes this suggestion by quoting McLane's point that "it was the economic emphasis of the Sabha's activities which accounted for the widespread support given to the (Cow protection) movement..." as evidence of a historiographical reduction of the causes of "sectarian outbreaks" to the level of elite economic interests; it is only several paragraphs later that he quotes the whole of McLane's sentence - "it was the economic emphasis of the Sabha's activities which accounted for the widespread support given to the (Cow protection) movement in the Central Provinces by Maratha Brahmin pleaders and other prominent persons" - by which time the link between McLane and this spurious bourgeois economism is already established. See McLane, *Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress*, p. 287.

presentation of the movement in a recognisable middle class framework. This is not to deny the validity of other motivating factors in the movement as a whole, nor the independent involvement of other classes with their own mobilising strategies. Pandey's work in particular has made these points clear. My argument is that the emphasis of the Nagpur Sabha's activities reflect the concerns of middle class advocates of cow protection in the Central Provinces. The Nagpur Sabha, in terms of its trajectory and its strategy of mobilisation, was a middle class organisation.⁶⁶

This point is supported by the nature of the organisation's structure, which constitutes the third area of change in cow protection in the 1880s and 1890s. The Nagpur Sabha was an archetypal middle class body, recognisable in the public space. It had a quasi-representational character, and also ran its own press and newspaper. Apart from its rural education programme, one of its principal means of operating was to petition government. In May 1894, for example, it submitted a Memorial calling for the regularisation of government response to disputes over cow slaughter, in the light of recent unprecedented riots across the northern plains (whilst at the same time, it may be added, thanking local government for its "liberal policy of non-interference" with cow protection societies in Central Provinces). This Memorial begins with a familiar invocation:

By the grace of God, peoples of various races, faiths and creeds have been brought together under the rule of Her Majesty the Empress of India and they have been ever since enjoying an impartial treatment in matters of religion, under that celebrated Proclamation of 1858, known to them more as a charter of religious liberty than for anything else.⁶⁷

Implicitly citing the "rights" of Hindus under the Proclamation, then, the Sabha's Memorial attempted to represent the concern of all cow protection societies at the government's failure to produce consistent rulings on cow protection disputes. This Memorial was part of the strategy of the Nagpur Sabha to present itself as the "headquarters" of the movement, a strategy formalised at the Sixth Anniversary Meeting of the Sabha in January 1894. Invitations to this meeting were sent to "all the cow protection societies of this country", and in response "over fifty delegates...

⁶⁶ Again, this did not preclude the involvement of other classes in the Sabha; this was, after all precisely the objective of the strategy of mobilisation in the districts. David Baker records that within a year of the establishment of the Sabha in 1888, "there were forty-nine similar bodies in the province, some in the district and *tahsil* (revenue subdivision) towns of the region, where *malguzars* (proprietary heads of rural estates) and moneylenders were amongst the most enthusiastic members." Baker, *Colonialism in an Indian Hinterland 1820-1920* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993), p. 323.

⁶⁷ "Memorial from the Chairman of a Public Meeting of the inhabitants of Nagpur and the adjoining Districts, praying that definite rules be framed for the guidance of District Officers in the matter of kine slaughter"; Home Department Public July 1894, Part A Nos. 301-304 (NAI).

attended the anniversary to represent their respective Sabhas... ."68 In fact the delegates were predominantly from the Maharashtra region, with Nagpur District providing thirty of the total of fifty-five delegates (sixteen of these represented Nagpur City itself).69 Nevertheless they "unanimously expressed a desire that the Nagpur Gorakshini Sabha should be made the central body of the cow protection movement, so as to give coherence, vitality and united strength to the disconnected efforts now being made all over India." The government response was characteristically suspicious of such representative claims: "I do not think it would be wise," one note comments, "to recognise the right of these Mahrattas to speak for the North-Western Provinces, or interfere in any matters occurring there".70 It appears, however, that the government's anxiety was largely unfounded. In effect, this was an attempt by the Nagpur Sabha to stretch a symbolic representative role over a wide ranging and extremely dynamic movement, which showed little inclination, at least outside Central Provinces, to be led in this manner.71

In the north cow protection was channelled through a variety of political and social structures. Caste was a major conduit, and various caste organisations did much to shape the quality of the movement, as Pandey has illustrated. The Arya Samaj also played a key role in sustaining the movement, following the publication of Dayananda's *Gokurananidhi*, or "Ocean of Kindness to the Cow", in 1881. This publication drew on the wide public debate over cow protection at this time, particularly in the wake of the incident at Mirzapur noted above, and may be perceived as part of the Swami's strategy to maintain strong links into the wider world of Hinduism.72 Part of its effect was to galvanise local Samajes into setting up Gaurakshini Sabhas in their localities. For the first time, the Samaj network was implemented as the framework of a wider movement. As we shall see, this was to become an increasingly important role for the Samaj in the development of organised Hinduism, a role which would draw it closer to horizontal organisation, despite the vertical implications of Arya ideology. In the

68 See "Proceedings of the Sixth Anniversary of the Gorakshini Sabha, Nagpur"; Central Provinces Secretariat General Home Department, B Progs, June 1894, Nos. 49-53 (Nagpur).

69 Delegates were from (where there was more than one, the number of delegates is given in brackets): Bombay (7), Farukabad, Darbhanga, Sitamadhi, Jalgam (2), Dharwar, Bhandara, Kolhapur, Poona, Raipur, Bela (2), Harda, Bori (2), Saoner, Dhamangam, Katol (2), Khapa, Kelod (2), Wardha, Umrer, Chatrapur (2), Dhapewara (2), Patasaongi (2), Arvi, Satara, Nagpur (16). See *ibid*.

70 Home Department Public July 1894, Part A Nos 301-304; 'Keep with' papers, note initialled A.P.M, dated 10 July 1894 (NAI).

71 Apart from the point gleaned from Pandey's work that this movement was fragmentary, driven by a series of disparate motivations, one should also note the counter-claims of the Allahabad Sabha to lead the movement: see *Mahratta* 30 June 1889, *Native Opinion* 16 September 1888 for reports of speeches by Sriman Swami which allude to the 'Central Committee' at Allahabad.

72 On *Gokurananidhi*, see Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati*, p. 220-2; on the strategy of maintaining links with the wider world of Hinduism, see this thesis, Section 3.3.1.

present context, it is significant to note that the Samaj collaborated with Sanatana Dharma Sabhas over cow protection,⁷³ despite evident ideological antagonism over other issues during this period. In addition, the Samaj never claimed leadership of the movement, despite its key role in the Punjab and western North West Provinces. Both these points may be seen as evidence of the significance of horizontal organisation as a key factor in middle class participation in the movement. The Arya Samaj subsumed ideological objections to Sanatani interpretations of Hinduism, on the basis that the movement had the potential to galvanise a wide cross-section of people as Hindus. Similarly, it avoided alienating these people by assuming a low profile approach - cow protection, if it was to achieve this galvanising objective, could not be perceived as a reformist project.

The Nagpur Sabha, on the other hand, had no such qualms about asserting a leadership role, as it had no reformist connotations. Its assertions may have had little practical impact in the north, but the headquarters self-image is nevertheless significant, because it again indicates the way in which horizontal organisation, as an ideology, influenced middle class involvement in cow protection. The Nagpur Sabha lay at the heart of a vibrant movement within the Central Provinces, and it used this position to project a wider representative role. Apart from their instruction on pastoral care, the Sabha's lecturers were reported to have distributed literature which reflected this concern for horizontal organisation. D.F. McCracken, in his confidential *Note on the Agitation against Cow Killing* of 1893, notes that lecturers "expatiate on the glories of the Hindu regime in the past when no kine-slaughter was permitted, and appeal to Hindus to protect the cow, by distributing pamphlets, leaflets and pictures of the cow with representations of the various gods in every part of its body. Some cartoons represent the cow about to be slaughtered by a butcher and all the different castes of Hindus standing around and crying out to him to desist."⁷⁴ The last point illustrates the way in which the cow was projected as a collective responsibility of Hindus.

Middle class involvement in the cow protection movement, then, may be said to represent a fairly inchoate attempt to put into practice the horizontal organisation of Hinduism. The increasing entrenchment of cow protection in the public space presented the middle class with an unprecedented opportunity to assume control of a movement that had developed amongst trading, banking and landowning castes, and involved other sections of the population through a myriad of caste-based structures of

⁷³ See McCracken's "Note on the Agitation Against Cow Killing", op. cit, p. 10.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*

mobilisation and enforcement.⁷⁵ The ideological developments which had produced the notion of the Maha Hindu Samiti and the "organic" unity of Hinduism could now be articulated under the aegis of a genuinely universal symbol, which seemed to encompass common ideas of what it meant to be a Hindu. As is clear from scholarly research on the cow protection movement, however, this middle class ideology was never able to assume a leadership role. I would suggest that one of the principal reasons for this failure was the limited development of middle class notions of organisation during this period. The Nagpur Sabha asserted its leadership on the basis of symbolic representation, a strategy which was unable to accommodate independently developed caste and local community based structures. Clearly, if the organic unity of Hinduism was to become a reality, it either had to be articulated differently, or a more efficient means of representing this unity needed to be developed.

4.3.2 *Shuddhi* as Vertical Organisation

The *shuddhi* movement, developing over much the same period as the cow protection movement, did attempt to articulate the unity of Hinduism in a different manner; a manner based on the vertical re-structuring of Hindu society. This was a unity which implied the transformation of the religion, as envisioned by Dayananda in the *Satyarth Prakash*.

Shuddhi means "pure" or "free from error", and is associated in Hinduism with the natural state of an individual in the performance of *dharma*. In the nineteenth century, however, the term began to assume a more specific ritual meaning. This meaning arose initially out of a singularly colonial situation, in that it referred to the ritual processes required of high caste Hindus who had travelled abroad, and in so doing naturally came into contact with polluting materials or persons. The flow of high caste, high class individuals to Britain to receive education demanded the formulation of ceremonial codes which allowed for full caste rehabilitation on their return.⁷⁶ Purification assumed the form of a standard ritual process signifying the re-entry of the individual into a situation where he could perform his *dharma* and resume normal social relations. Caste here is articulated as the defining framework of religiosity (as well as of normal social interaction). A polluted individual regains access to religious truths by readmission to

⁷⁵ For government reports on these structures, see McCracken's "Note on the Agitation Against Cow Killing", pp. 10-11, and the "Note on the Cow Protection Agitation in the Gorakhpur District", Home Department Public, A Progs, December 1893, Nos.212-3 (NAI).

⁷⁶ See Jordens, "Reconversion to Hinduism: The Shuddhi of the Arya Samaj" (in G.A. Oddie [ed.], *Religion in South Asia: Religious Conversion and Revival Movements in South Asia in Medieval and Modern Times*, Curzon Press, London, 1977, pp. 145-162), p.145; Sikand and Katju, "Mass Conversions to Hinduism among Indian Muslims" (*Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 29, No. 34, 20 August 1994, pp. 2214-2219) p. 2215.

his caste. Interestingly, then, *shuddhi* as ceremonial code reiterates the notion noted earlier (see Section 3.3.1) that caste functions as a church-like institution in Hinduism.

The establishment of a ceremonial process of this kind created theoretical space for the purification of individuals who for some reason had been outcasted. Jordens notes such an occasion in 1850 in Bombay, where a Brahman boy was outcast due to his extended stay in a non-Hindu (Christian) house.⁷⁷ The boy's father secured doctrinal authority for the re-establishment of caste status after purification rites had been performed, in the form of agreement from certain *pandits*, and from the *Shankaracharya* of Karvir *Math*. In practice, however, this re-admission failed due to the continued social boycott of the family in Bombay. Far more radical were the developments in Calcutta during the early 1850s. Here, the Dharma Sabha was encouraging debate over means of reaccepting high caste Christian converts, many of them the wayward sons of powerful *bhadraloki* families. The Sabha sponsored meetings along these lines, including a large public meeting attended by two hundred *pandits* and several hundred others in May 1851. The following year a "Society for the Deliverance of Hindu Apostates" was formed, which set up a public reacceptance ceremony. Four hundred people were assembled on 5 May 1852 "to form a native House of Commons, discussing, deliberating and determining upon the question at issue with the greatest eagerness, zeal and unanimity." Of the six applicants for reacceptance, "four were restored to the privileges of the caste and two were driven out with contempt and disdain."⁷⁸

This kind of occasion remained as a fairly isolated occurrence, however, until the late 1870s, when the Arya Samaj began to project *shuddhi* as a process of conversion. As in Bengal, the aggressive nature of Christian missionary activity in the Punjab formed the context for these ceremonies. Dayananda appeared acutely aware of the need to defend Hinduism against this threat. His main defence strategy was doctrinal refutation, comparing and contrasting the anomalies of Christian doctrine with the scientific truths of the Vedas. *Shuddhi* emerged as a further defence strategy, and Dayananda effected two such ceremonies in the north. The first was performed in Jullundar in 1877. The subject was a Christian convert. The second was performed in Dehra Dun two years later, where the subject was a born Muslim.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Jordens, "Reconversion to Hinduism", p. 146.

⁷⁸ *Bengal Hurkuru*, quoted in M.M. Ali, *The Bengali Reaction to Christian Missionary Activities 1833-1857* (Mehrub Publications, Chittagong, 1965), p. 97-100.

⁷⁹ Ali, *The Bengali Reaction to Christian Missionary Activities*, p. 146-7.

Dayananda's implementation of *shuddhi* as a strategy of conversion was immediately controversial, because it focused attention yet again on the vexed question of boundaries and essential characteristics of Hinduism. What, after all, defined a believer in Hinduism, other than their caste status? How could a convert be perceived as a Hindu, if he or she had no caste? In terms of Dayananda's creed, of course, this problem could be surmounted. The value of his limited scriptural tradition as the core of Hinduism was precisely that boundaries and characteristics were easily identified. *Shuddhi* fits easily into the logic of merit-based *varnavyavastha*, in that converted individuals would be assigned to their appropriate *varna* on the basis of their knowledge and practice of "pure" Hinduism. This was of course only a theoretical position in the late 1870s, which may have been cold comfort to Dayananda's converts. What the Arya Samaj could provide, however, was the Samaj Mandir, an institutional focus which was not defined by caste. It constituted the material representation of their new religious community, as well as a place to worship and to study.

Again, this is not to say that the Samaj Mandir provided a casteless haven for converts. It has already been noted that the Arya Samaj remained integrated into the wider world of Hinduism in the most crucial sense, in that Aryas maintained their caste status. Because of this, *shuddhi* developed as an Arya institution that continually questioned the organisation's practices and its relationship with that wider world. This is indicated by the first attempt at a standardisation of the *shuddhi* ceremony, developed by the Amritsar Samaj in the early 1880s.⁸⁰ The Amritsar *shuddhi* was devised in association with a local *pandit*, Tulsi Ram, and included a trip to Hardwar, where "after bath, they would get themselves purified by taking water made holy with cow dung by paying Rs. 5-4-0".⁸¹ This kind of practice was entirely against the teaching of Dayananda, and appears extraordinary in the context of numerous attacks on Brahman ritual and "superstition" in Arya journals at this time.⁸² This apparent contradiction is indicative of the awkward position of the Samaj. *Shuddhi* was, after all, not an issue of doctrinal debate, but rather one of purity and impurity. It operated on the limits of acceptability with regard to the caste structure. The involvement of locally recognised orthodoxy - as represented by Tulsi Ram - and practices associated with that orthodoxy at least gave

⁸⁰ Ali, *The Bengali Reaction to Christian Missionary Activities*, p. 149; see also R.K. Ghai, *The Shuddhi Movement in India* (Commonwealth Publications, New Delhi, 1990), pp. 46-7, quoting from the *Arya Patrika* 22 August 1885: "The Amritsar Arya Samaj has taken the lead in this matter, and Hindu society must be grateful to that Samaj. Very much is due in this direction to Pundit Tulsi Ram of Amritsar, who takes deep interest in Hindu society and deeply aware [sic] of the necessity of this reform, carries it into practice."

⁸¹ Noted by Swami Shraddhanand in his *Diary*; and quoted by Ghai, *The Shuddhi Movement*, p. 47.

⁸² See Jones, *Arya Dharm*, p. 110 for examples of this.

some insurance that Samajists would not themselves be outcast as a result of their involvement with *shuddhi*.

The nature of *shuddhis* carried out by the Amritsar Samaj and other Samajes during the 1880s and early 1890s was also relatively uncontroversial; they were generally straightforward purifications or reconversions of individuals, who could be rehabilitated quite smoothly into their former castes.⁸³ There was, nevertheless, a good deal of resistance even within the Arya Samaj to full integration with converts at this time.⁸⁴

Despite this resistance, an increasingly independent streak began to emerge in *shuddhi* practice. This shift in attitude is indicated as early as 1888 by comment in the Arya press that ritual aspects were "degrading", and that "a true Arya would never bow down to such unmeaning ceremonies and their selfish advocates, the Brahmins".⁸⁵ In 1890 the Montgomery Samaj refused to send a Muslim convert to Hardwar,⁸⁶ and in 1893 the Amritsar Samaj again led the way by changing its ceremony to conform to a "purely Vedic formula", consisting of shaving of the head, *havan*, explanation of the *Gayatri*, investiture with holy thread, explanation of Samaj duties and distribution of *sherbets* to all present at the ceremony.⁸⁷ This new streamlined ceremony, eliminating all priestly involvement, was to prove the vehicle for a fundamental change in the nature of *shuddhi*.

Before going on to examine this change, however, it is necessary to look briefly at a further development in the early 1890s which was critically linked to the *shuddhi* movement. This was the debate initiated by militant Aryas around the formation of an Arya *biradri*, or caste, which led to the formation of a new organisation within the Samaj, the Arya Bhratri Sabha. The Sabha attempted to promote the notion of the Arya Samaj as a separate social order, which would implement Dayananda's notion of merit-based *varnavyavastha*.⁸⁸ This new order was perceived as a means of overcoming the problem of how to integrate Arya converts. Counter-argument revolved around the fact that this would certainly lead to excommunication and isolation, a consequence which most caste Aryas could not contemplate. The debate engendered by the Arya Bhratri Sabha indicates the significance of *shuddhi* to the reforming trajectory of the Arya

83 For examples of *shuddhi* during this period, see Jones, *Arya Dharm*, p. 131, and Ghai, *The Shuddhi Movement*, pp. 45-6.

84 See J.R. Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 463.

85 *Arya Patrika* 21 August 1888, quoted in Ghai, *The Shuddhi Movement*, p. 48.

86 *Tribune* 28 May 1890, quoted in Jones, *Arya Dharm*, p. 134.

87 Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 463-5.

88 See Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", pp. 478-9.

Samaj, in that it consistently emphasised this contradictory relationship between the Samaj and caste as the central organising principle of contemporary Hinduism.

As the Sabha-inspired debate over caste and the Samaj continued, a two-fold shift in the nature of *shuddhi* ceremonies began to emerge.⁸⁹ First, from 1896 onwards the practice of individual ceremonies was superseded by multiple or mass purifications. Secondly, the subjects of *shuddhi* ceremonies were increasingly low-caste Hindus or untouchables, as opposed to Christians or Muslims.⁹⁰ The focus moves away from the notion of reclaiming those lost to other religions, and towards the notion of improving the predicament of groups nominally associated with Hinduism, by investing them with full (twice-born) caste status. The first significant *shuddhi* of this kind occurred in 1900, when the Lahore Samaj performed *shuddhi* for a group of Rahtia Sikhs, an untouchable caste similar to the Hindu Chamar caste.⁹¹ This action was followed rapidly by further *shuddhis* amongst Rahtias, as well as Ods and Meghs. By 1903 large numbers of low castes and untouchables were being purified at mass ceremonies in the districts of Punjab, Kashmir and U.P.⁹²

The shift in emphasis towards the mass purification of low caste communities provided the Arya Samaj with a viable strategy for reform, along the lines indicated by Dayananda's transformative trajectory. The Samaj could now point to the practical application of the Swami's vision of a reorganised Hinduism. Not only did this kind of *shuddhi* work towards the eradication of caste oppression associated with the corruption of contemporary Brahmanism; it also implicitly acknowledged the framework of merit-based *varna*, as the purification ceremony also implied the purification of low caste practice, as a feature of their new twice-born status. In short, it was a vehicle for the vertical restructuring of Hinduism, which would - at least theoretically - clearly define its boundaries. In addition, *shuddhi* could now be projected not only as a strategy of conversion, but also as a kind of pre-emptive strike against the threat of Christian missionary conversions of low caste groups.

The implicit contradiction between vertical and horizontal conceptions of the organisation of Hinduism was now made manifest. For Sanatanis, the shift in

89 Graham posits a causative relationship between the debate and the shift; "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 490.

90 See Jordens, "Reconversion to Hinduism", p. 150; Ghai, *The Shuddhi Movement*, p. 56 - a family of over 200 outcasted Sikhs were purified in a village in Gurdaspur District; this *shuddhi* was undertaken by the Lahore Shuddhi Sabha, a joint Arya-Sikh operation.

91 See Jordens, "Reconversion to Hinduism", p. 151; Ghai, *The Shuddhi Movement*, p. 69.

92 For fascinating insights into *shuddhi* during this period, see the extensive quotation of eye-witness accounts by two women, Serala Devi and Muriel Lester, in Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", pp. 500-504 (n.b. Devi's account is taken from an article entitled "Social Service in the Punjab", *Indian Review*, 18 May 1918).

emphasis meant a direct assault on the structure they sought to defend as a fundamental component of Hindu tradition. *Shuddhi* had come to be perceived as a means of reclaiming or converting individuals from the "foreign" religions of Christianity and Islam - the involvement of establishment *pandits* and ritualised ceremonies reflected and reinforced this perception. The new trend in Arya practice, however, shattered the image. How could low caste groups be converted or reclaimed, if they were already a feature of Hindu society? The question again focuses directly on the boundaries of Hinduism as the critical area of dispute for these developing ideologies. The implications of the reformist challenge to the maintenance of the established structure of Hinduism were such that there was immediate and strong resistance.⁹³ The concretisation of this conceptual opposition set the parameters for middle class debates in the early twentieth century on the development of Hinduism as both a political force and a socio-religious entity.

4.4 Summary of Discussion

This chapter has examined the way in which ideologies of organisation and representation began to develop as substantive features of Indian social and political life. The first section demonstrates the way in which this development was central to the emergence of elite-led nationalism as a political force. Organisations like the Sarvajanik Sabha and the Indian Association naturally addressed themselves to the state; their whole objective was to persuade the state to adopt policies that reflected the principles and visions of British liberal imperialism. I have called this type of nationalism "hegemonic", because it could succeed, make progress, only within the logic of colonial hegemony. The organisational form of hegemonic nationalism was characterised by symbolic representation - a constant invocation of "the people", "public opinion" and other representative idioms - which reflected precisely the state's hegemonic discourse of organisation.

Although the National Congress developed within this framework, it was almost immediately subjected to a questioning of its representative character. During the 1890s some nationalists began to search for alternative structures which would improve the representative quality of Congress. More adequate structures of representation, it was realised by B.G. Tilak and others, would have the dual effect of increasing the legitimacy of the Congress claim to speak for the people, and expanding the base - the constituency - of nationalist support. In practice movements like the Ganapati festival

⁹³ See Ghai, *The Shuddhi Movement*, p. 69.

failed to provide this kind of structure, but they nevertheless represent an attempt by nationalists to break free of the logic of hegemonic nationalism - to produce an elite-driven counter-hegemony, based on more legitimate claims to speak for the people. Movements towards counter-hegemony, of course, were antithetical to the state, and the state was soon to strike back against the representative claims of Indian nationalists, with significant ramifications for Hindu nationalists.

The second section has examined the development of further pressures on Hinduism towards the end of the nineteenth century, which again centred on the issue of caste, and its role in defining the shape of the Hindu religion. Both the census and low caste mobilisation highlight for high caste reformers and politicians alike the increasingly vexed issue of low caste status in a religious system without definite boundaries. This issue was again articulated as an issue of representation. The Census appeared to emphasise the fragmentary nature of Hinduism, calling into question the right of elite reformers and organisational spokesmen to speak for Hindus and the Hindu religion. The work of Jotirao Phule reinforced this, by actively challenging the representative claims of elite organisations like the Sarvajanic Sabha and the Congress. Because of the hegemonic presence of the discourse of organisation in the public space, the language of representation was used to challenge oppression on both a religious and a political level. The Satyashodak Samaj used the same idioms and structural interventions to challenge both the Brahman dominance of Hinduism and the middle class, urban dominance of politics. The Shudras and *adi*-Shudras, and the rural masses are blended in a blanket rejection of the high caste urban elite's search for viable constituencies.

The third section examined how these high caste urban elites sought to counter this challenge, by actively practising the organisation of Hinduism. Both the cow protection and the *shuddhi* movements witnessed elite attempts to unify Hinduism, and so to reify the constituency of Hindus. Colonial elites became increasingly involved in cow protection disputes during the nineteenth century, as the course of these disputes was entrenched more and more firmly in the public space. During the 1880s and early 1890s the massive upsurge in cow protection activity was accompanied and sometimes motivated by attempts to appropriate the cow as a symbol of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism - the religion being projected as bound together by a common, overriding concern for bovine welfare. This attempt to project a common symbol of Hinduness, however, was never underpinned by adequate structures of organisation. Middle class attempts to assume a leadership role were largely confined to symbolic invocations of the Hindu "people" or "nation", which clearly failed to penetrate the more concrete structures of caste and local communities. Ironically, the one major exception to this

was the Arya Samaj, which effectively employed its branch structure to mobilise and sustain cow protection throughout the north-west. Because of its image as a reformist organisation, however, the Samaj was never able to project this role onto a wider stage - its influence remained largely in those areas in which it already had a presence.

This image as a reformist organisation was undoubtedly strengthened by its leading role in the development of *shuddhi*. Here, the Samaj came increasingly to assume the transformative role that Dayananda had envisioned it would fulfil. With the shift in emphasis towards low castes and untouchables, *shuddhi* came to represent an attempt to vertically re-organise Hinduism, and in so doing, to reify the constituency of Hindus by re-drawing the lines or boundaries of definition. Unsurprisingly, this attempt met with solid opposition from within Hinduism, an opposition which produced a natural limitation on the success of this movement. Gradually, the Arya Samaj was to realise its ambivalent position in the construction of a modern Hindu identity - on the one hand pressing for the transformation of Hindu structures, the eradication of caste-based oppression; and on the other committed to the unification of Hinduism, and to the maintenance of its own position at the forefront of elite-led Hindu consciousness. The development of political Hinduism only accentuated this ambivalence.

Imagining the Constituency of Hindus in the Early Twentieth Century

The position of the Arya Samaj is indicative of a wider ambivalence for the nascent ideology of Hindu nationalism in the field of Indian politics. After the turn of the century, the idea of organised Hinduism began to assume an increasingly significant role in projections and counter-projections of the Indian people, which were central to contemporary political discourse. In this chapter I will examine how this discourse developed, and how organised Hinduism sought to establish a position within the framework it provided. In addition, I will examine further pressures on the conceptualisation of Hinduism, which again accentuated the urgency of those advocating the organisation of Hinduism - both vertically and horizontally - to develop their ideas in practice.

The organisational focus for this chapter will be the Hindu Sabha movement. The Sabha emerged in this highly pressurised context as the first concerted and practical attempt to overcome the differences of approach to the conceptual unification of Hinduism. My argument will be that the pressure to organise politically was such that organisation itself began to emerge as a paramount objective. The tacit subsumption of ideological differences which this caused implicitly favoured horizontal organisation, with its belief in the maintenance of the status quo. Henceforth the organisation of Hinduism began to be seen less as a process subject to ideological debate over the way the religion related to modernity, and more as a kind of self-referential symbol of Hindu salvation. Underpinning this transition, it will be argued, was the imagining of a constituency of Hindus in colonial politics. Consciously, I am referring to an imagined constituency as opposed to community, because it is necessary to emphasise the specifically political nature of the process.¹ Hindus were imagined as a social bloc in order to fulfil a particular role in developing political discourse. Understanding how this process of imagining occurred is a major objective of this chapter.

¹ I would not, however, dispense with Benedict Anderson's notion of imagined communities altogether; indeed, I think that in the context of the increasing significance of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism, Anderson's definition of community as a "deep, horizontal comradeship" that overrides "actual inequality and exploitation" may be particularly useful. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 7.

5.1 The Dynamism of Indian Nationalism

In the first instance, I will look at the dynamism of Indian nationalism around the turn of the century, which did much to shift the parameters of political discourse in which the constituency of Hindus was articulated.

5.1.1 Tilak and Nationalist Strategies of Confrontation

In July 1895 Tilak engineered a take-over of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha. This take-over not only articulated definitively the lines of moderate/extremist opposition in Maharashtra,² but also provided Tilak with an established structure, a recognised political body through which to work. His previous work had been conducted either within existing moderate dominated bodies, especially Congress, through his newspapers, or through the limited potential of the "festival" structure, as in both the Ganapati and Shivaji movements. The Sabha provided him with an organisational base through which he could launch further campaigns: the advent of famine during the winter of 1896 provided the opportunity to utilise this structure.

The famine of 1896-97 was severe throughout India, and particularly so in certain districts of the Bombay Presidency. Famine Relief Codes which had been drawn up initially in 1883 were brought into operation in the context of this unremitting and widespread famine. The thrust of Tilak's campaign was simply to ensure that the provisions of the Code in Bombay Presidency were upheld, during a period when district officials were also under pressure to maintain a flow of revenue for the Presidency. The situation, then, constitutes an illustration of the central colonial contradiction between the interests of the state and those of the people. On the one hand, the interests of the people were represented by the provisions for famine relief; on the other, the interests of the state were represented by the need to maintain revenue collection. Tilak's campaign effectively worked to expose this contradiction.

A significant feature of the Sabha's activity during the famine campaign was its extensive penetration of rural districts, whilst maintaining a co-ordinating focus at Poona. This latter was maintained not only through the central offices of the Sabha, but also through the columns of the *Kesari* and *Mahratta*, which regularly supplied theoretical meaning to the Sabha's immediate objectives, and reported the movement of Sabha workers in the districts throughout the campaign. The role of the newspapers is

² The takeover was followed by the establishment of the Deccan Sabha to represent the interests of moderate and liberal opinion in Poona; see S. Wolpert *Tilak and Gokhale*, p. 77.

important, because it cast this rural campaign firmly as an issue within the public space. In the same manner as middle class involvement in the cow protection movement, the basic thrust of the famine campaign remained educative throughout. In December 1896 the *Kesari* stated that “the *rayat* [peasant cultivator] requires to be taught what his basic rights are and how he should seek to enforce them”.³ Where the campaign differed from cow protection, however, was in the political implications of its educative role: in the context of the famine, teaching the *rayat* his basic rights meant exposing the contradiction between his interests and those of the state.

One of the most interesting features of the Campaign was the drive to create genuine rural political organisations, and to politicise pre-existing local bodies. In December 1896 Tilak wrote:

The *Kesari* advises the leaders of the people in various *talukas* to form themselves into committees to watch the progress of the famine operations in their respective centres and to ventilate the grievances of the *rayats* and the workmen employed on the relief works in such a way as to ensure speedy redress.⁴

To encourage this feature, the Sabha produced and distributed through its agents a number of pamphlets, including 6000 copies of the Famine Code translated into Marathi, as well as standardised petitions for the remission of land revenue.⁵ This attempt to initiate organic political organisations among the peasantry reflects a perception of the fundamental importance of the peasants’ role in the maintenance of British rule. The perception was not, of course, new in itself; what was new was the attempt to encourage political expression through peasant-led organisations. To disrupt, in effect, the established discourse of political organisation. Thus Tilak:

The country’s emancipation can only be achieved by removing the clouds of lethargy and indifference which have been hanging over the peasant We must remove these clouds, and for that we must completely identify ourselves with the peasant...⁶

The “removal of clouds” constitutes, in this context, an articulation of the need to counter state hegemony at its very base. In many ways - not least the appeal for the establishment of peasant-based political structures - the famine campaign represents an attempt to transform this articulation into political reality.

The work of the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha during this period pushed against the boundaries of the colonial public space. Its exposure of the Government's failure to

³ *Kesari*, 5 December 1896, Report on the Native Press in Bombay Presidency (hereafter RNP Bom) No. 51 of 1896.

⁴ *Kesari*, 22 December 1896, RNP Bom No. 52 of 1896.

⁵ Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya*, p. 129.

⁶ Quoted in D.V. Tahmankar, *Lokamanya Tilak*, p. 73.

deal effectively with the famine situation was obviously counter-productive to the interests of the state, and its attempts at mobilisation of the *rayats* challenged existing models of political organisation. This is reflected clearly in the uneasy official response to the Sabha's activities. In the early months of 1897 several individual agents of the Sabha were prosecuted on a local level. In March the Bombay Government took one fascinating step further: it withdrew the Sabha's status as a recognised public body. This was an attempt to marginalise the Sabha by asserting that it no longer had a position within the public space - in the eyes of the state, it had stepped beyond the limits of what was acceptable, even meaningful, within this space.

As we have seen, however, the public space was also full of independent indigenous discourse. Tilak was able to utilise the state's actions specifically to expose the limits of state hegemony. The *Mahratta* described those government officers who had effected prosecutions of Sabha agents as "the worst enemies of the people".⁷ On the withdrawal of public status, the *Kesari* comments:

The Sabha's activity has been an eyesore to the Government for some months past. They could not reply to its well-reasoned representation regarding the administration of famine relief. They could not legally convict any of its agents in a court of law. So they have by departmental procedure deprived the Sabha of all right to recognition as a public body...⁸

"Departmental procedure" is contrasted to the rule of law; the *Kesari* represents the Government as moving outside the area of its own hegemonic project, in order to suppress the "well-reasoned" activity of the Sabha. Some days later, the *Kesari* concluded from this action that the "interests of our present rulers and the people are generally found not to harmonise".⁹ The Government, then, was forced into a confrontation through which Tilak was able to illustrate dramatically the realities of the contradiction between the interests of the state and those of the people.

The famine campaign articulated a strategy of confrontation which was to have a lasting impact on the development of the national movement. This was reflected in the successes and failures of the next major confrontation with the state in India - the boycott and *swadeshi* movement against the partition of Bengal.

Tilak's involvement as a key figure in the 1905-08 campaign against the partition of Bengal is indicative of an emerging trend of considerable significance in the national movement. The focus of his work up to this time had been regional, in that all his

⁷ *Mahratta*, 21 February 1897, RNP Bom No. 9 of 1897.

⁸ *Kesari*, 23 March 1897; RNP Bom No. 13 of 1897.

⁹ *Kesari*, 6 April 1897; RNP Bom No. 15 of 1897.

campaign work - including of course the famine campaign - had concentrated on the specific context of the Deccan. The partition of Bengal was again, obviously, a regional issue, yet resistance to it was articulated to some extent on an all-India level. The articulation of a nationwide campaign, and the conflict between nationalists which it produced, is evidence of a shift in the defining characteristics of the elite-led movement, away from its regional bases, and towards an identification along party lines. Hence Tilak was involved in the anti-partition campaign specifically as a representative of the extremist party - he identified himself with a network of ideological perspectives and objectives manifested in a particular strategy of confrontation. In contrast to the moderate bloc in Congress, this strategy was specifically counter-hegemonic.

The strategy of boycott and *swadeshi* as employed during this struggle was based primarily upon an economic resistance to colonialism. The central focus of the movement was the boycott of Lancashire cloth (and other British goods) and the parallel encouragement of indigenous industries. The boycott was extended from this base into a more sophisticated network of boycotts (a "doctrine of passive resistance", as it was called by the Bengali extremist Aurobindo Ghose), encompassing education, justice and administration. The central economic focus was employed despite the fact that partition was not primarily an economic issue. Boycott was rather a strategic response. Economic exploitation was presented as having a central political significance, and the emphasis of the movement was persistently on the political comprehension of the economic relations of colonialism. As Tilak wrote in 1905:

Exclude the boycott from the *swadeshi* movement and the latter becomes lifeless. People will not persevere in the *swadeshi* movement, unless they burn with indignation at Manchester forcing upon us thirty crores worth of piece-goods and robbing the country of so much wealth.¹⁰

In this context the immediate objectives of the movement - i.e. the rejection of all things British and the promotion of all things indigenous - assumed almost a symbolic significance. As Tilak stated in relation to the administrative boycott:

if universal boycott is impossible, enforce it as far as practicable. It may not be feasible to boycott Government service altogether, but that is no reason why we should not try to *impress upon the minds of the people* that Government service exercises a debasing influence upon character.¹¹

The literal success of the boycott was not the issue here. Its principal objective was rather to increase popular consciousness of - to "impress upon the minds of the people"

¹⁰ *Kesari* 26 September 1905; RNP Bom No. 39 of 1905.

¹¹ *Kesari*, 19 February 1907; RNP Bom No. 8 of 1907 (my italics).

- the damaging implications of British rule. In this sense boycott and *swadeshi* may be defined as an emphatic strategy of counter-hegemony.

Such a strategy demanded the development of an appropriate structural or organisational base. It is clear that in the anti-partition movement Tilak recognised this necessity from an early stage. In September 1905 the *Kesari* urged that

we should...take advantage of the present agitated state of the public mind and establish a central Bureau for the collection and dissemination of information regarding indigenous and non-British manufactures. This Bureau should have its branches all over the country, and unremitting efforts should be made to keep up the movement not only by means of lectures and meetings, but also by the introduction of new industries in our midst.¹²

This vision of a nationwide *swadeshi* organisation can be contrasted to Tilak's own experience of structural limitations in the Deccan. It is evident that his involvement in the anti-partition movement was seriously hampered by the lack of adequate machinery and concerted policy. This is best illustrated by the limitation of his activity in Bombay City, the stronghold of Pherozshah Mehta and the Bombay Presidency Association. As the commercial centre of the Deccan, and the nucleus of the Indian Cotton industries, Bombay presented itself as natural (as well as vital) ground for the propagation of boycott and *swadeshi*. Tilak was able to enlist the support of some of the millowners in Bombay; he established the Bombay *Swadeshi* Co-operative Stores in May 1906; and he drew considerable support from the proletariat and petty-bourgeoisie, as is illustrated by the six day general strike in Bombay following his conviction in the 1908 Sedition trial.¹³ His attempt to draw the bloc-support of the millowners, however, was scuttled by Dinshaw Wacha,¹⁴ and in general his efforts lacked cohesion and continuity in the absence of established, workable political channels. Ultimately, in accordance with the overall results in Bengal, the *swadeshi* movement in Bombay City was not sustained.

5.1.2 The Battlefield of Representation: Extremists, Moderates and Constitutional Reform

Despite the limited success of the counter-hegemonic strategy, the parameters of debate, the possibilities of elite nationalism, had nevertheless developed significantly. The work of Tilak and others during the boycott and *swadeshi* campaign was grounded on

¹² *Kesari*, 12 September 1905; RNP Bom No. 37 of 1905.

¹³ See Chichenov, "Tilak's Trial and the Bombay Political Strike of 1908" (in N.M. Goldberg and I.M. Reisner, *Tilak and the Struggle for Indian Freedom*, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966, pp. 545-626).

¹⁴ See Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya*, p. 175

the principle of popular involvement - popular involvement not as objectors to specific features of government policy, but as nationalists opposed to the whole character of the colonial state. Consequently, the organisational structures that they sought to employ were directed not towards government, seeking redress, but towards the people, seeking the expansion of the constituency of Indian nationalists.

This was undoubtedly a shift of discursive focus, but it must be placed in the context of the struggle for control of Congress machinery during the anti-partition campaign. In practice, the only potential avenue for politicians like Tilak to implement such structural transformations was through Congress. The latter at least had a skeletal national framework upon which to work. It was, however, controlled by moderates committed to the maintenance of symbolic representation as the principal means of conducting politics. The split in Congress which occurred at the Surat session in 1907 effectively expelled the extremist strategy from Congress channels. The practical impact of this discursive shift was therefore limited.

The state had nevertheless to confront the growing counter-hegemonic potential of elite-led nationalism. It did so by attempting to marginalise extremism and actively accommodate moderatism, through the strategic offer of constitutional reform. Reform was an indication of political progress, signalling an affirmation of moderate methods. Why turn to new forms of articulating nationalism, the state in effect declared to the middle classes, when the old forms have reaped reward.

For the moderate Congress, the promise of reforms was an equally critical affirmation. As G.K. Gokhale commented to the Secretary of State, John Morley, in 1908, without reforms "the extremists will have their own way; confusion, danger, ruin will follow".¹⁵ Because of this pressure, the actual content of the reforms was of less significance to the moderates than the concept, the image, of reform taking place. This is reflected in the Act which eventually emerged in 1909 (known as the Morley-Minto reforms) after four years of deliberation.¹⁶ Other than the formal recognition of separate Muslim interests, it appears that the Act had no substantial transformational effects on the structure of Indian government.¹⁷ The enlarged Legislative Councils were merely a surface concession; they lacked, through the composition of their new

¹⁵ Morley to Minto 4 December 1908, quoted in S. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale*, p. 237.

¹⁶ On this question of image, it is interesting to note Morley's comment to Minto as early as June 1906: "Not one whit more than you do I think it desirable or possible, or even conceivable, to adapt English political institutions to the nations who inhabit India." Nevertheless, he continues, "the *spirit* of English institutions is a different thing..." Quoted in Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale*, p. 186.

¹⁷ For an overview of the content of the reforms, see Sarkar, *Modern India*, pp. 137-144.

non-official majorities, any real substance of power. Minto, the Viceroy, admitted in 1909 that "in fact I always thought our proposals are very conservative in many ways, and was surprised at the good reception they met with from Congress circles."¹⁸ A few months before the Bill was due to pass through Parliament, Morley wondered whether "we shall not be laughed out of court for producing a mouse from the labouring mountain."¹⁹

The moderates were nevertheless wholly committed to the successful working of the reforms, and this commitment drew them more and more into the state's hegemonic arrangement. When the 1908 Indian Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Bill was being framed, for example, Morley prevailed on the Viceroy to water this oppressive measure down in order to protect the moderates from extremist "attack". "Such an attack is sure to come, " he writes, "and it is our business... not to do anything that will give substance to extremist taunts and reproaches against their moderate opponents."²⁰ It was "the business" of the state, then, to protect the status of the moderates within the national movement. The point is made more explicit by Lord Hardinge, Minto's successor, in relation to the 1911 retention of the Seditious Meetings Act. Hardinge again agreed to soften the act in deference to Gokhale and other elected members of the Imperial Legislative Council, commenting that

We must be careful not to reduce the Act to an absolute nullity. Still, *some impression would be made* if the amendments to the Act were moved and accepted in open Council, so that the non-officials might get the credit for having effected something, and the government might *appear to have made some concession to opinions* in the Council.²¹

The Viceroy is not concerned so much with bowing to opposition within his Council, as with giving the "appearance", creating the "impression", of having done so. Interestingly, this is consonant with the moderates' concern, noted above, for the appearance of reform, rather than their specific content.

In both cases, the reforms represent an attempt to reiterate symbolic representation as a meaningful framework for the expression of political aspirations, in the context of the emergence of a counter-hegemonic discourse in middle class nationalism. The moderates' pursuit of a vision of noble imperialism of the kind promised in 1858 resulted in the effective neutralisation of their opposition to the colonial state, and also in their partial assimilation into the actual structure of state hegemony.

¹⁸ Minto to Lansdowne 18 March 1909; quoted in B.R. Nanda, *Gokhale: the Indian Moderates and the British Raj* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1977), p. 318.

¹⁹ Morley to Minto 6 August 1908; quoted in Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale*, p. 237.

²⁰ Morley to Minto 28 May 1908, quoted in Nanda, *Gokhale*, p. 303.

²¹ Quoted in Nanda, *Gokhale*, p. 383 (emphasis added).

One interesting and often cited feature of the Indian Councils Act of 1909 was the institution of exclusive Muslim colleges in the electorate for Provincial Legislative Councils.²² This of course explicitly affirmed the recognition of a Muslim constituency; just as surely, it also affirmed the recognition of a Hindu constituency. In presenting the reforms to the House of Lords in 1909, Morley stated that

Only let us not forget that the difference between Mahommedanism and Hinduism is not a mere difference of articles of religious faith. It is a difference in life, in tradition, in history, in all the social things as well as articles of belief that constitute a community...²³

Morley's perception illustrates well the reason why the "communal principle" was used as the basis for the programme of constitutional reform in India. For the state, religion was the defining principle of Indian identity, Indian history and culture. This religiosity, furthermore, was a condition which percolated all strata of Indian society, including the middle class. When discussing the advisability of admitting an Indian to the Viceroy's Executive Council as part of the reform package, Minto expressed his doubts by stating that "one must remember that such a colleague would necessarily become acquainted with all our State secrets, both interior and foreign, and that it is difficult to dissociate any Native, however able, from the influences of religion...".²⁴ Minto could not conceive of an Indian contribution to the ultimate decision-making body of the colonial state which was not articulated first and foremost from the standpoint of religion.

This is perhaps not surprising, given the pattern of colonialist thought on the nature of Indian society. It must also, however, be placed in the context of the above analysis of the Act as an attempt to reiterate symbolic representation as the language of political expression in colonial India. The Muslim and Hindu constituencies that the Act called up were in this sense no different to the kind of constituencies we have already noted in, for example, the Nagpur Gaurakshini Sabha's approaches to government: symbolic constituencies, which gave meaning to the expression of indigenous "rights" within the colonial discourse of organisation. There is no doubt, however, that the government's invocation of these constituencies in 1909 was significant in mobilising already somewhat urgent attempts to reify the community of Hindus. Indeed, the Morley-Minto reforms appear in this context to be part of a wider ideological trend, which

22 See, for example, Chandra et al, *India's Struggle for Independence*, p. 142. This aspect of the Act is cited as representing "the real purpose" of the reform package, a government attempt to "divide the nationalist ranks and to check the growing unity among Indians by encouraging the growth of Muslim communalism".

23 Morley on Indian Councils Bill, 23 February 1909; in Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan*, p. 86.

24 Minto to Morley, 5/7/06; see Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan*, p. 75.

focused attention on the precise size of this community. An examination of this trend returns us to familiar territory.

5.2 Caste and the Census: The Development of Hindu Consciousness in the Public Space

Progressively in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the idea that numbers, demographic majorities and minorities, were directly related to power in the colonial polity was becoming embedded as a feature of Hindu consciousness in the public space. The trend may be perceived as a development of the ideological concern to identify the boundaries and precise qualities of Hinduism which has been noted as central to middle class conceptions of their religion. Enumeration was a natural correlation of such concerns: if one could identify exactly what Hinduism was and where its limits lay, one could also begin to understand exactly how big it was in objective terms. The principal means of approaching such questions was through the census, which by the early twentieth century had developed into a powerful signifier of the nature of Indian society. Nowhere was this power more evident, in fact, than in debates over the demography of Hinduism.

5.2.1 The Gait Circular

In November 1910 (i.e. just prior to the 1911 census), the *Tribune* of Lahore published a note prepared by E.A. Gait, the Commissioner of the Census, entitled "The Census Returns of Hindus". Gait's note pointed to the difficulty experienced previously by census officers in acquiring accurate statistics relating to the size of the Hindu population, because of the grey area on the boundaries of Hinduism occupied by low caste and *adivasi* groups. "It is obviously absurd," he says, "to enter without comment as Hindus persons who do not worship the Hindu gods and are not admitted to Hindu temples, and who are not regarded by others, and do not themselves profess to be, Hindus."²⁵ The note then goes on to suggest that the approach of census officers could be standardised by the application of a series of set questions to be put to the potential Hindu. The questions he suggests related to such matters as the particular gods they worshipped, their access to temples and shrines, and their attitude towards untouchability.²⁶

²⁵ *Tribune* 12 Nov. 1910; the editorial commented that it was publishing the note as no paper had yet done so and "there seems to be a great deal of feeling on the subject and several papers have commented upon it in the dark...".

²⁶ See *ibid*; Gait's suggested questions - there were six in all - were meant to be commented upon and amended: "I should be glad to know which of them is regarded by the best opinion in

Historiographically, what is known as the Gait Circular has been presented as a classic policy of divide and rule.²⁷ Although the publication of the note in the indigenous press would suggest this,²⁸ it must also be set in the context of the genuine difficulty experienced by census officials attempting to enumerate Hinduism, as noted in Chapter 4. In this context the Gait Circular has some meaning as a standardising model for this process of enumeration. Its implementation in the 1911 census, however, did not appear to have clarified the situation. The Superintendent of Census Operations for Central Provinces and Berar, J.T. Marten, notes almost apologetically that "the question...as to what tests can be applied to differentiate a Hindu from a non-Hindu is not without considerable difficulty...".²⁹ Other Superintendents were equally circumspect, being unable to produce clear or consistent results.³⁰ Despite Gait's efforts, then, the "considerable difficulty" associated with defining Hinduism was to remain a feature of the census.

The ramifications of the Gait Circular, however, inevitably stretched beyond the fine-tuning of colonial ethnography. As Lajpat Rai describes it:

One fine morning the learned pandits of Kashi rose to learn that their orthodoxy stood the chance of losing the allegiance of six crores of human beings who, the Government and its advisors were told, were not Hindus, in so far as other Hindus would not acknowledge them as such, and would not even touch them.³¹

each province, etc., as the most decisive, or whether there are any others which should be substituted for them."

- 27 Jones cites the Gait Circular as classic divide and rule - see his *Arya Dharm*, p. 306; P.K. Dutta calls it "a blatant act of colonial engineering" - see his "Dying Hindus", p. 1306; it is interesting to note that the Circular was accompanied by a further suggested innovation - the separation of Hindi and Urdu in the language column; see Selections from the Native Newspapers published in United Provinces 1911, Nos. 1&2.
- 28 The *Tribune* 12 November 1910, along with numerous other papers, attributed Gait's note to the intervention of the Muslim League.
- 29 Marten tested 82 castes whose strength exceeded 1% of the population of Central Provinces and Berar. Of these 19% were said to deny the supremacy of Brahmans; 43% did not receive a *mantra* from a Brahman or other guru; 20% denied the authority of the Vedas; 22% did not worship "the great Hindu gods"; 25% were denied access to temples; and 33% ate beef. See *Census of India 1911*, Vol. X, Central Provinces and Berar Part 1: Report (Superintendent Government Printing, Calcutta, 1912), p. 73.
- 30 The United Provinces report states that there were "very few in this province...who, whilst returning themselves as of the Hindu religion, do not fulfil any of the prescribed tests. It is very rare indeed that no test at all is fulfilled by any one tribe." See *Census of India 1911* Vol. XV, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh Part 1: Report (Government Press, Allahabad, 1912), p. 123. The Bombay report shows little enthusiasm for the project, listing castes that could be excluded without enumerating them in proportion to the Hindu population. See *Census of India 1911* Vol. II, Bombay, Part 1: Report (Government Central Press, Bombay, 1912), p. 65-6. Without the slightest hint of irony, the Punjab report consistently excluded not untouchables or tribals, but reformist groups such as Arya Samajis, Brahmo Samajis and Dev Dharmis. See *Census of India 1911* Vol. XIV, Punjab, Part 1: Report (Civil and Military Gazette Press, Lahore, 1912), p. 109.
- 31 Lajpat Rai, *A History of the Arya Samaj*, p. 124.

Rai makes this point in the context of his commentary on low caste *shuddhi* as an Arya contribution to Hinduism. The Circular "galvanised the dying body of orthodox Hinduism into sympathy with its untouchable population". Despite this claim, there is no evidence of direct involvement of orthodox organisations in untouchable or low caste *shuddhi* in the wake of the Gait Circular. Such organisations were still unable to surmount the problem of how to accommodate purified untouchables and low castes within the institutional structure of caste.³² The general attitude remained tacit acceptance of the Arya-led Shuddhi Sabha, as long as newly purified groups remained in the relative backwater of the Samaj's local structure (the Samaj Mandir), and that the groups purified remained relatively 'soft targets' in terms of the level of their untouchability. The Gait Circular nevertheless exacerbated the problem of the legitimacy of high caste, middle class Hindus as the representatives of a religion inclusive of manifestly oppressed groups.³³ In this sense, the Circular was perceived as a direct challenge to the power of the Hindu elite, and it was a challenge articulated specifically through the institution of caste.

5.2.2 The Dying Race Theory

Caste and the census were also at the heart of the significant literature produced during this period by Colonel U.N. Mukherji of Calcutta. In 1909 Mukherji published a series of articles in the *Bengalee*, which later appeared as a pamphlet entitled *Hindus - A Dying Race*. Two years later, in direct response to the Gait Circular, Mukherji produced a further publication entitled *Hinduism and the Coming Census: Christianity and Hinduism*.³⁴ An indication of the impact of Mukherji's work is provided by Swami Shraddhanand's description of his meeting with the Colonel during this period:

It was in February 1912 while standing in the spacious hall of the Aryasamaj in Calcutta, that a Bengali gentleman, dressed in European habits, was introduced, as Colonel U. Mukerji of the I.M.S, to me. His dress at first prejudiced me against him, but when he spoke to me of the pamphlet on which he was engaged and worked out mathematically how

³² See *Arya Patrika* 4 January 1911. Although the *Patrika* talks approvingly of the galvanising effect of the Gait Circular on Sanatana Dharma Sabhas, it is unable to give examples of Sanatani involvement in *shuddhi*. Instead, it notes that Sanatanis have "declared it in bold and unambiguous terms that the Depressed classes are part and parcel of the body politic," citing as an example the establishment of "a school for low classes" linked to Central Hindu College, Benaras. Quoted in Jones, *Arya Dharm*, p. 309.

³³ See Punjab Native Newspaper Reports (hereafter PNNR) 1910, pp. 1018 - 1092 for numerous examples of the anxiety of the Hindu press over this issue; local Hindu Sabhas (see Section 5.3), for example, were exhorted by the *Parkash* of Lahore (15 November 1910) to "adopt resolutions declaring the [depressed] classes to be their kith and kin, while the Punjab Hindu Sabha should, on the strength of this unanimous declaration, submit a representation to Government protesting against the proposed division of the Hindu community."

³⁴ U.N. Mukherji, *Hindus - A Dying Race* (M. Bannerjee, Calcutta 1909); and *Hinduism and the Coming Census: Christianity and Hinduism* (Srikali Ghosh, Calcutta, 1911).

within the next 420 years the Indo-Aryan race would be wiped off the face of the earth unless steps were taken to save it, I learnt to respect his patriotism and resolved mentally that I would never be led away by mere appearance in judging of the worth of a man in future.

Colonel Mukerji read out to me the following extract from 'Census of India report', vol. 1, page 122:-

In the whole of India the proportion of Hindus to the total population has fallen in 30 years from 74 to 69 percent, but this is partly due to the inclusion at each succeeding Census of new areas in which Hindus, if they are found at all, are a minority." I agreed with Colonel Mukerji in holding that the addition of new areas was immaterial when we had to consider the actual decline of Hindus in number throughout the whole continent of India. Thus did Colonel Mukerji work out the problem:-

Taking 5 per cent to be the actual proportion of the decline of Hindus within thirty years, their present number of 69 per cent will be swallowed up within $14 \times 30 = 420$ years, if no efforts were made to put a stop to the present decline. I was impressed with the facts placed by Colonel Mukerji before me and as I was already interested in the work of reconversion of Hindus from Muhammadanism and Christianity I began a special study of the subject.³⁵

This study was to bear fruit some fourteen years later in Shraddhanand's influential work *Hindu Sangathan: Saviour of the Dying Race*. By this time (1926), the idea of demographic decline had become entrenched as a core feature of Hindu nationalism, and as P.K. Datta has illustrated, it began to assume a symbolic, rhetorical quality which subordinated the unwieldy burden of statistical evidence.³⁶

This, however, was a later development. In 1912, it is precisely the "scientific" character of Mukherji's calculations which make them significant in the growing pressure to organise. The encounter between the urbane *bhadraloki* Mukherji, member of the Indian Medical Services and son-in-law of Sir Surendrananth Banerjea, with Mahatma Munshiram,³⁷ the fiery Arya and founder of the *Gurukul* movement, represents a classic meeting of divergent ideological streams of middle class India. Munshiram's natural inclination was to scorn Mukherji and his "European habits" - here was a reminder of everything he had cast off when he began work on the *Gurukul* at Kangri in 1901. Yet he was soon swayed by the force of Mukherji's argument, and admonished himself for being "led away by mere appearance". Mukherji and Munshiram were united by a classic middle class rationalism, supported by the authoritative documentation of the census. The force of this rationalism was its apparent support for conceptual assumptions that underpinned the idea of an organised Hinduism: Hinduism as degenerate, a fragmented religion with a disparate, lacklustre

³⁵ Swami Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan*, pp. 14-15.

³⁶ As Datta puts it, "the retention of the emotional at the cost of the mathematical"; see "Dying Hindus", p. 1315.

³⁷ Swami Shraddhanand was the name assumed by Munshiram when he took *sannyas* in 1917.

following unconscious of the community that their faith constituted. Demographic decline reflected this degeneracy, and increased the urgency with which it needed to be countered. According to Mukherji, it was not simply a question of moral turpitude; it was a question of survival.

In *A Dying Race* Mukherji focused on the plight of low castes as the well-spring of Hindu degeneracy. When discussing the Bagdi caste, he comments: "he is lazy, thriftless, unreliable... . Hope, ambition, self-respect, self-reliance have no meaning for him, and things have been like this ever since he has been a bagdi." And then, significantly, "there is no object for which they can unite".³⁸ Against this, Mukherji presents two images of organisation. First, the organisation of the colonial masters. An Englishman, he says, is "a unit, and generally a very intelligent unit of a huge organisation where everyone, irrespective of rank or class, has a common idea and a common object." Secondly, the organisation of Islam in India, which he relates to what he perceives as Islam's privileged position in the colonial order. This "superiority," he claims "is entirely due to their religious revival and systematic moral training."³⁹

The image of organised Islam is of course particularly potent, because it is Islam which would replace Hinduism as the principal religio-social force as a result of demographic decline. In Mukherji's enduring phrase: "they count their gains - we calculate our losses".⁴⁰ This competitive demography indicates what I would perceive as a new alignment for the idea of Hindu organisation; a specifically communal alignment, in its implicit antagonism towards Islam. Hinduism and Islam are represented as directly competing social blocs - they are polarised symbolically, in a similar way to the polarisation of Aryas and Sanatanis as reformist and conservative in the 1880s. This of course was a polarisation that was supported by the symbolic constituencies mooted in the Morley-Minto reform package. For middle class Hindus, the material existence of these constituencies could only be enhanced by the apparent scientific quality of Mukherji's initial proposition. Suddenly, one could talk about the Hindus as an objective force, with clearly defined boundaries - admittedly these boundaries were shrinking, under attack from external forces, but at least they were there, "proven" by the authority of the census.

38 Quoted in Datta, "Dying Hindus", p. 1308.

39 Datta, "Dying Hindus", p. 1307.

40 For Datta's account of the significance of this phrase in communal literature, see "Dying Hindus", p. 1305.

The concentration in *A Dying Race* on the problem of low caste degeneracy begs the question of caste reform. Mukherji confronts this head on, calling for the reform of Brahmanism as a prerequisite to Brahman-led low caste reform. This would entail the eradication of untouchability, but not the wholesale disruption of the caste system. It is assumed that the reform of Brahmanism would in itself be a powerful enough force to produce a single Hindu society. Interestingly, the slightly later *Hinduism and the Coming Census* eschews this need for reform. This publication, of course, was produced in response to the Gait Circular, which threatened to remove low castes from the Hindu equation altogether. The "scientific" ethnography which Mukherji used in 1909 to establish the dying race theory now turned against him, through the simple and, as we have seen, quite extensively employed practice of census authorities shifting the goal posts, making their own pronouncements on where the limits of Hinduism lay. Mukherji now presented Hinduism as idealised pluralism, in which even untouchability was justified as part of an organic whole.⁴¹

There is a shift here in Mukherji's perspective which may be seen as a shift from a vertical to a horizontal approach to the organisation of Hinduism. This reflects the increasingly dominant position of the latter in the ideology of Hindu politics, as the issue of numbers became more entrenched as a signifier of power. The discourse of organisation encouraged the production of idioms of representation which could easily accommodate these vast projections of community as constituencies. Horizontal organisation could address this kind of constituency far more immediately than the long-term projections of vertical organisation, entailing wholesale reform and all its possible ramifications.

5.3 The Hindu Sabha Movement: Organisation as Paramount Objective

The emerging dominance of horizontal organisation is precisely what is indicated by the Hindu Sabha movement. This movement developed during the first decade of the twentieth century as an explicitly political attempt to represent "Hindu interests" in the increasingly dynamic arena of colonial power.

⁴¹ See Datta, "Dying Hindus", p. 1310.

5.3.1 Beginnings of the Movement: the Hindu Sahaik Sabhas

Although various organisations emerged towards the end of the century which attempted to encompass Hindus as a constituency,⁴² it was the Punjabi organisations - Arya, Sanatani and also Sikh - which initiated concrete moves towards the projection of this level of representation, as the political context began to shift in the early 1900s. From 1906 a series of Hindu Sahaik Sabhas were established which consisted of "the cream of the Arya, Brahmo, Theosophist, Sikh, Sanatanist Societies...".⁴³ The principal aim of these Sabhas was to "protect the interests of the Hindus by stimulating in them the feelings of self-respect, self-help and mutual co-operation so that by a combined effort there would be some chance of promoting the moral, intellectual, social and material welfare of the individuals of which the nation is composed." The first significant Sabha was established in Lahore, at a meeting held on 4 August 1906.⁴⁴ This meeting framed a series of objectives:

1. To promote brotherly feelings amongst the various sections of the Hindu community;
2. To help destitute and disabled Hindus;
3. To act as Trustees for charitable, religious, educational and other purposes of such properties as may be entrusted to the Sabha;
4. To improve the moral, intellectual and material condition of the Hindus;
5. Generally to protect, promote and represent the interests of the Hindu community.⁴⁵

Shortly afterwards, these were supplemented by a sixth objective: "To help the establishment of similar Sabhas in other important towns of India."⁴⁶ I have quoted all six objectives of the Lahore Sabha because I believe they indicate remarkably well the somewhat unfocused trajectory of the Sabha movement. Beyond the desire to expand, it is difficult to extrapolate any definite programme of action from them. Despite the fact that the Arya Samaj was influential in setting up the Sabha, then, the Lahore objectives reflect the preoccupation of horizontal organisation precisely: the need to bind together, to "protect, promote and represent", whilst avoiding any action disruptive of established social practice.

⁴² Most notably, as we have seen, the Nagpur Gaurakshini Sabha.

⁴³ *Tribune*, 24 August 1906.

⁴⁴ The *Tribune* of 2 October 1906 claimed that the first Sabha was established at Srinagar in June 1906.

⁴⁵ *Tribune* 24 August 1906.

⁴⁶ *Tribune*, 25 August 1906.

The Lahore Sabha was followed by similar organisations established at Multan, Sialkot, Gujranwala and Lyallpur.⁴⁷ The common theme was collaboration: inaugural meetings were attended by the "heads of all sections" coming together to "work with co-operation on a single platform".⁴⁸ The idea, then, was to create a conglomeration of organisations which together would form a spectrum of religious affiliation. As long as the spectrum presented a coherent image, it could claim to "represent the interests of the Hindu community." The constituency of Hindus is created by binding together in one organisation a series of existing organisations which purported to represent the various components of this larger constituency. Although it is a somewhat more elaborate mechanism, this image replicates the kind of symbolic representation projected by the Nagpur Gaurakshini Sabha. This point is supported by the fact that the kind of organisations involved were almost exclusively middle class: the *Tribune's* list above confirms this doubly, by emphasising the elitism of those involved ("the *cream* of the Arya, Brahmo, Theosophist..."etc.). A significant ideological convergence is apparent in this image. Horizontal organisation meshes with symbolic representation, to the extent that the latter constitutes the means of achieving the former. At the same time, the coherent image, the apparent unity, becomes the touchstone for the Sabha movement's representative claims. The two ideological forms begin to develop together, mutually affirming their legitimacy within the colonial discourse of organisation.

One direct result of this was that *sanatana dharma* emerged as central to the coherence of the Sabha movement. Projecting a spectrum of Hinduism meant providing a strategically central position to orthodoxy, with its implication of the largest constituency of Hindus. *Sanatana dharma* had by the turn of the century become entrenched in the public space as a signifier of this orthodoxy, represented by the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal.⁴⁹ Consequently these organisations were powerful movers in the character of unified Hinduism projected by the Sabha movement.⁵⁰

47 See accounts in *Tribune* throughout September 1906; many of these Sabhas were established in the wake of a provincial tour by Pandit Ram Bhaj Datta and his wife Sarala Devi. Datta was an Arya of the "College faction", who in 1907 was to become the first President of the Punjab-based Bharat Shuddhi Sabha, established to "devote itself exclusively to (shuddhi) work" and claiming to represent "the various Hindu societies" and so have the sympathy of "the entire Hindu population". Passages are from a speech delivered by Datta in Allahabad in 1911, quoted in Ghai, *The Shuddhi Movement in India*, p. 80. On Datta see also Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 26.

48 See *Tribune* 8 September, 2 September 1906.

49 Re. the claim made by the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal in 1902 to represent "the whole of the orthodox classes of the Hindus in India"; op. cit. Chapter 3, n. 116.

50 In making this point I am arguing against the line taken particularly by Jaffrelot that the Sabha movement was an extension of Arya Samaj ideology; see Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", pp. 26-33.

5.3.2 "Self Abnegation": Defining the Structure of Hindu Politics

In the context of the Congress split in 1907, and the constitutional reforms of 1909, the movement gathered pace despite its rather vague beginnings. Work was focused on the reform package, and on the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1901, which was perceived as particularly discriminating against the urban-based Hindu middle class.⁵¹ As well as addressing communications to both the provincial and central governments on these issues during 1909,⁵² the Sabha made its presence felt by voicing concern over the reform package to the Viceroy in person, as part of a welcome address during a short visit to Lahore in April. The address was reported to have "touched the Viceroy to the quick and led His Excellency to remark that the questions raised in it did not suit the occasion."⁵³ This incident was widely commented on in the press, and the Sabha consolidated the resulting heightened profile by preparing for a Provincial Hindu Conference in Lahore in October 1909, as a demonstration of the unity of Hindus in Punjab.

A prime mover in these preparations for the Conference was Lala Lal Chand, the first prominent leader of the fully established Sabha movement. Lal Chand was a well-known Samajist of the "College branch". He was also a judge in Lahore and one of the founders of the Punjab National Bank.⁵⁴ Beginning in February 1909, he published a series of articles in *The Punjabee* under the title *Self-Abnegation in Politics*, which have since gained stature as a "foundation text" of the Sabha movement.⁵⁵ The somewhat obscure title refers to the attitude of Hindus towards politics, which Chand perceived as self-denying, always allowing the claims of other forces in society to take precedence. The concession of separate Muslim electorates in the Morley-Minto reforms is presented as the apotheosis of the tendency.

51 For a summary of the provisions of this Act and its implications, see Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", pp. 22-23; for more detailed accounts see N.G Barrier, "The Punjab Disturbances of 1907: the response of the British Government in India to Agrarian unrest" (in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1967, pp. 353-383); and Barrier, *The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900* (Duke University, Durham, 1966).

52 In April and July; see Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 27.

53 *Jhang Sial* 17 April 1909; PNNR 1909. For further examples of press comment, see the *Hindustan* and the *Watan*, 16 April 1909, in PNNR.

54 Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 27.

55 They were later published in book form: Lal Chand, *Self-Abnegation in Politics* (Central Yuvak Sabha, Lahore, 1938); Jaffrelot has gone as far as to describe *Self Abnegation* as a Hindu version of the two nation theory - see "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 28.

Blame for this loss of self-assertion is laid fairly and squarely at the door of the Congress, an organisation that "makes the Hindu forget that he is a Hindu and tends to swamp his communal individuality (*sic!*) into an Indian ideal, thus making him break with all his past traditions and past glory."⁵⁶ The Congress ideal of a composite nationhood, he continues, "was not only erroneous to start with, but ...has become impossible under the declared hostile attitude of the other community." The only way forward, then, was "to start anew on a fresh basis, abandoning, if not pulling down, the fabric which instead of giving political shelter and refuge has exposed the (Hindu) community to winds and hailstorms from every quarter."⁵⁷

Lal Chand's agenda was explicitly political. His articles reiterate again and again the point that "the object is not to discuss the general amelioration of the Hindu community in its various aspects," but rather "the political aspect of the Hindu community *under its present* environments."⁵⁸ As such, he largely sidesteps the issue of what precisely constitutes the Hindu community which he is addressing. Beyond the invocation of fairly widely understood notions of Hindu history, and an attempt at defining patriotism in terms of community as opposed to territory,⁵⁹ Lal Chand does not appear to be particularly concerned with the issue of how to consolidate Hindu society. As a leading Arya, this may appear to be inappropriate, but *Self-Abnegation* needs to be viewed in its own context. In particular, the Morley-Minto reforms need to be seen not only in terms of the recognition of separate Muslim interests, but also in terms of the increasing impotence of Congress moderatism, and the related ideological struggle to assert counter-hegemony as the strategic focus of Indian nationalism. Lal Chand rejects the latter in no uncertain terms. His understanding of politics is "in the sense of relations between the governed and the governors;" he does not therefore endorse politics based on the "uprooting of these relations."⁶⁰ "It is mere tall talk," he continues, "to speak of self-growth and self-development" when the community is so weak. Because of this it is of "paramount importance to reconcile, and not to make needlessly antagonistic, the powers that be."⁶¹ Later he refers to the split in Congress at Surat in 1907 as a result of the clash of these opposing strategies towards the state:

Self-help [i.e. swadeshi and the rejection of state-centred politics]
...threatened at one time to cause a split in the Congress camp and not
improbably did cause the split. The advocates of the theory would

⁵⁶ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 112-3.

⁵⁷ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 113.

⁵⁸ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 98 [emphasis in original].

⁵⁹ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 102-3; this is a notion which Lajpat Rai had been advocating even in 1899, a point noted by Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 32.

⁶⁰ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 99.

⁶¹ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 100.

discredit their opponents by calling them mendicants. Their scheme was to make no appeals to Government nor send any memorials, but to achieve political ascendancy without Government help. The theory is attractive in form as it appeals to self-pride but I, at any rate, am at a loss to understand how resolutions passed at meetings will redress the grievances unless it is intended - whether so addressed in form or not - that these should reach Government and induce it to take measures for redress.⁶²

The politics of extremism, then, do not fall within the purview of this prominent judge of Lahore.

The moderate Congress, however, had also patently failed to deliver any tangible political gain, beyond the provision of separate electorates. "When the time came for rewarding the labours a little, the substantial portion of the reward was assigned to the other community."⁶³ The problem, however, lay not in the structure of Congress politics - i.e. the "appeal to the authorities...to address the wrong" - but rather on the projection of the Congress constituency (through, of course, symbolic representation) as a united nation. When Lal Chand talks of starting anew, of pulling down the fabric of contemporary politics, he is referring largely to the substitution of this constituency for a Hindu constituency:

Weak and disunited we are and divided into various sects. But the remedy lies in bringing the sections on a common political platform where they would realise that they are merely branches of the same stock and community, and not lead them further astray and to teach them as if no such community exists or has a political status.⁶⁴

Here again we see the convergence of symbolic representation and horizontal organisation. The ideological meshing noted above is reproduced. In this context, the appropriation of the existing structure of politics (i.e. that which has been termed "hegemonic nationalism") is the logical means of representing the imagined constituency of Hindus. Thus Lal Chand, at the very end of his series of letters, proposes:

the substitution of Hindu Sabhas for Congress Committees, of a Hindu press for the Congress press, organisation of a Hindu Defence Fund with regular offices and machinery for collecting information and seeking redress by self-help, self-ameliorations and petitions and memorials supplemented by agitation in the press and advocacy through trusted leaders in matters both special and common but dominated primarily by regard for Hindu interests.⁶⁵

⁶² Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 109; Chand continues: "The fallacy of the position taken up is rendered absolutely self-evident by actual results. An attempt to boycott Government service and even honorary service failed miserably...".

⁶³ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 112.

⁶⁴ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 118.

⁶⁵ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 125.

It is possible that Lal Chand's approach in *Self Abnegation* was influenced by the Government's crack-down on Arya involvement in politics following the Punjab disturbances of 1907.⁶⁶ Certainly he places great emphasis on his objection to the Congress demand for self government within the Commonwealth as an "impracticable demand and a pure source of irritation," and is keen at other points to emphasise his loyalty.⁶⁷ It is in any case perhaps not surprising that such a prominent citizen of the British Indian state should be anything other than an advocate of strictly constitutional politics. What is interesting is that this dry and somewhat unwieldy series of articles should emerge as what Jaffrelot calls the "ideological charter of the Hindu Sabha."⁶⁸ As Hindu politics emerged, it became fused to the idea of symbolic representation, a method of structuring politics which avoided the thorny question of who precisely was being represented. Conforming precisely to the state's own idea of how a political organisation should operate (not only in the sense of symbolic representation, indeed, but also of course in the sense that the projected constituency was - in some sense at least - religious), Lal Chand's vision of the Hindu Sabha intended to call the constituency of Hindus into being simply through the power of political articulation in the colonial public space.

5.3.3 The 1909 Hindu Conference: Establishing the Paramount Objective

In April 1909, whilst the "ideological charter" of the Sabha was still unravelling in the pages of the *Punjabee*, the prospects for the establishment of this unified Hindu constituency in the Punjab were rocked by events in the district town of Hoshiarpur. The local Arya Samaj performed a *shuddhi* ceremony during April to purify a group of Chamars. As stated earlier, the general attitude of high caste Hindus in the Punjab was to tolerate Arya *shuddhi* ceremonies, as long as the groups purified were relatively "soft targets" in terms of their caste status. The Hoshiarpur *shuddhi*, however, targeted the particularly untouchable Chamars. As a result it provoked a vicious backlash orchestrated by the local Sanatana Dharma Sabha, which led to extensive comment in the Punjabi press. The Lahore-based *Akhbar-i-Am* published a letter from Bawa Narain Singh of Hoshiarpur, which announced the outcasting of local Samaj members with the ominous statement: "Aryas should begin by sinking their own wells or they will die from thirst."⁶⁹ The Hoshiarpur-based *Tilak* reported that a group of Aryas

⁶⁶ See Jones, *Arya Dharm*, pp. 269-279 on this Government crackdown.

⁶⁷ Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p.116; see also, for example, p. 99.

⁶⁸ Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab", p. 28.

⁶⁹ *Akhbar-i-Am*, 5 May 1909; see PNNR No. 19 of 1909. Bawa Narain Singh's opposition is indicative of the way in which low caste *shuddhi* polarised middle class Hindu opinion - some twenty years earlier Singh had been publicly thanked by the Amritsar Arya Samaj for his donation of Rs. 80 000 to the local Dayanand Anglo Vedic College; see *Qaisari* 16 May

who had gone to fetch water were "given a severe beating by about 40 Sanatanists", and also that a secret society called the Sudhar Sabha had been established "to parade the streets in groups of from five to ten persons and...belabour with lathis solitary Samajists they may meet".⁷⁰ This hostility towards the Samaj was also expressed on a more general level, and collaboration in the Sabha movement was called into question. The editor of the Lahore-based *Hindu Sanatan Dharam Gazette*, for example, launched a bitter invective against the Samaj, concluding that "Sanatanists should have nothing to do with Hindu Sabhas, the Punjabi organisers of which consist mostly of Aryas," and that "these bodies (i.e. the Sabhas) will prove extremely injurious to the interests of Hindus."⁷¹

The response of the Arya Samaj is an interesting reflection of the dilemma it faced in its relationship with Sanatanis during this period. The Hoshiarpur Samaj immediately appealed to the powerful Lahore Samaj for help in its predicament. The Lahore Samaj then attempted to use the new Hindu Sabha machinery to effect a rapprochement.⁷² This is indicative of the Aryas' commitment to the idea of wider organisation, and to the Sabha movement as a means of diffusing tension. But it was not the only form of response. Two or three weeks after the Hoshiarpur incident, Lajpat Rai wrote an article in the *Arya Gazette* which was far more openly confrontational. Rai attacked caste as "one of the chief causes of the national and social ruin which has overtaken Hindus," although he did qualify this by noting that "in olden times the (*varna*) system was not characterised by its present rigidity," thus remaining within the broad ambit of Arya doctrine. He then appealed to his fellow Aryas to continue their *shuddhi* work, "bearing in mind that the seed which they are sowing is being sown by order of God", and predicted that "the Sanatanists, who thirst for the blood of the Aryas, will eat of (the fruits of their labours) and offer prayers for the latter."⁷³ This then presents an alternative view of the development of Hindu unity, in which the reformist principles of the Arya Samaj are ascendant, and in particular the transformation of Hindu society constitutes the basis for future unity.⁷⁴ It is clear from these reactions to Hoshiarpur

1885, in *Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers in the Punjab, North Western Provinces, Oudh, Central Provinces, Central India and Rajputana*, 1885.

70 *Tilak* 6 May 1909; see PNNR No. 21 of 1909.

71 *Hindu Sanatana Dharam Gazette*, 28 April 1909; see PNNR No. 19 of 1909; Aryas are described as "the killers of kine", and "the character of their women is open to objection"; the *Satyarth Prakash* is described as "a sinful and filthy book".

72 See *ibid*: "...the Lahore Samaj intends bringing pressure to bear on the Sanatan Dharam Sabha, Hoshiarpur, through the Hindu Sabha".

73 *Arya Gazette* 20 May 1909, quoted in PNNR No. 21 of 1909.

74 Certainly the Hoshiarpur Samaj appeared to survive the storm of 1909 and carry on with its *shuddhi* programme amongst Chamars. The Report on the Punjab Census 1911 notes that: "Information received from the Hoshiarpur district shows that 722 persons of the Kabirpanthi sect (Chamar by caste) have been elevated by the Arya Samaj in 49 villages of the Hoshiarpur and Kangra Districts within the last four years". See *Census of India 1911*, Vol. XIV, Punjab

that *shuddhi* was an issue at the heart of the debate over the nature of Hindu unity, Hindu organisation. Against this vibrant, sometimes violent backdrop of ideological confrontation, then, the first Hindu Conference was held in October.

Although the Conference was not held until the 21st and 22nd of October, from early in that month the press began setting the tone. In particular, the Arya daily the *Punjabee* began collecting comments from the national press which indicated that the Sabha movement "has made its infant existence, albeit devoid of any achievements, felt."⁷⁵ For example, it quoted admiringly from the *Reis and Rayyat*,⁷⁶ which had suggested a (admittedly somewhat vague) definition of the parameters of Hindu unity in anticipation of the Conference: "the Hindus scattered all over the Indian peninsula are divided into various forms. But there is the bedrock of uniformity in the belief in the Vedas and some other essential dogmas."⁷⁷ A few days later, an approving article in the *Bengalee* was extensively quoted. This article compares the unity of the Sabha movement to the fractious recent history of Congress nationalism: "While the echoes of the Congress controversy continue to reach our ears, the great Hindu community of the Punjab are silently maturing their plans and are slowly but steadily moving forward towards the formation of a great Hindu federation." The *Bengalee* also had a suggestion for the defining principle of unification in this federation: "Race, and not religion, ought to be the guiding principle of the organisation. For the Hindu is the most tolerant of human beings and the Hindu faith the most comprehensive that one can think of, embracing within its fold the believers in cults and creeds of the widest divergence."⁷⁸ Although it may not have rung true in Hoshiarpur, this idea of tolerant "unity in diversity", based on a range of unifying principles, was the overriding theme of pre-Conference comment. A confirmation of this unity, it appeared, was the most significant, the most sought after objective that the Conference could aspire to. As the *Punjabee's* Special Conference Issue commented, "This is the first time, we believe, in the history of modern India, that the Hindus as a body have sought to give expression to their communal consciousness, as distinguished from the detached movement of sects and castes."⁷⁹

The importance of *sanatana dharma* to the efficacy of this unity is indicated by the allocation of posts at the 1909 Conference. Although Lal Chand was Chair of the

Pt. 1, p. 152. Ghai also notes that one of the Kabirpanthi Chamars went on to become an MP, and one a prominent figure in the Sabha movement; see, *The Shuddhi Movement in India*, p. 75, n. 137.

⁷⁵ *Punjabee*, 7 October 1909.

⁷⁶ A Calcutta English language weekly.

⁷⁷ *Punjabee*, 5 October 1909.

⁷⁸ *Punjabee*, 9 October 1909.

⁷⁹ *Punjabee*, Special Conference Issue 23 October 1909.

Reception Committee, the Presidency was offered to Sir C.P. Chatterjee, "a patron of the Sanatana Dharma Sabha."⁸⁰ As well as his association with orthodoxy, the non-Punjabi Chatterjee signified the importance of communal identity over regional identity; he was "a Hindu first and a Bengali afterwards."⁸¹

The Conference was attended by some 3000 persons on each day. Although it was a provincial Conference, delegates were also drawn from the North West Frontier Province, with "some visitors from UP and other parts of the country."⁸² The importance of Sanatani sensibilities is again signified by the careful segregation of participants in the *pandal* according to caste.⁸³ The unity of Hinduism was not to be threatened by delegates' anxieties over potential pollution through the proximity of other delegates.

Lal Chand's address to the Conference indicates many of the concerns and dilemmas that defined organised Hinduism at this time. He began by referring to Mukherji's *Hindus: A Dying Race* as a reflection of the resurgence of "Hindu self-consciousness." "Numbers carry great weight in this age," he commented, "...and help materially in deciding the fate of any struggle. The progress of a community is now as much measured by its numerical strength as by its moral and economic achievements."⁸⁴ He then went on to urge the point made in *Self Abnegation*, that for Hindus defining this community was simply a question of articulating it on the level of colonial politics. Although he did refer to the "needless corrosive differences" of sub-caste in his critique of contemporary Hindu society, as any good Arya of the time would, his solution was based firmly in the realm of symbolic representation. "All that is needed", he says, "is to advocate the interests of the community at large and the moment we realise this germinal idea, this sacred obligation, ...all self-imposed differences and schisms will vanish away like chaff." As soon as Hinduism is presented as united, then, divisiveness will disappear. The image of organised Hinduism assumes the status of principal political objective in Chand's vision of the Sabha movement.

The nature of this image of organised Hinduism, furthermore, is unequivocally horizontal. Commenting on the predicament of low castes and untouchables, Lal Chand states:

80 *Punjabee*, 4 November 1909.

81 *Punjabee*, 26 October 1909.

82 *ibid.*

83 *ibid.*: "Every incomer was taken to the place specially reserved for gentlemen of his class by an obliging and energetic volunteer".

84 *Punjabee*, Special Conference Issue, 23 October 1909.

It is not pressed that the feet be given the status of the head, but it is certainly enjoined that their position as essential parts of the "sacred" living body be duly recognised, that they be not neglected and do receive their proper share of nourishment, education and enlightenment, to enable them to perform their own function to the best advantage of the community and the body politic.⁸⁵

No change in status for low castes and untouchables, then, but an entitlement to respect for their position and role in society. This is the main thrust, as we have seen, of ideas of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism - in particular it reflects the Sanatani attitude towards caste.

The influence of Sanatani concerns is also evident in the resolutions that emerged from the Conference. Not surprisingly, consensual issues were prominent: the promotion of Sanskrit and Hindi, support for cow protection and *ayurvedic* medicine, the promotion of "brotherly feelings" among Hindus and a commitment "to consolidate and strengthen the sense of common nationality". These were accompanied by more hard-nosed resolutions regarding the Punjab Alienation of Land Act and representation in Legislative Councils, which reflected the new political presence indicated by *Self Abnegation*. Several resolutions, however, were not put before the Conference, ostensibly through lack of time. These included Arya issues such as support for widows, low caste amelioration and the removal of sub-caste distinctions.⁸⁶ The idea that these resolutions were dropped not due to lack of time but due to "strife apprehended over them between the orthodox and the unorthodox" was denied at length after the Conference,⁸⁷ but undoubtedly the need for consensus was a prominent factor, and the *Punjabee* rounded off its denial of the above with a reminder that the main objective was "union as opposed to division". As we shall see, this emphasis on the need for consolidation at all costs was to emerge as the defining principle of Hindu nationalism, to which all other issues were subordinated.

One of the resolutions which was approved was that calling for the establishment of Hindu Sabhas "all over the country," and to hold an annual all-India Hindu Conference. This may be seen as an extension of the point noted in relation to the objectives of the Lahore Sabha in 1906, that the desire to expand stands out as a definite feature of the movement. Certainly the Conference appears to have been widely reported in the national press. The *Punjabee* continued its championing of the cause by reproducing comments on the Conference from papers published across the

85 *ibid.*

86 *Punjabee*, 26 October 1909.

87 See *Punjabee*, 30 October 1909.

subcontinent.⁸⁸ Generally, the comments welcomed the Sabha movement particularly in the context of constitutional reform, and the perceived anti-Hindu/pro-Muslim bias of the Government. After 1909, the Sabha movement nevertheless developed somewhat haphazardly. In 1911 the first Hindu Sabha was established in UP, and here it developed largely independent of the Arya Samaj.⁸⁹ By 1915 enough momentum had been generated to establish the All India Hindu Sabha, as a representative body for local and provincial Sabhas. It is this body which was to become fully active in the early nineteen twenties as the Hindu Mahasabha.⁹⁰

5.4 Summary of Discussion

In the first section of this chapter it has been illustrated how the state was confronted by ideological challenges which were specifically counter-hegemonic. Tilak's work during this period was examined as an example of how this counter-hegemonic strategy developed. In both the famine campaign and the anti-partition agitation, he sought primarily to expose the contradiction between the interests of the state and the putative Indian nation. This, then, was an ideological objective. It sought to transform the "mental frameworks", to use Hall's phrase, which different social groups used to make sense of the world.⁹¹ This of course assumes that the social groups targeted by Tilak - land-owning peasants during 1896-7, and the industrial bourgeoisie, workers, and lower middle class government servants during 1905-1908 - had mental frameworks which were dominated by the hegemonic influence of the state. Historiographically, it is unviable to make such an assumption without supplying a large body of evidence to support it. I am not, however, presenting it as a point of historiography. It is presented rather as an assumption of middle class nationalists like Tilak, increasingly committed to ideological struggle as the central strategy of confrontation with the state. My point is that regardless of the objective effectiveness of nationalist counter-hegemony, it has to be recognised as the emerging strategy of the Indian national movement in the early twentieth century. As a strategy, furthermore, it began to shift

⁸⁸ During November the *Punjabee* reproduced comment from the *Bengalee*, the *Indian Patriot*, *Amrita Bazaar Patrika*, *Indian Social Reformer*, *Hindu Patriot*, *Indian Mirror*, the *Advocate*, and the *Spectator*.

⁸⁹ Gordon's analysis of the 1915 UP Provincial Committee of the Hindu Sabha indicates the prominence of Sanatani representation. He also states that "not one member of the committee has been identified as belonging to the Arya Samaj", although there was strong representation from the UP Social Conference - See R. Gordon, "The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915-1926" (in *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 9, 1975, pp. 145-204), p.154.

⁹⁰ The new name was bestowed at the Hardwar session of the Sabha, 1921.

⁹¹ See Section 2.1 of this thesis.

the parameters of political discourse which occupied both middle class nationalists and the state at this time. For this reason it is significant.

One important feature of this shift was that representation now emerged as a site of political struggle. The state claimed always to act in the best interests of the people as a whole, and it supported this idea by persistently reiterating its dual image of colonial order and indigenous disorder, fragmentation, potential anarchy. Nationalists sought to counter this claim by illustrating the inherent contradictoriness of British benevolence, claiming that nationalism, and not the state, represented the interests of the people.

- This battlefield of representation was made more complex by the intra-nationalist struggle. Leaders like Tilak hoped to extend the representative quality of nationalism
- by wresting its organisational machinery (principally the Congress) from the control of the moderates. Leaders like Gokhale remained convinced that the state was ultimately benevolent, and so needed to be approached on its own terms, employing the quasi-parliamentary idioms dictated by the colonial discourse of organisation.

The state undoubtedly capitalised on this struggle, attempting to marginalise extremism by confirming the success of moderatism, through the offer of constitutional reform. In a fascinating reflection of its discursive framework, the reform package which emerged in 1909 was largely insubstantial, characterised by the overriding need to promote the *image* of reform. As the moderates projected themselves symbolically as the representatives of the people, then, so the reforms to which they were committed constituted a symbolic shift in the balance of administrative power. Ultimately, moderate strategy was discredited by this association; genuine nationalists like Gokhale were unable to escape the logic of the discursive framework in which their nationalism was constructed.

At the same time, however, the reforms provided a window of opportunity for the more forceful projection of a politically organised Hinduism. The incorporation of separate electorates implicitly invoked a constituency of Hindus within a discursive framework which confirmed symbolic representation as a legitimate form of political expression. The constituency of Hindus could be represented, simply by providing a united image within existing discursive parameters. It is precisely this image that the Sabha movement attempted to project. As Lal Chand asserted during the 1909 Conference, to create a politically significant Hinduism "all that is needed is to advocate the interests of the community at large."

This was not simply a reaction to the Morley-Minto reforms. It rather reflects the development of the idea of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism, and in particular its convergence with the idea of symbolic representation. This ideology has a history; a history which sees it emerging as increasingly prominent as the issue of numbers became more entrenched as a signifier of power in the colonial public space. In turn, this entrenchment was strongly related to the emerging power and sophistication of counter-hegemonic nationalism. It was resorted to by the state as a means of circumventing nationalist attempts to extend the constituency of nationalists, and consequently it reconstituted symbolic representation on the basis of these vast projections of community as legitimate constituencies. Here, then, a divergence is evident in the comparative trajectories of Indian and Hindu nationalism. Whilst Indian nationalism sought to improve its representative quality and reify the constituency of nationalists, the Hindu Sabha benefited from attempts to counter this development, by basing its representational legitimacy precisely on the state's implicit recognition of an imagined constituency of Hindus.

The association of numbers and power was at the heart of the two themes discussed in the second section: the Gait Circular and U.N. Mukherji's theory of demographic decline. Both these themes directed a sharp focus on the well-wrought issue of how to define Hinduism; in addition, they invested the issue with an acute anxiety related to numbers. In one way or another, both Gait and Mukherji presented a picture of the decline of Hinduism as a powerful force in society and politics through its numerical size in relation to other "communities" identified by the census - principally, of course, the Muslim "community". The urgency implied by these images of decline could be addressed far more easily by advocates of horizontal organisation: if numbers were to be the measure of power, then here was a means of presenting Hinduism as a homogeneous unit which side-stepped the difficult issues of how to address division or accommodate manifestly oppressed groups. The long term consolidation of Hindu society projected through low caste *shuddhi*, on the other hand, could only highlight such issues, thus leaving Hinduism vulnerable as a force in the arena of colonial power.

The Sabha movement reflected these concerns. As Lal Chand stated at the 1909 Conference: "numbers carry great weight in this age". The legitimacy of the Sabha as a political force was based on its claim to represent this vast constituency: the Hindus of the Punjab. It did so through the idea of horizontal organisation, presenting the image of a spectrum of Hinduism through the inclusion of a series of well-established groups in the public space. The unification of these different groups within one organisation symbolised the unification of the constituency. Any division, therefore, would affect

not only the legitimacy of the organisation; it would also directly impact upon the efficacy of the projected constituency. It was on this basis that "union as opposed to division" was to emerge as the most important feature of the 1909 Conference, despite the latent presence of confrontation over issues related to caste and social reform. And it was on this fragile foundation that the Sabha movement would be projected in the 1920s as the political voice of the Hindu nation.

Contextualising Hindu Nationalism: The Development of Political Discourse in the Post-War Years

There is no doubt that the First World War and immediate post-war years had a significant impact on the character of politics in colonial India. Most fundamentally, the war caused lasting changes in the colonial economy, strengthening the position of the indigenous bourgeoisie whilst at the same time radically increasing hardship for the majority of the population.¹ One result of these changes was an increased level of politicisation and class consciousness. Bourgeois wealth was stimulated by a series of protectionist measures taken by the Indian Government and an accompanying expansion of industries associated with war production. This led to a greater commitment amongst industrialists to the idea of self-government, as they realised materially just how damaging pro-British state intervention had been in the past. Economic deprivation also increased consciousness of the contradiction between the interests of the colonial state and those of the people, particularly amongst certain sections of the peasantry who suffered particularly due to the rise in prices.²

In the short term, this increased politicisation was capitalised upon by elite nationalists through the Home Rule Leagues. Engineered by Tilak and Annie Besant during 1916 and 1917, the Leagues sought to establish indigenous administration within the British Empire as the overall objective of the nationalist movement. In addition, the Leagues operated through a network of small-scale political organisations, utilising and growing out of specific local contexts.³

In the establishment of this network, the Leagues concretised a structural model that Tilak had been pursuing on a regional level since the 1890s. The model allowed for the extension of elite-led nationalist politics onto district and local levels.⁴ As such the

¹ See S. Sarkar, *Modern India*, pp. 168-78 for a good summary of these economic changes.

² Many better off peasants producing for the market were affected by strong differentials in price between imports and agricultural exports; poorer peasants and landless labourers were affected by price rises of coarse foodgrains; see Sarkar, *Modern India*, p. 170-1.

³ See H.F. Owen, "Towards Nationwide Agitation and Organisation: The Home Rule Leagues, 1915-1918" (in D.A. Low [ed.], *Soundings in Modern South Asian History*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1968, pp. 159-195), esp. p. 183: "For the first time, a network of local political committees covered much of British India."

⁴ Although the Leagues still drew their support mostly from middle class elements on these levels; Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, who joined Annie Besant's League in 1916, states that "The Home Rule Leagues were attracting not only all the old Extremists who had been kept

Leagues played a crucial role in the preparation of the ground for the restructuring of the Congress framework after the Nagpur session of 1920. This restructuring provided the framework for mass participation campaigns under Gandhi. An intimation of the League's role here is provided by the extensive use of League machinery during the Rowlatt *Satyagraha* in 1919. In Western India particularly, League channels were used to disseminate propaganda and guidelines for the implementation of *satyagraha*.⁵ In terms of the development of counter-hegemonic strategy, the Home Rule League structure contributed greatly to the construction of the nationalist constituency on an all-India level. For the first time, the movement could point to an organisational network which actively increased the legitimacy of its claims to represent the people.

The issues raised by the operation of the Leagues - representation and Home Rule - are particularly significant in the light of the Montagu-Chelmsford reform package, which was produced partly in response to these developments in the national movement. The "Montford" reforms constitute a discernible shift in the strategy of the state from that of 1909. Most significant was the assertion, as part of Montagu's initial declaration in 1917, that reforms could be seen as part of a gradual process of development towards self-rule. This was, of course, always a connotation of benevolent imperialism, but here was an explicit statement of the objective, and of the status of reform in relation to it. In effect, this declaration appeared to indicate the Government's complete acceptance of the strategy of hegemonic nationalism - the moderates' policy of a state-led progression towards *swaraj*.

The implications of the 1917 declaration were again apparently reiterated by the character of the reforms which emerged in the Government of India Act of 1919. Increased representation and executive control were presented as the substance that underpinned the Government's commitment. Provincial electorates were increased to an aggregate of around five and a half million, and Provincial Assemblies became responsible for certain areas of government.⁶ This system, known as dyarchy, ceded control of departments such as Education and Health, whilst retaining critical areas of

out of the Congress since 1907 but large numbers of newcomers from the middle classes. They did not touch the masses." See his *Autobiography* (Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1980), p. 31.

⁵ See Owen, "Towards Nationwide Agitation and Organisation", p. 184.

⁶ On the extension of the franchise, the view of the Chief Commissioner of Central Provinces, B. Robertson, was fairly typical: "It is impossible in existing circumstances to have the electors coming to the polls in their thousands. The basis of the franchise must be fairly wide, but...it (is) out of the question that it should be really broad; what we desire to see is a leavening of intelligence, which will spread to the mass as time goes on." Note by the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces, on Constitutional Reforms 30 October 1918; Central Provinces Secretariat, General Administration Dept, A Progs for February 1919, File No. 7-1 (Bhopal). The Central Provinces electorate emerged in 1920 as a modest 140 000; see P. Robb, *The Government of India and Reform: Policies towards Politics and the Constitution 1916-1921* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976), p. 112.

the administration such as Finance and Law and Order. As Sarkar has pointed out, this meant that real power still eluded indigenous control.⁷ The question remained, then, as to whether the Government was really serious about the commitment to self-rule; certainly the system of dyarchy and the still very limited extension of the franchise suggested that the notion of symbolic representation remained an integral feature of hegemonic rule in India.

One further feature of the Montford reforms which must be taken into account is the extension of the principle of separate electorates.⁸ Not only did the reforms reaffirm the notion of reserved Muslim seats; they went further, by sanctioning non-Brahman reservations in Madras Presidency.⁹ In the same manner as the Gait Circular, this decision had a galvanising effect on the ideology of organised Hinduism, as it focused attention yet again on the question of where to set the limits of Hinduism.

In these various contexts, then, middle class politics emerged in the post-war years as an enormously complex arena. Examining the interplay of contesting ideologies in the public space during this period constitutes the subject matter of this chapter, with the objective of identifying developments in political discourse which were crucial to the emergence of politically viable Hindu nationalism. I will concentrate on two areas: the way in which Hindu identity became entrenched as a feature of political discourse during this period; and before this, the way in which counter-hegemony developed as Indian nationalist strategy, and the profound impact of this pattern of development on established political discourses. The complex developments in these areas provide the context for the organisation and rapid growth of Hindu nationalism as both an ideological and an institutional presence in Indian politics from the nineteen twenties onwards.

⁷ See Sarkar, *Modern India*, pp. 165-8.

⁸ In Central Provinces Robertson put up some resistance to the principle: "In the Central Provinces we are fortunately so circumstanced that the question of communal electorates can hardly be said to arise. The Mahomedans are but a fraction of the population and are widely scattered; it is next to impossible to suggest separate constituencies to meet their case..." op. cit. n.5. He was, however, forced to cede this position, accepting 29 reserved Muslim seats in the Provincial Assembly; See D. Page, *Prelude to Partition: Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-32* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982), pp. 33-4. Page points out the interesting position of Central Provinces, which emerged as the only province where elected members of a majority community were in a position to command a majority in the Legislature. In every other province the government used reservations to disable non-official majorities.

⁹ Again, in Madras governor Willingdon resisted the extension of separate electorates to non-Brahmans. He nevertheless had to agree to reserve 28 out of 65 general seats in the Madras Legislature; see Robb, *The Government of India and Reform*, pp. 112-3.

6.1 Towards a New Discourse of Organisation

It is customary in nationalist hagiography to represent M.K. Gandhi's entry into Indian politics towards the end of the second decade of the twentieth century as the beginning of a new era of radicalism, generated by the singular personality of the Mahatma. It has been demonstrated in this dissertation, however, that radicalism had been an emerging force in the elite-led movement since the 1890s. Gandhi was of course a feature of this emerging force, and when he attended the Gujarat Political Conference at Godhra in November 1917, he signified just how far the colonial discourse of organisation had been undermined by the nationalist challenge. In addition, the style in which he presided over the Conference indicated what was unquestionably a fresh approach, a new framework for political action. A hint of this framework had already been given by Gandhi's intervention in the agricultural Champaran district during 1917. At Godhra, Gandhi now presided over a very different kind of Conference to that which was recognisable within the colonial discourse of organisation.¹⁰

From the outset, he made it clear that this was to be a Conference of and for the peasants of Gujarat. This was part of the wider assertion that the peasantry in general were the key to nationalist success - without peasant support, there would be no *swaraj*. As such, he did not go through established channels (i.e. the Bombay Congress) before arranging the Conference. He simply invited leading nationalists to attend.¹¹ In addition, he declared that as the Conference was for the peasants, all speeches should be in Gujarati. This caused difficulty to several prominent politicians, and Tilak insisted on speaking in Marathi, prompting the Mahatma to counsel the great Lokamanya publicly: "Though he is advanced in years, it would be but proper if he engages a Gujarathi teacher and picks up the language. We belong to the Bombay Presidency and should, therefore, learn both languages in order that we might know what the people feel." He followed this through by observing archly that "Queen Victoria learned Urdu".¹² Lastly, Gandhi tore up the standard resolution declaring

¹⁰ The trajectory of the Godhra Conference would not, for example, have been understood by the architect of the 1909 Lahore Hindu conference, Lal Chand, who, we may recall, had exclaimed: "I, at any rate, am at a loss to understand how resolutions passed at meetings will redress the grievances unless it is intended - whether so addressed in form or not - that these should reach Government and induce it to take measures for redress." Chand, *Self Abnegation in Politics*, p. 109; see Section 5.3.2.

¹¹ Those that did attend were shown no special favours. When Tilak arrived late for the opening session, Gandhi remarked tartly: "I am not responsible for his being late. We demand *swaraj*. If one does not mind arriving late by three quarters of an hour at a conference summoned for the purpose, one should not mind if *swaraj* too comes correspondingly late." "First Speech at Gujarat Political Conference", 3 November 1917; *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (hereafter *CWMG*), Vol. XIV (Government of India, Delhi, 1965), p. 48.

¹² "Second Speech at Gujarat Political Conference", 4 November 1917; see *CWMG* Vol. XIV, p. 69.

loyalty to the crown, reportedly commenting that "their loyalty could be presumed until they declared themselves rebels."¹³ This resolution, of course, was an integral feature of conference practice - a signifier, in a sense, of its status as a conference within the public space.

Here, then, we see an indication of the way in which organisational mores were being shifted in the context of the war and nationalist development. Following the Conference, this new direction was confirmed by the extension of political mobilisation in Kheda district to the point of a no-revenue campaign, in order to press the case for remissions in the context of a poor harvest. The Kheda campaign was articulated by Gandhi as *satyagraha*. It is in this concept that we see the provision of a new framework for political action in the elite-led nationalist movement, and through it, in effect, the development of a new discourse of organisation.

6.1.1 *Satyagraha* as a Framework for Nationalist Strategy

It is clear from Gandhi's comments on the colonial predicament that he perceived the issue of consent as central to India's subjugation: "the English have not taken India," he comments, "we have given it to them". And again, "they are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them."¹⁴ This manufacture of consent at the heart of colonial power was articulated by Gandhi as *maya*, a reference to the notion of the illusory nature of the world, which underpins the monism of *Advaita Vedanta*. The *maya* of colonial power, then, veiled the underlying truth that the state had no power save that which the people chose to allow it.

The truth that constituted the obverse of this colonial *maya* indicates the most seminal reinterpretation in Gandhian thought. This is the idea that Truth, *satya*, is God - it becomes the ultimate divine presence, to which all actions in the world are related. In effect, Gandhi employed a mundane, everyday idea to conceptualise a Vedantic notion of the divine. Truth became the central concept of Gandhian Hinduism - a concept to which all could relate, and according to Gandhi, which everybody possessed, at least in potential.

If colonial power was *maya*, nationalism became politics directed towards the unveiling of *satya*. It had a profound spiritual significance in the quest for truth, becoming almost a religious obligation. The means of fulfilling this obligation was by

¹³ See D. Hardiman, *Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat: Kheda District 1917-1934* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1981), p. 89.

¹⁴ Quoted in B. Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, p. 71.

undertaking *satyagraha*. This term has been understood as non-violent resistance; as truth-force and as soul-force, or simply as the search for truth. This variety of understandings would perhaps not have disappointed Gandhi, as his notion of truth as it existed in the world was always a relative truth: Absolute Truth, of course, being God, and therefore unrealisable without the attainment of *moksha*. Its components are *satya* - truth - and *agraha* - which in Gujarati means insisting on something without becoming obstinate or uncompromising.¹⁵ In itself, then, *satyagraha* expresses both an insistence on truth and a search for truth, with the implicit understanding that this search could entail a movement of one's original position to accommodate a newly revealed truth.

As well as acknowledging this philosophical meaning of *satyagraha*, it is important to maintain a view on the context in which it was developed as a political strategy. Gandhi first employed it in South Africa, where it conspicuously failed until it was backed up by the indentured labourers' strike of 1913.¹⁶ After his return to India in 1915, Gandhi used the strategy selectively in a few local disputes, including Kheda and Champaran, and progressively built in proven strategies of nationalist counter-hegemony, such as economic, political and institutional boycott and non-payment of taxes. It is in this sense that *satyagraha* provided the framework for the operation of these strategies; it was a framework that rooted the strategies within the parameters of Hindu tradition, and continually directed the objective of resistance back onto the people themselves, as potential *satyagrahis*.

There is, then, a confluence of strategic and spiritual objectives implicit in the notion of *satyagraha*, which in some sense is contradictory. An indication of this is given by a speech delivered in Madras in March 1919, during the Rowlatt *Satyagraha*. Gandhi refers to the mass implications of counter-hegemony, stating that "this movement is undoubtedly designed to prove to the Government that its authority is finally dependent upon the will of the people and not upon force of arms, especially when that will is expressed in terms of *satyagraha*."¹⁷ The final point here illustrates a crucial qualification to Gandhi's approach, in that it was the quality of *satyagraha*, rather than the actual mobilisation of the people, which constitutes the "people's will". He continues:

¹⁵ Parekh, *Gandhi's Political Philosophy: A Critical Evaluation* (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989), p. 143.

¹⁶ Parekh, *Gandhi's Political Philosophy*, p. 152-3

¹⁷ "Speech at Madras", 20 March 1919; CWMG Vol. XV (Government of India, Delhi, 1965), p. 142.

It is not numbers so much as quality that we want. Let me, therefore, note down the qualities required of a satyagrahi. He must follow truth at any cost and in all circumstances. He must make a continuous effort to love his opponents. He must be prepared to go through every form of suffering, whether imposed on him by the Government he is civilly resisting for the time being, or by those who may differ from him. This movement is thus a process of purification and penance.¹⁸

There was, then, a very strong pedagogic element in the agenda of mobilisation. "The people" needed to be taught how to be political, in a similar manner to their need to be taught how to protect cows during the 1893-4 movement.¹⁹ Gandhi's call for nationalist identification with the peasant was contingent upon the peasant's identification with a middle class sense of morality.

The key principles of *satya* and *ahimsa* lie at the heart of this morality. "Satyagraha," Gandhi stated in 1919, "is like a banyan tree with innumerable branches. Civil disobedience is one such branch, satya and ahimsa together make the parent trunk from which all innumerable branches shoot out."²⁰ In formulating and testing what he referred to as the science of *ahimsa*, Gandhi characteristically invoked Hindu tradition whilst simultaneously transforming it within the logic of his political philosophy. Loosely translated as non-violence, the concept of *ahimsa* can be located in both Buddhist and Jain as well as Hindu tradition. In the latter, it is a concept associated with the relationship between *Brahman* and *Atman*, and the idea that the cosmos has a holistic existence. At the highest level, all creation is divine, and therefore may be perceived as one. Because of this, there is an implicit tendency within Hinduism to propagate the notion of respect, if not goodwill, towards all living beings. Two central facets of modern Hinduism, vegetarianism and veneration of the cow, can be seen as directly related to this notion.²¹

This is not to say that killing or harming in itself is not evident in the Hindu tradition; a distinction is made between justified killing, required to maintain *dharma*, and unjustified or malicious killing - violence or *himsa*. This aspect is particularly elaborated in the epic and *puranic* tradition that informs *bhaktiyoga*.²² Here, the notion

18 ibid.

19 See Section 4.3.1 for middle class interpretations of cow protection during the 1893-4 movement.

20 "Press Statement on the Suspension of Civil Disobedience", 18 April 1919; CWMG Vol. XV, p. 244.

21 For a full treatment of the status of *ahimsa* in Indian tradition, see U. Tahtinene, *Ahimsa: Non-violence in Indian Tradition* (Rider, London, 1976); for an overview, see Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, pp. 108-12.

22 i.e. the devotional approach to the divine which underpinned Gandhi's own religiosity, and which is particularly influential in modern Hinduism. On the emergence of *bhakti* see Klostermaier, *A Survey of Hinduism*, pp. 210-225; also A. Embree [ed.], *Sources of Indian Tradition Vol. I* (Columbia University Press, 1988 - Second Edition), esp. Part III, "The Hindu Way of Life", pp. 201-378.

of *ahimsa* is both diffused and concentrated. Diffused in the sense that it underpins a general attitude of respect for other beings, and concentrated in the sense that in terms of actual practice it is related to a withdrawal from the world, a theological methodology in the approach to *Brahman* - the preserve, as it were, of *pandits* and *sannyasis*.

Gandhi's project was to reverse this practical association between *ahimsa* and withdrawal from the world. He infused the concept with worldly emotions, relating it particularly to compassion and to love. It was, he said, a duty not only to assist those who had been harmed, but also to prevent that harm being done in the first place. "Non-violence," he stated, "is not a cloistered virtue to be practised by the individual for his peace and final salvation, but a rule of conduct for society if it is to live consistently with human dignity."²³ By invoking society, Gandhi opened up what was now the "duty" of *ahimsa* to all Hindus: "the religion of non-violence is not meant merely for the *rishis* and saints. It is meant for the common people as well."²⁴ *Ahimsa*, then, was projected as a defining religious principle, a way of being religious, for "the common people", and it was through the adoption of this religious principle that India would be liberated.

This, needless to say, was an immensely ambitious vision of political development. Its trajectory is indicated by the link to morality, which situates *ahimsa* and *satyagraha* as pathways to moral regeneration, the purification of the soul of the nation (*atmashuddhi*). Here, Gandhi drew on entrenched notions of degeneracy as the defining feature of contemporary Hindu society, which have been linked in Chapter 3 to the colonial discourse of organisation.²⁵ As we have seen, it was this idea, in conjunction with the notion of the Golden Age, which underpinned a variety of middle class approaches to Hindu tradition.

In this context, Gandhi's philosophy may be perceived as an attempt to reproduce the concerns of middle class Hindus about their traditions on the dynamic level of popular practice. The means of effecting regeneration was through politics, because politics was an essential feature of *dharma* for all Hindus in the *Kaliyuga*: "No Indian who aspires to follow the way of true religion," he says, "can afford to remain aloof from politics". And again, "in the circumstances that obtain today, in following the path of

²³ Quoted in Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, p. 114.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Parekh emphasises Gandhi's interpretation of degeneration as a result of the failure to develop a *Yugadharma* appropriate to contemporary society; the process of *atmashuddhi* was aimed at developing this *Yugadharma*; see Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, p.15-16 and chapter 3, "Gandhi and Yugadharma", pp. 71-106.

religion they [the peasantry] must take into account the political conditions."²⁶ Politics, then, was for Gandhi a means of mediating the objective of moral regeneration. At the same time, there is no doubt that the religious connotations of *satyagraha* and *ahimsa* were perceived by many nationalists as mediating nationalist objectives in a popular context.²⁷ From both angles mediation was the central issue. How to effect mass mobilisation, mass regeneration, whilst maintaining the essentially middle class nature of the leading ideologies. The organisation of the movement was again the critical factor.

6.1.2 Mediating *Satyagraha*: Nationalist Organisation and the Volunteer Concept

The meshing of *ahimsa* with mass mobilisation implied, as I have said, an enormously ambitious project, characterised by Gandhi as *atmashuddhi*, the purification of the nation's soul. This was presented as a process of self-assertion which would lead to independence not only from colonial control, but from all the oppressive, immoral, *adharmic* aspects of society. The institution, as Gandhi would have it, of a new *Yugadharma*. It is clear from the development of *satyagraha* as a strategy in India that this process was to be mediated by a kind of vanguard, which would demonstrate, organise and lead the people in the process of *atmashuddhi*. The way in which this vanguard notion developed, from the localised *satyagraha* campaigns of 1917-18 to the termination of non-cooperation in 1922, is a fascinating indication of rapid shifts in the character of the movement and its counter-hegemonic strategy. Most importantly, by 1922 the idea of volunteers - variously perceived as workers and organisers, and increasingly, *provocateurs*, restrainers and controllers - had become entrenched as a basic unit in the nationalist conception of how to articulate politics.

Enthusiasts in the nationalist cause had of course always been a feature of the movement. From the rural campaigning of the Sarvajanik Sabha onwards, and particularly during the anti-Partition movement, nationalism had been driven by committed groups of volunteers.²⁸ In addition, this had been an integral feature of socio-religious reform organisations since at least the 1870s. What emerged in the immediate post-war years was, however, a somewhat different notion; a notion, as I will illustrate, which was central to the trajectory of Indian nationalism.

²⁶ Both quotations from Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, p.92.

²⁷ See, for example, Nehru's comment about Gandhi's emergence as a political leader: "He did not descend from the top; he seemed to emerge from the millions of India, speaking their language and incessantly drawing attention to them and their appalling conditions." J. Nehru, *Discovery of India* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989 Centenary Edition), p.358.

²⁸ For a thorough account of the involvement of volunteers in the anti-Partition movement, see S. Sarkar, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-1908* (Peoples' Publishing House, New Delhi, 1973), pp. 336-360.

In issuing instructions to volunteers during the Kheda *Satyagraha* in 1918, Gandhi stated that:

The volunteers must remember that this is a holy war. We embarked upon it because, had we not, we would have failed in our dharma. And so all the rules which are essential for living a religious life must be observed here too.²⁹

Gandhi's volunteers - in this case the workers entrusted with the task of facilitating a peasant withholding of land revenue - were to present themselves as archetypal *satyagrahis*. They were to observe "all the rules" of a "religious life", and in so doing they would inspire the peasants to do the same. The volunteers, then, had a critical role in the mediation of the idea of *satyagraha* in its full religious sense, because it was principally through their demeanour that this meaning of *satyagraha* would be transmitted to the people. In addition, *satyagraha* could be taught in the direct pedagogic sense noted above, and it was the volunteers who were also the source of this teaching. But it was the behaviour of the volunteers that was crucial. Gandhi issued the statement quoted here as part of a fifteen point set of instructions, of which nine dealt explicitly with the issue of behaviour.³⁰ The most striking was that related to rudeness:

Rudeness has no place in *satyagraha*. Perfect courtesy must be shown even to those who may look upon as their enemies (*sic*) and the villagers must be taught to do the same. Rudeness may harm our cause and the struggle may be unduly prolonged. The volunteers should give the most serious attention to this matter and think out in their minds as many examples as possible of the advantages accruing from courtesy and the disadvantages resulting from rudeness and explain them to the people.

The incitement to withhold land revenue, then, was to be accompanied by a very middle class sense of propriety. It was important not to alienate authority through any overt demonstration of subalternity, which may have led to the marginalisation of the movement. As well as the religious significance of *satyagraha*, therefore, the volunteers were required to teach the peasants some manners.

This point was reiterated in the instructions to volunteers issued at the beginning of the Rowlatt *Satyagraha* some eleven months later. To become a *satyagrahi* an individual had to sign the *Satyagraha* Pledge to resist the oppressive Rowlatt legislation. Volunteers were assigned the task of explaining the significance of the Pledge to every potential signatory, and weeding out unsatisfactory or unprepared candidates. Part of the Pledge was in the form of a vow. The volunteers' instructions state that: "Here the signatory affirms that he will refuse civilly to disobey certain laws. Volunteers must

²⁹ "Instructions to Volunteers," 17 April 1918; *CWMG*, vol. XIV, p. 350.

³⁰ *ibid*; points 1-9 deal with behaviour.

explain to the signatory the full significance of the word "civilly". For instance, to break moral laws is not civil disobedience. Nor is it civil disobedience to be discourteous to officials with whom one may have to deal, while disobeying laws."³¹ The meaning of civil disobedience, then, is made twofold. First, it is civil because it implies the withdrawal of co-operation with the state and its various institutions. In addition, however, it is civil in a behavioural sense - the opposite, in fact, of "uncivil" disobedience. This approach may be seen as part of Gandhi's particular notion of *ahimsa*. *Satyagraha* relied for its success on the complete absence of *himsa*, and *himsa* included "insulting, demeaning or humiliating others, diminishing their self-respect, speaking harsh judgements, anger and mental cruelty."³² This was to develop, as the power and popularity of *satyagraha* developed during the Non-cooperation Movement, into a frequently elaborated theory of the difference between social (especially caste-based) boycott as *himsa*, and political boycott as *ahimsa*.³³ The invocation of civility as a feature of *ahimsa*, however, was a more problematic nuance. Apart from anything else, the need for it appeared to contradict the established nationalist image of the peasantry as a diffident mass, oppressed to the point of mute acceptance of authority. As elite nationalism progressed towards its objective of mass mobilisation, this image was increasingly undermined by the eager self-assertion of subaltern groups.

Gandhi was to become increasingly aware of this self-assertion, and its incompatibility with the kind of self-assertion he was trying to propagate through the dignified discipline of *satyagraha*. A speech at Idgah, Karachi, in July 1920, shortly before the launch of non-cooperation, began with a stern reproach:

Before coming to the reasons for my visit to Karachi, I wish to refer to the scene at the railway station. We were to arrive this morning, but owing to an unfortunate railway accident and subsequent blocking of the line, we did not arrive until 9pm. The Karachi City station was overcrowded; many were in the sheds and many were whistling. What impression did I get from this? I realised your affection for me, but affection does not mean obstructing the platform and preventing me, the one you love, getting out. This is the result of lack of education and knowledge. What is the use of volunteers if they are unable to control crowds and do not obey their officers? Work cannot proceed under these circumstances.³⁴

Gandhi referred to this kind of unruly behaviour as "mobocracy", and was concerned that it would jeopardise the success of non-cooperation, as well as the general principle

³¹ "Instructions to Volunteers" February 26 1919; *CWMG*, Vol. XV p.119.

³² Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, p. 117.

³³ See R. Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize" (in P. Chatterjee and G. Pandey [eds.], *Subaltern Studies VII*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993, pp. 69-120), pp. 92-95.

³⁴ "Speech at Idgah", 22 July 1920; *CWMG* Vol. XVIII (Government of India, Delhi, 1965), p. 80. For similar examples see Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", pp. 105-7.

of *satyagraha*.³⁵ As a result, volunteers began to assume a new role. What is the use of volunteers, Gandhi asked at Idgah, if they could not control crowds?

Here, the volunteer is projected with a very different function to that of the archetypal *satyagrahi*. They are useful because they can control crowds; they can, in other words, mediate the more unfortunate ramifications of a strategy based on mass mobilisation. As Gandhi himself described them in 1920, they should be "people's policemen".³⁶ As this role became more significant, the importance of volunteers' discipline was enhanced:

Much greater discipline, method and knowledge must be exacted from volunteers, and no chance comer should be accepted as a full-fledged volunteer. He only hinders rather than helping. Imagine the consequence of the introduction of one untrained soldier finding his way into an army of war. He can disorganise it in a second.³⁷

The images of organisation and disorganisation refer us strikingly back to comments made in Chapter 3 about the relative projections of the state and society in colonial India. Volunteers had to be organised, and their role was to transmit this organisation to the "mob". As the Non-cooperation Movement progressed, it became clear that Gandhi remained dissatisfied with volunteers' ability to keep the movement on course. Nationalist agitations became increasingly marred by violence, culminating in the death of twenty-two police constables at Chauri Chaura in February 1922.

This act of violence caused Gandhi to suspend the Non-cooperation Movement. The Congress Working Committee resolutions confirming the stoppage began by condemning the "inhuman conduct of the mob at Chauri Chaura." Resolution 8 dealt specifically with the failings of volunteers:

Complaints have been brought to the notice of the Working Committee that in the formation of Volunteer Corps great laxity prevails in the selection and that insistence is not laid on the full use of hand-spun and hand-woven khaddar, and on full observance by Hindus of the rule as to the removal of untouchability, nor is care being taken to ensure that the candidates believe fully in the observance of non-violence in intent, word and deed, in terms of the Congress resolution, the Working Committee call upon all Congress organisations to revise their lists and remove from them the names of all such volunteers as do not strictly conform to the requirements of the pledge.³⁸

35 See, for example, his article in *Young India* 8 September 1920, entitled "Democracy vs. Mobocracy"; *CWMG* XVIII, pp. 240-244. See also Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", pp. 107-14.

36 "Democracy vs. Mobocracy", *CWMG* XVIII p.240; he uses the phrase when complaining that "volunteers often become demonstrators instead of remaining people's policemen."

37 *CWMG* XVIII, p. 242.

38 "Working Committee Resolutions at Bardoli", 12 February 1922; *CWMG* XXII (Government of India, Delhi, 1966), p. 377-8

The suggestion, then, was almost of a purge of the Volunteer Corps, in order to ensure that similar acts of violence were avoided. Interestingly, however, volunteers were not to be expelled because of lack of discipline or failure to control crowds, but rather because of failures in their observance of non-violence or of other aspects of their role as ideal *satyagrahis*. This is consonant with the original Gandhian position that *satyagraha* was essentially directed at moral regeneration. Subaltern violence and the failure of volunteers to control it, therefore, was really a reflection of a breakdown of the process of *atmashuddhi*, as propagated by Gandhi himself and his ideal *satyagrahis*.³⁹ A few days after the Bardoli Resolutions, Gandhi was quoted in a newspaper as commenting: "the incident at Chauri Chaura would have been impossible if the Congress and the Khilafat organisations were perfect. It is all a question of perfecting the Congress organisation."⁴⁰ Perfecting the organisation meant perfecting the conduct of volunteers. As the interface between the elite leadership and the mass of non-cooperators, the volunteers now formed the most vital element in the implementation of nationalist strategy.

The importance of their position is illustrated by the very different view of volunteers adopted by Government at this time. Judith Brown records the perception of volunteers first and foremost as an intimidatory force, "undisciplined mobs of rowdies who could be called out to enforce non-cooperation but over whom the real political leaders had virtually no control."⁴¹ She goes on to quote the Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal as noting in 1921 that volunteers "are now distinctly of a lower class than at first, and are backed by the riffraff of the town, recruited on a payment of a daily wage to do whatever work is demanded of them."⁴² Perhaps not surprisingly, the Government's perceptions of nationalist volunteers were replete with images of disorder and disorganisation - the opposite, as it were, of the state's own image of order and organisation.

At the same time, these are precisely the images that Gandhi feared most: "undisciplined mobs" over whom nationalist leaders had "virtually no control"; "riffraff" who joined the nationalist cause not because of any desire to bring about independence or to purify the soul of the nation, but rather in return for "payment of a daily wage". Every report

39 Guha notes that on those occasions when violence did break out during the Non-cooperation Movement, "politics as a collective secular activity was made to yield to spiritualised politics in its ultimate monadic form as the Mahatma, atoning for the violence of the masses, subjected himself to the ritual of a punishing and purifying fast." "Discipline and Mobilize", p. 118.

40 *Bombay Chronicle* 18 February 1922; CWMG XXII p. 407.

41 J. Brown, *Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974), p. 316.

42 Quoted in *ibid.*

of intimidation, every act of violence in which volunteers were implicated, brought the fear of this second scenario closer for the nationalist leadership. Having conceived of volunteers as a means of shepherding mass nationalism into the ambit of elite nationalist hegemony, the leadership could not divorce itself from the fear that they would in the end constitute an unruly and uncontrollable intrusion of subalternity into the discrete world of middle class politics. As Ranajit Guha has pointed out, this fear is indicative of the failure of the Gandhian leadership to "assimilate the class interests of peasants and workers effectively into a bourgeois hegemony."⁴³ The language of this failure is that of organisation: it is a failure to "control" and "discipline" subalternity in the interests of the middle class leadership.

The position of the volunteers in the national movement remained fraught with problems. The leadership was unable to decide whether it had created a people's police force, disciplining and containing the presence of subaltern elements, or a band of ideal *satyagrahis*, sent out to inspire the people with the example of their soul force. Even for Gandhi, the integration of these roles was problematic; for other nationalists it was compounded by confusion over the Mahatma's notion of *ahimsa*. Nehru illustrates this when commenting on resistance at the Cocanada Congress of 1923, to the setting up of the Congress volunteer organisation, the Hindustani Seva Dal: "We were surprised", he says, "to find out later how much opposition there was to the Seva Dal among leading Congressmen. ...At the back of the mind of some was the notion that the idea of having trained and drilled volunteers was somehow inconsistent with the Congress principle of non-violence."⁴⁴ This indecision was a crucial dislocation in the development of both a nationalist counter-hegemony, and the organisation to fulfil this strategy. In the mid-twenties, the new, dynamic nationalist strategy began to acquire a formulaic quality, divorced from its specific objectives. This quality allowed it to be appropriated in a variety of contexts, as a means of political expression; in short, it became a central feature in the development of a new discourse of organisation.

6.1.3 Institutionalising Nationalist Strategy as Political Expression

Throughout this thesis it has been illustrated how nationalist strategy developed in dynamic relation to a state-engendered political discourse. It has also been shown how other political ideologies (i.e. non-Indian nationalist ideologies) - such as, for example, some forms of low caste assertion, and of course the nascent ideology of Hindu nationalism - have been affected by this relationship; how, in fact, the nationalist-colonialist nexus set the parameters for the possibilities of political expression in the

⁴³ See Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", p. 102.

⁴⁴ J. Nehru, *Autobiography* (Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, 1980), p. 121.

public space.⁴⁵ The nationalist strategy of counter-hegemony, developed gradually through the 1890s and the first two decades of the twentieth century, was the driving force behind the dynamism of this relationship. The state was forced time and again to shift its strategy in order to combat more effectively the potential of nationalist counter hegemony. The Non-cooperation Movement may be seen as the culmination of this dynamic relationship as the overwhelmingly dominant force in Indian politics. After 1922, a whole host of ideologies and organisations began to impinge on the arena of politics in the public space. Indian nationalists could no longer speak for "the people" in the same way. Other forces were able to claim a legitimate representative position in the public space.⁴⁶ As I have suggested in the previous section, this shift may be attributed to the inability of the middle class leadership of the Congress to follow the logic of its strategy and accommodate all the conflicting interests of those to whom it appealed for support; to become, in Guha's words, a "supra-class representative of the nation."⁴⁷ The failure of the Congress to assume this position is indicated by the increasing importance of discipline as a feature of mass mobilisation. Again referring to Guha, this represents an attempt to settle for "dominance without hegemony."⁴⁸

This is not to say, however, that the strategy of counter-hegemony as employed by the Gandhian Congress was not significant, nor that it did not have a lasting impact on the structure of Indian politics. This is particularly so in relation to the discourse of organisation - the way of "being political", in colonial India. In this section I will argue that key elements of the strategy as developed by Gandhi - *satyagraha* and the use of volunteer corps - became institutionalised as central features in a new discourse of organisation, liberated from the nationalist-colonialist nexus. Despite its distaste for both volunteers and the idea of *satyagraha*, the state was forced to accommodate them as recognisable, legitimate features of a new political landscape.

In the aftermath of the Non-cooperation Movement several sustained *satyagraha* campaigns were launched. An example is provided by the National Flag *Satyagraha* in Nagpur.⁴⁹ This action developed out of a comparatively minor incident, when a

⁴⁵ This of course does not deny the existence of political expression outside the public space; but this kind of expression was not legitimised, was not accepted as political expression, in the eyes of the state.

⁴⁶ See Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", pp. 99 - 103 for an indication of how the claim of the Congress "to speak for all was being contested more and more vigorously on both the major axes - that is, the communal and class axes - of Indian politics."

⁴⁷ Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", p. 97. One reason for this failure was the inability evident in this thesis of the middle class to speak with one voice - to have one overriding ideological position in relation to the nation and the state.

⁴⁸ Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", p. 103.

⁴⁹ Other examples include the *satyagraha* campaigns of Guru-ka-Bagh, Jaito, Tarakeshwar, Borsad, Vaikom - all launched 1922-3; see Sarkar, *Modern India*, p. 228-9.

procession carrying the Congress flag to mark the end of National Week in April 1923 was refused entry beyond the Civil Lines, ostensibly out of respect for the national sensibilities of the British residents of Nagpur.⁵⁰ The stand-off developed into a formal *satyagraha* campaign from May 1 onwards, with *satyagrahis* courting arrest by attempting to carry the flag into the Civil Lines area. Although the agenda of the campaign was obviously nationalist, it is clear that it was a local mobilisation which only latterly received Congress support. The *Pranavir*, a Hindi bi-weekly published in Nagpur which supported the *satyagraha* throughout, called on nationalist figures to support the campaign some two weeks after it was launched:

The leaders should come forward and offer themselves for arrest as soon as their organising work is finished with a view to meeting the objection of the detractors of the movement that the leaders are keeping themselves in the background while sending small boys and common people to the front. (The *Pranavir*) deplores the attitude of the Maharashtrian (*sic*) leaders who...refused to give any active help to the movement...⁵¹

Wider support did eventually emerge, with the Gujarat Provincial Congress sending substantial numbers of volunteers.⁵² In August, Vallabhbhai Patel negotiated a somewhat muted settlement, whereby a limited flag procession was allowed to pass through the Civil Lines along a prescribed route with a heavy police escort.⁵³

The significance of the Flag *Satyagraha* in our context is not so much its success or failure, but rather the way in which it arose, and the fact that it was sustained amid considerable opposition. Immediately prior to the launch of the campaign, in March 1923, a similar incident at Jubbulpur had set in motion a half-hearted *satyagraha* which was scuttled by the opposition of the All-India Congress Committee.⁵⁴ The Nagpur campaign was launched despite negative comment in much of the local press,⁵⁵ and the lacklustre backing of the national Congress. My point is that it was nevertheless launched and sustained because *satyagraha* had, in the wake of no-cooperation, become an accepted form of political expression in localised contexts. The Nagpur nationalists chose this form of expression as appropriate to their needs, where twenty or even ten

⁵⁰ For a full account, see *Pranavir* 15 April 1923; Reports on Indian Newspapers Published in the Central Provinces and Berar (hereafter RIN CP&B), No. 16 of 1923.

⁵¹ *Pranavir*, 13 May 1923; see RIN CP&B No. 20 of 1923.

⁵² Many of whom were arrested before they reached Nagpur - see *Tarun Maharashtra* 14 July 1923; RIN CP&B No. 29 of 1923.

⁵³ The *Maharashtra*, the newspaper with the widest circulation in Central Provinces, called it "abject surrender on the part of the satyagrahis." 29 August 1923; RIN CP&B No. 35 of 1923.

⁵⁴ See *Maharashtra* 28 March 1923; RIN CP&B No. 13 of 1923.

⁵⁵ See, for example, editorials in the *Karmavir*, the *Lokmitra* and the *Prajapuksha*; RIN CP&B No. 22 of 1923.

years previously they may have opted for a meeting of "representatives of the people of Nagpur" and a petition to the local government.⁵⁶

The Flag *Satyagraha* illustrates the way in which the Gandhian strategy had been adapted and extended in the context of localised nationalist politics. There is however a further, less formal way in which the strategy interceded in forms of politics during this period. Another incident in Nagpur in 1923 illustrates this point. In the run up to the Ganapati festival in September tension mounted in Nagpur over the proposed route of the immersion procession. This route was to take the processionists past a newly constructed gate to the Masjid in the Ganesh Peth locality. Representatives of the Masjid applied to the District Magistrate to prevent the procession passing the gate, and in the context of rising tension the Magistrate granted an injunction.⁵⁷

Although initially the injunction was complied with, tension continued, and in October Hindus began taking processions out in defiance of the injunction. This defiance was expressed in Gandhian terms. The *Khobar*, a recently-launched Marathi daily published in Nagpur, stated that "this is perhaps the fittest occasion for the Hindus to have their long standing right of taking (out) religious processions established by means of satyagraha." Similarly, the established Nagpur Marathi weekly the *Maharashtra* suggested that "it is a noble endeavour of the Hindus to awaken a feeling of broadmindedness in their Muslim brethren by self-suffering and courting prison."⁵⁸ K.B. Hedgewar's biographers take up the story:

In October the Bhajan groups had to pass through the same route. Muslims objected to this also. But ignoring their protests, the Bhajan groups went through the same route for two or three days. But later on the police sided with the Muslims and started obstructing the Bhajan processions. Dr. Hedgewar and other Hindu leaders went from house to house and mobilised a large number of people to join the Bhajan. On 8th November, 41 prominent leaders including Dr. Hedgewar, Dr. Paranjpe, Dr. Cholkar and others took part in the Satyagraha. Thousands of people gathered. On 11 December, Raja Lakshmanrao Bhonsle also joined the movement. Over forty thousand people had congregated to witness this rare sight of Hindu resurgence.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ In addition, it should be noted that because of the nationalist boycott of Legislative Assemblies, the channels for middle class nationalist complaint were further limited in the early twenties.

⁵⁷ See W. Anderson and S.D. Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism* (Vistaar, New Delhi, 1987), p.32; B.V. Deshpande and S.R. Ramaswamy (edited by H.V. Seshadri), *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker* (Sahitya Sindhu, Bangalore, 1981), p. 69-70.

⁵⁸ *Khobar, Maharashtra* 31 October 1923; RIN CP&B No. 44 of 1923.

⁵⁹ Deshpande and Ramaswamy, *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker*, p. 70.

Again the pattern is seen of small groups systematically defying a government order in the name of *satyagraha*, watched by larger groups of interested by-standers.⁶⁰ Throughout November the defiance of the injunction continued, and many middle class people took part. B.S. Moonje noted that "shastris, pandits, doctors, pleaders, merchants, all offered themselves for arrest and were actually arrested...".⁶¹ The *Pranavir* reported that a total of 500 Hindus were arrested during this month.⁶²

The issue of music before mosques, of course, is one of the most persistent themes of communal tension during the twenties, and I will return to this particular example in Section 6.2.3.⁶³ What is to be noted here is the references to the Gandhian strategy, with its attendant implication of the presence of a body of volunteers ready to go to prison in support of the cause. Although obviously not formalised by applications for recognition from the Congress machinery, the strategy and the language of *satyagraha* was again used in a local context as a recognised form of political expression. The two simple prerequisites were a body of willing volunteers and a law or ordinance to break.

Here, a similarity emerges between the Flag *Satyagraha* and the Ganesh Peth incident, which illustrates the adaptation of the Gandhian strategy as an independent means of political expression. Gandhi's campaigns up to this point had all been meticulously preplanned as a means of countering an identified injustice perpetrated by the state - a means, as it were, of advancing the cause of truth. Both the "campaigns" discussed here, however, were designed to defy measures taken by authority specifically to control the original campaigners. The Flag *Satyagraha* was instigated in response to a local injunction preventing the carrying of the flag through certain areas in the first place. Similarly, *satyagraha* at Ganesh Peth was invoked in response to a District Magistrate order preventing a procession passing the Masjid. It is the potential *satyagrahis* who set the agenda in both cases - creating the situation by pushing at the limits of the law in a general sense, then courting arrest over a "law" created specifically to control this push. The Nagpur activists had taken advantage of a subtle change in the position of the law in relation to the public space; a change that occurred as a result of the institution of Gandhian *satyagraha* as mainstream nationalist strategy. For the first time, breaking the law was a legitimate way of being political. As an act of politics, in other words, it had a recognisable position within the public space. By invoking *satyagraha*, activists were now able simultaneously to assert new "rights" whilst remaining within the public space. This was a critical slippage of state control, but -

⁶⁰ The *Mahratta*, 18 November 1923, stated that 20,000 were involved in one procession; see Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 32.

⁶¹ See Baker, *Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province*, p. 100.

⁶² *Pranavir* 2 December 1923; RIN CP&B No. 49 of 1923.

⁶³ For other examples, see G. Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, pp. 89-101.

equally critical - it was not a slip in favour of nationalist counter-hegemony, but rather of any form of politics that engaged with the public space.

Satyagraha in this sense assumes a new, legitimising quality. The *Hitavada*, an English weekly published in Nagpur which had consistently opposed the Flag *Satyagraha*, asks in May: "Supposing the honour of the flag is vindicated, what then? Will India be any nearer the goal of *swaraj*?"⁶⁴ The *Pranavir* answers, acknowledging the apparent meaningless of the Flag *Satyagraha* ("such a step does not advance the cause of the country even by an inch"), but nevertheless supports it because "the arrest of innocent men produces a great effect on the minds of other people who begin to look upon the Government with contempt."⁶⁵ Despite the fact that the whole nature of the campaign was to court arrest by breaking the law, "innocence" was guaranteed by the association with *satyagraha*. It is because of this association that the flag ordinance becomes a symbol of colonial injustice, and a reason for holding the Government in contempt.

Of course, Gandhi's own practice of *satyagraha* had a symbolic value. In a sense, all acts of *satyagraha* against the state were symbolic. But the examples from Nagpur show a development of this function, because their meaning is assigned not by their opposition to extant oppression, but rather by their own agency. *Satyagraha* here becomes less a search for truth, and more a formulaic strategy for the practice of politics. In effect, it becomes the key element in the development of a new discourse of organisation, a discourse which was critically decentred, in the sense that it was no longer focused on the nationalist-colonialist nexus of political expression. The implications of this in terms of the organisation of Hindu nationalism will be examined in the next chapter. Prior to this it is necessary to examine a further development of political discourse during this period.

6.2 Situating "Others": Hindu Identity and Communal Consciousness in the Early Twenties

An unprecedented feature of the Non-cooperation Movement had been the Congress alliance with the All-India Khilafat Committee (AIKC), and the consequent incorporation of its objectives into the movement. Indeed, it was from the AIKC that the call for non-cooperation first came, at the Delhi *Khilafat* Conference in November 1919. *Khilafat* was, of course, an issue primarily of Muslim concern; it should not be overlooked, however, that it also had a strong element of anti-European solidarity, in

⁶⁴ *Hitavada* 9 May 1923; RIN CP&B No. 19 of 1923.

⁶⁵ *Pranavir* 23 May, 28 June 1923; RIN CP&B Nos. 21 & 27 of 1923.

that it opposed the Allied destruction of the Turkish Empire in the wake of the First World War. As a Congress Enquiry later commented:

In 1920 and 1921 the Congress Committees were full of Musalmans and Hindu Chairmen and Secretaries of Khilafat Committees could be counted by the score. The Hindus began to realise how closely was the problem of the Middle East linked with the fate of India. ...It was a glorious time in the history of Indian nationalism.⁶⁶

The Turkish Sultan had a disputed claim to the *khilafate* - the position of spiritual protector of Islam - and the post-war settlement effectively removed his ability to fulfil this role. There are two senses in which the adoption of this issue extended the parameters of nationalist politics in India. First, it was an international issue, where the national movement had previously been steadfastly internal. Secondly, of course, it was an issue self-consciously related to religious faith, when again the concerns of the national movement had previously been operationally secular, even when they were presented as religious imperatives. This religious issue, then, lay at the heart of a movement which was articulated by Gandhi as the first national *satyagraha* - i.e. a movement conducted on the basis of the "religion" of *ahimsa*.

Religion, then, was brought right to the foreground of nationalist politics. Not only did it underpin one of the principal objectives of the movement; it also permeated the very structure of that agitation. Significantly, when he suspended the movement in 1922, Gandhi did so precisely because the religion of *ahimsa* had been transgressed. For the AIKC, this caused the collapse of the alliance with Congress and the realignment of *Khilafat* as an exclusively Muslim issue. The *Khilafat* cause was soon completely undermined, when the new Turkish National Assembly first separated the office of Caliph from the government of the Turkish state in November 1922, and then abolished the Caliphate altogether in March 1924.⁶⁷ The leadership vacuum created by the collapse of the AIKC was quickly filled by the Muslim League, who in 1924 held their annual conference separate from Congress for the first time since 1918.

Both during and after this course of events, there was an unprecedented wave of communal rioting across British India.⁶⁸ It is this succession of riots which established violent communalism as a regular, if not systematic, feature of Indian politics. Undoubtedly, a sense of identity was engendered amongst Hindus as a result of this process of communalisation; as it was, of course, amongst Indian Muslims. In

⁶⁶ "Congress Cawnpore Riots Enquiry Committee Report" (1931), reprinted in N.G. Barrier [ed.], *Roots of Communal Politics* (Heinemann, New Delhi, 1976), pp. 218-9.

⁶⁷ See P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972), p. 197.

⁶⁸ See "Congress Cawnpore Riots Enquiry Committee Report", p.228, for a list of major riots, totalling 43, between 1921 and 1931.

this section (6.2) I will examine the nature of this sense of (Hindu) identity. In particular, I will look at the way in which certain "Others" emerged as a feature of Hindu identity,⁶⁹ and their relationship with the ideology of Hindu organisation which was, of course, reacting to and developing in the context of this heightened tension.

6.2.1 "Stigmatising and Emulating Threatening Others"

Christophe Jaffrelot has used two expressions to describe the development of Hindu nationalist ideology. In earlier work he has expressed the development as "strategic syncretism": "syncretic because it has been culled from cultural values of groups perceived as being antagonistic to the Hindu community and strategic because it underlies an ideology that seeks to dominate the 'others' in terms of prestige as well as on a concrete socio-political plane."⁷⁰ In his recent book, however, he has revised his approach, citing ideological development as a strategy of "stigmatisation and emulation": "...a process of cultural reorganisation" which "redefined Hindu nationalist identity in opposition to... 'threatening Others' while - under the pretext of drawing inspiration from a so-called Vedic 'Golden Age' - assimilating those cultural features of the Others which were regarded as prestigious and efficacious in order to regain self-esteem and resist the Others more effectively."⁷¹

The shift in terminology is subtle: Jaffrelot eschews syncretism as a facet of Hindu nationalist ideology because the implication of some kind of cultural synthesis is seen as inappropriate in this blatantly exclusivist context. The agenda of cultural synthesis is rather attributed to movements such as the Brahmo Samaj - in some sense a more "innocent", less threatening accommodation of the Other. Hindu nationalism, however, with its apparent roots in the aggressive exclusivism of the Arya Samaj, is perceived as emulating facets of another culture in order to resist a perceived threat from that culture. There is, in a sense, a double instrumentality in this model. First, certain proponents of the other culture present a threatening image of that culture; second, Hindu elites appropriate aspects of the threatening image in order to rebuff it.

Jaffrelot describes this process as a cycle. In the late nineteenth century there was the cycle of Arya-led stigmatisation and emulation, with the colonial state and the Christian

⁶⁹ Others as a feature of identity in the sense developed by Edward Said in *Orientalism* (Routledge, London, 1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (Chatto & Windus, London, 1993); a "fundamentally static notion of identity" based on the idea that "there is an 'us' and a 'them', each quite settled, clear, unassailably self-evident." This notion of identity is described by Said as "the hallmark of imperialist cultures as well as those cultures trying to resist the encroachments of Europe." See *Culture and Imperialism*, p. xxviii.

⁷⁰ Jaffrelot, "Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building", p.517.

⁷¹ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p.6.

missions constituting the threatening Other. This cycle led to the development of "Arya nationalism", or "proto-Hindu nationalism". A second cycle occurred, Jaffrelot states, in the early twenties, and this led to the development of Hindu nationalism and the idea of *sangathan*. The threatening Other in this case was a particular projection of Muslim culture - as Jaffrelot puts it, "a mobilisation on the part of the Muslims".⁷² This was the *Khilafat* movement. The Muslim mobilisation, he continues, "degenerated in some instances into anti-Hindu riots," an example being the Moplah or Mappila rebellion of 1921. The internal unity displayed by Muslims during this period forms the basis - through emulation - for the ideological development of *sangathan*.

Surprisingly, then, it is "the Muslims" who bear a fair brunt of the responsibility for the emergence of Hindu nationalism in Jaffrelot's model. It is their mobilisation over *Khilafat*, and its degeneration into anti-Hindu riots, which constitute the threatening Other responsible for the cycle of stigmatisation and emulation amongst Hindu elites which produced the *sangathan* movement. This historically truncated conclusion, I would say, illustrates the limitations of the "stigmatise and emulate" model. In the first instance, it cannot accommodate the idea of *Khilafat* as an Indian nationalist concern. As stated above, the collaboration between the All-India *Khilafat* Committee and the Congress is indicative of a composite nationalism and fairly widespread feeling of co-operation during this period which cannot be dismissed.⁷³ Secondly, some scholarly work has illustrated that the anti-Hindu character of the Moplah rebellion was a secondary feature, emerging only in the context of the institution of oppressive martial law, and in many ways attributable to this oppression.⁷⁴ Thirdly and most importantly, Jaffrelot himself has noted that "the cohesion attributed to the Muslim community was grossly exaggerated." The cycle of emulation is therefore related to stereotypes of Islamic unity which had "taken shape between about 1890 and 1910."⁷⁵ This introduces a new, highly ideological element into the cycle: the idea of Hindu nationalist *sangathan* built not so much on the emulation of threatening Islam symbolised by *Khilafat*, as on pre-formulated stereotypes of Muslim cohesion. Later, in relation to RSS *sangathan*, Jaffrelot takes a different line, splitting the process of stigmatisation and emulation between the two over-arching images of the British and the Muslims. "From the Hindu nationalist point of view," he says, "Muslims fulfilled the role of

⁷² Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 19.

⁷³ The classic symbol of this time being Swami Shradhdhanand's address from the pulpit of the Delhi Jama Masjid during the heady days of the Rowlatt *Satyagraha*. See Jordens, *Swami Shradhdhananda*, p. 109.

⁷⁴ See, for example, K.N. Panikkar, "Peasant Revolts in Malabar in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries" (in A.R. Desai, *Peasant Struggles in India*, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1979, pp. 601-630); for a summary see B. Chandra et al, *India's Struggle for Independence*, p. 201-3.

⁷⁵ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 24.

"threatening Others" while the British colonialists represented the Other to be emulated."⁷⁶ In this equation the model is particularly untenable, as it contradicts the fundamental idea that the ideology is built precisely by appropriating what it sees as threatening.

Evidently, then, there are problems. These problems, I would say, derive from the initially limited idea of ideology as a specifically appropriated facet of culture, an idea that recalls the earlier discussion of Jaffrelot's presentation of the relationship between reforming elites and Hindu tradition.⁷⁷ To recap briefly, Hindu tradition is perceived in this relationship as what I have described as a "cultural supermarket" - the reforming elites are presented as turning to it and picking and choosing aspects of that tradition particularly suited to their purpose. It is a model that renders tradition as an undynamic tool in the creation of an ideological perspective - what sociologists might call a "cultural object".⁷⁸ In Chapter 2 I argued that this objectification of culture, and the concomitant idea of instrumentalist manipulation, is too isolated from the complexities of ideological development in the nineteenth century, even in the comparatively limited arena of the colonial public space. This is also the case with the model of stigmatisation and emulation. Jaffrelot overlooks the historical development of the ideology of Hindu nationalism over a more enduring period. By acknowledging the historical independence of ideologies, and their position as a means through which culture is defined (i.e. in terms of Hall's "mental frameworks"), this complex development may be accommodated.

This is a point, of course, which lies at the very heart of this thesis. What it underlines here is the whole problem of "Others". Where did they stand in relation to this ideological development; what was their role in the construction of a pan-Hindu identity; how and why were particular images projected by Hindu elites? I will argue in the following sections that the particular projection of these images - the way in which they were presented as "Others" - was dependent on the growing influence of the ideological stream that has been identified in this thesis as Hindu organisation. It is this ideology, then, which projects particular characteristics onto its Others, rather than the objective existence of these characteristics being picked up and extended by particular groups or individuals bent on the self-interested development of a particular ideology. This may be related precisely to the definition of ideology as constituting "mental frameworks" through which culture, and cultures, are defined.

⁷⁶ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 50.

⁷⁷ See Section 2.4; Jaffrelot's notion of ideology as a facet of culture is developed from Clifford Geertz' work - see Section 2.1.

⁷⁸ On the concept of "cultural objects", see W. Griswold, *Cultures and Societies in a Changing World* (Pine Forge Press, London, 1994), p. 11-12.

6.2.2 Representing The Moplah Rebellion

Examining press comment on the rise of communal tension in various parts of India during the mid-twenties, one particular incident emerges as seminal, a defining symbol of a self-conscious Hindu predicament. This is the Moplah, or Mappila, rebellion of 1921, which occurred in Malabar, far from the focal points of communal tension in the north. The Moplahs were a community of Muslim leaseholders and cultivators with a history of revolt against the oppression of local (Hindu) landlords. In 1921 the Moplahs led a rebellion on a massive scale in Malabar, which was brutally suppressed by the British. In order to gain an idea of the significance of this rebellion, it is not necessary to look at local press comment, because from the point of view of national politics, it was very much an event within the public space. As such it was scrutinised at length by the Central Provinces press, a press which in 1921 was relatively unaffected by communal tension, because of the absence of communal incidents in the Provinces. I will argue that the reason for the prominence of Moplah even in this press environment was its association with the idea of conversion (I am deliberately omitting the prefix of "forced" which is so closely linked to Moplah) - an idea which is immediately associated with key themes of Hindu organisation.

The Moplah rebellion of 1921 has been presented in a variety of forms.⁷⁹ Not surprisingly, the British administration in Malabar cast it as the work of a handful of Muslim "fanatics", whipped into a frenzy by *Khilafat* agitators, who then became the perpetrators of mass forced conversions of local Hindus.⁸⁰ This view has been progressively broken down in historical accounts, presenting the rebellion more as a peasant-based and peasant-led outbreak of violent resistance against British rule and landowners' oppression, which assumed a communal form in the wake of massive repression.⁸¹ Sarkar records that the first case of forcible conversion occurred on 10 September 1921, the rebellion having been sparked by a police raid on Tirurangadi mosque on 20 August. Thursby's coverage of the western and northern press, however, shows that *reports* of forced conversion were being aired prior to this date,

79 For an overview of differing views of the rebellion, see R. Hardgrave, "The Mappilla Rebellion 1921: Peasant Revolt in Malabar" (in *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 11, no. 1, 1977, pp. 57-99) pp. 92-99.

80 On reasons for the Government's angle, see Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 138.

81 See D.N Dhanagare, *Peasant Movements in India 1920-1950* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1983) pp. 78-82; K.N. Panikkar, "Peasant Revolts in Malabar in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", pp. 623-4; S. Sarkar, *Modern India*, pp. 216-7; B. Chandra et al, *India's Struggle for Freedom*, p. 197-209.

and that the numbers involved varied quite widely.⁸² As this suggests, accuracy was never a particularly important feature of reporting in relation to the rebellion. In the first instance, events were occurring at such a vast distance, both geographically and politically, from the normal ambit of northern and western reportage. In addition, the class character of the rebellion encouraged a rather ambiguous attitude from middle class Indians, as a result of which religious fanaticism was sometimes seen as a more palatable motivation for the unrest.⁸³

In contrast to some of the northern and western press, however, the whole tenor of reporting in Central Provinces at the time of the rebellion was to reject the idea of forced conversion as significant. "We put absolutely no credence," states the *Young Patriot* on 12 September, "in the stories of forced conversion of the Hindus by the Moplahs. They all seem to be concocted to deal a death blow to Hindu-Muslim entente."⁸⁴ As it became clear that some forced conversions had taken place, newspapers continued to play down its significance. The *Samajsewak* of Nagpur comments towards the end of September: "The Moplah riots will serve as a proof of the extent to which the Government is bent upon thwarting the Non-cooperation Movement. The unfortunate incident of the forcible conversion of a few Hindus to Islam was made use of by the Government to cause a split between the two communities by giving exaggerated accounts of some conversion."⁸⁵ In addition, reports began to isolate the characteristics of Moplahs, regarding them as a somewhat uncivilised community unrepresentative of Indian Islam.⁸⁶

The response to the growing realisation that forced conversion had occurred was expressed in terms of the desire to effect reconversion. Due to its experience with *shuddhi*, the Arya Samaj was able to respond particularly promptly in this area.⁸⁷ But the desire to see reconversion effected in Malabar was far more widespread than this. In Nagpur, the *Nagpur Samachar* noted that the "orthodox section" of local Brahmans supported reconversion. The *Lokmatt* reported that a "Commission" had been

82 The *Times of India* states that 200 had been converted by 7 September; the *Pioneer* that 1200 had been converted by 8 September; see Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 140.

83 Certainly some newspapers displayed a callous contempt for the value of a Moplah peasant's life; for example, the "special correspondent" of the *Madras Mail* states on 14 November 1923: "I voice the sentiments of a host of victimised Hindus in Malabar when I say that it is their fervent desire, after their terrible experience, that the Moplahs as a race should be exterminated from their country." Quoted in Hargrave, "The Mappilla Rebellion 1921", p. 94.

84 RIN CP&B No. 38 of 1921; see also *Sankalpa* 10 September: "We are not disposed to believe in the alleged forcible conversion of the Hindus to Islam," in *ibid*.

85 *Samajsewak* 29 September 1921; RIN CP&B No. 41 of 1921.

86 See RIN CP&B Nos. 39 and 40 of 1921 for evidence of this approach.

87 See Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, pp. 141-2.

appointed "by the Nagpur public" to enquire into the forced conversions and their reversal. This "Commission", which included the prominent Nagpur Tilakite and future Hindu Mahasabha president B.S. Moonje, was supported by the *Shankaracharya* of Karweer Pith, Dr. Kurtkoti, who had "broken off with the blind traditions of the hoary past and kept abreast of the times. Such an attitude is bound to lead to a resuscitation of the Hindu religion."⁸⁸ This last comment indicates the way in which the Moplah conversions were being appropriated as a feature of the Hindu ideology of organisation. Here, it appeared, was an opportunity to put the idea of Hindu organisation into practice in an entirely non-threatening manner. Not only were the lost Hindus of Malabar a seemingly soft target because they had been forced into Islam and their caste could be easily identified, but in addition they were part of a distant world, viewed from the north at arms length as a kind of "laboratory" for the practice of Hindu organisation.⁸⁹

The Nagpur "Commission" on the Malabar conversions led to the production of a report, some two years later, written by Dr. Moonje.⁹⁰ In the context of the rising tensions of summer 1923, this report projects the aspirations of organised Hinduism onto Islam:

The Hindus are divided into so many water tight compartments, each having a social culture and life of its own, that there is hardly any association between them in the wider field of social activities and amenities of the community as a whole...; so that if one section happens to come into conflict with the Mahomedans, the other sections hardly ever consider it worth their while to come to its help. ...The Mahomedans, on the other hand, form one organic community, religiously well-organised and disciplined so that any injury done to any part of the community anywhere is felt as keenly all through out.⁹¹

The comparative indifference with which the northern Muslim communities viewed the vicious suppression of the Moplah rebellion provides us with a counterpoint to Moonje's argument here.⁹² But this is not the point of Moonje's discourse; the threat he is highlighting is not so much the organic unity of Muslims, as the chronic disunity of Hindus. The image of Islamic unity is set up as a paradigmatic Other, incorporating precisely those characteristics which have been shown to have developed as ideals in the ideology of Hindu organisation. Conversion stands as an indication of the failure

⁸⁸ Nagpur Samachar 27 September 1921, Loknatt 30 September 1921; RIN CP&B No. 41 of 1921. For Kurtkoti's contribution to the *sangathan* movement, see Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, pp. 23-4.

⁸⁹ The significance of Moplah for the development of *shuddhi* in the twenties will be discussed in 7.1.2.

⁹⁰ "Forcible Conversions in Malabar - Dr. Moonje's Report", Nagpur, 4 August 1923; Moonje Papers (NML); see Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, pp. 20-1

⁹¹ Quoted in Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 20.

⁹² See Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, pp. 139-41.

of Hinduism to attain these ideals. Not only forced conversion, but any conversion exists as a marker of the continued inability of Hindus to become organised. This point is illustrated by comment in the *Karmavir* early in 1923:

We cannot shut our eyes to the deplorable condition of the untouchables who for want of sympathy from their brethren are fast becoming converts to Christianity or Islam and are thus depleting the strength of the society. We have been rendered incapable of defending ourselves and our rights. The atrocities perpetrated by the Moslems on the Hindu population at Multan and in Malabar are not yet effaced from our memory.⁹³

The *Karmavir* blends two apparently contradictory images: on the one hand, the image of untouchables voluntarily converting because of the evident oppressions of Hinduism; on the other, the image of Malabar (as well as that of Multan, where a riot had occurred in September 1922), where the "atrocities perpetrated" was forced conversion of Hindus. The reason the paper gives for this atrocity was the oppression and disunity of Hinduism, as characterised by voluntary conversion. Muslim agency is almost entirely incidental here.

Malabar emerges, then, as a symbol of the "loss of strength" of Hindu society, caused by lack of unity. What this suggests is that rather than stigmatising and emulating the "other culture" of Indian Islam, the ideology of Hindu organisation was primarily in dialogue with itself, addressing its own historically defined preoccupations.

6.2.3 Music Before Mosques as Hindu Self-Assertion

This point is reiterated through an examination of the nature of developing tension during the twenties over the playing of music in Hindu processions which passed mosques, particularly during prayer times (*namaz*). This kind of tension was not a new phenomenon in the twenties. It had emerged sporadically as a public order problem in various areas from the late nineteenth century onwards.⁹⁴ In Nagpur in 1903-4, for example, there was protracted tension over this issue, which was settled by the ruling of the Divisional Commissioner.⁹⁵ As another Divisional Commissioner of Central Provinces stated in 1914:

⁹³ *Karmavir* 13 January 1923; RIN CP&B No. 3 of 1923.

⁹⁴ See Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 89; he records an incident in Madras Presidency in 1874. He then points to Tilak's development of Ganapati processions in the 1890s, citing riots in Poona in 1894 and Dhulia in 1895.

⁹⁵ The *Mahratta*, 11 October 1903, blamed the dispute on the intervention of the Deputy Superintendent of Police in Nagpur City, who issued a ruling before the Dussehra holiday that "no music was to be allowed to the Hindus for about 10 paces on either side of a mosque under any conditions".

By far the most common form of dispute (between Hindus and Muslims) is regarding the playing of music when passing places of worship, and when friction arises regarding that matter it is almost always due to some temporary ill-feeling which takes advantage of the very delicate nature of the music question to stir up strife. Processional music must have been played for centuries without dispute so long as the obvious restraints dictated by good feeling were observed. But when good feeling is at an end, there is a demand for freedom from all restraint on the one side and for prohibition or excessive restraint on the other that calls for intervention by the authorities who consult the leaders on both sides as to what is fair and in accordance with custom.⁹⁶

Unlike cow protection, the issue of music before mosques never developed the characteristics of a movement. As the Commissioner comments, it was rather an outlet for underlying tension. Its presence in the public space was ensured not through the setting up of organisations, but rather through the "intervention of authorities" and the "consultation of leaders", as well as the reporting of incidents in the press. It represents a sporadic assertion of "rights": either of the Hindu "right" to carry on processions unhampered on public highways; or of the Muslim "right" to offer *namaz* in an appropriate environment. As the dispute in Nagpur in 1903-4 unfolded, for example, the police ruling preventing the playing of music before mosques was described by the Poona weekly the *Mahratta* as a denial not of "pleasure or privilege", but of "rights immemorially enjoyed by the whole Hindu community".⁹⁷ It is important to note that these assertions were projected as the existing rights of the respective communities; the job of authority was to adjudicate whose rights were more genuine, more established.⁹⁸

As this suggests, the articulation of disputes over this issue returns us directly to Victoria's Proclamation and the position of "religious communities" in relation to the state. Representation, of course, was a central feature of this quasi-constitutional relationship. The occurrence of disputes, as the Commissioner suggests, would lead naturally to the consultation of community leaders - individuals recognised by local authority as representing the interests and views of local Hindus or Muslims. This was, however, always a localised, unformalised pattern, reflecting the centrality of symbolic representation in the colonial discourse of organisation. Interestingly, the above comments are made in the context of a resolution moved in the Imperial

⁹⁶ J. Walker, Nerbudda Commissioner to Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces Police Dept 7 December 1914; Central Provinces Secretariat (Police Dept) A Progs May 1915, No. 1 - 19: "Proposed formation of Conciliation Boards for the Composition of Disputes Between Hindus and Mohammedans."

⁹⁷ *Mahratta* 11 October 1903.

⁹⁸ The *Mahratta* suggested in relation to the Nagpur situation that "a test civil suit would...afford a suitable solution of the important question of whether the Police have such authority as they have arrogated to themselves in prohibiting music for 10 paces on either side of a mosque." Ibid.

Legislative Council to form permanent "Conciliation Boards" consisting of local representatives, in an effort to forestall the build up of tension. This formalisation was unanimously rejected by Central Provinces District Commissioners whose opinions were solicited, one remarking: "There is no system of election or nomination in this country, and none could be devised, whereby the representatives of Hindus and Muhammedans would be elected by a unanimous vote of their people and we have no guarantee that the people would with one consent follow the leaders approved."⁹⁹ Formalisation was meaningless, then, without proper structures of representation, and these structures were inappropriate to Indian conditions ("no system of election or nomination...could be devised"). The Central Provinces Government therefore advised the Government of India that existing arrangements, recognising local leaders through the knowledge and judgement of the state's local representative, were sufficient.¹⁰⁰

This arrangement was sustainable whilst the state retained control of the public space. As we have seen, however, the post-war years witnessed a shift in the balance of power over the public space, indicated by the emergence of a new discourse of organisation. In this context, music before mosques developed into a means of asserting new "rights" in the public space, in the manner noted in Section 6.1.3. The 1923-4 Ganesh Peth incident and its aftermath in Nagpur again provides us with an example of how this strategy was employed as a means of consolidating Hindu identity. In particular, it illustrates how music before mosques was utilised as a practical means of countering the "loss of strength" of Hindu society which had been symbolised in the public space by the Moplah conversions. As one newspaper commented in relation to the dispute in October 1923: "It is high time the Hindus realised the value of organisation in their society, which alone will save them from the persecution of people of other religious persuasions."¹⁰¹ And again in November:

The fact is that ever since the Hindu society became dead to its sense of honour and self-respect, any community can insult it with impunity... . If the Hindus at all want to survive such humiliations, they ought, without delay, to organise themselves into a compact whole and be prepared to act in the world more manfully than they have hitherto done.¹⁰²

The fact that the dispute was originally cast as a kind of Hindu *satyagraha* increased the emphasis on organisation during this period. Courting arrest in a systematic fashion was symbolic of the wider concerted effort of Hindus to resist "humiliation". The

⁹⁹ The Deputy Commissioner, Betul, in "Proposed formation of Conciliation Boards for the Composition of Disputes Between Hindus and Mohammedans", op. cit. n. 97.

¹⁰⁰ See letter from J.T. Marten, secretary to Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces to Secretary to Government of India, Nagpur 18 May 1915; in *ibid.*

¹⁰¹ *Khabar* 31 October 1923; RIN CP&B No. 44 of 1923.

¹⁰² *Swatantra Hindusthan*, 17 November 1923; RIN CP&B No. 47 of 1923.

Ganesh Peth dispute dragged on into 1924, and was eventually settled, after rioting in the summer, through the arbitration of Motilal Nehru and Maulana Azad.¹⁰³ The terms of the settlement were that five specified processions were permitted to pass mosques with music at all times, whilst others were required to stop music during *namaz*.¹⁰⁴ Note that the dispute was settled not through government, but through nationalist intervention.

In the aftermath of Ganesh Peth, playing music before mosques began to assume the position of a display of Hindu strength in unity. A year later, an Urdu weekly published in Nagpur, the *Al Haq*, commented that: "This year the dindi processions, attended by thousands of Dr. Munje's followers armed with lathis, passed peacefully before the Nagpur mosques, where their pace suddenly slackened to give them full opportunity to play the music with the utmost noise."¹⁰⁵ The reference to "Munje's followers" is an indication of the Doctor's central position in these displays. D.R. Goyal states that Moonje was the leader of the Ganesh Peth agitation, whilst Dr. Hedgewar, who was to become leader of the RSS, "acted as the stormtrooper".¹⁰⁶ Together they subsequently formed a kind of local "service" to Hindus taking out processions. In 1927, for example, Moonje records in his diary that he was consulted by a worried father intending to take out a marriage procession which would have to pass a city mosque. Moonje writes that he "told him to consult Dr. Hedgewar but...warned him not to stop music."¹⁰⁷ Several other sources corroborate this view of Hedgewar as a source of protection for Nagpur's Hindu processionists.¹⁰⁸

The tone of these remarks suggest the emergence of music before mosques not so much as an issue of disputed religious "rights", in the sense denoted by the Proclamation, but rather as a symbol of Hindu assertion, embellished by the defiance of the "Other" of Muslim organisation. Although it would be unhistorical to completely efface Muslim agency in these disputes, it is clear that the small Muslim community in Nagpur was becoming increasingly terrorised through this kind of aggressive Hindu self-assertion.

¹⁰³ *Maharashtra* 18 January 1925; RIN CP&B No. 4 of 1925.

¹⁰⁴ The five specified processions were Raja's Ganapati, Raja's Dasehra, Raja's Bhadrpadya Ganapati, Jagnath Dindi and Raja's Ram Navami; see "Reference from the Bombay Govt. regarding the procedure adopted in the matter of Hindu-Muslim disputes in Central Provinces," Central Provinces Government, Political and Military Department (Confidential), 1927, File No. 113-I (Bhopal).

¹⁰⁵ *Al Haq* 15 November 1925; RIN CP&B No. 47 of 1925.

¹⁰⁶ D. R. Goyal, *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (Radhakrishna Prakashan, New Delhi), p. 49.

¹⁰⁷ Moonje's Diary 13 June 1927; Moonje Papers Reel 1.

¹⁰⁸ See Deshpande and Ramaswamy, *Dr Hedgewar: the Epoch Maker*, p. 71: "Because of the in-built fear of the Muslims among the Hindus, the band troupes sometimes shirked to play before the Masjid. On such occasions, Doctorji himself would take over the drums and rouse the dormant manliness of the Hindus." A similar story was also told by Vasant Rao Oke in interview, 16 December 1995.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1927 riot in Nagpur (see Chapter 7), the normally mildly pro-Hindu *Hitavada* comments:

It is no use disguising the fact that the Mahommedans in Nagpur have become very nervous and terror-stricken. ...Whatever views one might hold about the causes of the trouble, the fact remains that many Mahommedan families have left Nagpur and that most of the Mahommedan residents in the city are afraid to leave their homes and move freely in the localities where there is a preponderance of the Hindu element.¹⁰⁹

In this context, the issue of music before mosques may be seen as a further indication of the tendency of the ideology of Hindu organisation to construct a dialogue with itself, employing the "Other" of Muslim aggressiveness as a rationalising or legitimising agent. The objective existence of a "threatening Other" is of minimal importance here.

6.2.4 Hindu Organisation and Low Caste Mobilisation

The political energy that so characterised the India of the early 1920s did not just signify the extension of nationalism and communalism. Other forces were developing: socialism was to emerge in the thirties as a major force in Indian politics, for example; equally significant was the development of low caste movements. Already strong in the south, the independent mobilisation of low castes and untouchables developed across much of the country during the nineteen twenties. Phule's legacy provided an ideological and organisational basis for development in the west, and this was to lead in the late twenties to the emergence of Ambedkar as a leader of national importance.

The development of ideologies and movements based on caste - far more than those based on Islam - constituted a specific threat to the ideology of Hindu organisation. It has been noted in Chapter 4 how Phule's work challenged the claims of high caste dominated organisations to represent a Hindu "community" that included low castes and untouchables. Mobilisation in the twenties extended this work. The historical distinction which Phule made between the original inhabitants of India and the Aryan "invaders" was to become a central feature of non-Brahman identity. This kind of ideology undermined the image of Hinduism as the religion of the soil, of *Bharat Mata*, and questioned the boundaries of Hinduism as stipulated by the all-embracing ideology of Hindu organisation.

In Nagpur low caste mobilisation was driven by leaders from the Mahar caste. This was an untouchable caste which formed about one sixth of the population of Nagpur

¹⁰⁹ *Hitavada* 11 September 1927.

district, and had by the turn of the century demonstrated significant tendencies towards independent organisation.¹¹⁰ Mahars also formed some 40% of workers in Nagpur's powerful textile industry.¹¹¹ As early as 1909 the Mahar leader Kisan Faguji Bansode was distinguishing low castes from Hindus by reference to the Aryan conquest, proclaiming: "At that time we were your conquest, you treated us even worse than slaves and subjected us to any torture you wanted. But now we are no longer your subjects, we have no service relationship with you, we are not your slaves or serfs... . We have had enough of the harassment and torture of the Hindus."¹¹² Again following the example of Phule, Mahar leaders were particularly critical of what were perceived as high caste attempts to alleviate the condition of low castes. Thus in 1923 the Nagpur weekly *Bahishkrit Bharat*, published by the Mahar Ganesh Akaji Gawai, commented on a recent meeting of the Maharashtra Hindu Dharma Parishad in Yeotmal. Here, a resolution was passed stating that untouchability should not be observed in public spaces "barring temples, sacred places and public tanks or wells." The *Bahishkrit Bharat* describes this as a "shameless resolution (which) only adds insult to the injury of the depressed classes." "Under the name of the defence of Hindu religion," the editorial continues, "attempts are made to perpetuate the religious and social predominance of the priestly class over the non-Brahman and depressed classes."¹¹³

The final comment here indicates a recognition of the relationship between low caste "uplift" and high caste anxiety over the welfare of Hinduism in the modern world. The ideology of low caste mobilisation specifically counters the logic of this relationship, which by mid-1923 was emerging as central to the notion of Hindu *sangathan*. Because of this, low caste mobilisation became increasingly the most threatening "Other" for the ideology of Hindu organisation. This is illustrated by the way in which low caste mobilisation was perceived by the high caste press, including the nationalist press. The 1925 Central Provinces and Berar Non-Brahman Conference at Wardha was described by the *Hitavada* as a "separatist movement".¹¹⁴ The *Maharashtra* apparently confirmed the *Hitavada*'s suspicions by noting disapprovingly the Conference's decision to omit "Hindu" from its title, and by describing the "wild and vulgar attacks on Brahmins" during proceedings.¹¹⁵ Reports such as these are replete with a sense of horror at the apparently uncontrollable nature of low caste mobilisation,

110 The 1908 District Gazetteer noted that Mahars had "combined to dig wells and in Nagpur have opened a school for members of their community". *Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District* Vol. A, p. 85.

111 G. Omvedt, *Dalit Visions: The Anti-Caste Movement and the Construction of an Indian Identity* (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1995), p. 35.

112 Quoted in *ibid*.

113 *Bahishkrit Bharat* 24 February 1923; RIN CP&B No. 9 of 1923.

114 *Hitavada* 27 May 1925; RIN CP&B No. 22 of 1925.

115 *Maharashtra* 31 May 1925; RIN CP&B No. 23 of 1925.

its "wildness" and "vulgarity". This sense is encapsulated by the persistent reference to the movement as a kind of disease. The Wardha Conference was described by other papers at the time as evidence of the "anti-Brahmin infection" and the "contagion of anti-Brahmin feeling."¹¹⁶ Similarly, B.S. Moonje, commenting on a Dr. Powar of Mohad in his personal diary in 1926, is thankful that he was not "affected by the virus of the non-Brahmin controversy."¹¹⁷ This persistent representation of low caste consciousness as a virus or disease is indicative of its status in the ideology of Hindu organisation. It simply cannot be located within the parameters of recognisable political discourse. The only way of comprehending it, rather, is by presenting it as an unfortunate natural disorder.

This of course is a rather drastic representation, but it does indicate an attitude of incomprehension that runs through virtually all high caste attempts to effect amelioration of the low caste predicament through "uplift" - such a characteristic feature, as we have seen, of the horizontal approach to Hindu organisation. This is illustrated by an examination of Gandhi's heartfelt attempts to eradicate untouchability. It is possible, I would say, to situate Gandhi as an advocate of horizontal organisation in this context because of his attitude towards caste.

Prior to 1925, Gandhi supported the idea of caste in its contemporary form. He produced a whole series of arguments in its defence, which generally responded to western critiques based on its supposed non-egalitarian nature.¹¹⁸ Very briefly, Gandhi presented what he saw as the basic principles of the caste system - heredity and occupational differentiation underpinned by the theological imperatives of *karma* and rebirth - as the framework of a social order based on harmonious integrated relationships, rather than competition and class war, which were so manifest in western "egalitarian" social orders. Where caste was defended, however, untouchability was unequivocally rejected. Gandhi rationalised this by making a conceptual distinction between the two. Whereas caste was an integral part of the Hindu way of life, untouchability was "not a sanction of religion" but rather "a device of Satan". It was a "sin" which went directly against the "spirit of the Vedas", a spirit that represented "purity, truth, innocence, chastity, simplicity, forgiveness, godliness and all that makes a man or woman noble and brave."¹¹⁹ Atoning for this sin was perceived by Gandhi as an essential feature of the creation of a new society in India; as essential, and in fact inextricably bound up with, the need for independence:

¹¹⁶ See *Swatantrya Hindusthan* and *Lokmat* 31 May 1925; RIN CP&B No. 23 of 1925.

¹¹⁷ Moonje's diary 2 April 1926; Moonje Papers Reel 1 (NML).

¹¹⁸ For a summary, see Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, p.226.

¹¹⁹ "The Sin of Untouchability", in *Young India* 19 January 1921; see CWMG Vol. XIX (Government of India, Delhi, 1966), pp. 242-3.

I have often told English officials that if they are friends and servants of India they should come down from their pedestal, cease to be patrons...and believe us to be equals in the same sense they believe fellow Englishmen to be their equals. ...I have gone a step further and asked them to repent and to change their hearts. Even so is it necessary for us Hindus to repent of the wrong we have done, to alter our behaviour toward those whom we have "suppressed" by a system as devilish as we believe the English system of the government of India to be. We must not throw a few miserable schools at them, we must not adopt the air of superiority toward them. We must treat them as our blood brothers as they are in fact. We must return to them the inheritance of which we have robbed them. And this must not be the act of a few English-knowing reformers merely but it must be a conscious voluntary effort on the part of the masses. We may not wait till eternity for this much belated reformation. We must aim at bringing it about within this year... . It is a reform not to follow Swaraj but to precede it."¹²⁰

On the basis of a paralleling of the two oppressions - colonial and caste - the eradication of untouchability is integrated with the objective of *swaraj*, bringing a sense of urgency to Gandhi's approach. There is, however, a shift in the weight of required agency between the two oppressions. Whereas he may appeal individually to British officials to "repent and change their hearts" in relation to India, the main burden of agency lies with the people to mobilise and actively work - through *satyagraha* - towards the attainment of liberation. In the case of the oppression of untouchables, however, the burden of agency is reversed - it is the job of the oppressors to effect liberation. The urgency of the need for the eradication of untouchability is directed towards caste Hindus and their need for repentance; the call is for a moral shift in order that untouchables be accommodated "as our blood brothers". Untouchables themselves have little to do except be patient and wait for this to happen.

This point is illustrated by Gandhi's attitude towards the Vaikom *Satyagraha*. A major temple in this village in the princely state of Travancore was targeted by the District Congress Committee due to its practice of disallowing untouchable access to roads surrounding the temple.¹²¹ *Satyagraha* was launched in March 1924, with the District Congress sanctioning mixed groups of caste and untouchable *satyagrahis* to breach the temple bar on road use, which by this time was backed up by a prohibitory order of the

¹²⁰ *ibid.*

¹²¹ This was an extension of the principle of *theendal*, or unapproachability. Two castes prevalent in Kerala, the *Ezhavas* and *Pulayas*, were barred from approaching higher castes nearer than 16 feet and 72 feet respectively; See B. Chandra et al, *India's Struggle of Independence*, p. 230. Eleanor Zelliot notes that the local Congress resolve was "also an outgrowth of the Ilavas (Ezhavas) own movement to gain political and religious rights. It came in the wake of the Ilavas' 1918 appeal to the Travancore government for the opening of state temples to all Hindus and their 1921 threat to convert in a body to Christianity." Zelliot, "Gandhi and Ambedkar: A Study in Leadership" (in J.M. Mahar [ed.] *The Untouchables in Contemporary India*, Univ. of Arizona, Tucson, 1972, pp. 69-96), p. 80.

District Magistrate. Although he supported the *satyagraha* campaign, Gandhi was opposed both to its extension to other temples, and to the involvement of the national Congress organisation; he treated it as a purely local dispute.¹²² When he eventually visited Vaikom in March 1925, it was not to bolster or take charge of the *satyagraha* campaign. Rather it was to enter into dialogue with the *pandits* of the temple who had spearheaded resistance to the campaign. "I have come," he said, "to reason with my orthodox friends."¹²³ His objective, then, was to institute a process of repentance in the manner described above. Gandhi plunged into a theological debate in which he attempted to assert mutual respect and love between Hindus as the "spirit of the Vedas". His acceptance of the central principles of caste, *karma* and rebirth, however, meant that he conspicuously failed to make any in-roads into the beliefs of the *pandits* in relation to untouchability.¹²⁴ In effect, he failed to realise the conceptual distinction between caste and untouchability which his approach claimed to make. He therefore left Vaikom without effecting any form of compromise. The situation was resolved later that year, although it is unclear from source material whether the Brahmans capitulated or resorted to the ingenious measure of moving the road further away from the temple. In any case untouchables were denied actual entry to the Vaikom temple until 1936.¹²⁵

After this experience Gandhi shifted his approach towards caste. He developed a vision of a reformed system based on an archetypal *varna vyavastha*. This was a partially open system, in which each varna had some practical access to the qualities of the others:

All are born to serve God's creation, a Brahman with his knowledge, a Kshatriya with his power of protection, a Vaishya with his commercial ability and a Shudra with bodily labour. This, however, does not mean that a Brahman for instance is absolved from bodily labour, or the duty of protecting himself and others. His birth makes a Brahman predominantly a man of knowledge, the fittest by heredity and training to impart it to others. There is nothing, again, to prevent the Shudra from acquiring all the knowledge he wishes. Only, he will best serve with his body and need not envy others their special qualities for service. But a Brahman who claims superiority by right of knowledge

122 See Interview with *The Hindu* 15 April 1924: "I do not think that the leaders from all the parts of India can spare themselves and concentrate their energy directly on the movement."; see CWMG Vol. XXIII (Government of India, Delhi, 1967), p. 440; see also Jordens, *Swami Shraddhananda*, p. 146; Shraddhananda, who visited Vaikom in May, attempted to persuade Gandhi to widen the objectives of the campaign.

123 Quoted in Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, p. 223.

124 For some fascinating excerpts from these exchanges, see Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, pp. 220-3.

125 See Zelliott, "Gandhi and Ambedkar: A Study in Leadership", p. 80; for Ambedkar's criticism of Gandhi's handling of the Vaikom affair, see p. 81.

falls and has no knowledge. And so with the others who pride themselves upon their special qualities.¹²⁶

The system, then, continued to operate on the basis of heredity and functional differentiation. This differentiation, however, was not *absolute*; there was some room for manoeuvre, based on the idea of equality of status and mutual respect. The system depends for its smooth operation on the absence of any sense of superiority or of envy. "Varnashrama," Gandhi helpfully adds, "is self-restraint." What appears, therefore, to be a fresh approach based on structural change as a means of eradicating the idea of untouchability as a feature of caste, continued to base itself on a rather vague assertion that equality lay at the heart of the system. If only this equality could be realised, the oppressions of the system - including untouchability - would fall away.

Despite its somewhat radical appearance, then, Gandhi's post-Vaikom approach to caste and untouchability seems to reiterate the basic principles of horizontal organisation: the binding together of Hindu society based on the idea of mutual respect, effected through the moral transformation of caste Hindus. This is certainly borne out by his approach to the problem of untouchability and his attitude to low caste mobilisation in later years. As Parekh comments, in the wake of Vaikom "he modified his language of discourse, intensified the educational campaign (amongst caste Hindus) and increased the harijan welfare work. However, he neither reconsidered his strategy nor mounted a new initiative."¹²⁷ Gandhi continued to oppose any low caste mobilisation that emerged as antagonistic to caste Hinduism. Duncan records that when a "deputation of Scheduled Castes" asked Gandhi's advice as to how they could alleviate their predicament, he advised them that "instead of working for separate treatment for themselves, they should 'endeavour to merge themselves in the ocean of Hindu humanity. That is the only possible way to free India.'"¹²⁸ In the early thirties he undertook a "fast unto death" in response to the government's proposal to grant separate electorates to untouchables, and when he established the Harijan Sevak Sangh in 1932, it was made clear that "while the League will work by persuasion among the caste Hindus to remove every vestige of untouchability the main line of work will be constructive, such as the uplift of Depressed Classes educationally, economically and socially which itself will go a great way to remove untouchability."¹²⁹ Even the idea of "persuasion" of caste Hindus, then, was to be secondary to the work of low caste "uplift".

¹²⁶ Quoted in R. Duncan [ed.], *The Writings of Gandhi* (Fontana, London, 1971), p. 179.

¹²⁷ Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, p. 235.

¹²⁸ Duncan, *The Writings of Gandhi*, p. 183.

¹²⁹ Quoted in Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform*, p. 239.

Gandhi's attitude is indicative of the strength of the ideology of Hindu organisation in the twenties and early thirties. Where his position was far removed from leaders such as Moonje, Parmanand and Savarkar on the issue of, say, *satyagraha* as nationalist strategy, the issues of caste reform and low caste mobilisation brought them somewhat closer together.¹³⁰ The idea of Hindu unity, it appears, had by the twenties emerged as a pervasive force in political discourse.

6.3 Summary of Discussion

Chapter 6 has examined the development of some aspects of political discourse in the years after the end of the First World War. Two broad aspects have been identified as central. First, the emergence of a new discourse of organisation as a result of developments in nationalist strategy during this period. This discourse challenged the colonial discourse of organisation as the principal means of organised political expression in the public space. It allowed for the articulation of ideologies in what I have termed a "decentred" manner - a manner, that is, which was not constricted by the colonialist-nationalist nexus that had previously set the parameters for the possibilities of political expression in the public space. Gandhi's intervention was crucial in this respect. His development of *satyagraha* as political strategy transported the national movement into previously uncharted waters, shifting the focus of political objectives firmly towards mass mobilisation and transforming the language of politics altogether. What has been illustrated in the first part of this chapter, however, is the failure of the Gandhian Congress to follow through the counter-hegemonic implications of this strategy. Ultimately this hampered the ability of the Congress to realise mass-based nationalism; more immediately it prevented Congress nationalism from assuming a hegemonic position in the new discourse of organisation. Consequently in the twenties this discourse was populated by a host of ideologies that struggled to establish themselves within the public space.

The second part of this chapter has examined the development of Hindu identity in the context of further political developments in the early twenties. This period was characterised by an extraordinary divergence of political events. On a national level, the

¹³⁰ Compare, for example, Gandhi's approach with that propagated by Moonje during a tour of Maharashtra in 1927. Moonje states that the "time has come for the declaration of equal public rights to all castes in social and religious matters... ." "The non-Brahmans of Maharashtra," he continues, "ought to be satisfied if such a public declaration is made by the leaders," saying that full equality can only be established by "educating public opinion." Moonje says that this public declaration would be "an epoch-making leap of complete self-abnegation from our long established vested interests and rights of the caste system." Press Statement, *Hitavada* 17 July 1927.

Non-cooperation Movement represented mobilisation on the conscious platform of Hindu-Muslim unity. Even during the Movement, however, and particularly after it, various (mostly urban) centres were struck by communal rioting, an unprecedented display of Hindu-Muslim antagonism. Nagpur was one centre in which this antagonism was prominent. I have illustrated how Hindu identity developed in this context not so much through the threat of Muslim aggression, as through the increasing importance of the ideology of Hindu organisation, the strength of its position as a recognised feature of the political landscape. The "Other" of Islamic unity was constructed as an integral feature of this ideology, and was often invoked without reference to any objective threat. Indeed the one persistent objective threat to this sense of Hindu identity - the steady growth and increased sophistication of low caste mobilisation - was consistently marginalised in the ideology of Hindu organisation. The latter failed to pick up the trajectory of low caste mobilisation - its long term political significance - precisely because of the direct threat it posed to the central principles of Hindu organisation. It is interesting to note that these two sets of ideologies have now developed into arguably the most powerful opposing forces in contemporary Indian politics.

The analysis of Gandhi's approach to low caste mobilisation has demonstrated the pervasive character of the ideology of Hindu organisation during this period, and how the dynamic ideological movements of the twenties helped to consolidate it as a feature of Hindu identity. In the next chapter I will examine the way in which this ideology became embedded in modern political discourse as Hindu nationalism.

Organisation and the Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Twenties

The nineteen twenties was a period of intense ideological dynamism in Indian politics. Even within the confines of the colonial public space, a variety of ideologies engaged with one another and attempted to gain a dominant position, a position of power in political discourse. Hindu nationalism emerged as one of these ideologies, challenging with other political ideologies for the hearts and minds of ordinary Indians. The objective of this chapter is to understand this process of emergence. It will become apparent that this was not a process of linear development. Rather, it was a process in which the varying ideological trends which have been identified as informing approaches to the political and social organisation of Hinduism struggled for dominance. At the heart of this struggle was the idea of *sangathan* - the strident assertion of organisation as the principal ideal of the Hindu "nation". The divergent ways in which this ideal was pursued, I will argue, are an indication of discursive splits in the approach of the middle class to political representation, splits which were to inform many of the dislocations of post-independence politics in India.

Two major proponents of Hindu nationalism are examined: the Hindu Mahasabha and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). There is a great deal of difference between the two. The Mahasabha was by the mid-twenties a fairly high profile organisation on the national political scene; it carried with it the weight of its self-image as the representative body of the Hindus, an image which was sustained, as we shall see, by reference to the colonial discourse of organisation. Within this framework, it could operate on the basis of a "template of polarisation", through which it gained legitimacy as the obverse of the Muslim League (i.e. in the same manner as the Arya Samaj - Sanatana Dharma Sabha template - see 3.3). Thus by 1930 Mahasabha delegates (Moonje, Nanak Chand and N.C. Kelkar¹) were present at the first Round Table Conference in London, where they deliberated along with the British Government, the Muslim League, the Liberals and a big contingent from the Princely States on the possibilities of a federal assembly (the Congress, of course, was not represented, as it was at that time engaging the Government of India in the Civil Disobedience campaign,

¹

See Indra Prakash, *Hindu Mahasabha: Its Contribution to India's Politics* (Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, Delhi, 1966), p. 42.

as a result of which most of its leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru, were in jail).² The RSS, on the other hand, which was formed in 1925, was a small organisation struggling to establish itself in Central Provinces and across Maharashtra. It was not until after our period, the late thirties and early forties, that it began to establish a presence in northern India, and so began to have an impact on national affairs. In giving so much weight to the RSS in this chapter, I am following the logic of the loose regional focus of this thesis, which has led me to turn to Nagpur as an example of localised responses to the flow of middle class ideologies in the public space. I am also, however, taking advantage of historical perspective, in the sense that the later expansion of the Sangh was to have a profound impact on Indian politics. Its early development, therefore, the ideologies and organisational models through which it situated itself in the public space, are of particular importance. The comparison with the Mahasabha will illustrate the development of an alternative strategy in the RSS, a strategy which capitalised on wider political developments in an innovative manner. In the first instance, however, I will examine the Mahasabha within the context of these developments.

7.1 The Organisation of Hindu Nationalism I: The Hindu Mahasabha

At the fifth session of the Punjab Hindu Sabha, held at Ambala in December 1913, the following resolution was passed:

This Conference is strongly of the opinion that in order to deliberate upon measures for safeguarding the interests of the Hindu community throughout India and elsewhere it is highly desirable that a General Conference of the Hindus of India be held at Hardwar on the occasion of the Kumbh in 1915, and it requests the following gentlemen to make the necessary arrangements for the purpose.³

In recalling this resolution, Swami Shraddhanand notes that "Hindu leaders from all parts of the country were nominated to the Committee". He then goes on to state, however, that only a handful of activists from Punjab and U.P organised the 1915 Inaugural Session.⁴ This image of a grand front - "a flourish of trumpets", as Shraddhanand called it - supported by a rather desultory, skeletal framework is indicative of the character of the All-India Hindu Sabha (renamed the Mahasabha in

² B.P.S. Roy, the President of the National Liberal Foundation in the early forties, commented that "the (Muslim) League and the Mahasabha are the two communal organisations running at a tangent and fighting for a share in political power." See Roy, *Parliamentary Government in India* (Thacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta, c. 1943), p. 373.

³ Quoted in Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 107.

⁴ *ibid*: "only five gentlemen attended when the first preliminary meeting was held at Dehradun on 24 September 1914 - and three of these belonged to Dehra Doon (*sic*) itself."

1921) during its early phase. As is suggested by its derivation from the Punjab Sabha, the All India organisation was conceived as a body that would represent the "Hindu community" in a symbolic fashion, within the colonial discourse of organisation. It was also committed to the "union and solidarity" of this community as "one organic whole", without identifying itself with any particular sect or sects of the Hindu community."⁵ In other words, it pursued the objective of horizontal organisation. The same ideological meshing which was evident in the Punjab Sabha, then, is also evident here.

It was noted in relation to the Punjab Sabha that this meshing was linked to the central importance of *sanatana dharma* for the movement. In 1915 the All-India organisation was dominated by Sanatanists; in particular, the U.P. Sabha was closely integrated with the *sanatana dharma* movement.⁶

The organisation remained semi-dormant until the early twenties, when in the context of non-cooperation it began to assume a more significant role in politics.⁷ After a lapse of two years, the Mahasabha met at Hardwar in April 1921 and reconfigured itself as a nationalist style organisation.⁸ The 1922 Session at Gaya, presided over by M.M. Malaviya,⁹ elaborated this image by creating an Organising Committee to establish Sabhas in all provinces, with a view to extending the organisation onto a village level. In addition, it called for the creation of local volunteer groups to protect Hindu interests in communal riots. Although these resolutions were not generally backed up by practical measures,¹⁰ they did at least signify a new dynamism of thought in the Mahasabha. The nature of the resolutions, of course, reflects the influence of the

⁵ Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 109-10.

⁶ Gordon's analysis of the 1915 UP Provincial Committee of the Hindu Sabha indicates the prominence of Sanatani representation. He also states that 'not one member of the committee has been identified as belonging to the Arya Samaj', although there was strong representation from the UP Social Conference - See R. Gordon, "The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915-1926" (in *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 9, 1975, pp. 145-204), p. 154.

⁷ See Shraddhanand's dismissive attitude to the early years, *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 114; See also Indra Prakash' two works, *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement*, and *Hindu Mahasabha: Its Contribution to Indian Politics*, neither of which devotes much space to the Mahasabha before 1923.

⁸ Shraddhanand notes with satisfaction the removal of the "loyalty" clause in the objectives of the Sabha at this Session, and its replacement by a clause committing the Sabha to the objective of a "united and self-governing Indian nation"; see *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 116.

⁹ Although Indra Prakash, *Hindu Mahasabha - Its Contribution to India's Politics*, says Swami Shraddhanand was president this year, both R. Gordon, "The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress", p. 169, and Shraddhanand himself in *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 119, indicate that Malaviya presided.

¹⁰ From the Central Provinces, these developments drew interested but somewhat frustrated comment; of the resolution on organisational development, the *Karmavir* opines: "It should not be allowed to remain on record only, but should at once be translated into action." 13 January 1923; RIN CP&B No. 3 of 1923.

Congress, and the development of the new discourse of organisation during this period. It was this dynamism of thought, however, which underpinned the emergence of the *sangathan* movement as an integrated articulation of the ideology of Hindu organisation.. The Mahasabha provided the framework for this articulation, and its next Session, at Benaras in August 1923, was crucial in deciding the trajectory of the movement.

7.1.1 Swami Shraddhanand and the Articulation of *Sangathan*

The first conscious articulation of *sangathan* as a distinct movement in the 1920s is a difficult occurrence to locate. Certainly in the run-up to the Mahasabha session in 1923 the press - particularly Malaviya's *Leader* - referred repeatedly to the need for Hindus to become organised as paramount:

Nothing is now left for the Hindus but to organise themselves... . They must as a community inspire respect before they can have unity on reasonable and equal terms with the Muslims. Their first duty, in their own interest, in the interest of the country, and also in that of Hindu-Muslim unity, is that they should organise, organise, organise.¹¹

In the context of this thesis, however, it may be seen that only a greater sense of urgency distinguishes this statement from earlier examples of the ideology of Hindu organisation. It has already been illustrated how this idea dominated the Lahore Conference of 1909. A further example is provided by Rampal Singh's Presidential Address to the 1918 session of the Mahasabha in Delhi. Referring to the Hindu "community", he says that

We have lost sight of the high ideals which used to pulsate and animate the hearts of our forefathers. The chief cause is that we are disorganised and disunited. It is for the Hindu Sabha to organise and unite the scattered atoms of our Community and to devise means for the amelioration of the whole, so that we might rise again to the same pinnacle of glory and civilisation which our forefathers had attained.¹²

When this plea for organisation was translated into the evocative invocation of *sangathan*, however, is not clear. Prakash suggests that the first usage was by Malaviya during the Congress Enquiry into the riot at Multan in September 1922.¹³

¹¹ *Leader*, 2 April 1923.

¹² Quoted in Indra Prakash, *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement*, p. 86.

¹³ See *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement*, p. 25. Other sources are not explicit about the origin of the term: See Jordens, *Swami Shraddhananda*, p.134; Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 20-22. Certainly the Multan riot prompted a rash of press statements on the need for Hindu organisation. The *Vedic Magazine*, for example, an Arya monthly published in Lahore, commented in its September edition that "the tragedy, deplorable as it is, has a lesson for its victims. Organise yourselves. Evolve unity in your own ranks. Develop strength, develop character." See Punjab Press Abstracts, 1922, No. 40.

Other evidence suggests that the concept was developed only in conjunction with the campaign begun early in 1923 to reclaim through *shuddhi* a large group of nominal Muslims in Agra district of U.P., known as Malkana Rajputs.¹⁴ This crucial *shuddhi* campaign will be discussed in the next section. Its presence here is an indication of the influence of the Arya Samaj, and in particular the radical leader of the *Gurukul* educational movement, Swami Shraddhanand, who was the main organising force behind the *shuddhi* campaign.

Shraddhanand's involvement with the Mahasabha was relatively recent. Since taking *sannyas* in 1917, he had become increasingly involved in politics. He played a prominent role in the Rowlatt *Satyagraha* in Delhi in 1919, and also in the Non-cooperation Movement. Throughout this period he had attempted to put the issue of untouchability on the nationalist agenda, believing it to be the perfect constructive counterpoint to the essentially destructive campaign of non-cooperation.¹⁵ The apparent reluctance of the Congress to address this issue in any practical sense was a major factor in Shraddhanand's eventual abandonment of mainstream politics: "Noticing even the Congress powerless to absorb the untouchable," he said early in 1923, "I have made it the sole mission of my remaining life."¹⁶

It was only in 1923, then, that Shraddhanand turned wholeheartedly to the Hindu Mahasabha. His involvement was linked very much to his determination to tackle untouchability, although this objective was overshadowed during 1923 by his strong commitment from February onwards to the Malkana *shuddhi* campaign. During the summer of 1923, as he toured Punjab and UP to gather support for the *shuddhi* campaign, Shraddhanand referred to the idea of *sangathan*, and its promotion by the Mahasabha.¹⁷ He defined *sangathan* here as a movement "to resuscitate the ancient glory of Arya civilisation and to counteract the symptoms of degeneration displayed by the Hindus in the crises of Malabar and Multan."¹⁸

During 1923, it is difficult to find a more precise definition of *sangathan* than this rather vague invocation of the Golden Age and degeneration, suffixed by the urgency of current "crises". A comprehensive exposition is provided by Shraddhanand somewhat later, in his pamphlet *Hindu Sangathan: Saviour of the Dying Race*. Though completed

¹⁴ See Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 164.

¹⁵ For an account of Shraddhanand's struggle to put untouchability at the heart of the nationalist agenda, and particularly his disagreements with Gandhi over the issue, see Jordens, *Swami Shraddhananda*, pp. 142-47.

¹⁶ *Leader* 7 February 1923; quoted in Jordens, *Swami Shraddhananda*, p. 131.

¹⁷ Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 164.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

in 1924, this pamphlet was not published until 1926. From the outset, Shraddhanand articulates *sangathan* in classic Arya terms: "The ancestors of the present day Hindus, the Ancient Aryans, who gave their name to our motherland (the ancient Aryavarta) were a highly civilised and organised race."¹⁹ *Sangathan*, then, was the natural state of Arya society and the Aryan people ("an organised race"), a facet of the Golden Age. Deterioration from this state was the result of four central causes: first, conversion, either by force or aggressive missionary activity; secondly, perversion of the merit-based *varna* system, leading to proliferation and rigidity of castes, the introduction of idol worship and superstition, and the emergence of untouchability; thirdly, child marriage and lack of remarriage of widows; and lastly, the dislocation of *ashrama dharma* - in particular, the loss of the ideal of *brahmacharya* as the framework of adolescent and young adult life. Shraddhanand pinpoints much of this debilitating decline as stemming from the great war between the Kauravas and the Pandavas, the focus of the *Mahabharata*. After this, he says, "*adharma* took the place of *dharma*," "the ancient organisation of the Aryas was cut asunder by mutual jealousies and pride," and "disorganisation became the order of the day."²⁰

The ideal of *sangathan*, then, is located by Shraddhanand very much as an attribute of the Aryan Golden Age. It is characterised first and foremost by the smooth operation of *varnashrama dharma*. Within this framework, the function of *brahmacharya* is given paramount importance: "control of the senses through right study and by the practice of plain living and high thinking," he says, provides the discipline, aspiration (i.e. in terms of the allocation of *varna* on merit) and order upon which society is constructed.²¹ Without the moral discipline of *brahmacharya*, for example, strict adherence to the *dharma* of the *grihastha*, the householder, is not possible, thus "undermining the physical and moral health of the nation."²² Shraddhanand's emphasis on the key role of *brahmacharya* may be related to his position in the *Gurukul* movement - his remedy for the degeneration of *brahmacharya*, not surprisingly, is the full revival of the *Gurukul* system. It is nevertheless reminiscent of Gandhi's emphasis

¹⁹ Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 1.

²⁰ Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan*, pp. 78, 94.

²¹ Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 103; "...the whole fabric of the Ashram Dharma," he says, "hinged on one pivot i.e. the *brahmacharya*. Until all the functions of the human organism were properly and rightly trained and a harmonious development of the physical body, the organs of action, the organs of sense, the mind, the intellect, the memory and the ego was accomplished, the three later stages of human life could not work in unison with the laws of nature."

²² See *ibid.* *Grihasthadharma*, Shraddhanand states, meant that "the married couple should only cohabit for bringing forth healthy progeny. During the 25 years of married life they ought to procreate ten children only (*sic!*), a period of two and a half years being devoted to the nourishment of each child from the date of conception, during which period the couple should abstain from sexual intercourse."

on and practice of *brahmacharya*, and this provides us with the basis for an instructive comparison of their approach towards caste.

Both Gandhi and Shraddhanand saw morality and self-discipline as key attributes of *brahmacharya*. For both of them, therefore, the loss of this institution was the key to the moral degradation of contemporary society. Untouchability constituted one of the central features of this moral degradation, and both pointed to it as symptomatic of the weakened state of Hindu society. As Shraddhanand states, "the question of uprooting the curse of untouchability was the 'sine qua non' of Nationality in India."²³ Their approaches to the problem, however, were quite different. As we have seen, Gandhi attempted to eradicate untouchability through the moral transformation of caste Hinduism. Shraddhanand, on the other hand, referred unerringly to the compact, closed Hinduism of Swami Dayananda. Eradicating untouchability meant nothing more than untouchables "regaining their former position," because "it is plain...that they come from the same stock from which sprang the Brahman, the Kshatriya and the Vaishya."²⁴ *Shuddhi* was the practical means through which this reintegration could be achieved, and the Arya vision of *varnashramadharma* would form the framework of the reintegrated, reorganised society. If Gandhi's approach was a reflection of the influence of horizontal organisation, then, Shraddhanand's was very much a reflection of that of vertical organisation.

In fact Shraddhanand embellished his Arya-based vision of *sangathan* with a very familiar institutional notion:

The first step which I propose is to build one Hindu Rashtra Mandir at least in every city and important town, with a compound which could contain an audience of 25 thousands and a hall in which *katha* from Bhagavad Gita, the Upanishads and the great epics Ramayana and Mahabharata could be daily recited.²⁵

Here, the Samaj Mandir, such an important feature of the Arya Samaj's transformative trajectory in relation to caste Hinduism, is replicated in the wider context of Hindu *sangathan*. In many ways Shraddhanand had simply transposed the central transformative principles of Arya ideology onto this widened context. The *sangathan* movement became an opportunity for the realisation of Dayananda's original objective of a transformation of Hindu samaj. Nowhere is this intention more clear than in Shraddhanand's approach to *shuddhi* as a feature of *sangathan*. Indeed, it is over this issue that the movement witnessed a decisive internal battle during the Mahasabha

²³ Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 89.

²⁴ Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 85.

²⁵ Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 140.

session of August 1923, and the special Session that followed it in February 1924. Yet again the old tensions over horizontal and vertical organisation underpinned this battle.

7.1.2 *Shuddhi*, *Sangathan* and the Triumph of Horizontal Organisation

The re-emergence of *shuddhi* as an issue of critical importance during and after the Moplah rebellion provided the context for this struggle. When the news of the Malabar conversions reached northern India in September 1921, it was the Arya Samaj which responded proactively. The College wing Pratinidhi Sabha in Punjab, under the leadership of Hans Raj, immediately launched an appeal for funds and dispatched an *updeshak* (missionary), Pandit Rishi Ram, to organise a programme of reclamation. The United Provinces Pratinidhi Sabha subsequently campaigned vigorously to raise funds to support Hans Raj's initiative.²⁶ The Arya Samaj was able to respond promptly to this crisis for two reasons. First, it had the institutional structure to generate a response, both in terms of finance and appropriate personnel. Secondly, the Samaj had years of experience in *shuddhi* work, and it was clear from the start that, despite the widespread destruction of homes and businesses during the Moplah rebellion, the principal objective of relief work was to be the reclamation of forcibly converted Hindus.

Rishi Ram and his fellow Aryas in the Malabar mission did not have the Samaj structure to fall back on, as the Samaj was still very weak in the South.²⁷ Their approach to *shuddhi* had therefore to be somewhat different if it was to have any real impact. They had no alternative but to work closely with representatives of local orthodoxy.²⁸ In fact, it is unclear exactly how much influence the Samaj had in bringing about the reconversions in Malabar.²⁹ Local orthodox leaders appear to have

²⁶ Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 142-3.

²⁷ R.K. Ghai states that Rishi Ram was joined from the Punjab by Lala Khushal Chand; Ghai's text then suggests that they recruited other Aryas locally; see *Shuddhi Movement in India*, pp. 86-88.

²⁸ An interesting counterpoint to the Arya approach in Malabar is provided by the Tinnevely conversions of 1899, when the Shanars, a caste of toddy tappers, were converted to Islam. The Samaj sent two *updeshaks* to Tinneveli, but they failed to effect reconversion because of the solid opposition of the local brahmans. See H. Fischer-Tine, "Kind Elders of the Hindu Biradri: The Arya Samajes Struggle for Influence and its Effect on Hindu-Muslim Relations 1880-1925" (Unpublished Conference Paper, Copenhagen 1996). This comparison is cited, however, with the caution that there is obviously a vast difference between reclaiming a caste of toddy tappers and the converted Hindus of Malabar, who were largely drawn from high caste, landowning families.

²⁹ J.R. Graham states that "without the stimulus of the Arya Samaj, the orthodox would have done nothing towards readmitting the unfortunates." See Graham "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism", p. 509. Thursby, however, could find no independent evidence to support this, and notes that the Madras Government makes no mention of the Samaj in its report on the meeting of Pandits in Calicut that eventually led to the reconversions; see *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 143 n. 50.

taken the initiative, and the actual processes of reconversion were decided at a meeting of *pandits* in Calicut in 1922, under the auspices of the ruling prince of Calicut, Zamorin Raja. These processes were highly ritualistic, and would almost certainly have been rejected by a northern Shuddhi Sabha.³⁰ A significant point, however, was that they were guided by a fourth or fifth century document known as the *Devala Smriti*. The *Smriti* was a short Sanskrit document giving details of ritual activities to be followed as a result of pollution through contact with *mlecchas*, or non-Hindus.³¹ Whatever the extent of Arya involvement in the reconversions, the Samaj certainly did not object to the use of this *Smriti* and its prescribed rituals, which resulted in the reclamation of between 2500 and 3000 Hindus.³²

For Sanatanists, this apparent orthodox sanction of *shuddhi* provided a fresh impetus for involvement in the field of purification and, more significantly, reconversion. The Malkana *shuddhi* campaign was the testing ground for this involvement. The so-called Malkana Rajputs were nominal Muslims living in villages across the western part of United Provinces. Although a great deal of their religious practice could be considered Hindu, they had no social contact with caste Rajputs, and, crucially, they were consistently returned as Muslim in census reports.³³ A Rajput Shuddhi Sabha had been organised as early as 1907 by local caste organisations, but had little sustained success.³⁴ At a meeting in Agra early in 1923, Shraddhanand proposed the foundation of a fresh organisation, the Bharatiya Hindu Shuddhi Sabha, to which he was duly appointed president. The Sabha was at first a genuine coalition of forces, incorporating Sikhs and Jains as well as Sanatanists and of course Aryas. It is this practical coalition which made the Malkana *shuddhi* such an important symbol of the *sangathan* movement. Aryas again showed a willingness to subsume their own beliefs in order to ensure Sanatani involvement. Commenting on a *shuddhi* ceremony in March 1923, the *Leader* notes that "Sanatani Hindu Pandits conducted the formal ceremony of *yaggi* in the presence of Swami Shraddhanand."³⁵ Even the radical Shraddhanand, then,

30 See Ghai, *Shuddhi Movement in India*, p. 87 for an account of the kind of ritual involved.

31 Both Graham (p. 511 n. 1) and Thursby (p. 144) state that the *Devala Smriti* was 'discovered' at this time. The credit for this 'discovery' was claimed at the time by none other than B.S. Moonje. See his Presidential Speech to the 1926 All-India Shuddhi Sabha Conference, reproduced in *Ilitavada* 18 April 1926; Moonje says that he discovered the *Devala Smriti* whilst "studying the smritis that I could get hold of in the libraries of Nagpur" after witnessing the problems of the Moplah converts in gaining readmission to Hinduism.

32 Fischer-Tine, "Kind Elders of the Hindu Biradri", p. 12.

33 See Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 146.

34 *ibid.*

35 *Leader*, 11 March 1923.

appears to have turned a blind eye to ritual as a feature of the ceremony in the interests of a united front.³⁶

The Malkana Rajputs constituted an ideal target for a unified *shuddhi* campaign, principally because of their clear link into high caste Hinduism. They could claim descent from the Jadun Rajput caste, having been nominally converted in return for land rights during the Mughal period, the name 'Malkana' deriving from '*milkayat*' or ownership of land.³⁷ From the point of view of Sanatanists, therefore, the dilemma of how to accommodate purified Malkanas did not arise; they were simply absorbed into their nominal *biradri*.³⁸ The collaboration was undoubtedly strengthened by the presence of Muslim organisations in the area, working to counter the influence of the *shuddhi* campaign through *tabligh* (an Islamic "equivalent" of *shuddhi*, in the sense of an organised movement seeking conversion to Islam). Tensions nevertheless existed between Aryas and Sanatanists working within the campaign. Aryas were unhappy with the idea of Malkanas being "removed from one form of false religion and ... placed in another"³⁹ - i.e. being reclaimed by the orthodox *biradris*. Sanatanists were uncomfortable about working with Aryas, and a purely Sanatanist organisation, the Punah Samskar Samiti, was set up soon after the Bharatiya Hindu Shuddhi Sabha began work.

Tension was brought to a head at the 1923 Session of the Mahasabha at Benaras. Shraddhanand tabled three resolutions, based on the Arya vision of vertically organised Hinduism, which informed his approach to *sangathan*. The first dealt with untouchables, calling for practical concessions (access to wells, schools etc.) as a prelude to their assimilation into the "organic whole in the great body of the Aryan fraternity" (i.e. through *shuddhi*). The second dealt specifically with the Malkana Rajputs. The third dealt more generally with *shuddhi* as a process of conversion from other religions, calling for the acceptance "by the whole Hindu community" of converts regardless of which 'sect' had performed the *shuddhi* rites. This alludes to the theoretical recognition of merit-based *varna*, in the sense that reclaimed Aryas would be

³⁶ Although I have been unable to find any direct reference to it, Moonje implies in his Presidential Speech to the 1926 All-India Shuddhi Sabha Conference that the *Devala Smriti* was used as the basis of the purification ceremony in the Malkana campaign; See *Hitavada* 18 April 1926.

³⁷ See Y. Sikand & M. Katju, "Mass Conversions to Hinduism among Indian Muslims", p. 2216.

³⁸ At a meeting of "Benaras Sanatanists" in April 1923 "all spoke supporting the Malkana *Shuddhi* movement as allowed by the religious books and traditions of Sanatan Dharm"; see *Leader* 30 April 1923.

³⁹ Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India*, p. 153.

invested with twice-born status in accordance with Dayananda's flexible *varna* structure.⁴⁰

The only resolution dealt with immediately was that referring to the Malkana Rajputs. The resolution that emerged stated that the Malkanas "should be taken back into the Hindu fold in the castes to which they originally belonged."⁴¹ This was doing no more than confirming the righteousness of the *shuddhi* campaign as it stood.

Both of Shraddhanand's other resolutions, however, were referred to a committee of *pandits* for consideration. This committee, consisting of 75 *pandits*, met in January 1924, and the results of their deliberations were adopted as Mahasabha policy at a special session in February. Concession was made in relation to the first resolution on the issue of untouchability, in that access to wells, temples and schools was generally encouraged. At the same time, however, the resolution tabled made it clear that this concession would not stretch to a consideration of *shuddhi* amongst untouchables, stating that it was "against scripture and the tradition to give the untouchables *yajyopavit* [i.e. investiture with sacred thread], to teach the Vedas and to interdine with them... ." ⁴² Although Samajists present at this meeting were able to amend this resolution by qualifying it as the belief of a "very large body of Hindus, i.e. the Sanatanists," it was clear that many of the *shuddhi* rites conducted by the Samaj amongst low caste and untouchable groups would not be recognised by the Mahasabha.

⁴⁰ *Leader*, 8 August 1923; the full text of the resolutions reads:

1. With a view to do justice to the so-called depressed classes in the Hindu community and to assimilate them as part of an organic whole in the great body of the Aryan fraternity, this conference of Hindus of all sects holds:
 - a) that the lowest among the depressed classes be allowed to draw water from common public wells.
 - b) that water be served to them at drinking posts freely as is done to the highest among other Hindus.
 - c) that all members of the classes be allowed to sit on the same carpet in public meetings and other ceremonies with the higher classes and
 - d) that their children (male and female) be allowed to enter freely and, at teaching time, to sit in the same form with other Hindu and non-Hindu children in government, national and denominational institutions.
2. Looking to the splendid enthusiasm which has been aroused among the Hindu public in the work of reclamation of Malkana Rajputs and their entry into their brotherhood this conference decides once and for all that all such Neo-Muslims whether they be Rajputs or Brahmins, Vaishyas, Jat or Gujars etc, who have always conformed to the Hindu customs and rites be taken back into their several brotherhoods and be treated as Hindus for all intents and purposes.
3. In view of the fact that an overwhelming majority of Indian Mahomedans and Christians are the descendants of Hindu converts and in view of the catholicity of the ancient Vedic Dharma which absorbed non-Aryans into the community - this conference resolves that non-Hindus converted by any sect of the Hindus according to the purification (*prayashchit*) rite prescribed by the representative body of that sect be considered Hindus to all intents and purposes by the whole Hindu community.

⁴¹ *Leader*, 24 August 1923.

⁴² *Leader*, 8 February 1924.

The other referred resolution, dealing with conversions, emerged with conditions attached. "Any non-Hindu was welcome to enter the fold of Hinduism," the adopted resolution ran, "though he could not be taken into any caste".⁴³ This curious statement again ensured the preservation of the existing caste structure, whilst attempting to confront the problem of *shuddhi* as conversion. The implication of Shraddhanand's original text - that the Mahasabha should recognise the theoretical validity of merit-based *varna* - was resolutely rejected. Significantly, however, the new policy did not rule out conversion, and this indicates an expansion of the idea of horizontal organisation. Conversion without caste was possible, as converts could be channelled into the alternative structure of the Arya Samaj, from where the purity of caste Hindus could be affected only remotely. In effect, the statement could make sense only if the Arya Samaj was perceived as part of the horizontal organisation of Hinduism.

This is indicative of the predicament of the Arya Samaj as a facet of the *sangathan* movement. It has been shown how even in the context of the 1909 Hindu Conference, Punjabi Samajists eschewed reformism in the name of consolidation. By the mid-1920s, as the country became more embroiled in an unprecedented wave of communal rioting, the Samaj was increasingly drawn into the ideology of *sangathan* at any cost. The idea of a catholic, horizontal unity based on the perceived tolerance of the Hindu tradition, encompassing all sects and dishing out theoretical respect to all levels of Hindu society, became the defining principle of Hindu representation. No discord could be expressed without negating this defining principle. Instead, the Mahasabha promoted signifiers of Hinduism which reflected this idea of unity and consensus - cow protection, the promotion of Hindi, Sanskrit and Nagari, *swadeshi* as a facet of Hindu culture, service to widows and low caste/untouchable groups (but, again, no change in status). In contrast, controversial issues relating to the nature of organised Hinduism, such as *shuddhi*, and the relationship of untouchables to caste Hindus generally, became increasingly subject to the parameters of this unity.⁴⁴

43 *ibid.*

44 The later history of the *shuddhi* movement illustrates this, in the way that the purification of untouchables becomes increasingly subordinated to that of Christian and Muslim converts, and the focus of the movement has tended towards 'soft targets' among the latter. This tendency has been examined in a recent article, which links the *shuddhi* activity of the Arya Samaj to that of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad in more recent years. The authors note that "Muslim castes which have been particularly vulnerable to Hindu missionary efforts... are generally only nominally Muslim and still retain many Hindu customs and beliefs. Most of the mass conversions have occurred among Muslim Rajput groups". Sikand & Katju, "Mass Conversions to Hinduism among Indian Muslims", p. 2219. My argument here disputes the view taken by Walter Anderson that Sanatanists were alienated from the Mahasabha during the twenties. He states that "Because of the strong reformist Arya Samaj inclination of the dominant group, the Sanatanists withdrew behind their own orthodox associations (i.e. Bharat Mahamandal)." He offers no evidence to support this view. See his "The Rashtriya

An example of this overriding attitude is provided by the Central Provinces Provincial Conference of the Hindu Sabha in 1927. The Central Provinces Sabha tried hard to encompass the Maharashtrian non-Brahman movement,⁴⁵ and at the 1926 Session a strong non-Brahman contingent attended. Waman Rao Ghorpade, a prominent Mahar leader, attempted to move a resolution calling for the abolition of caste. Moonje records the attempts of Lajpat Rai, who was presiding, to persuade Ghorpade to withdraw the resolution, "as it is against the present policy of the Hindu Mahasabha which holds in itself all shades of thought and opinion though the conference has full sympathy with the resolution." Although Ghorpade complied, Moonje comments that "there was one Mahar man...who gave a fiery harangue from his place in Ghorpade's group in the large audience but we smothered it in expressions of sympathy and the unpleasantness was avoided."⁴⁶ This indicates precisely the approach of the Mahasabha towards low caste reform. A surfeit of sympathy, but no "unpleasantness". It was an attitude which Swami Shraddhanand was unable to accommodate. In 1926 he resigned from the Mahasabha, commenting in his resignation statement that

the Mahasabha does not consider it its duty to work for those social improvements which are utterly essential in order to save the Hindu community from total ruin, and the Sabha even puts obstacles in the way of its members who try to fulfil that very duty.⁴⁷

By this time, then, Shraddhanand had conceded that his notion of *sangathan* could not be effected through the Mahasabha.

This consolidation of horizontal organisation as the basis of Mahasabha *sangathan* was accompanied by a continued commitment to symbolic representation. Throughout the twenties and thirties the Mahasabha remained a relatively unstructured organisation with little local level organisation. The 1929 Session at Surat did pass resolutions designed to "organise Hindu Sabhas in every village and town", and called on "all Hindu leaders" to establish Sabhas "in places where they do not exist at present."⁴⁸ These somewhat vague appeals, however, were still not supported by a specific programme of organisational development.⁴⁹

Swayamsevak Sangh, II: Who Represents the Hindus?" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 7, No. 12, 18 March 1972, pp. 633-640) p. 634.

45 Moonje was particularly concerned to draw non-Brahmans into the Hindu Sabha; see Baker, *Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province*, p. 100.

46 Moonje's Diary 4 April 1927; Moonje Papers Reel 1.

47 *Liberator*, 23 September 1926; quoted in Jordens, *Swami Shraddhananda*, p.156.

48 See Indra Prakash, *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement*, p.183.

49 At the 1937 Mahasabha Session at Allahabad, held in the wake of Congress triumph in the first elections under the provisions of the 1935 Government of India Act, Savarkar concluded his first session as President by declaring that the Mahasabha was in a position "similar to the position of the Congress 20 years ago when it passed pious resolutions. If Hindu voters

Nevertheless the Mahasabha created the space for the elaboration of Hindu organisation as a significant ideology in Indian political discourse. It was the natural focal point for middle class Hindus looking to extend these notions of organisation, to find a more cogent expression of them in the modern world. The idea of *Hindutva* was increasingly to encapsulate this expression.

7.1.3 V.D. Savarkar and the Articulation of *Hindutva*

A good deal of work has been done recently on *Hindutva*, or "Hinduness", as the defining principle of Hindu nationalism.⁵⁰ This concept appears to encapsulate the cultural justification of Hindu nationalism. Because of this, its first full articulation as a Hindu nationalist "manifesto", in Vinayak Damodar Savarkar's 1923 work *Hindutva/Who is a Hindu?* (hereafter *Hindutva*), is often cited as the first time the idea of the Hindu nation had been fully expressed.⁵¹ Undoubtedly, Savarkar's short book has been a major influence for many Hindu nationalists, providing a compact statement of the ideological components of Hindu nationalism. In addition, it was adopted as a kind of long-term statement of objectives for the Hindu Mahasabha, and its author was to become the foremost leader of the Sabha in the run-up to independence and partition. This thesis, however, presents Hindu nationalism as a gradual ideological development. The themes to which Savarkar returns repeatedly in *Hindutva* revolve around the now familiar idea of boundaries, defining the limits of Hinduism and its relationship with external forces. Such preoccupations situate *Hindutva* as a feature of this ideological development.

The idea of the Hindu nation is an example of this. Its development can be identified in the articulation of Hindu organisation. The Sabha movement in the Punjab was examined in Chapter 5 as an attempt to encompass Hinduism by recruiting representatives of a kind of spectrum of beliefs. This idea was extended and developed by the Mahasabha, and the general notion of *sangathan* as articulated after the effective

voted at the next election for Hindu candidates standing on the ticket of the Mahasabha they would come into power." Quoted in N.N. Mitra [ed.], *Indian Annual Register 1937* Vol. II (Annual Register Office, Calcutta, 1938), p. 422. This ambitious vision was of course far from fulfilled. As Anderson states, "The Hindu Mahasabha...was never effectively organised nor did it ever seriously challenge the Congress for the support of Hindus." See his "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, II", p.635.

50 See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*; and also his "The Idea of the Hindu Race in the Writings of Hindu Nationalist Ideologues in the 1920s and 1930s: a Concept between Two Cultures" (in P. Robb [ed.], *The Concept of Race in South Asia*, OUP, 1995); G. Pandey, "Which of Us are Hindus?"; Ram-Prasad, "Hindutva Ideology: Extracting the Fundamentals" (in *Contemporary South Asia* Vol. 2, No. 3, 1993, pp. 285-309).

51 See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 25; Pandey, "Which of Us are Hindus?", p. 242.

defeat of Shraddhanand's resolutions is a reflection of this. The Hindu "community" was entreated to become organised, it should in some sense pull together and become a more forceful, a more "real" unit in the modern world. For those seeking to effect this ideal, articulating the unit was of course central. What emerges is a gradual development from a community made up of several components, towards the composite notion of a nation; a unit, a constituency, with real meaning in the modern world.

This development is evident in the campaign to establish Benaras Hindu University. The first prospectus of the University, published in 1906, states that the University will "train teachers of religion for the preservation and promotion of Sanatana Dharma which is inculcated by the Srutis, Smritis and Puranas, and which recognises varna and ashrama," and further that "all religious work (will) be under the control of Hindus who accept and follow the principles of the Sanatana Dharma."⁵² By 1911 this approach had been modified. In his statement on the University during this year, Malaviya comments that "every nation cherishes its own religion (and) the Hindus are no exception to that rule." He then goes on to express the mutuality of this nation, stating "there is visible at present a strong desire for greater union and solidarity among all the various sections of the community, a growing consciousness of common ties which bind them together and which make them sharers in sorrow and in joy...".⁵³ Malaviya, then, reflects a movement towards composite solidarity expressed in the idea of the nation, shedding the somewhat aggressive exclusivism of the earlier commitment to *sanatana dharma*.

Even in the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal, the nation had begun to supersede orthodoxy as the projected constituency. In 1915 the Mahamandal announced its impending session at Benaras by describing it as an "All-India Conference of Hindus", stating that: "invitations would be sent...to every Hindu gentleman who can speak for his sect, order, class or caste. The representative character of the conference...would be so thorough, complete and beyond question as to impart to its decisions the prestige and authority of the united voice of the Hindu nation."⁵⁴ The representative sweep of the

⁵² "First Prospectus of the Benaras Hindu University", produced by M.M. Malaviya in March 1906. Reproduced in V.A. Sundaram (ed.), *Benaras Hindu University 1905-1935* (Benaras 1936), p. ii - iii.

⁵³ M.M. Malaviya, "Benaras Hindu University: Why it is Wanted and What it Aims at", (no date - Reproduced in *ibid.*), p. 35-7. I have cited this document as produced in 1911 on the basis of a statement in the text as to the desire to have the foundations of the University laid "in December next, in the happy and auspicious days when His Majesty, the King-Emperor will be in our midst." (p.56). This is presumably a reference to the visit of George V during this year.

⁵⁴ Announcement from the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal Head Office, Benaras, 31 July 1915; see Tilak Papers Reel 1 (Correspondence), (NML).

Mahamandal, then, had moved on from the 1902 invocation of "the whole of the orthodox classes of the Hindus in India", to "the united voice of the Hindu nation".

Of course, in both these cases the nation is expressed very much in religious terms, and it is invoked in a symbolic manner, as a means of representing the idea of a composite solidarity - a religious *sangathan*. This, in one sense, is a further indication of the influence of symbolic representation in Indian politics, particularly politics related to religious representation. Savarkar moved away from this by stepping self-consciously out of the realm of religion and into the realm of culture. In discussing the ancient term *Arya* he states that "it must be clearly pointed out that the definition is not based on any theological hair-splitting or religious fanaticism." Rather, he says, it meant "all those who had been incorporated as parts integral in the nation and people that flourished on this our side of the Indus whether Vaidik or Aavidik, Brahmana or Chandala..." By the same token, "Mlechcha" referred to "foreigners nationally and racially and not necessarily religiously."⁵⁵ On this basis Savarkar's notion of *Hindutva* was a radical extension of the idea of horizontal organisation, cutting through the problem of internal division and tension with a grandiloquent catholicity. This unproblematic approach was quite singular in the context of the early twenties, reflecting the singular conditions in which the book was produced.

In his early years Savarkar, a Chitpavan Brahman from Ratnagiri in Maharashtra, was a revolutionary nationalist. In 1909 he was implicated in the Jackson assassination case, and a year later, after his dramatic temporary escape in Marseilles, he was finally sentenced to transportation for life to the harsh conditions of the cellular jail in Andaman. His escape and re-arrest on French soil led to a questioning of the actions of the Government in international law, and this ensured that Savarkar maintained a high profile in the public space even after his incarceration.⁵⁶ Not only was Savarkar perceived as an ardent and committed nationalist; he had also been the victim of manifestly unjust treatment from the Government. The writing of a man with such impeccable nationalist credentials, then, was bound to have an impact.

The very production of *Hindutva*, furthermore, was an indication of Savarkar's heroic resistance. As the Preface to the Second Edition states, "it was on the whitewashed walls of his solitary cell in the Andamanes (*sic*) prison that the first outlines of this book were sketched, chapters and points fixed and the definition versified."⁵⁷ Having

⁵⁵ Savarkar, *Hindutva/Who is a Hindu?* (S.S. Savarkar, Bombay, 1989 - 6th Edition; 1st Edition 1923), p. 33.

⁵⁶ See D. Keer, *Veer Savarkar* (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1988), pp. 93-98.

⁵⁷ Reproduced in Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p. iii-iv.

been transferred back to a series of mainland jails in 1921, he wrote out the manuscript and "through various surreptitious channels parts of it continued to be cleverly smuggled out of those Indian Prison walls till at last the whole work reached its destination." The book itself, then, seemed to echo the acts of heroism and sacrifice which it highlights as aspects of Hindu history. It was in itself a symbol of the projected quality of Hindu nationalism.⁵⁸

As well as giving the book an aura of heroism, this context meant that it was written in comparative isolation. Not only had Savarkar been in prison for some twelve years by the time the book was published; before this he had been in Europe for five years. I would suggest that the unproblematic catholicity of *Hindutva* is partly a product of this distance from the debates around the organisation of Hinduism.⁵⁹ A comparison with Shradhanand's *Hindu Sangathan* is revealing. Whereas the latter is preoccupied with the problems of contemporary Hinduism - in particular the problem of untouchability, the "sine qua non of Nationality in India", Savarkar easily encompasses untouchables as an integral feature of *Hindutva*. In the "prolonged furious conflict" to protect their nationality, he says, "Sanatanists, Satnamis, Sikhs, Aryas, Anaryas, Marathas and Madrasis, Brahmins and Panchamas - all suffered as Hindus and triumphed as Hindus."⁶⁰ And again: "Some of us are Brahmans and some Namashudras or Panchamas; but Brahmans or Chandalas - we are all Hindus and own a common blood."⁶¹

This notion of common blood or race is particularly significant in the legitimisation of horizontal organisation in *Hindutva*. It is one component of Savarkar's first formula for the identification of Hindus: *rashtra-jati-sanskriti*, or nation-race-culture.⁶² In effect, Savarkar reverses the idea of *jati* (most commonly translated as caste - i.e. as distinct from *varna*) as divisive, making it the touchstone of the racial unity of the Hindus:

The very castes which you owing to your colossal failure to understand and view them in the right perspective, assert to have barred the common flow of blood into our race, have done so more truly and more effectively as regards the foreign blood than our own. Nay is not the

⁵⁸ As Swami Shradhanand commented somewhat grandiosely: "It must have been one of those Vedic dawns indeed which inspired our Seers with new truths, that revealed to the author of 'Hindutva' this 'Mantra', this definition of Hindutva!!"; quoted in *ibid.* p. vii.

⁵⁹ Although it should be noted that Savarkar claimed to have introduced a *shuddhi* ceremony and persuaded other prisoners to accept his definition of Hindu whilst in Andaman; see Savarkar, *My Transportation for Life* (S.S. Savarkar, Bombay, 1984), pp. 316-323.

⁶⁰ See Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p. 45.

⁶¹ Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p. 89.

⁶² The second formula being *Pitribhumi-Punjabhumi*, or fatherland-holy land; see Savarkar, *Hindutva*, pp. 102-116.

very presence of these present castes a standing testimony to a common flow of blood from a Brahman to a Chandala?⁶³

Savarkar rationalised this argument by reference to the idea of sanctioned inter-marriage.⁶⁴ It is this idea, he says, which created the caste system, endlessly proliferating through the union of members of different castes. All castes, therefore, were bound by the same blood, the same race. In addition, a further co-mingling has been caused by the existence of caste rules. Those who break the rules would be outcast, and after all, he states rather pragmatically, "being outcast from a caste, which is an event of daily occurrence, is only getting incorporated with some other."⁶⁵

Here, then, Savarkar rejects the stigma of hierarchical oppression almost entirely, through what he sees as the overriding commonality of Hindu blood. All castes, untouchables and *adivasis* are part of the same organic whole which is *Hindutva*. The caste system exists simply as a rationalising and ordering network within this whole:

All that the caste system has done is to regulate its noble blood on lines believed - and on the whole rightly believed - by our saintly and patriotic law-givers and kings to contribute most to fertilise and enrich all that was barren and poor, without famishing (*sic*) and debasing all that was flourishing and nobly endowed.⁶⁶

The idea of horizontal organisation, the binding together of Hindus without disrupting contemporary caste status, was thus eloquently reiterated by *Hindutva*, precisely at a time when it was most severely under attack from Shradhdhanand and the Arya attempt to install caste reform as the principal Mahasabha ethos.

Underpinning this approach to organisation and caste was a perception of Indian history which resisted to a remarkable degree one of the principal structures of Orientalism - the idea of Hindu degeneration. Caste proliferation is certainly perceived as historical, as it is, for example, by Shradhdhanand. But whereas the latter sees it as both cause and effect of the decline from the Golden Age of Vedic Hinduism, Savarkar perceives it simply as a facet of historical development that only helped to preserve and expand the influence and power of the Hindu race. This was particularly so in the wake of Buddhist decline in India - a decline of sorts, when the Hindu race fell pray to the excessive "universalism" and "passivity" of Buddhism, before the national sensibility of the race reasserted itself.⁶⁷ But the Mughal invasions, so important in

⁶³ Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p. 85 - Savarkar is addressing an imaginary sceptic who expresses the "not unoften interested objection that carpingly questions 'but are you really a race? Can you be said to possess a common blood?'"

⁶⁴ The system of *Anuloma* and *Pratiloma*; see *ibid.* For an explanation of these concepts, see Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*; pp. 20-21.

⁶⁵ Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p. 88.

⁶⁶ Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p. 86.

⁶⁷ Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p. 27.

previous versions of "Hindu history" as a catalyst to degeneration, are not presented as a symptom of Hindu decline. Rather, "peace and plenty" lulled Hindus into a false sense of security, which was shattered by the forces of Islam, the "veritable human Sahara whirling and columnning up bodily in a furious world storm." The invasions are presented as part of a pan-Islamic attack on Asia and Africa, in which India alone resisted suppression: "Day after day, decade after decade, century after century, the ghastly conflict continued and India single-handed kept up the fight morally and militantly."⁶⁸ Consistently, then, Savarkar refuses to accept the notion of degeneration. By side-stepping this overriding issue, the patriotic rhetoric of his quasi-historical account constructs a more brazen, aggressively triumphalist vision of the Hindu nation, unburdened by the problems and preoccupations of other ideologues of Hindu organisation.

Hindutva also stands out because it does not dwell self-consciously on the issue of *sangathan*, when this notion dominated Hindu politics of the period. There is a reference in the last few pages to the need to "consolidate the race", for the "Hindu people (to) get fused and welded into an indivisible whole." There is also a veiled threat to low caste movements and potential converts ("Those of you who in a fit suicidal...dare to disown the name Hindu will find to their cost that in doing so they have cut themselves off from the very source of our racial life and strength").⁶⁹ The principal objective of the book, however, is to establish a broad definition of what it means to be Hindu and proclaim the history of this "Hindu race" or nation with a quite unbridled sense of triumphalism.⁷⁰ Nevertheless it must be emphasised that the issues that Savarkar addresses are the same issues that underpin the articulation of *sangathan*. Organisation in this sense is implicit in his vision of the Hindu nation.

Hindutva was unquestionably a text designed for a middle class readership. Not only is it in English, but it is also characterised by what is at times a most obscure and florid rhetoric. The first sentence of the book makes it abundantly clear that this text is not for the un- or even traditionally - educated:

We hope that the fair Maid of Verona who made the impassioned appeal to her love to change a name that was 'nor hand, nor foot, nor arm, nor face, nor any other part belonging to a man' would forgive us for this

⁶⁸ Savarkar, *Hindutva*, pp. 42-4.

⁶⁹ Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p. 141.

⁷⁰ This is not to say, however, that Savarkar was unconcerned with the plight of low castes and particularly untouchables. He was, for example, actively engaged in work with untouchables during the period after his release in 1924 when he was confined to Ratnagiri. In particular, he worked to increase untouchable access to Government maintained schools; see Miscellaneous Correspondence 1925-37, Savarkar Papers Reel 22, (NML).

our idolatrous attachment to it when we make bold to assert that,
'Hindus we are and love to remain so!'⁷¹

The irony apparent in Savarkar's "idolatrous" defiance of Shakespearean wisdom only increases the impression of this work as directed at a very limited audience - precisely the audience, in fact, that the Hindu Mahasabha appealed to for active support. English-educated, high and middle caste Hindus, fearful for their political position and their employment prospects in the post-Montford polity.

Nevertheless *Hindutva* had nothing to say in terms of practical steps towards the consolidation and expansion of this support base. Despite the frequent characterisation of the text as a "scientific analysis" of what it means to be a Hindu,⁷² it has been noted that Savarkar did not deal explicitly with the issue of *sangathan*. As such, *Hindutva* reaffirmed the tendency in horizontal organisation to overlook the means of effecting organisation, and hence to drift again towards a reiteration of symbolic representation as a means of bringing the nation into being. A related and supporting feature here was the continued reliance of the Hindu Mahasabha on aristocratic support. In the absence of a popular organisational structure the Mahasabha was heavily reliant on the patronage of conservative notables and princes such as Laxmanrao Bhonsla, the heir to the disestablished kingdom of Nagpur who supported Moonje's activities quite heavily. This inter-related reliance on symbolic representation and aristocratic support severely limited the political position of the Mahasabha in the post-Independence period.⁷³

A parallel development of the ideology of Hindu organisation, however, signalled a quite radical departure from this pattern of development. The establishment and growth of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in Nagpur channelled the idea of *sangathan* into a different discursive framework.

⁷¹ Savarkar, *Hindutva*, p.1.

⁷² See Keer, *Veer Savarkar*, p. 162.

⁷³ On the post-Independence electoral performance of the Mahasabha, see Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, pp. 107-113. Also, Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, II", p. 635, notes that : "RSS members have frequently told the author that the Hindu Mahasabha was a collection of rich talukdars and zamindars with no real organisation capable of defending Hinduism."

7.2 The Organisation of Hindu Nationalism II: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

Like Savarkar's *Hindutva*, the historical and ideological development of the RSS is a subject which has been quite comprehensively covered by a variety of scholars. Christophe Jaffrelot is the most recent to examine these issues in detail, and little would be gained by duplicating his excellent coverage, which draws both on earlier quite thorough accounts, and on a variety of new sources, including the valuable contribution of oral history accounts.⁷⁴ Almost inevitably, however, the development of the argument in this thesis leads me to disagree with some aspects of Jaffrelot's analysis, particularly in relation to the early development of the RSS. For Jaffrelot, the emergence of the RSS is a further example of the strategy of stigmatisation and emulation of threatening Others which built on that developed by Savarkar. Part of this process was the incorporation of notions of asceticism and the "egalitarian sect" (*sampradaya*) as conduits for the emulation of "western individualistic values".⁷⁵ I will argue against this analysis by highlighting key elements of RSS development in the context of themes raised in this thesis, and in contrast to the pattern of development in the Mahasabha. In keeping with the way in which such developments have been viewed, the emergence of the RSS will not be perceived as a "natural" culmination of the ideological development of Hindu nationalism. Rather, I will illustrate it as a seminal clashing of discursive forms, which effectively constituted a fissure in the ideological meshing previously noted between horizontal organisation and symbolic representation. My argument suggests that this was a highly significant departure in the history of Hindu nationalist ideology.

7.2.1 Early History of the RSS: the Pattern of Expansion

RSS literature cites the founding of the Sangh in 1925 as the work of Dr. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, who would later go on to become the first *Sarsanghchalak*, or

⁷⁴ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*; Pandey, "Which of Us are Hindus?"; T. Basu et al, *Khaki Shorts Saffron Flags*; W. Anderson and S.D. Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*; D.R. Goyal, *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*; W. Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, I: Early Concerns (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 7 No. 11, 11 March 1972, pp. 589-97); J.A. Curran, *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A Study of the RSS* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1951). In addition, there is a large body of RSS-sponsored literature that perpetuates a hagiographic view of the organisation's development. I have referred to two of these accounts fairly extensively: K.R. Malkani, *The RSS Story* (Impex India, New Delhi, 1980); and Deshpande and Ramaswamy, *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker*.

⁷⁵ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 43-5.

absolute leader of the Sangh.⁷⁶ Hedgewar was a Deshastha Brahman; his family was resident in Nagpur and his father followed a traditional priestly occupation. They were by no means well-off, and when both his parents died of plague in 1902, Hedgewar was left at the age of thirteen to fend largely for himself. It does appear, however, that he received substantial help even in his early years from B.S. Moonje, a close associate of Tilak and, as we have seen, a budding Hindu nationalist.⁷⁷

This Tilakite association was continued into the twenties, and some non-RSS sources cite the involvement of several Tilakite politicians in the establishment of the Sangh in 1925.⁷⁸ Certainly, it is evident from Moonje's own diaries that his association with Hedgewar was fairly close. Whenever Moonje was in Nagpur, Hedgewar is a consistent presence in the diaries. RSS members, however, are referred to as "Hedgewar's volunteers" and the actual organisation of the Sangh does not appear as a concern of this national level politician.⁷⁹ This is perhaps not surprising, as the Sangh was at this time an extremely small organisation. Hedgewar's association, however, with more prominent politicians - established particularly since his involvement in the Nagpur Congress of 1920 - almost certainly gave the organisation a particular public profile in the locality.⁸⁰

This profile was quickly enhanced by the Sangh's first formal public action. This was during the *Ram Navami* festival in April 1926. *Ram Navami* was celebrated as a regional *mela* at the temple complex of Ramtek near Nagpur.⁸¹ *Melas* at Ramtek were

76 H.V Seshadri describes the *Sarsanghchalak* as the "guide and philosopher of the Sangh"; see his *RSS: A Vision in Action* (Jagarana Prakashana, Bangalore, 1988), p. 321. Hedgewar became *Sarsanghchalak* in 1929.

77 Deshpande and Ramaswamy state that Hedgewar first worked for Moonje during the "Paisa Fund" agitation 1901; later, after taking his matriculation he stayed with Moonje, and the latter was influential in his decision to enrol at the National Medical College in Calcutta; see *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker*, p. 7, 15.

78 D.R. Goyal, *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*, p. 59 cites the five original members as Moonje, Paranjpe, Tholkar, Babarao Savarkar (Vinayak Damodar's elder brother), and Hedgewar. See also Basu et al, *Khaki Shorts Saffron Flags*, p. 16.

79 See, for example, Moonje's Diary 1927: entries on 4 May, 4 June, 11 June, 13 June; Moonje Papers Reel 1 (NML).

80 Hedgewar's high profile organisational work at the Nagpur Congress (see below) was overseen by Paranjpe - see Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, I", p. 591; his involvement with Moonje, as stated, was long established, but the particular model of "leader" and "stormtrooper" developed after the establishment of the Nagpur Hindu Sabha in 1923, and the subsequent violence at Ganesh Peth - see Goyal, *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*, p. 49; in relation to this, it is interesting to note that the *swayamsevak* and former prominent *pracharak* Vasant Rao Oke, who joined the Sangh in 1926, recalled how he first came to know of Hedgewar through the latter's confrontational strategy of supervising the playing of music before mosques - the issue, of course, which sparked the Ganesh Peth riot; interview with Oke, 16 December 1995.

81 There were in fact two annual *melas* at Ramtek: the April *mela* was far smaller than the 15 day long main event in November. Interestingly, Ramtek's religious significance derives from a story of assertive low caste devotion to Ram. Ram was said to have visited the site in order

characterised by a certain amount of chaos and crime, and Hedgewar led the *swayamsevak*s in a stewarding role, enforcing queues, providing drinking water, and expelling corrupt practitioners.⁸² Significantly, this was the first occasion on which the *swayamsevak*s wore their now familiar uniform of khaki shorts, white shirts and caps. This was the same uniform as that worn by the organisational force directed by Hedgewar at the 1920 Congress Session in Nagpur.⁸³ At Ramtek, then, the Sangh presented itself specifically as a force of order and organisation in the context of a public gathering. Although there was obviously a religious agenda here, the RSS role was not necessarily communally inspired: the *swayamsevak*s are reported to have "driven off" both "Muslim fakirs and brahmin pandits".⁸⁴ The emphasis is more on the bringing of order and justice for the benefit of ordinary pilgrims. This formula of mixing organisational work with a kind of social service has been an enduring feature of Sangh activity.⁸⁵

The first permanent unit, or *shakha*, of the Sangh was established soon after this, at Mohite Wada in the Mahal district of Nagpur city.⁸⁶ By the end of that year three other *shakhas* had been established in the Mahal area, as well as one in the Sitabaldi area of the city.⁸⁷ These small, very localised units acted as the building blocks of RSS expansion. Over the next few years the organisation expanded gradually across Maharashtra, through the establishment of *shakhas*, often after a visit to the area from Hedgewar or one of his associates.⁸⁸ *Shakha* activities ranged from physical games, through marching and *lathi* training, to singing and ideological discussion (*bauddhik* classes). Three aspects of the *shakha* structure need to be emphasised here.⁸⁹ Firstly,

to cut off the head of a Shudra named Shambuka, who had so upset the natural order of things by practising Brahman-style austerities that he caused the death of a Brahman's son. Whilst accepting his fate as an honour, Shambuka "prayed to Rama that he would abide forever at Ramtek. ...So Rama took up his abode on the hill, and the Shudra was turned into a *linga* over which the temple of Dhumreshwar Mahadeo was built." See *Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District*, A Volume (1908), p. 331.

82 Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 35; this role was confirmed by Vasant Rao Oke, who recalled that Swayamsevak "went together by bicycle to Ramtek to manage the *yatra*."

83 See Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, I", p. 593; and Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 35, n. 55.

84 Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 35; again supported (undemonstratively) by oral evidence from Oke.

85 During Partition, for example, the RSS was active in relief work for refugees from the newly created Pakistan. Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, II", p. 638, notes that this not only enhanced the Sangh's reputation, but also assisted directly its expansion: "As the refugees spread out over northern and western India, they took the RSS with them and served as the membership nucleus for new *shakhas*."

86 28 May 1926; see Deshpande and Ramaswamy, *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker*, p. 83.

87 Evidence from Vasant Rao Oke, who joined the Sitabaldi *shakha* in 1926.

88 N.B. Lele, interviewed 20 January 1996, explained that he joined the RSS as one of "a dozen students" in his home town of Jalgaon in Maharashtra after a visit from one of Hedgewar's associates in 1934.

89 I will look at *shakhas* in further detail in the next section.

shakhas convened at the same times each day. RSS hagiography cites Sister Nivedita, the Irish-born disciple of Vivekananda, as the inspiration for this, through an apparently Christian notion of religiosity: "Congregate and pray together for fifteen minutes everyday, and Hindu society will become an invincible society."⁹⁰ This synchronisation of activity became more powerful as the organisation expanded. Thus the second *Sarsanghchalak*, M.S. Golwalkar, was able to point to it as a symbol of the national significance of the RSS:

Throughout the length and breadth of Hindusthan, not only in towns and cities but in far off hamlets, hills and dales, these inspiring scenes and soul-stirring songs greet us regularly and punctually at the time of sunrise, sunset or at night everyday. We call it *shakha*.⁹¹

Secondly, recruitment to the *shakha* was directed at the very young.⁹² Dr. S.B. Warnekar was only nine years old when he joined the Mohite Wada *shakha* in 1927. He recalls that most of the boys he saw in the *shakha* were older than him. However, when he asked Dr. Hedgewar if he could join, he was told that he should collect ten boys of his age, then he would be able to join. The next day he brought ten boys from his neighbourhood and so gained entry.⁹³ This brings us to the third point to note in relation to the *shakha*: recruitment occurred very much through local word of mouth. Warnekar described it as a "friends' circle" approach to recruitment. As a result, recruitment during this early period was confined to a particular social/caste stratum: middle class and lower middle class, upper caste (mostly Brahman) boys. Much has been made of this high caste, middle class profile.⁹⁴ There is no doubt that the disciplining of high caste youth was a feature of the organisation; as Moonje commented in 1927, "I wish that many more young Brahmin lads go through such discipline and experience."⁹⁵ Considering the ideological trajectory and middle class base of the RSS, however, this high caste domination was not extraordinary. It had also, after all, been a feature of socio-religious reform organisations like the Arya Samaj and the Ramakrishna Mission, and indeed of the early Congress organisation.

⁹⁰ Quoted in M.S. Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts* (Vikram Prakashan, Bangalore, 1966), p. 368; also recalled by K.S. Sudarshan, former joint General Secretary of the RSS, in Basu et al, *Khaki Shorts Saffron Flags*, p. 16.

⁹¹ Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts*, p. 334; Jaffrelot has pointed to this aspect of the *shakha* as evidence of the Sangh's projection of an imagined community, in the manner described by Benedict Anderson as a key feature of nationalist consciousness; see *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 64.

⁹² Of the five *Swayamsevaks* I interviewed who had joined the organisation in the first nine years of its existence, only one had reached his teens when he joined.

⁹³ Interview with S.B. Warnekar, 22 April 1996.

⁹⁴ See Goyal, *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*, p. 60; Basu et al, *Khaki Shorts Saffron Flags*, pp. 16-7; for an opposing view, see Curran, *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics*, p. 11.

⁹⁵ Diary 11 June 1927; Moonje Papers Reel One (NML); also see his press statement in *Hitavada* 17 July 1927.

These three elements help us to establish a profile of RSS expansion during these early years. The accent on youth and "friends' circle" recruitment emphasises the localised nature of expansion; the synchronisation of *shakha* activity continually puts this local setting into a wider and ever expanding context. This simple model allowed the RSS to expand in Maharashtra and later, in the thirties, in the north, relying on similar urban and semi-urban middle class settings, where the three elements had the most impact.

One further element also needs to be taken into account: the communal riot. In September 1927 a serious riot occurred in Nagpur city. Three days of rioting resulted in twenty deaths and 131 wounded. The estimated economic cost was Rupees 50 000 per day.⁹⁶ The riot had something of a manufactured quality to it, having been preceded by stagey processions by both Hindus and Muslims.⁹⁷ The *Hitavada* stated that "the Hindus, who had anticipated a challenge from the Mahommedans, were not unprepared," and that certain areas of Nagpur were guarded by Hindu volunteers who were "constantly patrolling the streets."⁹⁸ This suggestion of RSS involvement is by no means denied in RSS literature:

The warlike posture of Muslims sent shock-waves through the hearts of the Hindus. But a little over hundred young men of the Sangh were determined to protect the Hindu society. Anna Sohani had divided them into sixteen groups and stationed them in strategic places in different Hindu areas. As planned, Muslim goondas began abusing the Hindus and attacking them. However, they were in for a rude shock. Swayamsevaks, who were on the alert, repelled the attacks instantly. The Muslims were totally taken aback at this unexpected turn of events and found it hard even to make a get-away. Seeing the swayamsevaks repulsing the Muslims, other Hindus also felt emboldened and joined the fray - many of them barely dressed, some in their silk dhoti customarily worn during *pooja*!⁹⁹

Anna Sohani was a close associate of Hedgewar's, and his marshalling of the *swayamsevaks* is shown to have "repulsed Muslim attacks". It is possible that the RSS involvement in the riot has been over-emphasised in RSS literature - there is no mention of the organisation, for example, in the Government communiqué on the matter - but certainly the occasion led to a higher profile for the organisation. S.B. Warnekar commented that after the riot "people looked to the RSS...with some hope." Baparao Wharadpandey, another Nagpur *swayamsevak*, also recalled that the RSS expanded after the riot due to the spread of ideas about "Hindu society as one entity".¹⁰⁰

96 *Hitavada* 11 September 1927.

97 See Local Government Communiqué on the riot, published in *Hitavada* 13 September 1927.

98 *Hitavada* 8 September 1927.

99 Deshpande and Ramaswamy, *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker*, p. 95-6.

100 Interview with Baparao Wharadpandey, ex-Nagpur *pracharak*, in Nagpur 21 April 1996; interview with Warnekar op. cit. note 84; Deshpande and Ramaswamy, *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker*, pp. 96-7, comment: "After the riot the name of the Sangh as well as its founder Doctor Hedgewar spread throughout the length and breadth of Central Provinces."

An interesting feature of Deshpande and Ramaswamy's comment on the riot above is the reference to the involvement of Hindus "in their silk dhotis". This is preceded by an assertion that the Muslim "plan" was to "loot the Hindus belonging to the rich and middle classes." For the RSS, then, this was not simply an occasion of low class slippage into anarchy and disorder. The 1927 riot is presented as an occasion when the middle classes, inspired by the actions of the *swayamsevak*s, began to fight back. Whether or not this was the case is difficult to establish, but the implication is clear: the RSS is presented as the embodiment of a middle class-led *sangathan*, capable of defending itself and of teaching a few lessons in the process.¹⁰¹ It is notable that in the wake of the 1927 riot *swayamsevak*s were invited to attend the Mahasabha Session at Ahmedabad, where another of Hedgewar's associates, Balaji Huddar, gave a speech that "reflected the conquering zeal of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh." "This was how the leaders of the various provinces were introduced to the Sangh," Deshpande and Ramaswamy comment, "it was natural that all of them developed great warmth towards the Sangh."¹⁰²

This rapid popularisation was underpinned by the steady expansion of the *shakha* network. By the beginning of 1929, there were eighteen *shakhas*, mostly in Nagpur and Wardha. By August that year the number had increased to thirty four.¹⁰³ It is clear that Hedgewar perceived Nagpur as the centre of the Sangh, an example for expansion in other areas. He repeatedly emphasised this notion in letters, particularly during those periods when he was himself absent from Nagpur.¹⁰⁴ The strength of Nagpur then formed the basis for a methodical and controlled approach to expansion. By the early thirties Hedgewar had instituted monthly reports to himself as a duty of all *shakha* leaders (*pramukhs*). The practice was instigated at a meeting in Nagpur of all *pramukhs* on 9 and 10 November 1929. The policy of *ekchalakanuvartita* (following one leader) - the central idea of RSS discipline - was evidently adopted at this meeting. The most significant act in the adoption of this policy is often cited as Hedgewar's formal assumption of the position of *Sarsanghchalak*.¹⁰⁵ Equally important, however, was the range of information *pramukhs* were required to bring to the meeting. This included the precise size of their *shakha* and a profile of their *swayamsevak*s; the size of the town in which they operated, and the proportion of Hindus, Muslims and Christians in the town; and also the nature of any opposition to the Sangh in the

101 Wharadpandey, Oke and Warnekar all commented that after the '27 riot, the Nagpur Muslims "did not cause trouble again".

102 Deshpande and Ramaswamy, *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker*, p. 97.

103 Hedgewar to Dadar Paramarth 21 August 1929; Hedgewar Letters No. 5 of 1929.

104 See for example, Letter Nos. 1, 5, 6 of 1929; No. 2 of 1931.

105 See, for example, Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh", p.593.

area.¹⁰⁶ Hedgewar's power, it appears, was constructed on the basis of a precise knowledge of the nature and extent of the organisation, and the environment in which it operated. Over the next few years Hedgewar's correspondence consistently refers to the maintenance of this flow of information, not only in relation to *shakhas* but also to functions and camps held in different regions, and festivals attended by *swayamsevaks*.¹⁰⁷

This approach to knowledge is reminiscent of the zeal of the colonial bureaucracy. As noted in Chapter 3, knowledge operated as a key feature of the colonial image of order and organisation. With this interesting linkage in mind, I will now examine in further detail the organisational models which underpinned the RSS structure as it emerged towards the end of the twenties.

7.2.2 Organisational Models

In examining the emergence of the RSS organisation, several models have been highlighted by scholars. One of the most persistent has been the *akhara*, a localised unit of young men which bears a strong resemblance to the *shakha*.¹⁰⁸ The *akhara* is most commonly associated with physical fitness gymnasiums and the art of wrestling, but also with forms of cultural performance (theatre, music, poetry), medicine and even "the organisational structure used by mendicants". Sandria Freitag has cited the *akhara* as a significant organisational form in the public arena: "a basic unit for mobilising for collective action of various kinds...*akharas* represented a potentially diverse and distinctly voluntary form of social organisation."¹⁰⁹ To some extent, *akharas* had a religious association, in that many included temples to Hanuman in their grounds.¹¹⁰ It should also be noted, however, that particularly during the second half of the nineteenth century the *akhara* institution played an increasingly fluid role in popular organisation, often being adapted as a means of gaining popular patronage by cultural practitioners who had previously received aristocratic or royal support. Such adaptations were given

¹⁰⁶ Circular letter, Hedgewar to all *pramukhs*, 1 Nov. 1929; Hedgewar Letters No. 9 of 1929.

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, Letter to Nilkantrao Sadaphal 24 April 1932, No. 7 of 1932, and to Balasaheb Dani 13 August 1933, No. 44 of 1933.

¹⁰⁸ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 35; Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 35; J. Alter, "Somatic Nationalism: Indian Wrestling and Militant Hinduism" (in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 28 No. 3, 1994, pp. 557-88).

¹⁰⁹ See S. Freitag [ed.], *Culture and Power in Banaras: Community, Performance and Environment, 1800-1980* (Univ. of California 1989) p. 120-1.

¹¹⁰ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 35.

legitimacy by maintaining familiar structures as a feature of the organisation, such as, for example, the teacher-disciple relationship.¹¹¹

Certainly the way in which the RSS emerged confirms the connection between *akharas* and the *shakha* unit. Before the daily *shakha* was introduced in May 1926, Hedgewar encouraged his volunteers to attend an *akhara*.¹¹² Early *swayamsevak*s interviewed in relation to this project all stated either that they had joined the RSS via an *akhara*, or that they had been attracted by the "physical tricks" of *shakha* activity and viewed it as "a new kind of *akhara*".¹¹³ This reflects very much the increased prominence of *akharas* as a feature of politics in the mid-twenties. Anderson and Damle note a leap in the number of *akharas* in Nagpur district over this period from 230 to 570.¹¹⁴ It is also evident that the *sangathan* movement had to some extent encouraged the idea of *akhara* attendance as a feature of the revitalisation of Hindu society.¹¹⁵ Jaffrelot has noted the expansion of *akhara* activity in relation to the spread of extremist nationalism, and Freitag has noted the setting up of *akharas* as a feature of the Congress-led Municipal Board in Kanpur in the nineteen twenties.¹¹⁶ To some extent, then, the *akhara* had become entrenched as a feature of political life, if not a symbol of political intent, by the mid-twenties. With its implication of physical, or even quasi-military, preparation (the Kanpur *akharas* had been started "to teach the art of warfare") this organisational form appears to have represented a counterpoint to the supposed passivity, or, as Ashish Nandy has suggested, femininity, of Gandhian *ahimsa* as a basis for mobilisation.¹¹⁷ In this context the adaptation of the *akhara* model in the RSS has a clear implication: it was an appropriate form for an organisation which resisted the trajectory of Gandhian *ahimsa*.

¹¹¹ See Freitag, *Collective Action and Community*, p. 122; I emphasise this partly in reaction to Jaffrelot's citation of the teacher-disciple relationship as a feature of the religious significance of the *akhara* form, which I believe is over-emphasised.

¹¹² Malkani notes that "Most of them went to Anna Khote's Nagpur Vyayamshala." *The RSS Story*, p. 15.

¹¹³ V.R. Oke and B. Wharadpandey joined via *akharas*; S.B. Warnekar and M.G. Vaidya (interviewed 22 April 1996) were attracted by the physical exercises; N.B. Lele recalled that he and his friends saw the RSS as "a new kind of *akhara*".

¹¹⁴ Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 35; Nagpur District had by far the largest concentration of *akharas* in Central Provinces and Berar - the figures for the whole area over the period are 466 in 1921, and 1338 in 1931; see *Census of India* 1931 Vol. XII, Central Provinces and Berar, Pt. 1: Report (Government Printing, Nagpur, 1933), p.296.

¹¹⁵ Shradddhanand included an *akhara* as a necessary feature of his Rashtra Mandirs - see *Hindu Sangathan*, p. 140; it is also interesting to note that in the context of the Ganesh Peth tension in 1923, the *Pranavir* called for the construction of a temple to Ganesh in the area, to include a branch office of the Mahasabha and an *Akhara* in its grounds - see *Pranavir* 29 November 1923; RIN CP & B No. 49 of 1923.

¹¹⁶ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 36; Freitag, *Collective Action and Community*, p. 225.

¹¹⁷ See Jaffrelot's comments and citation, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 46.

Interestingly, however, other aspects of the Gandhian strategy evidently had their place as models of RSS organisation, and this may be related to the argument developed in Chapter 6 concerning the emergence of a new discourse of organisation in the twenties. The volunteer model is perhaps the most immediate. It has been mentioned that Hedgewar took charge of a large body of volunteers at the 1920 Congress. Under the direction of Paranjpe, he supervised some of the work of the 1200 strong force that managed the Congress *tamasha*.¹¹⁸ The experience obviously had some impact on Hedgewar. As we have seen, when the *swayamsevaks* appeared in their first crowd management role at Ramtek in 1926, they were required to wear the same uniform as the volunteers at the 1920 Session. Earlier, when Hedgewar was appointed Joint Secretary of the Provincial Congress in 1922, he had attempted to raise a permanent, district-based volunteer force as part of the Congress. In doing so he faced some opposition, and was unable to raise an effective force.¹¹⁹ Here, it appears, he confronted the indecision of the Gandhian Congress in relation to volunteers. Deshpande and Ramaswamy state that "those who had taken the Gandhian vow of non-violence were basically opposed to such an organisation."¹²⁰

As we have seen, the concept of volunteers was central to Gandhi's notion of *satyagraha*. Nevertheless the nervousness with which the elite leadership reconciled the volunteer corps with the strategy of non-violence led to a repeated misconception of the meaning of the corps in the context of mass mobilisation. Because it was not related to the strategy of non-violence, the ideology of Hindu organisation was able to appropriate the concept of disciplined volunteering without this kind of ideological anxiety. The volunteer concept reflected perfectly the desire to present Hindu society as a homogenous, co-ordinated unit, working in a dedicated and organised fashion. It was, in effect, the perfect vehicle for the articulation of *sangathan* as the salvation of Hindu society.

Part of the reason for this confluence between volunteering and *sangathan* was, ironically, the proximity of volunteering in the political discourse of the twenties to the idea of *satyagraha*. It has been illustrated how Gandhian *satyagraha* was conceived as operating through a double layer of activists. Front-line *satyagrahis* were people who had taken the *satyagraha* oath and were prepared to break the law and fill the prisons in the name of the cause. These *satyagrahis* were ordinary people - peasants, workers, government servants, traders etc. - who had been drawn into the movement for liberation. They were the life-blood of the strategy of mass mobilisation. Behind them

¹¹⁸ Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 31

¹¹⁹ Deshpande and Ramaswamy, *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker*, p. 66.

¹²⁰ *ibid.*

were the full-time workers of Gandhian nationalism - the "ideal *satyagrahis*" who not only managed the movement, but practised *satyagraha* as a way of life. It was these workers who would effect, through their example, the process of *atmashuddhi*. As students of Truth, these workers were also *brahmacharyas*, and celibacy was an important feature of their commitment. "Those who want to perform national service," Gandhi comments in 1916, "or those who want to have a glimpse of the real religious life, must lead a celibate life, no matter if married or unmarried."¹²¹

A double layer of activists is also evident in the RSS from an early date.¹²² The *swayamsevaks* form the front-line of RSS activity. They demonstrate their allegiance through daily attendance at the *shakha* as well as through the oath of allegiance,¹²³ and are called upon to put in service to the Sangh as and when required. They remain, however, ordinary people with college, job, family and other commitments. Behind them are the *pracharaks*, the full-time workers of the Sangh, who organise Sangh activities within a given area and provide guidance to all *swayamsevaks* within that area.¹²⁴ Again, *pracharaks* are presented as "ideal" workers. They are wholly committed to the objectives of the Sangh, live in Sangh accommodation, and remain unpaid. In addition, they generally remain unmarried and live a life of celibacy.¹²⁵ The *pracharak* ideal, then, is also replete with ideas of *brahmacharya*. Indeed, Gandhi is said to have appreciated this quality in Hedgewar,¹²⁶ although the *pracharak* ideal is generally perceived as a more conventional approach to *ashrama dharma* than that propagated by the Mahatma.¹²⁷

From this comparison it may be seen that the basic structure of the RSS was drawn from standard nationalist idioms, developed in the broad context of the search for an

¹²¹ "Speech on Ashram Vows", at YMCA Madras, February 1916; quoted in R. Iyer, *The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991), p. 286.

¹²² N.B. The first *pracharaks*, the "higher" level of activists, were appointed out of the first Officer Training Camp in Nagpur in 1927.

¹²³ See Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh I", p.593.

¹²⁴ This idea of a double layer refers to the activist manifestation of the organisation. The Sangh also has a hierarchical structure of command (in the same way as the Gandhian Congress had a structure of command, although of a somewhat different nature). For a full picture of the RSS organisation, see Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, pp. 84-9.

¹²⁵ Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 88; also Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 40, 43.

¹²⁶ The Mahatma's visit to the Sangh camp at Wardha in 1934 is recalled in Anonymous, *RSS: Spearheading National Renaissance* (Prakashan Vibhag, Bangalore 1985), p. 15: "The spirit of rigorous simplicity and self-sacrifice of the swayamsevaks in bearing the entire burden of the organisational expenses...had especially impressed Gandhiji. And when he came to know that Doctorji had neither taken to any profession not to a married life, he exclaimed 'Ah, that explains the remarkable degree of your success in such a short time.'"

¹²⁷ Anderson and Damle note that although becoming a *pracharak* was theoretically a lifelong commitment, many "intended to sacrifice several years of their lives for the nation and then fulfil their duties as a householder." See *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 88.

elite-led strategy of mass confrontation with the state. Hedgewar's innovation was to use these idioms as a means of propagating the ideology of Hindu nationalism, whilst much of the Hindu nationalist movement from which he drew ideological inspiration remained wedded to the notion of symbolic representation. Hedgewar had been intimately involved in the Indian national movement, and his establishment and development of the Sangh must be seen in this context. In particular, it must be seen in the context of the new discourse of organisation which had emerged as a result of the reconfiguration of nationalist strategy. What Hedgewar was doing was drawing on structures and idioms of political mobilisation made available to him through this discourse.

Interestingly, the model of British-style bureaucratic organisation also emerges in this context. As we have seen, after 1929, when the policy of *ekchhalak anuvartita* was adopted, Hedgewar consistently pressed his associates to provide a regular flow of information to him in Nagpur on the status of the Sangh and its immediate environment. At the same time, local units of the Sangh were left to run themselves, under the guidance of the local *pracharak*. The strength of the Sangh organisation, then, was based on the flow of knowledge from local to central points, whilst at the same time leaving local leaders to react to local situations, within the framework of Sangh ideology. As Jaffrelot has pointed out, this model meant that the idea of organisation superseded any individual practitioner in the RSS; loyalty was owed to this organisation (and its symbol, the "guru" of the RSS, the *Bhagwa Dhwaj*, or saffron flag), rather than to Hedgewar or his successors.¹²⁸ This model is reminiscent of the way in which colonial bureaucracy operated, because of the self-image of that bureaucracy as the representative of state organisation, a symbol of order within the disorganised state of Indian society.¹²⁹ At the same time, however, it recalls Gandhi's emphasis on the organisation, and the volunteers as its constituent parts, as the real path to *swaraj*. As he said, Chauri Chaura could not have happened "if the Congress and the Khilafat organisations were perfect. It is all a question of perfecting the organisation."

This argument is presented as a counterpoint to the image of the Sangh as based on semi-mystical/religious organisational models. Much academic work on the Sangh has emphasised these models as a reason for the Sangh's ability to sustain itself and expand

¹²⁸ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, pp. 62-4.

¹²⁹ See Section 3.1.2 - Bureaucracy is presented here as a "tool for the organisation of colonial society, through the acquisition and processing of information"; Baparao Wharadpandey stated in interview that the basic model used by Hedgewar to promote organisation was the British; he "never criticised the British" because of this awareness of the "organisation of British society."

its organisational base quite remarkably over the past seventy years. In particular, Christophe Jaffrelot characterises the Sangh as a nationalist "sect" (*sampradaya*) and *pracharaks* as ascetic *karma yogins*. His argument is that these "traditional" models were utilised by Hedgewar and later Golwalkar as "a means of developing the sociological structure of an egalitarian, united nation."¹³⁰ The *sampradaya* structure is presented here as "the only system within Hindu society where an egalitarian form of individualism can be observed," and it is this form of individualism which is needed for the construction of the idea of nation. In this sense, Hedgewar is presented as appropriating this traditional structure as a means of strategically emulating the western individualistic values which underpin the nation concept.¹³¹

The immediate problem with this argument is the way in which it extracts the *sampradaya* structure from its wider context. Jaffrelot draws on Dumont's work to oppose the structure to the caste system, "in so far as the first represents the domain of the individual and the second forms a holistic system in which the individual has no real place."¹³² This overlooks the fact that caste and *sampradaya* have a complementary significance. They have integrated roles in the maintenance and change of Hindu socio-religious structures.¹³³ To extract the *sampradaya* structure from this equation as a societal model ignores the fact that this structure is inextricably linked into the wider societal model provided by the caste-*sampradaya* nexus.

A second problem with the argument derives from the agency invested in Hedgewar and Golwalkar as ideological architects of the RSS. Jaffrelot is forced into the position of presenting the first two *Sarsanghchalaks* as consciously manipulating "traditional" symbols in order to impute alien notions of nationality to a gullible public. Much as this may gratify the tendency of RSS ideologues to present their leaders as the sole source of inspiration for the movement, it can present only a limited, instrumentalist view of how ideologies are constructed and how they operate in the world. My point is that Hedgewar's project can only be given full meaning by placing it within the historical context of ideological and organisational development. The RSS was able to establish a presence in Nagpur and begin to extend it within Maharashtra precisely because it presented itself in the familiar idioms of nationalist organisation. Naturally, this format meant that the same groups who had been the driving force of the nationalist agitations of the early twenties were influential in the development of the Sangh: i.e. the younger generation of middle class and lower middle class Hindus, disaffected with

¹³⁰ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 45.

¹³¹ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 44.

¹³² Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 43.

¹³³ See A. Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change", esp. p. 3-4.

colonial government and eager to assert a self-confident sense of nationality. Evidence from oral accounts supports this, through the assertion by most of the early *swayamsevaks* I interviewed that one of their principal reasons for joining the RSS was in order to be part of the national movement.¹³⁴

The point illustrates the way in which the ideologies of Indian nationalism and Hindu nationalism still merged together during this period. They emanated from the same middle class base and attracted the same middle class people as activists. The RSS in a sense increased this confluence, because of its operation within the new discourse of organisation which had emerged from the political dynamism of the early twenties. It was nevertheless a resolutely Hindu nationalist organisation, bringing all the attributes of the model of the horizontal organisation of Hindu society into this new discursive arena. In the next section I will examine how this model of society was articulated.

7.2.3 *Sangathan* in RSS Ideology: Conceptualising Hinduism and Hindu Society

The objectives of the RSS were drawn directly from the idea of *sangathan* as the horizontal organisation of Hindu society. *Sangathan*, that is, not in Shraddhanand's sense, but in the sense of a non-confrontational binding together of Hindu society, eschewing reform whilst at the same time encouraging respect for all castes as part of the "organic" whole. As we have seen, whilst this idea was at the heart of the movement of the mid-twenties, an overall strategy for effecting *sangathan* was not developed, because of the constrictions of the political discourse in which it was expressed. The development of the localised, volunteer-based structure of the RSS, on the other hand, created the opportunity for the elaboration of *sangathan* along these lines. This section will look at how this elaboration took place, by examining the relationship between this idea of *sangathan* and later RSS articulations of Hinduism and Hindu society.

In RSS ideology, the path to *sangathan* was perceived as a revitalisation of the Hindu nation, through an awakening of consciousness: "Awakening is knowledge and knowledge is the capacity to realise unity in diversity, to find harmony in place of conflict, and to worship society in the place of self." It is important to realise that this process was seen as revitalising what had previously existed:

¹³⁴ Oke, Wharadpandey and Warnekar all stated this as an important reason for their joining the RSS. N. B. Lele, who joined somewhat later in 1934, was not attracted by Indian nationalism, saying that because of his commitment to the Sangh he had "no time" for politics. Indeed, as an active *swayamsevak* in Bombay in the late nineteen thirties, he recalled that he faced opposition from Congress workers, who perceived RSS members (wrongly, Lele emphasised) as working on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha.

...We believe that the present perversions and misconceptions are only a passing phase. Our cultural roots are too firm and too deeply struck into the springs of immortality to be easily dried up. They are bound to assert their age-old vigour and vitality and throw out the parasitic growth of the past few centuries and sprout forth once again in all their pristine purity and grandeur.¹³⁵

These passages, written by Golwalkar, reflect the elaboration of *sangathan* in a new discursive framework. The objective was to transform the fragmented state of the Hindu nation, by breaking the shackles of "foreign" domination. The cultural tradition of Hindu society was perceived as having its own independent existence: it was just a case of guiding the people towards it. The RSS objective was to provide this guidance; *sangathan* meant transforming the consciousness of Hindu society, in the same way as the counter-hegemonic strategy of the Congress aimed to transform the consciousness of the Indian people. Similarly, what Jaffrelot describes as the RSS's "sangathanist" method of organisation was adapted from the Gandhian model of mass mobilisation - transforming consciousness on a microcosmic level.¹³⁶

How then, was consciousness to be transformed; what was the meaning, in other words, of RSS *sangathan*? The catholicity apparent in Savarkar's work, which as we have seen is necessarily implicit in the idea of *sangathan*, was developed by the RSS' self-image of cultural nationalism. Culture here is defined as "a value system established through a long and intricate process of history", and based on the idea of *dharma*. *Dharma* is a "moral principle of universal harmony" which governs processes of integration. Religion is part of this *dharma*, in the sense that it represents an individual's integration with God, but it is not the whole of *dharma*. The Hindu *rashtra*, in this conception, is a vision of *dharma* in a cultural, social and historical sense, but not in a religious sense. *Sangathan* relates specifically to the social aspect of *dharma*.¹³⁷

Religion, then, is removed from the vision of an organised Hindu society, in a manner again reminiscent of Savarkar's *Hindutva*. It becomes a private concern, a matter of one's personal relationship with God.¹³⁸ This is a classic statement of the "tolerance"

¹³⁵ M.S. Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts*, p. 29, 32.

¹³⁶ This Gandhian strategy was to give way in the Congress to the "aggregationist" strategy, as that body withdrew from the mass implication of counter hegemony; see Jaffrelot, "The BJP in Madhya Pradesh: Networks, Strategies and Power" (in G. Pandey, *Hindus and Others*, pp. 110-145), p. 111.

¹³⁷ This paragraph is based on an interview with the RSS *Baudhik Pramukh* Baburao M.G. Vaidya on 22 April 1996. Quotations are direct transcripts from this interview.

¹³⁸ Vaidya goes as far as to decry the notion of *punyabhū*, or holy land, as a qualifying stipulation of Hindu nationality. "It is not essential", he says, and Christians and Muslims can "become Hindu" as long as they accept the notion of Hindu society.

of Hinduism, which draws on the universalist tendencies of *Advaita Vedanta*. It differs markedly from the reformism of the late nineteenth century - in particular the Arya Samaj, with its insistence on the Vedas as the source of all Truth.

This distinction is also apparent in the RSS attitude towards caste. Because of the restriction of religion as a private concern, caste becomes a social issue; it therefore comes within the self-proclaimed ambit of RSS concerns. The ideal Hindu *rashtra* is a casteless society, in which all Hindus are one, united as a kind of cultural brotherhood.¹³⁹ The Sangh is a reflection of this ideal, in that *shakhas* and camps do not officially recognise caste distinctions, and *swayamsevaks* are required to perform all tasks whilst in this environment.¹⁴⁰

In consonance with the idea of horizontal organisation, however, this attitude is not supported by a programme of reform in relation to caste. The attitude is rather described as "erosion", a gradual process of change through the example of *swayamsevaks*.¹⁴¹ In fact, Jaffrelot has noted that the idealised vision of a casteless society was supplemented by a defence of caste, based on the *dharmic* quality (i.e. in terms of social harmony) of the *varna* system.¹⁴² This point is supported by Balasaheb Deoras, the third *Sarsanghchalak* of the Sangh, in a speech in Pune in 1974. Giving an account of the proliferation of castes on the basis of *varna vyavastha*, he stated:

The whole society was visualised as a single living entity, personified into a magnificent figure with a thousand heads, a thousand eyes and a thousand feet. Such a glorious concept does not permit the perverse and ridiculous notion that the thighs are superior to the feet, hands are superior to the thighs or the head is superior to the hands. The idea is that all these limbs are equally essential for the proper functioning of society.¹⁴³

This defence was tempered by the assertion that the system "has to die and is already dying a natural death." The policy of erosion was then cited by reference to the example of Hedgewar:

139 The maleness of RSS ideology is, of course, always already assumed as a central feature of "traditional Hindu society"; Hedgewar, for example, often referred to the importance of the Nagpur Sangh as the "father" of the organisation; op. cit. n. 104; for an interesting account of the position of women within this ideology, see Tanika Sarkar, "Women's Agency within Authoritarian Communalism: The Rashtrasevika Samiti and Ramjanmabhoomi" (in G. Pandey, *Hindus and Others*, pp. 24-73).

140 Anderson and Damle note that participants in Officer Training Camps "are required to take their turn at cleaning the latrines, sweeping and other 'defiling' activities." See *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 95. This is another feature of the Wardha camp which Gandhi is supposed to have warmly approved in 1934. - see Deshpande and Ramaswamy, *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker*, pp. 146-50.

141 The process was explained to me in these terms by M.G. Vaidya.

142 Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 45.

143 B. Deoras, *Social Equality and Consolidation* (Jagarana Prakashana, Bangalore, 1974), p. 9.

I was present in the first Sangh camp. In that there were quite a number of Mahaar (untouchable) brethren. At the time of meals, some began hesitating to sit along with them. They had never before in their life sat for meals with the Mahaars. They placed their problem before Doctorji. But he did not enforce the discipline of the camp and ask them to get out. Doctorji simply said "our practice is to sit together. We shall sit accordingly." All of us sat together for meals. Those few that were hesitant sat in a separate line. But, for the next meals these very people came to Doctorji and apologised and sat with us of their own accord.¹⁴⁴

Of course, if this incident did take place - and one has to be sceptical of the idea that "quite a number of Mahaar brethren" took part in an early Sangh camp - the weight of peer group pressure on young minds needs to be taken into account in the process of erosion. Nevertheless it expresses the idea of non-confrontational example which is confirmed by other accounts.¹⁴⁵

The Sangh, then, has developed an approach to Hinduism and reform which draws much from the horizontal approach to organisation. It does not deny that society needs to be changed, but assumes that change is occurring "naturally", as a feature of the homogenisation of society. Caste identity, as it was explained to me, is being *replaced* by Hindu identity. This is a fascinating idea, in that it side-steps the old dilemma of horizontal organisation about how to consolidate Hinduism without disturbing caste; caste being perceived precisely as essential to Hindu identity. The RSS notion in effect presents an alternative organising principle in Hindu society, in a similar manner noted as the function of the Arya Samaj's Mandirs: in this case the alternative is the RSS itself. As Vaidya states, the RSS "is not an organisation in society, but of society"; its objective is to be "coterminous with Hindu society."¹⁴⁶ The difference between this and the Arya Samaj's structural intervention is that the RSS organisation does not confront caste in the same way, because it is not backed up by a radical, transformative ideology, like that of Dayananda. Nevertheless it is something of an anomaly in the context of a horizontal approach to organisation.

Ideologically, in fact, the RSS is quite flexible. It has the ability to appropriate powerful symbols and adopt different strategies as and when they are needed, without threatening its basic principles or sense of identity.¹⁴⁷ This is because it is based as much on a catholic sense of cultural inclusivism as it is on anti-Muslim exclusivism. I

¹⁴⁴ Deoras, *Social Equality and Consolidation*, p. 13.

¹⁴⁵ For example, Bapurao Wharadpandey recalled "persuading" other *swayamsevak*s that commensality was the way forward: "it was the logical step from the idea of one Hinduism." Similarly, S.B. Warnekar informed me that although he saw caste rigidity as damaging, and dissipating the strength of Hindu society, he was nevertheless committed to the sub-caste marriage of his son. The RSS, he said, would not object to this.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with M.G. Vaidya.

¹⁴⁷ This is a point which Jaffrelot's book makes repeatedly.

have argued that this cultural inclusivism, having its roots in the idea of horizontal organisation, was extended and developed because of the localised structures through which the RSS has worked, integrating itself into local cultural norms. It is these localised structures which broke the ideological link between horizontal organisation and symbolic representation, and so for the first time opened up opportunities for the development of elite Hindu nationalist ideology as a strategy of mass mobilisation, drawing on and accommodating microcosmic experiences of what it means to be a Hindu. On this basis the RSS developed its image as a cultural force, removed from a primary involvement in politics. In most cases it has maintained this image, developing associate organisations to effect overt interventions in state-level politics. As an adjunct to this I would say that the Congress' own dislocation from questions of cultural development, cultural identity, resulted precisely from the elite leadership's continued concentration on this level of politics, stemming from its inability to carry through the counter-hegemonic strategy of the early twenties. As a result it was unable to draw on or accommodate those same microcosmic experiences of identity - of what it meant, in this case, to be an Indian.

This is not to say, however, that the RSS developed as a "popular" or democratic organisation as such. As we have seen, ideologically it is rooted firmly in the middle class, and its leadership, right down to *pracharak* level, has remained a high caste, middle class preserve.¹⁴⁸ This is a reflection of the trajectory of Sangh ideology, emanating from this middle class, high caste base. As such, low caste mobilisation has never formed the principal source of opposition for the Sangh; it could not, because as I have illustrated, low caste mobilisation even in the twenties operated on an entirely different discursive plane. Rather, the Sangh finds it easier to encompass (in an ideological sense) low caste movements than to oppose them. Neither does Islam form this opposition - of course it is strongly reviled and emerges as the most persistent Other in RSS ideology, but apart from in intensely communal situations, this Other is not an opposition - indeed, it is a key feature of the inclusivist Hindu identity. Rather, the principal opposition emerges as the "pseudo-secularists" and "territorial nationalists" of the Congress. The opposition is strongest precisely because of the discursive commonality of these singularly middle class forms of nationalism. Nothing illustrates this commonality more clearly than the ease with which the Sangh appropriated and developed organisational forms which had initially emerged as a mechanism for the realisation of counter-hegemonic Indian nationalism.

¹⁴⁸ See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 45; Anderson and Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron*, p. 88: "the typical *pracharak* is recruited in his early twenties. He is well educated, usually a college graduate. He is fluent in English and Hindi, besides the language of the area in which he works. Most of those we met were science graduates. He tends to come from an urban middle-class, upper-caste background."

7.3 Reviewing Approaches to the Organisation of Hinduism

What we see in the twenties, then, is a contrapuntal movement of ideologies on the two inter-related levels of the organisation of Hinduism that have been examined in this thesis.

First, on the level of religious ideology - the way in which organisation came to be articulated as an ideal to which Hindus could legitimately aspire - a convergence is evident. The tensions apparent in the opposition of horizontal and vertical approaches were consumed by the urgency of the time, and particularly by the increasingly systematic appearance of the communal riot as a feature of modern politics. From 1923 onwards, the idea of a vertical restructuring of Hindu society, eradicating incipient oppressions through a radical transformation of the religion, became increasingly marginalised in the arena of Hindu politics. The unstructured catholicity of horizontal organisation, particularly in its new formulation of *Hindutva*, now dominated the social vision of politically oriented Hinduism.

Secondly, on the level of political mobilisation - the way in which Hindus became organised as a political force - a divergence is evident. The emergence of a new discourse of organisation on the basis of forms of politics developed by the Gandhian Congress created the opportunity for new ways of being political in the public space. The divergent ways in which the Mahasabha and the RSS established themselves during the nineteen twenties is indicative of this new context in Indian politics. Although they developed with fairly similar notions of how the Hindu nation was to be conceptualised, then, their ideas about how to pursue this ideal - their comparative political strategies - were radically different. This is evident in the hostility of Hedgewar from a very early stage to suggestions from powerful figures within the Mahasabha, including his old mentor Dr. Moonje, that the two organisations should be formally associated.¹⁴⁹ The Sangh, it was clear, was to plot a very different path. The difference may be schematised as follows:

¹⁴⁹ V.D. Savarkar suggested in 1929 that the RSS should become a part of the Mahasabha. Hedgewar rejected the suggestion outright, and when Savarkar persisted he "cut all ties with the Sabha." In 1932, Hedgewar rejected overtures from Moonje on the same issue, causing a split between the two. See Baker, *Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province*, p. 106. Jaffrelot, however, demonstrates that the two organisations maintained some degree of contact during the 1930s, with tension arising only in the context of these Mahasabha attempts to absorb the Sangh. After Golwalkar became *Sarsanghchalak* in 1940, a complete break was effected. See *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, pp. 72-74. Nevertheless any resistance to Mahasabha overtures is notable in the context of the considerable financial difficulty which the Sangh experienced during its early period. This is persistently evident in Hedgewar's letters. See, for example, Letter No. 5 of 1929, Hedgewar to Dadar Paramarth, 21 August 1929; No. 51 of 1932, Hedgewar to Bhaiya Saheb Tatade, 2 December 1932.

	Strategy 1 (Mahasabha)	Strategy 2 (RSS)
Constituency of Hindus:	Represented symbolically	"Created" through transformation of consciousness
Addressed to:	The (Colonial) State	The (Hindu) People
Form of politics:	Constitutional	Populist, "organic", cultural
Principal opposition:	Muslim League	Congress ("pseudo-secularists")

The Mahasabha continued to operate within the colonial discourse of organisation, consolidating its position in relation to the state as the representative of "the Hindus", a counterpoint to the Muslim League as the representative of "the Muslims". I have again described this position as a "template of polarisation", recalling the relationship between the Arya Samaj and Sanatana Dharma Sabhas in the public space in the late nineteenth century. The anonymity of the Mahasabha in post-Independence politics is indicative of the operation of this template, as the image of a counterweight to the Muslim League was of greatly reduced significance in domestic politics after the creation of Pakistan.

The RSS, on the other hand, articulated a strategy in the context of the emerging discourse of organisation, separated from the colonialist-nationalist nexus and distanced from the state. This was a populist, "organic" form of politics in which middle class culture was able to express itself politically (i.e. away from the constrictions of state-led politics), and it is this culture which the RSS has been able to adapt, fashion and exploit in the course of its gradual development into a politically significant bloc. Consistently, this form of politics has enabled the RSS to work towards expanding the constituency of Hindus (i.e. the Hindu nation) by transforming consciousness on a microcosmic level.

As it has expanded, the RSS has become involved in other discourses, other forms of politics. The advantage of ending this study in 1930 is that there is a clarity in the trajectory of both organisations, the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha. These established trajectories demonstrate the structure of elite-led politics, as India entered the most turbulent phase of her political history during the colonial period. The position of

culture in this political structure is of particular significance. The dislocation of culture from politics in the "constitutional" strategy represented by the Mahasabha only serves to emphasise its integration in the strategy represented by the RSS. The success of the RSS version of Hindu nationalism can be strongly related to this privileged position in terms of the ideological interpretation of culture. Developments in the discourses of organisation in the nineteen twenties, particularly on the basis of the increased sophistication of Indian nationalist strategy, were seminal in the establishment of the RSS on this level of elite-led politics.

7.4 Summary of Discussion

This chapter has demonstrated how the key concept of organisation configured the development of ideas of the Hindu nation and its representation in the arena of middle class politics in the nineteen twenties. It has concentrated on two organisations as examples of divergent approaches in this development.

The Hindu Mahasabha provided the principal forum for debate in the early twenties. It continued to operate through the idea of a spectrum of religious affiliation in order to legitimise its claim to represent Hindus as a homogeneous "community". Unsurprisingly, this spectrum produced different ideas about what it meant to be a Hindu, and how the "community" should be represented. The idea of a *sangathan* movement focused these differences, leading to the tension apparent within the Mahasabha during 1923-4. The lines of debate over *sangathan* were drawn particularly between the conflicting notions of horizontal and vertical organisation. Swami Shraddhanand's presentation of *sangathan* as a coherent programme designed to "save the dying race" was based precisely on the transformative core of Arya reformism. Within the Mahasabha, this ideal was ranged against notions of horizontal organisation which perceived *sangathan* in far less explicit terms. The issue of *shuddhi*, with its persistent questioning of the boundaries of Hinduism, was the battleground on which these conflicting notions were articulated. It has been demonstrated that horizontal organisation was decisively triumphant in this conflict, and that consequently ideas of the vertical restructuring of society were increasingly marginalised in the field of Hindu politics. As if to confirm this trend, Savarkar's *Hindutva* emerged as a major text of Hindu nationalism. This text provided an ideological framework for the projection of horizontal organisation as a Hindu ideal. Characteristically, this framework was not explicit about how the ideal was to be realised.

In the second half of the chapter I have argued that the RSS began to develop a strategy of mobilisation aimed at effecting such a realisation. My argument is based on the idea that the RSS drew heavily on models of organisation developed in the context of Indian nationalism, as explained in Chapter 6. These models provided the RSS with a recognisably modern form in the political arena of the nineteen twenties, enabling it to establish its position amongst politically active middle class Hindus. The trajectory of the RSS was singular, in that it eschewed the idea of symbolic representation altogether, aiming instead to "create" its constituency in the emergent discourse of organisation, removed from the centrality of the colonialist-nationalist nexus. Despite the gradualism inherent in this trajectory, I have nevertheless argued that this was a radical departure in the history of middle class Hindu politics. This radicalism is to some extent evident in the development of the organisation's approach towards Hinduism and Hindu society. It has been demonstrated that the RSS maintained an approach to these concepts based on horizontal organisation. The logic of its trajectory, however, has led it to introduce the idea of an alternative to caste as an organising principle in Hindu society. This organising principle is the Sangh itself. On an ideal level, then, the RSS pursuit of Hindu *sangathan* implies the rejection of caste, a view of Hindu society which is the antithesis of horizontal organisation. It is perhaps a reflection of the ideal nature of the Hindu nation itself that this dichotomy is not perceived as problematic in RSS ideology.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

Hindu nationalism emerged from the nineteen twenties as an established feature of modern Indian politics. Its presence is clear both in an institutional sense, in the form of the Mahasabha and other organisations, including the RSS,¹ and in an ideological sense, as it blended and clashed with Indian nationalism in the Congress, and in the "mental frameworks" of politically aware Hindus. The discrete lines of development towards this situation, always a problematic feature of modern Indian history, have been the subject of this dissertation. My thesis has been that Hindu nationalist identity was constructed as a result of certain projections of colonial hegemony, and the elaboration of the colonial polity within this context. In particular, I have posited that the state's self-image of organisation was enormously influential; that, in fact, it developed a specific discourse on this basis which attempted to set the parameters of political expression in the colony. Hindu nationalist identity was a product of this discourse of organisation, in the sense that certain Hindus used it as a means of articulating their "Hinduness" in certain public situations. If this sounds a little obscure, it is only because it is necessary to be cautious about using terms which have a tendency towards universalism - notably "Hindus" and "public" - when their meanings in the context of colonial India are multi-layered, defined by context and trajectory.

In this concluding chapter I will review the objectives set in Chapter 1, and examine the way in which they have or have not been met by the thesis. I will also look again at some of the questions raised in Chapter 2 in relation to Hindu nationalism and the position of ideology in Indian politics, and review them in the light of the findings of this dissertation. Leading on from this I will suggest some areas of further research which arise out of my work.

¹ In Indra Prakash, *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sanghatan Movement*, written in 1938, the following organisations are listed as representative of Hindu nationalist objectives: the Hindu Youth movement, the *shuddhi* movement, the Bhonsala Military School, the RSS, the cow protection movement, and the Hindu Seva Ashram. Other "institutions, associations, missions, samajas, ashramas etc." are referred to, but not covered in the review; see p. xv-xvi.

8.1 Reviewing Objectives

(i) Organisation and Hindu identity

I have demonstrated how the idea of organisation impinged on Hindu identity as it was perceived in the public space of colonial India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. One feature of colonial control was the persistent focus on Hinduism as an entity: how it was to be recognised as a religion, and what distinguished it from other religions. Initially, this was a project of Orientalism, which attempted to define Hinduism by reference to its "essential" texts. Increasingly, however, colonisers and colonised alike were confronted with the inability of this kind of definition to encompass the realities of people's perception of their religiosity. At the same time, certain forces - notably missionaries, Hindu reformers, incipient low caste movements, census enumerators - focused attention on the boundaries of Hinduism. The question was persistently asked as to who could safely be identified as a Hindu, and who could safely be identified as not a Hindu.

The organisation of Hinduism emerged in the context of this persistent questioning. The idea of consolidating the religion, of firming up these boundaries, developed along two principal paths. First, the vertical restructuring of the religion, eradicating manifest oppressions through a complete overhaul of what it meant to be a Hindu. Implicitly, this would entail the deconstruction of caste as a central feature of Hindu identity. Secondly, the horizontal binding together of the various strands of religiosity and caste identity in the name of a composite catholicity and tolerance. Whereas the first path presented itself as an act of reform, the second appeared to be little more than a symbolic act of will - unity and consolidation being conferred through a kind of collective imagining. Ironically, this comparative theoretical weakness strengthened the position of horizontal organisation, because of the nature of the discourse within which both approaches operated. This discourse naturally favoured a symbolic approach to issues of political significance. The idea of an organised Hinduism nevertheless developed through the dynamic relationship of these two positions, culminating in the ascendance of horizontal organisation after the Mahasabha sessions of 1923 and 1924.

(ii) Organisations and Movements

These ideas of organisation were expressed in a series of religious and political bodies and movements. In this dissertation I have examined the following as progressive examples of the various approaches: the Arya Samaj; the Sanatana Dharma Sabhas and the Bharat Dharma Mahamandal; the cow protection movement of the early eighteen nineties; the *shuddhi* movement; the Hindu Sabha movement; the Hindu Mahasabha

and the *sangathan* movement; and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. This is not an exhaustive list of bodies and movements concerned with the organisation of Hinduism. Such organisations as the Nagari Pracharini Sabha, the Ramakrishna Mission, the Theosophical Society, as well as numerous smaller organisations, all contributed to the debate about the nature and extent of Hinduism, and its position in the colonial polity.² I have examined organisations and movements on the basis of their centrality in the debate, and their contribution to the development of Hinduism as a political force.

It has been argued that the nature of these bodies and movements was configured by the dominant discourse of organisation. Even movements which clearly had an existence outside of this discursive arena, such as the cow protection movement in the early eighteen nineties, were represented principally as manifestations of Hindu consolidation within this arena. The Sabha movement of the early twentieth century formalised this position through its explicit linking of horizontal organisation to the notion of symbolic representation, as illustrated in Chapter 5.

The strength of this linkage meant that the developments apparent in the Indian National Congress towards a more palpable form of representation - through the strategy of counter-hegemony - were resisted strongly in organisations that represented this sense of Hindu identity. This is evident in the perceived "loyalism" of the Mahasabha (a more complex position than simple reactionary conservatism, as it has often been presented) in the nineteen thirties and forties. The political context of the twenties, however, did change this situation. The development of a new discourse of organisation in the public space allowed for the articulation of consolidated Hinduism in a different relation to its projected constituency. The emergence of the RSS signified a break in the link between horizontal organisation and symbolic representation. This was a departure of profound significance in the history of Hindu nationalism.

(iii) Religious Reform and Hindu Nationalism

In this dissertation I have argued against the direct historical link that is often made between the reform movements that developed in the nineteenth century - particularly the Arya Samaj - and Hindu nationalism. The Samaj has been presented as the key advocate of vertical restructuring as the means of effecting the organisation of Hinduism. It has been illustrated that on the level of ideology, the core values of the Arya Samaj which informed this approach diverged from the emergent milieu of Hindu nationalism. The Samaj as a reform movement was structured by Dayananda as having

² On the Nagari Pracharini Sabha, see C. King, *One Language, Two Scripts: the Hindi Movement in Nineteenth Century North India* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1994)

a transformative role in Hinduism. This role was projected through two central features of Arya ideology: first, the assertion that certain texts constituted the fixed canon of the Hindu faith; and secondly, the attempt to undermine caste as the central institution of Hinduism, to be replaced by an idealised, merit-based *varna* system. The Samaj was confronted with the dilemma of how to work towards these objectives whilst remaining a part of the very structure that it sought to repudiate. Increasingly, the objectives of the Samaj were compromised by this dilemma.

The *shuddhi* movements of the early twenties, and the concomitant articulation of *sangathan*, brought this situation to a head. During this critical period, the central ideology of the Arya Samaj was unable to assert its hegemony over the wider movement. Instead it was drawn into the idea of organisation as an over-riding objective. *Sangathan* emerged as a catholic, horizontal unity, based on the perceived tolerance of the Hindu tradition and the theoretical equality of castes and their functions in society.

This is not to say that the Arya Samaj did not contribute to the development of Hindu nationalism. It brought considerable expertise and experience in terms of disseminating propaganda, and the extensive network of local Samajes in the north were an invaluable source of support for campaigns such as the Malkana *shuddhi*. The Samaj also produced some important advocates of the organisation of Hinduism - most notably Lal Chand and Swami Shraddhanand - and later supplied leaders to the Mahasabha such as Bhai Parmanand. Even in terms of ideology, the Samaj undoubtedly created sustained pressure within the Mahasabha for the extension of uplift programmes and other progressive initiatives. But the core of Arya ideology - the transformative values which defined it as a reform movement - were persistently rejected by emergent Hindu nationalism.

This is important, because it disrupts the representation of Hindu nationalism as an extension of the reformist approach to Hindu religion, with its attendant baggage of "purifying" Hindu practice. The search for the antecedents of Hindu nationalism has focused too sharply on revivalism as a product of this reformist approach. This dissertation has argued that the real point of significance is the middle classness of this approach to Hinduism - whether it be reformist or non-reformist. This is one reason why the focus on Nagpur City is so important in this study: it presents a picture of the development of Hindu nationalism which is not blurred by the presence of a strong reformist movement like the Arya Samaj. Its significance is rather located simply in its status as a city of colonial India in which the middle class had a powerful voice.

(iv) *The Status of Sangathan*

It is interesting to note that in his preface to Indra Prakash's *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement*, written in 1938, V.D. Savarkar refers to *sangathan* as a movement that incorporates a whole host of organisations working towards the same goal of consolidation. "All these Hindu Sangathanist institutions," he says, "even though they are not formally affiliated to each other, are still allied with one another in the common cause. All of them aim at the regeneration of the Hindu Race, moulding it into a free and mighty Hindu Nation."³ The Mahasabha is perceived as the leading institution, but nevertheless it is still part of the wider *sangathan* movement, the movement towards nationhood. This is something of a shift from the articulation of *sangathan* in the nineteen twenties, where the movement was perceived as a project sanctioned and supervised by the Mahasabha, in the same manner as the Malkana *shuddhi* campaign.

The shift reflects the significance of the idea of *sangathan* in the ideology of Hindu nationalism. By the late thirties, it had become the common denominator of a group of organisations (including, of course, the RSS) which operated in the name of Hindu nationalism. This centrality is indicative of the defining importance of the idea of organisation in the development of the ideology. From the late nineteenth century onwards, middle class Hindus, responding to a variety of pressures, were drawn increasingly into the political representation of their Hinduism on the basis of ideas of organisation. In particular, these ideas defined the parameters of a constituency of Hindus - a constituency which required representation in the rapidly developing political arena. As representation became a key battlefield in the struggle between the state and Indian nationalism in the early twentieth century, this constituency of Hindus gained prominence as a counterpoint to Indian nationalists' attempts to reify their own constituency. As well as reiterating the value of symbolic representation, the Morley-Minto reforms' incorporation of separate electorates implicitly recognised this constituency of Hindus as a politically significant bloc. It has been illustrated in Chapter 5 that the idea of horizontally organised Hinduism as propagated by the Hindu Sabha developed precisely as a means of projecting this constituency. Chapter 7 has illustrated that the nation developed as a symbol of this constituency.

In this sense, then, organised Hinduism as it was debated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century set the parameters for the conceptualisation of the Hindu nation. The articulation of this nation in the twenties was hence less of a revelation than has at

³ Indra Prakash, *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sangathan Movement*, pp. xv-xvi.

times been suggested in academic accounts. Indeed, it has been illustrated that it was used quite unproblematically at earlier points, and that its central importance was as a meaningful symbol of the constituency of Hindus in the discursive arena of Indian politics.

(v) Hindu Nationalism and Indian Nationalism

A very strong inter-relation has been demonstrated between the ideology of Hindu nationalism and that of elite-led Indian nationalism. The strength of this inter-relation is based upon the production of these ideologies in a common arena, the arena of middle class consciousness, using the same set of discursive tools. This emphasises the similarity of the two ideologies in terms of their structure and the way in which they were articulated as political strategies, even though they remained very much distinct in terms of their objectives and their comparative interpretation of Indian culture. In Chapter 2 I have argued that this similarity is not problematic if an appropriate conceptual distinction is made between the ideology of Hindu nationalism and the ideological framework of communalism. Communalism, I have argued, is an alignment, rather than an autonomous ideology in itself. By making this distinction, the historical necessity of implacable opposition between Indian nationalism and Hindu nationalism is removed. What emerges instead is the more easily reconcilable notion of two ideologies developing contemporaneously in the same discursive terrain, blending and clashing together, often being expressed almost simultaneously by various individuals. This is evident, for example, in the work of V.D. Savarkar, Swami Shraddhanand, Lajpat Rai: all three of these "architects" of Hindu nationalism had been in prison because of their activities as Indian nationalists, and all were perceived as - and perceived themselves as - genuine Indian nationalists during the nineteen twenties.

This argument is supported by the fact that organisation was also a significant factor in the development of elite-led Indian nationalism. The thesis has illustrated how this nationalism was expressed initially within the colonial discourse of organisation. Because of its grounding in an economic critique of colonialism, however, it had a far more progressive trajectory in relation to this discourse. It has been demonstrated that developments in the way of being political in the colonial public space were driven by the increasing challenge of elements within the Congress to colonial hegemony. This challenge was based largely on the exposure of the contradiction between the economic interests of the state and those of the people. Progressively, the Congress developed a strategy of confronting the state which enabled it to expose the contradiction more effectively. In its necessary development of the mass base of the party, this strategy eroded the power of the colonial discourse of organisation, leading to the development of a new, alternative discourse in the nineteen twenties.

These developments were significant for the ideology of Hindu nationalism, precisely because of its proximity to that of Indian nationalism in terms of structure and strategy. Hindu nationalism benefited from the Congress' challenge to state hegemony, initially through the state's encouragement of an alternative to the Congress as an appropriate representative of "Hindu opinion" (in the sense implied by symbolic representation), and later through the development of a new discourse of organisation to challenge that of the state. As we have seen, the latter liberated Hindu nationalist ideology from its strong relationship with the colonial discourse. Ironically, it was henceforth able to deploy its interpretation of culture on a far more effective, resonant level.

8.2 Implications

The issues raised in this dissertation are connected to the problem of the representation of religion and culture in colonial politics. I have focused on this problem as it was manifested in the ideologies produced by one particular class: the middle class. In terms of the dominant ideologies of modern political discourse, I have argued that the middle class has been a particularly important social bloc. This importance derives from the position of this middle class in relation to the colonial state and its attempt to gain hegemony in India. Unquestionably, this was a position of power which the middle class utilised to effect its own bid for hegemony in the emerging arena of colonial politics. In making this bid, the middle class attempted to encapsulate the religion and culture of those over whom it claimed hegemony - the ideologies which were produced have had an enduring impact in terms of the character of post-colonial politics.

To say that this class had an ideological position, however, is to misconstrue the class-ideology relationship. As Gramsci stated, classes are more often than not cross-cut by various, often conflicting ideologies, and this was certainly the case with the middle class in colonial India. This dissertation has shown how the ideologies of Hindu and Indian nationalism contested the terrain of middle class consciousness, often in a non-explicit manner. Both these ideologies claimed to represent the interests of vast, amorphous constituencies: the Indian nation, the Hindu community, and progressively, the Hindu nation. Within the colonial discourse of organisation, the co-existence of these projected constituencies was less problematic. As the Congress began to challenge the forms of the discourse, however, by extending its structure and increasing the participation of the people whom it claimed to represent, the opposition between these ideological positions was more manifest.

The crucial developments in this direction, which occurred in the early nineteen twenties, produced opposition, but did not effect ideological polarisation. Congress drew back from the full implementation of its strategy of mass mobilisation, because it was unable, ideologically, to accommodate the well-developed political positions of subaltern elements. Reiterating Guha, the Congress "failed to assimilate the class interests of peasants and workers effectively into a bourgeois hegemony."⁴ Reiterating Hall, it failed to concretise sufficient "tendential alignments" on the basis of an ideology of Indian nationalism.⁵ This drawing back was critical in two ways: first, it created space for the development of a "decentred" politics on the basis of the new discourse of organisation, as noted in Chapters 6 and 7; secondly, it left Congress itself in two worlds, oscillating between the two discourses, as it were - the one directed towards the state, the other directed towards the people. This oscillation was to characterise the strategy of the Congress leading up to independence; it has also influenced the operation of Congress as a party in post-colonial politics. It may be useful to look at the "aggregationist" mode of politics so effectively employed by Congress, for example, as indicative of the continued importance of the colonial discourse of organisation. Certainly the idea of "vote banks", where political parties recruit the support of local notables whose followers vote according to their instructions, appears to echo the key principles of symbolic representation and imagined constituencies in a democratic framework.⁶

Oscillation between the two discourses is also the principal reason for the Congress' inability to effectively combat the ideology of Hindu nationalism. The nineteen twenties, as I have said, did not represent ideological polarisation, despite the posturing of the Congress on the issue of communal violence. This was precisely because of the Congress retreat on the strategy of mass mobilisation, which meant that its representation of the people maintained a strong symbolic element. Only by attempting to reify its constituency (i.e. the Indian nation) fully, would it have come into direct opposition with the Hindu nation as a constituency. As it was, and is, the coexistence of the two ideologies even within the Congress organisation remained largely unproblematic.

⁴ Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize", p. 102; see Section 6.1.2.

⁵ On tendential alignment see Hall, "The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees", p. 42. For my discussion see Section 2.1.

⁶ See Jaffrelot, "The BJP in Madhya Pradesh: Networks, Strategies, Power", p.111: "The process of building a party consists mainly...in accumulating sufficient vote banks to ensure electoral majorities in the constituencies and the return of pledged candidates to legislative assemblies and the Lok Sabha."

This is not to say, however, that there was no polarisation during the twenties. What I have said is that there was no ideological polarisation, that ideologies continued to co-exist in a relatively unproblematic manner. There was nevertheless a new dialectic in Indian politics which is closely related to the ideologies of Hindu and Indian nationalism: the dialectic between communalism and secularism. Gyan Pandey has noted the development of communalism in the nineteen twenties as concurrent with the development of what he has termed "pure" nationalism, "unsullied, in theory, by the 'primordial' pulls of caste, religious community etc."⁷ The defining characteristic of this form of nationalism was its secularism - its perception of individuals only as citizens with equal, democratic rights, regardless of their religion or caste.

The paralleling of communalism and secularism in this way suggests an interesting proposition on the nature of secularism. As communalism has been described as a framework or structure that aligns the interests of a particular imagined community against the interests of others, so secularism may also be conceived of as a framework, a way of aligning the interests of the imagined nation against those of other - religiously configured - nations. This is at least hinted at by Akeel Bilgrami in a recent article:

For three decades before independence the Congress under Nehru refused to let a secular policy emerge through negotiation between different communal interests, by denying at every step in the various conferrings with the British, Jinnah's demand that the Muslim League represents the Muslims, a Sikh leader represents the Sikhs, and a harijan leader represents the untouchable community. And the ground for the denial was simply that as a secular party they could not accept that they did *not* represent *all* these communities.⁸

The idea of secularism, then, forms the framework of opposition. Through it, Indian nationalist ideology was aligned politically against the ideology of Muslim separatism, Sikh consciousness, low caste consciousness and, one might add, Hindu nationalism. The actual ideologies themselves were not necessarily implacably opposed in this sense, but the imperative of the secularism versus communalism model demanded an oppositional stance. Interestingly, the opposition is expressed precisely in terms of representation; it revolved around the theoretical (or symbolic) question of who could represent who in the political arena of modern India. This model of how secularism and communalism operate as structural formations in the relationship of state and society perhaps allows for a clearer understanding of how seemingly oppositional ideologies appear to co-exist operationally in political parties with an expectation of state power. Ideological "purity" is not a necessity, because the contest for state power

⁷ See Pandey, *The Colonial Construction of Communalism*, p.235.

⁸ Bilgrami, "Two Concepts of Secularism: Reason, Modernity and the Archimedean Ideal" (in *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. 29 No. 28, 9 July 1994, pp. 1749-1761), p. 1754; this number includes a series of useful articles on secularism, modernity and the state.

is based around these structural oppositions and how they are utilised by the various parties. This is a possible basis for understanding apparent anomalies in contemporary Indian politics. For example, the recent electoral alliance which brought together the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party and the low caste Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. Here, a seemingly direct and implacable ideological conflict is overlooked in the context of the assumption of state power. One effective way of extending this analysis would be to examine the development of the idea of secularism in Indian politics; a historical analysis, similar to the analysis of Hindu nationalism in this dissertation. This would require a further examination of the role of Hindu reformism in the development of national culture. The conceptual de-linking of reformism and Hindu nationalism which I have argued for in this thesis has implications here. Does the transformative ideology of nineteenth century reformism have more to contribute to representations of Indian secularism, after all, than to those of communalism?

Other than reformism, two further concepts have emerged from this study as significant in terms of the development of modern Hinduism. The first, of course, is *sangathan*. This concept has been examined very much in terms of its impact on the articulation of a specifically political Hinduism. There is evidence, however, that this articulation has had ramifications for the representation of Hinduism in contexts which are not, at least explicitly, political. This is particularly so as Hinduism has developed a self-conscious image of itself as a "World Religion", part of the global "club" of great, universalising religious traditions. Within this context, certain Hindus appear to be pursuing a somewhat familiar ideal. As Klostermaier states at the end of his *Survey of Hinduism*, "Hinduism is organising itself, it is articulating its own essentials, it is modernising, and it is carried by a great many people with strong faith. It would not be surprising to find Hinduism the dominant religion of the twenty-first century."⁹ Exploring the emergence of *sangathan*, and of the idea of a pan-Hindu identity, in this context may help to locate such developments more precisely in the context of post-colonial India.

The second concept is that of *sanatana dharma*. The appearance of this concept as a middle class signifier of orthodoxy in the late nineteenth century has been demonstrated in this thesis. In the context of modern Hinduism, however, it has developed an indistinct, amorphous quality. Scholars of religion tend to marginalise it, either as simply another - and perhaps a more respectful, more 'Indian' - term for Hinduism,¹⁰ or alternatively as a universalising signifier that has no real place in the complex reality

⁹ Klostermaier, *A Survey of Hinduism*, p. 413.

¹⁰ See, for example, Zaehner, *Hinduism*, p. 2: "The Hindus themselves call their religion the *sanatana dharma*."

of Hindu practice.¹¹ In both cases, *sanatana dharma* is perceived as an articulation that is cosmetic, rather than signifying any particular structure of belief. The relationship between this amorphous concept and the fixed meaning associated with the term in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century needs to be explored. The importance of *sanatana dharma* as orthodoxy, after all, has been demonstrated precisely in its position as a signifier in the context of colonial modernity. Does *sanatanadharma* as a universalising signifier have a similar importance in a post-colonial context?

One of the principal reasons for bringing this study to a close at the end of the nineteen twenties has been cited as the advantage gained in terms of the clarity of ideological trajectories and organisational strategies at this point. This nevertheless begs the question of how precisely these trajectories and strategies developed during the following, extremely dynamic, period of Indian politics. If there was, as I have stated, no ideological polarisation during the nineteen twenties, what was the influence of Hindu nationalist ideology within Congress in the years leading up to independence? How far can this ideology be said to hold a congruent position in the representation of right and left wing politics within this forum? And from this, to what extent did Hindu nationalism as an ideology inform the position of the so-called "Hindu traditionalists" who are represented as the core of the Congress right? These questions may be approached particularly from the point of view of the articulation of different communities as constituencies during the nineteen thirties and forties.

A further implication related to the nineteen thirties and forties concerns the development of the Hindu Mahasabha. The final section of Chapter 7 appears to consign the Mahasabha to a somewhat muted, unproductive fate. Yet in the late nineteen thirties it undoubtedly gained prominence under the leadership of V.D. Savarkar. This formidable politician and prolific ideologue demands further attention. How did his leadership of the Mahasabha and his development of the idea of *sangathan* impact upon politics during this period? As well as being the author of *Hindutva*, it has been noted that Savarkar had also been a significant figure in the Indian nationalist movement, and became a symbol of nationalist sacrifice after his transportation to the Andamans. This confluence of ideological positions makes him a particularly

¹¹ See Lipner, *Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, p. 220-221: "I have yet to discover a Hindu *sanatana-dharma* in the sense of some universally recognised philosophy, teaching or code of practice. Indeed, there can be no such thing, for it presupposes that Hinduism is a monolithic tradition in which there is agreement about some static, universal doctrine. But...Hinduism is a pluriform phenomenon in which there are many dynamic centres of religious belief and practice."

fascinating figure in the emergence of secular nationalism and communalism as symbolic opposites in the modern political arena.

The co-existence of ideologies is a point which has been noted in Chapter 7 as evident in the early development of the RSS. In a sense, this contradicts the image of the RSS as rigidly devoted to certain normative ideological positions. The initial rigidity of the RSS, I would say, is to be found in its organisational form, which enabled it to replicate itself in a singularly effective manner as a kind of "organic" cultural order, immersed in local contexts across central, west and north India. It is by following the logic of a Congress-inspired discourse of organisation that this "organic" growth became entrenched, allowing for the development of elite Hindu nationalist ideology, and its tendential alignment with other, non-elite, ideologies, in the arena of Indian politics. How this alignment occurred in the nineteen thirties and forties constitutes a further area of research. What were the precise mechanics of RSS expansion during this period? How was "decentred" politics practised, and how was the cultural trajectory of the RSS articulated in localised settings? These questions could only be addressed by a detailed study of the period.

To sum up, then, research implications have been identified in a variety of areas. The "discursive oscillation" model implies a reinterpretation of strategies of mobilisation in mainstream Indian politics; in particular, the operation of vote banks in the post-Independence polity. The presentation of communalism as an ideological structure informed by certain ideologies - among them Hindu nationalism - suggests an examination of the idea of secularism as a similar kind of structure. Tracing the development of ideologies which informed this idea of secularism would entail a reassessment of reformism as a facet of national culture. Other significant concepts identified in this thesis - *sangathan* and *sanatana dharma* - may be examined in terms of their implications for the development of modern Hinduism as a self-conscious "World Religion", and the conception of what it means to be a Hindu in a pluralist context. The demonstration of a strong inter-relationship between Hindu and Indian nationalism implies that an examination of the development of this relationship is necessary. I have suggested two ways in which the examination could be extended: first, through the operation of Hindu nationalist ideology within Congress during the nineteen thirties and forties; and secondly, through the political and ideological development of V.D. Savarkar. Finally, the identification of the RSS as operating through a new discourse of organisation points to the need for a detailed examination of the development of the Sangh in the period leading up to Independence. In particular, how the Sangh used this discursive framework to develop its distinctive cultural trajectory.

The cultural trajectory of the RSS has, of course, since become increasingly involved in mainstream politics, and it is in this "re-entry" that the image of ideological rigidity noted above emerges. The RSS is singular in national politics in that its strength is derived from its position in the decentred discourse of organisation. It draws its resources from this discourse, launching them into the discourse of mainstream politics in the form of political parties - the Jan Sangh and the BJP. This singularity is signified by the continued presence of the headquarters of the RSS in Nagpur - making it perhaps the only self-proclaimed national organisation of political significance not to base itself at the centre of state power, in New Delhi. This approach engendered problems which have been illustrated well by Jaffrelot in his analysis of the relationship between the RSS and the BJP.¹² Tension has repeatedly emerged in this relationship, as the BJP periodically attempts to divert attention away from the cultural objectives of the parent organisation, and towards more pragmatic policies of socio-economic populism in its bid for power. At the same time, the implication of leading BJP figures in corruption scandals and the breakdown of discipline in states with BJP governments has led to a disillusionment amongst RSS cadres with the pitfalls of mainstream politics - this was hardly reconcilable with the ideal of Hindu *sangathan*.¹³ In this sense, the ideological "rigidity" which the RSS has displayed in national politics is more to do with the projection of ideals developed and sustained in the decentred discourse in this wider arena - an arena still dominated by the power of symbolic representation.

Significantly, Jaffrelot concludes his book by reiterating the strength of RSS organisation on an "organic" level, looking at the development of social welfare and educational programmes - areas where state provision is still relatively weak. "This trend," he says, "could help...to crystallise a Hindu nationalist identity which in the long term could challenge the durability of India's multi-cultural society."¹⁴ The operation of Hindu nationalism in this area, away from the limelight of state power, is precisely directed towards the achievement of the ideal of *sangathan* - a consolidated, catholic Hindu culture, in which personal religious and caste identity is subordinated to the greater good of *Bharat Mata*. Identification with non-Hindu cultures (religious or

¹² See Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, esp. chapter 9, pp. 314-337, chapter 13, pp. 449 - 481, and also pp. 547 - 549; see also Jaffrelot, *The BJP and the 1996 Elections* (Unpublished Conference Paper, Copenhagen 1996).

¹³ For an overview of RSS-BJP tension, see N.K. Singh's article "Hindu Divided Family" in *India Today*, 15 December 1996. Although he notes this tension, Jaffrelot's indication in *The BJP and the 1996 Elections* is that the image of the BJP as comparatively untainted by corruption still appeared to carry weight with the electorate in the 1996 election, despite the high profile indictment of the party president, L.K. Advani, in the so-called "hawala" case; see pp. 32-3.

¹⁴ Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, p. 532.

otherwise) in this paradigm implies the acceptance by the adherents of such cultures of the position of second-class citizen in the Hindu nation.

Challenging the ideal of *sangathan* means engaging the ideology of Hindu nationalism on this decentred, localised discursive level, where cultural and religious identities are formed and sustained. Throughout this dissertation it has been illustrated that ideologically, the one position which Hindu nationalism has been unable to situate or accommodate fully is that of low caste consciousness. Here, the idea of a composite, horizontal organisation of Hinduism has been challenged repeatedly by the assertion of autonomous indigenous cultures which have refused to accept these parameters. Identity politics associated with these cultures continue to emerge as significant formations, developing in local contexts but producing ramifications in national politics.¹⁵ As this thesis has shown, the impact of such formations is felt precisely because of their distance from the discourses of elite-led politics. Unlike both Hindu and Indian nationalism, the dominant ideology of low caste consciousness has emerged from a non-middle class social bloc. The development of a coherent movement on this basis appears as the most credible and effective trajectory of resistance to the continuing entrenchment of elite-led Hindu nationalist identity as a force in Indian politics.

¹⁵ This point has recently been demonstrated in A. Wyatt, "Dalit Christianity and Identity Politics in India", (Unpublished Conference Paper, Bath, 1997). Here, the organisation of dalit consciousness is presented as "positive" identity politics, a way of countering discursively the "negative" identity politics of communalism.

Glossary of Indian Terms

<i>Adharma</i>	Against order or moral law, vice.
<i>Adivasi</i>	Original inhabitant; tribal.
<i>Advaita</i>	'Non-duality' i.e the monistic school of Vedanta; exponent: Shankara.
<i>Ashrama</i>	4 stages of life: student, householder, hermit/recluse, ascetic; also a religious retreat (<i>ashram</i>).
<i>Atman</i>	Eternal self, 'soul' (obverse of <i>Brahman</i>).
<i>Atmashuddhi</i>	Purification of the soul.
<i>Bhakti</i>	Devotion.
<i>Baudhik</i>	RSS intellectual training classes - regular part of <i>shakha</i> activity.
<i>Baudhik Pramukh</i>	RSS chief ideologue.
<i>Bhagwa Dhwaj</i>	Saffron flag: the "guru" of the RSS.
<i>Brahman (Brahma)</i>	Ultimate reality or oneness of universe; the supreme spiritual being.
<i>Dharma</i>	Moral law which sustains the world, human society and the individual - a non-static concept.
<i>DharmaShastra</i>	Text that codifies sacred law.
<i>Ekchalak anuvartita</i>	"Following one leader": the core idea of RSS discipline.
<i>Gaurakshini</i>	Cow protection.
<i>Gayatri</i>	The most sacred verse of the Rig-Veda, repeated daily by Brahmans (the <i>Gayatri mantra</i>)
<i>Jati</i>	Community, caste, (later) race/nation.
<i>Jati-vyavastha</i>	Caste system as it exists today (i.e. not <i>varna</i> <i>vyavastha</i>).
<i>Kaliyuga</i>	Age of strife, the last period in each <i>kalpa</i> , or world era equivalent to one day of Brahma (432 million years).
<i>Karma</i>	'doing' - deeds, action, work - result or fruit of work, produced by the law of cause and effect.
<i>Manu Smriti</i>	Lawbook of Manu; versified code explaining <i>dharma</i> .
<i>Matha</i>	Monastic establishment.

<i>Maya</i>	Deceptiveness, illusion.
<i>Moksha</i>	Release from <i>samsara</i> .
<i>Panchayat</i>	"Council of five"; the traditional caste or village authority.
<i>Pandit</i>	Brahman teacher; learned man.
<i>Pitribhu</i>	Ancestral/father land.
<i>Pracharpramukh</i>	RSS chief organiser.
<i>Pracharak</i>	Preacher; full-time RSS cadres.
<i>Pramukh</i>	Instructor and leader.
<i>Punjabhu</i>	Holy land.
<i>Rashtriya</i>	National.
<i>Rayat</i>	Peasant, cultivator.
<i>Sampradaya</i>	Literally, "what is handed over"; a religious tradition founded by a sage or saint, extant in a religious Order. In modern Hinduism it has also come to mean religion itself, as in "Hindu- <i>sampradaya</i> ".
<i>Samsara</i>	Cycle of rebirth.
<i>Sanatan dharma</i>	The eternal dharma, sometimes used instead of "Hinduism"; C19 and early C20: orthodoxy.
<i>Sangathan</i>	Organisation; to be organised.
<i>Sannyasa</i>	Renunciation; fourth <i>ashrama</i> .
<i>Sarkaryavachak</i>	RSS general secretary.
<i>Sarsanghchalak</i>	RSS Supreme leader.
<i>Sat</i>	The ordered universe in the Rig Veda; existence.
<i>Satya</i>	Performance of duty in accordance with dharma, bringing about a state of harmony with <i>sat</i> ; hence truth.
<i>Shakha</i>	RSS cell/meeting of cell.
<i>Shankara</i>	Philosopher and commentator on texts, inc. Vedanta Sutras. Main influence in establishing predominance of Vedanta.
<i>Shruti</i>	Revelation, as found in the Vedas.
<i>Shuddhi</i>	Purification, (re-)conversion.
<i>Smriti</i>	Tradition, as in interpretation or codification of <i>Shruti</i> .
<i>Swadeshi</i>	"Of one's own country"; indigenous production.
<i>Swadharma</i>	An individual's own specific social obligations.
<i>Swaraj</i>	Freedom, independence.
<i>Swayamsevak</i>	Volunteer.

<i>Vaishnava</i>	Devotee of Vishnu.
<i>Varna</i>	Literally "appearance", "colour"; the four socio-religious orders or classes: Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Shudra.
<i>Varnashramadharma</i>	The ordained duties of the four classes and the four stages of life.
<i>Varna-vyavastha</i>	<i>Varna</i> system.
<i>Vedanta</i>	"End of the Vedas"; i.e. Upanishads
<i>Vijaya Dashami</i>	Festival celebrated by RSS - Ram's victory over Ravana; occasion supposedly chosen by Hedgewar for founding of the Sangh in 1925.
<i>Vyavastha</i>	System, order, arrangement; also ruling or judgement.
<i>Yuga</i>	Era, age; hence <i>yugadharma</i> , moral law and way of being appropriate to the era.

Bibliography

A) Primary Sources

Private Papers and Letters

K.B. Hedgewar Letters (Hedgewar Bhavan, Nagpur)
B.S. Moonje Papers (Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi)
V.D. Savarkar Papers (Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi)
Sir Richard Temple Papers (India Office Library, London)
B.G. Tilak Papers (Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi)

Published Work by Prominent Figures of the Period

S. Banerjea, *Speeches* (Calcutta, n.d.)
S. Banerjea, *A Nation in Making* (Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1963)
Lal Chand, *Self-Abnegation in Politics* (Central Yuvak Sabha, Lahore, 1938)
Dayananda Saraswati (Ed: C. Bharadwaja), *Light of Truth or An English Translation of Satyarth Prakash* (Arya Samaj, Madras, 1932)
M.K. Gandhi, *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vols. XIV - XXIII (Government of India, Delhi, 1965-67)
Bhai Parmanand, *Hindu Sangathan* (Central Hindu Yuvak Sabha, Lahore, 1936)
V. D. Savarkar, *Hindutva/Who is a Hindu?* (S.S. Savarkar, Bombay, 1989)
V.D. Savarkar (Trans. V.N. Naik), *My Transportation for Life* (S.S. Savarkar, Bombay, 1984)
Swami Shraddhanand, *Hindu Sangathan - Saviour of the Dying Race* (Arjun Press, Delhi, 1926)

Interviews

N.B. Lele. Journalist and RSS worker; joined RSS in Jalgaon in 1934. Interviewed on 20 January 1996.
Vasant Rao Oke. First RSS organiser in Delhi; joined RSS in Nagpur in 1926. Interviewed on 16 December 1995.
Baburao M.G. Vaidya. RSS *Baudhik Pramukh* ; joined RSS in Nagpur in 1932. Interviewed on 22 April 1996.

Dr. S.B. Warnekar. Ex-Nagpur *pracharak*; joined RSS in Nagpur in 1927.

Interviewed on 22 April 1996.

Baparao Wharadpandey. Ex-Nagpur *pracharak*; joined RSS in Nagpur in 1932.

Interviewed on 21 April 1996.

Official Sources

(i) Archival

Central Provinces Secretariat Records 1861-1918 (Madhya Pradesh State Record Office, Nagpur)

Central Provinces Secretariat Records 1919-1930 (Madhya Pradesh State Record Office, Bhopal)

Government of India Home Department Records 1870-1930 (National Archives of India, New Delhi)

Government of India Foreign Department Records 1902 (National Archives of India, New Delhi)

Indian Newspaper Reports 1881 - 1930 (India Office Library, London & National Archives of India, New Delhi). The following volumes and volume series have been cited in the text:

Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers, Punjab, North West Provinces, Oudh, Central Provinces and Berar, 1881;

Selections from the Vernacular Newspapers in the Punjab, North Western Provinces, Oudh, Central Provinces, Central India and Rajputana, 1885;

Selections from Vernacular Newspapers, North Western Provinces, Oudh, Central Provinces, Central India and Rajputana, 1889;

Reports on the Native Press in Bombay Presidency, 1895 - 1907;

Punjab Native Newspaper Reports 1909 - 10;

Selections from the Native Newspapers published in United Provinces 1911;

Punjab Press Abstracts, 1922;

Reports on Indian Papers Published in the Central Provinces and Berar, 1921 - 1926.

(ii) *Published*

Census of India 1881 - 1931

Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District, A Volume (R.V. Russell [ed.], Times Press, Bombay, 1908)

Central Provinces District Gazetteers, Nagpur District, B Volume: Statistical Tables 1891-1927 (Government Press, Nagpur, 1928)

Gazetteer of the Central Provinces Pt. IV: Munda & Nagpore (Chief Commissioner's Office Press, Nagpur, 1867)

Gazetteer of the Central Provinces of India (C. Grant [ed.], Education Society Press, Bombay, 1870)

House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1812-13, Vol. IX.1

House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1830, Vol. XXVIII.783

Newspapers

Bengalee (Calcutta)

Bombay Telegraph and Courier (Bombay)

Hindu (Madras)

Hitavada (Nagpur)

Indian Mirror (Calcutta)

Leader (Allahabad)

Mahratta (Poona)

Native Opinion (Bombay)

Punjabee (Lahore)

Tribune (Lahore)

B) Secondary Sources

Books

M.M. Ali, *The Bengali Reaction to Christian Missionary Activities 1833-1857* (Mehrub Publications, Chittagong, 1965)

B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, London, 1991)

W. Anderson and S.D. Damle, *The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism* (Vistaar, New Delhi, 1987)

C. Buci-Glucksmann, *Gramsci and the State* (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1980)

- D. Baker, *Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province: The Central Provinces and Berar 1919-1939* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1979)
- D. Baker, *Colonialism in an Indian Hinterland 1820-1920* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993)
- N.G. Barrier [ed.], *Roots of Communal Politics* (Heinemann, New Delhi, 1976)
- R. Barthes, *Image, Music, Text* (Fontana, London, 1977)
- T. Basu, P. Datta, S. Sarkar, T. Sarkar, S. Sen, *Khaki Shorts and Saffron Flags: A Critique of the Hindu Right* (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1993)
- C. Bayly, *Local Roots of Indian Politics: Allahabad, 1880 - 1920* (Clarendon, Oxford, 1975)
- C. Boggs, *Gramsci's Marxism* (Pluto, London, 1976)
- J.L. Brockington, *The Sacred Thread: Hinduism in its Continuity and Diversity* (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1981)
- J. Brown, *Modern India: the Origins of an Asian Democracy* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994)
- R. Cashman, *The Myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and Mass Politics in Maharashtra* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975)
- B. Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India* (People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1966)
- B. Chandra, *Communalism in Modern India* (Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1984)
- B. Chandra, M. Mukherjee, A. Mukherjee, K.N. Panikkar, S. Mahajan, *India's Struggle for Independence* (Penguin, Delhi, 1989)
- S. Chandra, *The Oppressive Present: Literature and Social Consciousness in Colonial India* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992)
- P. Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (Zed Books, London, 1986)
- P. Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993)
- B. Cohn, *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987)
- S.D. Collet, *The Life and Letters of Raja Rammohun Roy* (Sadharan Brahmo Samaj, Calcutta, 1962 - 1st ed. 1900)
- J.A. Curran, *Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A Study of the RSS* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1951)
- V. Dalmia and H. von Stietencron (eds.), *Representing Hinduism: the Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity* (Sage, New Delhi, 1995)
- F.L. Damen, *Crisis and Religious Renewal in the Brahmo Samaj 1860-1884* (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, 1983)
- B. Deoras, *Social Equality and Consolidation* (Jagarana Prakashana, Bangalore, 1974)

- J.D.M. Derrett, *Religion, Law and the State in India* (Faber, London, 1968)
- A.R. Desai, *Social Background of Indian Nationalism* (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1976)
- B.V. Deshpande and S.R. Ramaswamy [edited by H.V. Seshadri], *Dr. Hedgewar: The Epoch-Maker* (Sahitya Sindhu, Bangalore, 1981)
- J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India* (Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1967)
- J. Femia, *Gramsci's Political Thought* (Clarendon, Oxford, 1981)
- D.B. Forrester, *Caste and Christianity: Attitudes and Policies on Caste of Anglo-Saxon Protestant Missions in India* (Curzon Press, London, 1979)
- S. Freitag, *Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India* (Oxford University Press 1990)
- C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Culture* (Fontana, London, 1993)
- E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1983)
- R.K. Ghai, *The Shuddhi Movement in India* (Commonwealth Publications, New Delhi, 1990)
- B. Ghose, *Selections from English Periodicals of Nineteenth Century Bengal*, Vol. V (Papyrus, Calcutta, 1980)
- M.S. Golwalkar, *Bunch of Thoughts* (Vikram Prakashan, Bangalore, 1966)
- D.R. Goyal, *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (Radha Krishna Prakashan, New Delhi, 1979)
- B. Graham, *Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: the Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990)
- A. Gramsci (edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971)
- M. Hasan, *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-1930* (Manohar, New Delhi, 1991)
- D. Haynes, *Rhetoric and Ritual in Colonial India: The Shaping of a Public Culture in Surat City, 1852 - 1928* (Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1991)
- C. Heimsath, *Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964)
- E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983)
- R. Inden, *Imagining India* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990)
- C. Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India* (Viking Penguin India, New Delhi 1996)
- M.R. Jambunathan [ed.], *Swami Shraddhanand* (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1961)

- K. W. Jones, *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth Century Punjab* (Manohar, Delhi, 1976)
- K. W. Jones, *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989; series title: New Cambridge History of India, 3.1)
- J. T. F. Jordens, *Dayananda Saraswati: His Life and Ideas* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1978)
- J. T. F. Jordens, *Swami Shraddhananda: His Life and Causes* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1981)
- B. Josh and S. Joshi, *Struggle for Hegemony in India* Vols. I - III (Sage, New Delhi, 1992-4)
- S. Kaviraj, *Unhappy Consciousness: Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay and the formation of nationalist discourse in India* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1995)
- D. Keer, *Mahatma Jotirao Phooley: Father of the Indian Social Revolution* (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1964)
- D. Keer, *Veer Savarkar* (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1988)
- K. Klostermaier, *A Survey of Hinduism* (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989)
- D. Kopf, *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969)
- J.J. Lipner, *Hindus: Their Beliefs and Practices* (Routledge, London, 1994)
- J. Lorrain, *The Concept of Ideology* (BI Publications, New Delhi, 1979)
- P. Lutgendorf, *The Life of a Text: Performing the Ramcaritmanas of Tulsidas* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991)
- K.R. Malkani, *The RSS Story* (Impex India, New Delhi, 1980)
- S. Marks and D. Engels (eds.), *Contesting Colonial Hegemony in Africa and India* (British Academic Press, London, 1994)
- P.J. Marshall (ed.), *The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970)
- J. McLane, *Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977)
- T. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994; series title: The New Cambridge History of India ; 3.4)
- A. Misra, *Grants in Aid of Education in India* (Macmillan, Delhi, 1973)
- D. Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen [eds.], *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, (Routledge, London, 1996)
- R. O'Hanlon, *Caste, Conflict and Ideology: Mahatma Jotirao Phule and Low Caste Protest in Nineteenth Century Western India* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985)

- G. Omvedt, *Dalit Visions: The Anti-Caste Movement and the Construction of an Indian Identity* (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1995)
- G. Pandey, *The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India* (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1990)
- G. Pandey [ed.], *Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today*, Viking Penguin India, New Delhi, 1993)
- K.N. Panikkar [ed.], *Communalism in India* (Manohar, New Delhi, 1991)
- B. Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse* (Sage, New Delhi, 1989)
- B. Parekh, *Gandhi's Political Philosophy: A Critical Evaluation* (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989)
- C.H. Philips (ed.), *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947: Select Documents* (Oxford University Press, London, 1962; Vol. IV of *Select Documents on the History of India and Pakistan* - general editor, C.H. Philips)
- J.W. Pickett, *Christian Mass Movements in India: A Study with Recommendations* (Abingdon Press, Lucknow, 1933)
- I. Prakash (Indraprakash), *Review of the History and Work of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Hindu Sanghatan Movement* (Akhil Bhartiya Hindu Mahasabha, Delhi, 1938)
- I. Prakash (Indraprakash), *Hindu Mahasabha: Its Contribution to India's Politics* (Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha, Delhi 1966)
- Lajpat Rai, *A History of the Arya Samaj* (Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1992)
- P. Robb, *The Government of India and Reform: Policies towards Politics and the Constitution 1916-1921* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976)
- L. & S. Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967)
- S. Sarkar, *Modern India 1885-1947* (Macmillan India, Delhi, 1983)
- A.D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (Duckworth, London, 1971)
- V.A. Sudaram [ed.], *Benaras Hindu University 1905-1935* (Benaras, 1936)
- R. Thapar, *Interpreting Early India* (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993)
- R. Thapar, H. Mukhia & B. Chandra., *Communalism and the writing of Indian history* (People's Publishing House, Delhi, 1969)
- G.R. Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: a Study of Controversy, Conflict and Communal Movements in Northern India 1923-1928* (Brill, Leiden, 1975)
- P. Van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1994)
- S. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1962)

A. Yang [ed.], *Crime and Criminality in British India* (University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1985)

Articles and Chapters of Edited Volumes

- A. Ahmed, "Fascism and National Culture: Reading Gramsci in the Days of Hindutva" (in *Social Scientist* Vol. 21, Nos. 3-4, 1993, pp. 32-68)
- J. Alter, "Somatic Nationalism: Indian Wrestling and Militant Hinduism" (in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 28 No. 3, 1994, pp. 557-88)
- W. Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, I: Early Concerns (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 7 No. 11, 11 March 1972, pp. 589-97)
- W. Anderson, "The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, II: Who Represents the Hindus?" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 7, No. 12, 18 March 1972, pp. 633-640)
- N.G. Barrier, "Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab 1894-1908" (in *Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 26, 1966-7, pp. 363-379)
- C. Bayly, "The Pre-history of 'Communalism'? Religious Conflict in India 1700-1800" (in *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 19 No. 2, 1985, pp. 177-203)
- U. Chakravarty, "What ever happened to the Vedic Dasi? Orientalism, Nationalism and a Script for the Past" (in Sangari and Vaid [eds.], *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*, Kali For Women, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 27-87)
- B. Chandra, "The Long-Term Dynamics of the Indian National Congress - Presidential Address" (*Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 1985)
- B. Cohn, "The Command of Language and the Language of Command" (in Guha [ed.], *Subaltern Studies IV*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1985, pp. 276-329)
- V. Dalmia, "The Only Real Religion of the Hindus': Vaisnava Self-representation in the Late Nineteenth Century" (in V. Dalmia and H. von Stietencron [eds.], *Representing Hinduism: the Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity*, Sage, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 176-210)
- S. Das, "Communal Violence in Twentieth Century Bengal: An Analytical Framework" (in K.N. Panikkar [ed.], *Communalism in India*, Manohar, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 34-50)
- N. Dirks, "The Invention of Caste: Civil Society in Colonial India" (in *Social Analysis* Vol. 25, No. 9, pp. 42-52)
- V. Dua, "The Arya Samaj and Punjab Politics" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 5, Nos. 43-44, 24 October 1970, pp. 1787-1791)

- P.K. Dutta, "'Dying Hindus' - Production of Hindu Communal Common Sense in Early 20th Century Bengal" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 28, No. 25, 19 June 1993, pp. 1305-1319)
- A. Eschmann, "Mahima Dharma: An Autochthonous Hindu Reform Movement" (in Eschmann, Kulke and Tripathi [eds.], *The Cult of Jagannath and the Regional Tradition of Orissa*, Manohar, Delhi, 1978, pp. 375-410)
- T. Fitzgerald, "Hinduism and the World Religions Fallacy" (in *Religion*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1990, pp. 101-118)
- S. Freitag, "Sacred Symbol as Mobilising Agency: The North Indian Search for a 'Hindu' Community" (in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 597-625)
- S. Freitag, "Collective Crime and Authority in North India" (in A. Yang [ed.], *Crime and Criminality in British India*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1985, pp. 140-164)
- R. Frykenberg, "Constructions of Hinduism at the Nexus of History and Religion" (in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, Winter 1993, pp. 523-550)
- W. Fusfield, "Communal Conflict in Delhi: 1803-1930" (in *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1982, pp. 181-200)
- D. Gold, "Organised Hinduisms: From Vedic Truth to Hindu Nation" (in M. Marty and R. Appleby [eds.], *Fundamentalisms Observed*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, pp. 531-593)
- R. Gordon, "The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 1915-1926" (in *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 9, 1975, pp. 145-204)
- B. Graham, "The Congress and Hindu Nationalism" (in D.A. Low [ed.], *Indian National Congress: Centenary Hindsight*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1988, pp. 170-187)
- R. Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India" (in Guha [ed.], *Subaltern Studies I*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982, pp. 1-8)
- R. Guha, "Discipline and Mobilize" (in P. Chatterjee and G. Pandey [eds.], *Subaltern Studies VII*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993, pp. 69-120)
- S. Hall, "The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees" (in D. Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen [eds.], *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 25-46)
- S. Hall, "Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity" (in D. Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen [eds.], *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 411-440)

- C. Jaffrelot, "Hindu Nationalism: Strategic Syncretism in Ideology Building" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 20, Nos. 12-13, 20-27 March 1993, pp. 517-524)
- C. Jaffrelot, "The Genesis and Development of Hindu Nationalism in the Punjab: from the Arya Samaj to the Hindu Sabha 1875-1910" (in *Indo-British Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1993, pp. 3-39)
- C. Jaffrelot, "The BJP in Madhya Pradesh: Networks, Strategies and Power" (in G. Pandey [ed.], *Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today*, Viking Penguin India, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 110-145)
- C. Jaffrelot, "The Idea of the Hindu Race in the Writings of Hindu Nationalist Ideologues in the 1920s and 1930s: A Concept Between Two Cultures" (in P. Robb, *The Concept of Race in South Asia*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1995, pp. 327-354)
- K. Jones, "Communalism in the Punjab: the Arya Samaj Contribution" (in *Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 28, No. 1, 1968, pp. 39-54)
- J.T.F. Jordens, "Reconversion to Hinduism: The Shuddhi of the Arya Samaj" (in G.A. Oddie [ed.], *Religion in South Asia: Religious Conversion and Revival Movements in South Asia in Medieval and Modern Times*, Curzon Press, London, 1977, pp. 145-162)
- S. Kaviraj, "The Imaginary Institution of India" (in *Subaltern Studies VII*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1992, pp. 1-39)
- S. Kaviraj, "On the Construction of Colonial Power: Structure, Discourse, Hegemony" (in Marks and Engels [eds.], *Contesting Colonial Hegemony in Africa and India*, British Academic Press, London, 1994, pp. 19-54)
- S. Kaviraj, "The Reversal of Orientalism: Bhudev Mukhopadhyay and the Project of Indigenist Social Theory" (in Dalmia and von Stietencron, *Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and national Identity*, Sage, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 253-279)
- U. King, "Some Reflections on Sociological Approaches to the Study of Modern Hinduism" (in *Numen: International Review of the History of Religions*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1989, pp. 72-97)
- M. Kishwar, "Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 29, No. 33, 13 August 1994, pp. 2145-2161)
- J.J. Lipner, "On 'Hindutva' and a 'Hindu-Catholic', with a Moral for our Times" (in *Hindu-Christian Studies Bulletin* Vol. 5, 1992, pp. 1-8)
- T.N. Madan, "Secularism in its Place" (in *Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. 46, No. 4, 1987, pp. 747-58)

- L. Mani, "The Production of an Official Discourse on *Sati* in Early 19th Century Bengal" (in *Economic and Political Weekly* , Vol. 21 No. 17, 26 April 1986, pp. 32-40)
- L. Mani, "Contentious Traditions: the Debate on *Sati* in Colonial India" (in K. Sangari and S. Vaid [eds.], *Recasting Women: Essays in Colonial History*, Kali for Women, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 88-126)
- C. Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci" (in Mouffe (ed.), *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, Routledge, London, 1979, pp. 168-204)
- C. Mouffe, "Gramsci Today" (in Mouffe (ed.), *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, Routledge, London, 1979, pp. 1-18)
- A. Nandy, "Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance" (in V. Das [ed.], *Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 69-93)
- R. O'Hanlon, "Recovering the Subject: Subaltern Studies and Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia" (in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 22, 1988, pp. 189-224)
- R. O'Hanlon, "Historical Approaches to Communalism: Perspectives from Western India" (in P. Robb [ed.], *Society and Ideology* , Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 247-266)
- G. Pandey, "In Defence of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Annual Number, March 1991, pp. 559-572)
- G. Pandey, "Which of us are Hindus?" (in G. Pandey [ed.], *Hindus and Others: The Question of Identity in India Today* , Viking Penguin India, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 238-273)
- K.N. Panikkar, "Presidential Address" (in *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 38th, 1975, pp. 365-399)
- K.N. Panikkar, "Peasant Revolts in Malabar in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries" (in A.R. Desai, *Peasant Struggles in India*, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1979, pp. 601-630)
- K.N. Panikkar, "In Defence of 'Old' History" (in *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. 29, No. 40, 1 October 1994, pp. 2595-97)
- K. Prior, "Making History: The State's Intervention in Urban Religious Disputes in the North Western Provinces in the Early Nineteenth Century" (in *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 27, 1993, pp. 179-204)
- M. Radhakrishnan, "The Criminal Tribes Act in Madras Presidency: Implications for Itinerant Trading Communities" (in *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1989, pp. 270-295)

- M. Radhakrishnan, "Surveillance and Settlements under the Criminal Tribes Act in Madras" (in *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, Vol. 29 No. 2, 1992, pp. 171-198)
- T. Raghavan, "Origins and Development of Hindu Mahasabha Ideology: the Call of V.D. Savarkar and Bhai Parmanand" (in *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. 18, No. 15, April 9 1983, pp. 595-600)
- P. Robb, "The Challenge of Gau Mata: British Policy and Religious Change in India, 1880-1916" (in *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1986, pp. 285-319)
- Y. Sikand & M. Katju, "Mass Conversions to Hinduism among Indian Muslims" (in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 29, no. 34, 20 August 1994, pp. 2214-2219)
- R. Thapar, "Syndicated Moksha?" (in *Seminar* No. 313, 1985, pp. 14-22)
- A. Varshney, "Contested Meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism and the Politics of Anxiety" (in *Daedalus* Vol. 122, No. 3, 1993, pp. 227-261)
- A. Yang, "Sacred Symbol and Sacred Space in Rural India: Community Mobilisation in the 'Anti-Cow Killing' Riot of 1893" (in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1980, pp. 576-596)
- A. Yang, "Dangerous Castes and Tribes: the Criminal Tribes Act and the Magahiya Doms of Northeast India" (in Yang [ed.], *Crime and Criminality in British India*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1985, pp. 108-127)
- E. Zelliot, "Gandhi and Ambedkar: A Study in Leadership" (in J.M. Mahar [ed.] *The Untouchables in Contemporary India*, Univ. of Arizona, Tucson, 1972, pp. 69-96)

Unpublished Dissertations, Conference and Seminar Papers

- S. Bayly, "Hindu 'modernisers' and the 'public' arena: indigenous critiques of caste in colonial India" (Seminar Paper, SOAS, London, 1993)
- V. Dalmia, "The Modernity of Tradition: Harischandra of Banaras and the Defence of Hindu Dharma" (Seminar Paper, SOAS, London, 1993)
- A. Eschmann, "Religion, Reaction and Change: the Role of Sects in Hinduism" (Seminar Paper, Kandy, 1973)
- H. Fischer-Tine, "'Kind Elders of the Hindu Biradri': The Arya Samaj's Struggle for Influence and its Effect on Hindu-Muslim Relations 1880-1925" (Conference Paper, Copenhagen, 1996)
- J.R. Graham, "The Arya Samaj as a Reformation in Hinduism with Special Reference to Caste" (PhD Dissertation, Yale, 1942)
- C. Jaffrelot, *The BJP and the 1996 Elections* (Conference Paper, Copenhagen, 1996)

- N. Kumar, "Sanskrit Pandits and the Modernisation of Sanskrit Education in the 19th-20th Centuries" (Seminar Paper, SOAS, London, 1993)
- K. Prior, "The British Administration of Hinduism" (PhD Dissertation, Cambridge, 1990)
- S. Sarkar, "Colonial Times: Clocks and Kaliyuga in Nineteenth Century Bengal" (Seminar paper, SOAS, London, 1996)
- A. Wyatt, "Dalit Christianity and Identity Politics in India", (Conference Paper, Bath, 1997)
- J. Zavos, "Ideology and Hegemonic Struggle in the Early National Movement: Some Case Studies" (M.Phil Dissertation, Jawaharlal Nehru University 1987)